ALCATEL LUCENT

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 10, 2020

2019003220 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 10, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/782,353 10/05/2015 Chandrika K. Worrall LUTZ 202069US01 9402
48116 7590 09/10/2020
FAY SHARPE/NOKIA
1228 Euclid Avenue, 5th Floor
The Halle Building
Cleveland, OH 44115-1843
EXAMINER
HARLEY, JASON A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2468
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/10/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@faysharpe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHANDRIKA K. WORRALL
___________

Appeal 2019-003220
Application 14/782,353
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) the Examiner’s decision
rejecting claims 1, 6, and 8–19. Final Act. 1.2 Claims 2–5 and 7 are
canceled. Appeal Br. 14–15 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the real party-in-interest as Alcatel Lucent. Appeal Br. 1.
2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
November 6, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed March 15, 2019); the
Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed July 20, 2018) and the Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed February 21, 2019); and the Specification (“Spec.,”
filed October 5, 2015). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and
determinations and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to
these documents.
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35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The recited methods, user equipment, and base stations “relate[] to a
method of transmitting an indication of user equipment uplink buffer status
in a wireless communications network in which user equipment is
configured to communicate with one or more base stations using dual
connectivity techniques.” Spec., 1:4–8.
As noted above, claims 1, 6, and 8–19 are pending. Claims 1, 10, 11,
and 14 are independent. Appeal Br. 14 (claim 1), 15 (claim 10),
16 (claim 11), 16–17 (claim 14) (Claims App.).
Claim 1 recites, “[a] method of transmitting an indication of user
equipment uplink buffer status in a wireless communications network in
which said user equipment is configured to communicate with more than one
base station at a given time using dual connectivity techniques in which a
scheduler is provided at each serving base station.” Id. at 14 (emphasis
added). Claim 11 similarly recites “[a] method of receiving an indication of
user equipment uplink buffer status.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Claim 10
recites “[u]ser equipment configured to transmit an indication of user
equipment uplink buffer status in a wireless communications network in
which said user equipment is configured to communicate with more than one
base station at a given time using dual connectivity techniques in which a
scheduler is provided at each serving base station.” Id. at 15 (emphasis
added). Claim 14 similarly recites, “[a] base station configured to receive an
indication of user equipment uplink buffer status in a wireless
communications network in which said user equipment is configured to
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communicate with more than one base station at a given time using dual
connectivity techniques in which a scheduler is provided at each serving
base station.” Id. at 16–17 (emphasis added). Claims 6, 8, 9, 15, and 19
depend directly from claim 1; claims 16–18 depend directly or indirectly
from claim 10; and claims 12 and 13 depend directly from claim 11. Id.
at 14–18.
Claims 1 and 19 are reproduced below with disputed limitations
emphasized; claim 1 is illustrative.
1. A method of transmitting an indication of user
equipment uplink buffer status in a wireless communications
network in which said user equipment is configured to
communicate with more than one base station at a given time
using dual connectivity techniques in which a scheduler is
provided at each serving base station, said method comprising:
receiving an indication of a dual connectivity
configuration to be used by said user equipment for uplink
transmission; and
structuring an uplink buffer status reporting in which
uplink buffer status is grouped for one or more schedulers to be
used for said user equipment according to said received
indication of a dual connectivity configuration;
wherein structuring said uplink buffer status reporting
comprises constructing an independent uplink buffer status
report for each scheduler to be used for said user equipment;
wherein the method further comprises transmitting said
independent uplink buffer status reports to one or more of said
base stations using resources granted by said more than one base
station; and
wherein the resource used to transmit each said
independent uplink buffer status report implicitly indicates which
scheduler each said independent uplink buffer status report is
intended for.
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
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19. The method according to claim 1, wherein the buffer status
report is formatted according to a cell order.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added)
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following references:
Name3 Reference Publ’d Filed
Heo US 2011/0268045 A1 Nov. 3, 2011 Apr. 30, 2010
Stern-
Berkowitz
US 2013/0176953 A1 July 11, 2013 Aug. 10, 2012
Qu US 2014/0029584 A1 Jan. 30, 2014 July 26, 2013
Kuo US 2014/0293896 A1 Oct. 2, 2014 Mar. 25, 2014
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 6, 8–14, 16, and 19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz.
Final Act. 4–14. The Examiner also rejects claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as obvious over the combined teachings of Kuo, Stern-Berkowitz, and Qu
(id. at 14–15) and claims 17 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
the combined teachings of Kuo, Stern-Berkowitz, and Heo (id. at 16–17).
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the contentions and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). The Examiner and Appellant focus their findings and
contentions on claims 1 and 19; so do we. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 10–11.
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Unless
otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office

3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
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Action and the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact
for emphasis. We address the rejections below.4
ANALYSIS
A. Obviousness Over Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz
1. Claim 1
As noted above, the Examiner rejects claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as obvious over the combined teachings of Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz. Final
Act. 4–7. In particular, the Examiner finds that Kuo teaches or suggests the
majority of the limitations of independent claim 1. Id. at 4–6. The
Examiner finds, however, that Kuo does not teach or suggest “the resource
used to transmit each said independent uplink buffer status report implicitly
indicates which scheduler each said independent uplink buffer status report
is intended for.” Id. at 6. Nevertheless, the Examiner finds that Stern-
Berkowitz teaches or suggests this limitation and that a person of ordinary
skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine Kuo’s teachings
with those of Stern-Berkowitz to achieve the method recited in claim 1. Id.
at 6–7 (citing Stern-Berkowitz ¶¶ 122, 130).

4 The Examiner interprets certain limitations of claims 10 and 14 as means-
plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 7–
8. Although Appellant disagrees with this interpretation (Appeal Br. 11–12;
Reply Br. 8), the only rejection that Appellant substantively challenges
relates to claims 1 and 19, which do not recite these limitations, and
Appellant does not contend that the interpretation of these limitations is
relevant to its challenges to the obviousness rejection of claim 1 or 19.
Therefore, we do not address the interpretation of those limitations in this
appeal.
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In particular, Stern-Berkowitz discloses:
In certain scenarios, for example as depicted in FIG. 7, a
[wireless transmit/receive unit (WTRU)] 702 may transmit a
[Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH)] or [Physical
Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH)] on one set of [Uplink (UL)]
resources intended for reception by, or which may be received
by, multiple [evolved node-Bs (eNBs)] or schedulers. [Timing
advance (TA)] needed for reception, or the TA that would be
determined, by one eNB or scheduler may be different from that
for a different eNB or scheduler, yet only one timing advance
value may be physically applied to the one transmission. The
present disclosure provides systems and methods for the WTRU
to determine how much TA to apply to an UL transmission
intended for reception by, or which may be received by, multiple
eNBs, cells of multiple eNBs or multiple schedulers, to satisfy the
UL timing requirements of the multiple eNBs, the cells of
multiple eNBs, or the multiple schedulers.
Stern-Berkowitz ¶ 122 (emphasis added); see id. ¶¶ 82 (“eNB as used in this
disclosure, may mean, may include, or may be replaced by a scheduler, such
as an independent scheduler, or multiple schedulers and still be consistent
with this disclosure.”), 83 (“Further, eNB as used in this disclosure may
mean, may include, or may be replaced by a cell, a set of cells, multiple sets
of cells, a site, a beam, or a set of beams and still be consistent with this
disclosure.”). Further, Stern-Berkowitz discloses:
The scenario may be that the WTRU may transmit PUCCH or
PUSCH on the resources of a specific cell and that PUCCH or
PUSCH may be intended for reception by, or may be received
by, one or more eNBs, cells, or schedulers, for example, as
depicted in FIG 7, which may include that cell or the eNB
managing it and one or more other eNBs or schedulers.
Id. ¶ 130 (emphasis added). Thus, the Examiner finds Stern-Berkowitz
teaches or suggests that a UL resource transmits the independent uplink
buffer status report (BSR), as is taught by Kuo, and implicitly indicates, such
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as by the transmission channel, for which scheduler the uplink BSR is
intended. Final Act. 7; see Ans. 5–6.
Appellant contends the Examiner errs for two reasons. For the
reasons given below, we are not persuaded by either of Appellant’s reasons.
First, Appellant contends that, unlike the claimed methods, Stern-
Berkowitz seeks “to solv[e] the particular problem of the situation of when a
WTRU would exceed its maximum configured output power.” Appeal
Br. 8–9 (citing Stern-Berkowitz ¶ 120). Thus, Appellant contends
“including a ‘unique identifier’ in a [power headroom report (PHR)] (as in
Stern[-Berkowitz]) does not fairly suggest that the resource used to transmit
each independent uplink buffer status report implicitly indicates which
scheduler each said independent uplink buffer status report is intended for
(as in claim 1).” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). Appellant asserts that including
a “unique identifier” in a PHR does not teach or suggest, “the resource used
to transmit each said independent uplink buffer status report implicitly
indicates which scheduler each said independent uplink buffer status report
is intended for.” Reply Br. 4–5.
Initially, the Examiner finds, “[i]n regards to the claim limitation[,]
the term ‘implicit indication’ is not well define[d] in the applicant’s claim
and therefore is considered implicit indication.” Ans. 4. The Specification
explains, “an indication of serving cell identity is explicitly or implicitly
included in a [Media Access Control Control Elements (MAC CE)].” Spec.,
5:8–9. In particular, the Specification explains,
An indication of the identity of the intended scheduler (cell) is
also included in the buffer status report MAC CE as a cell ID
index. In an alternative embodiment, an indication of a cell ID
is implicitly indicated via the [logic channel identification
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(LCID)] included in the [Media Access Control Protocol Data
Unit (MAC PDU)] sub-header. Such embodiments require
transmission of a buffer status report MAC CE per serving cell.
Id. at 4:32–35. Thus, the scheduler may be expressly identified in the BSR
of MAC CE or it can be implicitly identified by its LCID in the MAC PDU
sub-header.
As noted above, the Examiner finds Kuo teaches or suggests,
“transmitting said independent uplink buffer status reports to one or more of
said base stations using resources granted by said more than one base
station.” Final Act. 5–6 (citing Kuo ¶¶ 46, 47, 164). Thus, the Examiner
relies on Kuo, not Stern-Berkowitz, to teach or suggest the uplinking BSRs
by UL resources. Further, Kuo discloses the use of LCIDs of MAC CE to
direct BSRs. Kuo ¶¶ 91, 92; see id. ¶ 152.
The Examiner finds:
In Stern[-Berkowitz] paragraphs 0370, 0377, 0380, “The
WTRU may report include in a PHR at least one of an indication
of the applicable eNB, scheduler, or configured set of cells, for
each CC or cell or each group of [component carriers (CCs)] or
cells or for the report itself. The WTRU may know which CCs
or cells are assigned to a given eNB or scheduler by a configured
set of CCs or cells that correspond to a particular eNB or
scheduler.[”]
Ans. 5. Further, Stern-Berkowitz explains, “[t]his indication may be a
unique identifier associated with the particular set of configured CCs or
cells.” Stern-Berkowitz ¶ 371 (emphasis added); see Appeal Br. 9.
As Stern-Berkowitz explains, however, TA commands and PHRs may
be signaled via MAC CE. Stern-Berkowitz ¶¶ 100, 101, 385. Similar to a
BSR, TA commands may take into account transmission delays. Final
Act. 17–18; see Stern-Berkowitz ¶¶ 99–100.
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Further, Stern-Berkowitz explains:
An eNB may signal, and a WTRU may receive, separate TA
commands for PUCCH, in addition to other TA commands,
which may still apply to PUSCH and [Sounding Reference
Signal (SRS)]. This may be done by using the R field in the MAC
CE to indicate a PUCCH TA command, or by using a unique
LCID to identify a separately signaled PUCCH TA command.
Id. ¶ 357; see id. ¶ 356.
A person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have understood
that a MAC CE may contain both a BSR and a PHR and, as described in
Stern-Berkowitz, may use an LCID to indicate implicitly the scheduler, for
which the buffer status report is intended. See Heo ¶ 22 (“For example, Rel-
8 MAC control elements may include a Cell Radio Network Temporary
Identifier (C-RNTI) MAC CE, a Buffer Status Report (BSR) MAC CE, and a
Power Headroom Report (PHR) MAC CE.” (emphases added)).5
Consequently, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding Kuo and
Stern-Berkowitz teach or suggest the resource transmits the buffer status
report with an implicit indication of the scheduler. Ans. 5 (“The office
action shows that the prior art Kuo shows a Buffer Status Report in
paragraph 0142. Stern is brought in to show the resource used to transmit
each buffer status report.”); see Final Act. 7.
Second, Appellant contends Stern-Berkowitz does not teach or
suggest, “the resources themselves would be used as an indication of a

5 The cited prior art is representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art.
See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise
to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and
a need for testimony is not shown’”; quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v.
Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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specific scheduler that the transmission is intended for.” Appeal Br. 9–10.
This argument is unpersuasive because Stern-Berkowitz teaches or suggests
that the UL resource may identify the scheduler for which the transmission
is intended by other means.
For example,
As another example, the report may indicate, possibly with a bit,
whether or not the power was based on the power needed for the
cell on which the PUCCH was transmitted or for another eNB.
For example, if the PUCCH is transmitted on the resources of the
PCell, there may be an indication, possibly a bit, indicating
whether the power was driven by the requirements for the PCell
or the requirements to reach another eNB. The WTRU may
report, possibly as part of the PHR, for which eNBs or cells the
PUCCH was intended when computing the PH.
Stern-Berkowitz ¶ 383; see id. ¶¶ 382, 384 (describing other indications).
Consequently, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding
Stern-Berkowitz teaches that the resource itself, e.g., the WTRU, transmits
an implicit identification of the intended scheduler. Final Act. 7. To the
extent Appellant is arguing that the scheduler must be indicated by the
identity of the resource itself, rather than by data transmitted by the resource,
the Specification indicates that the claims should not be construed so
narrowly. Spec. 4:32–35 (“An indication of the identity of the intended
scheduler (cell) . . . is implicity indicated via the LCID included in the MAC
PDU sub-header”).
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding that claim 1, as
well as claims 10, 11, and 14, are obvious over the combined teachings of
Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz. See Appeal Br. 10. Further, with the exception
of claim 19, Appellant does not challenge the rejection of the dependent
claims separately, and, on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner
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errs in finding that claims 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, and 16 are obvious over the
combined teachings of Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz. See id. Consequently, we
sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 1, 6, 8–14, and 16.
2. Claim 19
As noted above, the Examiner also rejects claim 19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over the combined teachings of Kuo and Stern-
Berkowitz. Final Act. 14. Claim 19 recites, in the method of claim 1, “the
buffer status report is formatted according to a cell order.” Appeal Br. 18
(Claims App.). The Examiner acknowledges that Kuo does not teach or
suggest this limitation, but finds Stern-Berkowitz teaches or suggests this
limitation and a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to
combine the teachings of Kuo with those of Stern-Berkowitz to achieve the
method as recited in claim 19. Final Act. 14 (citing Stern-Berkowitz ¶¶ 79,
80).
In particular, Stern-Berkowitz discloses “a WTRU may be configured
such that it is aware of which cells, serving cells, or CCs belong to a certain
eNB or scheduler.” Stern-Berkowitz ¶ 80. Thus, the Examiner finds that
Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz teach or suggest a WTRU “may establish
communication with a first set of cells and a second set of cells.” Final
Act. 14 (emphasis added). In the Answer, the Examiner further finds that
Kuo teaches a long and a short BSR format and that these formats can be
associated with various logic channel group identifications (LCG IDs).
Ans. 6 (citing Kuo ¶¶ 89–93). From this, the Examiner finds that the
references teach or suggest formatting a BSR “according to a cell order.”
Appellant disagrees and contends that being “aware of which cells,
serving cells of CCs belong to a certain eNB or scheduler” does not teach or
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suggest, “the buffer status report is formatted according to a cell order.”
Appeal Br. 11 (emphasis added). We are not persuaded that the Examiner
shows a causal link between the report format and the cell order, as recited
in claim 19. See Spec., 5:4–12. Although Kuo teaches that different BSR
formats can be applied to different LCGs, this does not teach or suggest
formatting the BSR “according to the cell order.” Reply Br. 7–8.
We are persuaded the Examiner errs in finding that the claim 19 is
obvious over the combined teachings of Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz.
Consequently, we do not sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 19.
B. Obviousness Over Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz With Qu or Heo
As noted above, the Examiner also rejects claim 15 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Kuo, Stern-Berkowitz, and
Qu (Final Act. 14–15) and claim 17 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over the combined teachings of Kuo, Stern-Berkowitz, and Heo (id.
at 16–17). Appellant does not argue these dependent claims separately, and,
instead, relies solely on its challenges to the rejection of their base claims,
claims 1 and 10, to show Examiner error in these rejections. See Appeal
Br. 10. On this record and for the reasons give above, we are not persuaded
the Examiner errs in finding that claims 1 and 10 are obvious over the
combined teachings of Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz. Consequently, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 15, 17, and 18, and we
sustain the obviousness rejections thereof.
DECISION
1. The Examiner does not err in rejecting:
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a. claims 1, 6, 8–14, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as obvious over
the combined teachings of Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz;
b. claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Kuo, Stern-Berkowitz, and Qu; and
c. claims 17 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Kuo, Stern-Berkowitz, and Heo.
2. The Examiner errs in rejecting claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as
obvious over the combined teachings of Kuo and Stern-Berkowitz.
3. Thus, on this record, claims 1, 6, and 8–18 are not patentable, but
claim 19 is not unpatentable.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 6, and 8–18, but
reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Basis/Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed
1, 6, 8–14,
16, 19
103 Kuo, Stern-Berkowitz 1, 6, 8–14,
16
19
15 103 Kuo, Stern-Berkowitz,
Qu
15
17, 18 103 Kuo, Stern-Berkowitz,
Heo
17, 18
Overall
Outcome
1, 6, 8–18 19
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART