Albert D'Alisa et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 16, 2020

14957062 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/957,062 12/02/2015 Albert D'Alisa CAME-0005 2252
79999 7590 04/16/2020
Keohane & D'Alessandro
1881 Western Avenue
Suite 180
Albany, NY 12203
EXAMINER
CHOO, JOHANN Y
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Docket@kdiplaw.com
drubbone@kdiplaw.com
lcronk@kdiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ALBERT D’ALISA, SCOTT W. FREY,
FRANK S. GIACCIO, GREG HINES, and FRANK SHERMAN
____________

Appeal 2019-006508
Application 14/957,062
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before DONALD E. ADAMS, RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, and
FRANCISCO C. PRATS, Administrative Patent Judges.

ADAMS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12–18, and 20–26 (Final Act.2 2). We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “the named
inventors,” Albert D’Alisa, Scott W. Frey, Frank S. Giaccio, Greg Hines,
and Frank Sherman (Appellant’s March 29, 2019 Appeal Brief (Appeal Br.)
1).
2 Examiner’s October 30, 2018 Final Office Action.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s disclosure “relates generally to online payment
processing” (Spec. ¶ 1). Claims 1 and 24 are reproduced below:
1. A computer-implemented method for processing a payment
in an electronic commerce environment, the method
comprising:
[a] providing a universal payment interface to a customer
of a first merchant website associated with a first merchant in
the electronic commerce environment in response to a request
to pay by the customer, the universal payment interface being a
third-party interface on a separate server from the first merchant
website;
[b] downloading from the universal payment interface a
retrieval request for a proprietary token to a client computer
being used by the customer to access the first merchant website;
[c] initiating, in response to a receipt of the retrieval
request at the client computer, a transfer of a proprietary token
stored on a mobile device of the customer from the mobile
device to the client computer, wherein the client computer and
the mobile device are each operated separately from the
separate server;
[d] retrieving the proprietary token from the client
computer of the customer electronically over a network by the
universal payment interface, the proprietary token being a
mobile device-based token that is proprietary to the mobile
device and provided to the mobile device by a provider of the
mobile device prior to the request to pay, the provider being at
least one of a manufacturer of a hardware of the mobile device
or a developer of an operating system of the mobile device and
being independent of the first merchant and the universal
payment interface;
[e] requesting, by the universal payment interface in
response to the retrieving of the proprietary token, a
determination from the provider as to whether the proprietary
token is valid;
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and
[f] verifying the payment based on the determination
from the provider.
(Appeal Br. 19–20 (annotated to label each step of the claim for reference).)
24. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
providing the universal payment interface to a second
customer of a second merchant website associated with a
second merchant that is not affiliated with the first merchant in
the electronic commerce environment in response to a request
to pay by the second customer, the second merchant being
independent of the provider and the universal payment
interface;
retrieving a second proprietary token from the second
customer electronically over the network by the universal
payment interface;
requesting, by the universal payment interface in
response to the retrieving of the second proprietary token, a
determination from the provider as to whether the second
proprietary token is valid; and
verifying a second payment based on the determination
from the provider.
(Id. at 25–26.)
Appellant’s independent claim 9 is drawn to a computer system
comprising, inter alia, a processor for executing program instructions that
cause the system to perform the method of Appellant’s claim 1 (id. at 21–
22). Claim 17, Appellant’s remaining independent claim, is drawn to a
computer readable storage device comprising program instructions stored
thereon, which when executed, cause a computer device to perform the
method of Appellant’s claim 1 (id. at 23–24).

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Grounds of rejection before this Panel for review:
Claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12–18, and 20–26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
Claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12–18, and 20–26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b).
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 10, 12–15, 17, 18, 20–22, and 24–26 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of
Hammad,3 Woo,4 Kassemi,5 and APA.6
Claims 8, 16, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Hammad, Woo, Kassemi, APA, and
Dayalan.7

Subject Matter Eligibility:
ISSUE
Does the preponderance of evidence of record support Examiner’s
finding that Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter?
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.

3 Hammad, US 2010/0327054 A1, published Dec. 30, 2010.
4 Woo, US 2005/0108104 A1, published May 19, 2005.
5 Kassemi et al., US 2014/0297537 A1, published Oct. 2, 2014.
6 Appellant’s Admitted Prior Art as asserted by Examiner (see, e.g., Final
Act. 9–10)
7 Dayalan, US 2013/0290189 A1, published Oct. 31, 2013.
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However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
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In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
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Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Guidance”).8 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October
2019 Update at 1.
Under the Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).9
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:

8 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
9 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
ANALYSIS
(Step 1)
We first consider whether the claimed subject matter falls within the
four statutory categories set forth in § 101, namely “[p]rocess, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54;
see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Examiner finds that Appellant’s claims 1, 2, 4–8, and
24 are directed to a process, claims 9, 11–16, and 25 are directed to a
system, and claims 17, 18, and 20–26 are directed to a product, i.e. computer
readable medium and, thus, squarely fall within the statutory categories set
forth in § 101. Therefore, we proceed to the next steps of the analysis.
(Step 2A, Prong 1)
In the first prong of Step 2A, the Guidance instructs us next to
determine whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the
claim. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. In this regard, the Guidance identifies three
judicially-excepted groupings identified by the courts as abstract ideas: (1)
mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human behavior,
and (3) mental processes. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54.
On this record, Examiner finds that steps a–f of Appellant’s claim 1
are directed to the management of transaction data and the
processing/authentication of information, used in a commercial transaction,
i.e., a sales activity, which falls into the Guidance’s judicially-excepted
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group of certain methods of organizing human behavior, such as commercial
or legal interactions including sales activities (see Ans. 3; see also Final Act.
4; Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52).
(Step 2A, Prong 2)
Having determined that Appellant’s claim recites a judicial exception,
the Guidance requires an evaluation as to whether the claim as a whole
integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the
exception. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
On this record, Examiner finds that Appellant’s claim 1 does not
integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application (see
generally Final Act. 5–6). According to Examiner, Appellant’s “‘practical
application’ is merely utilizing a token in a transaction performed with a
payment page, cards, mobile devices, etc.” and, therefore, the judicial
exception recited in Appellant’s claim 1 “is not integrated into a practical
application but is instead merely being automated with the use of generic
computing devices/interfaces, e.g. portals, mobile devices, payment cards,
etc.” (Ans. 3–4). We are not persuaded.
Appellant discloses that the “proprietary token . . . is a package that
includes payment information (e.g., credit card information) of a user . . . of
[the] mobile device,” wherein the “information is encrypted within [the]
proprietary token” (Spec. ¶ 41). As Appellant discloses “[t]his allows the
proprietary token . . . to be extremely secure, as the credit card information
belonging to the user . . . is never transmitted in clear text or found in clear
text on the mobile device” (id.). Stated differently, on this record, the
abstract idea, recited in Appellant’s claims, provides a secure means of
processing a payment in an electronic commerce environment that uses a
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mobile device, which is a practical application of the judicial exception (see
Appeal Br. 10 (Appellant contends “to the extent, if any, that one or more
portions of the claimed invention may include a judicial exception, the
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application”)). This
concludes the eligibility analysis on this record. See Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 51.
CONCLUSION
The preponderance of evidence of record fails to support Examiner’s
finding that Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to patent ineligible
subject matter. The rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12–18, and 20–26 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is reversed.

Definiteness:
Does the preponderance of evidence support Examiner’s conclusion
that the (a) term “proprietary token,” as set forth in Appellant’s claims 1, 9,
and 17 and (b) phrase “second merchant that is not affiliated with the first
merchant,” as set forth in Appellant’s claims 24–26, are indefinite?
ANALYSIS
(a)
Examiner finds that Appellant identifies Apple Pay®, Samsung Pay®,
and Google Wallet® as examples of a proprietary token (see Ans. 5; cf. Spec.
¶ 40 (Appellant discloses that examples of a proprietary token “include, but
are not limited to, an Apple Pay® token . . ., a Samsung Pay® token . . ., a
Google Wallet® token . . . and/or the like”)). According to Examiner, Apple
Pay®, Samsung Pay®, and Google Wallet® “are all tokens proprietary to the
token generating entity, and not to individual users” (Ans. 5). Thus,
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Examiner finds that it is unclear what makes a token proprietary in the
context of Appellant’s claimed invention (Final Act. 6; see also Ans. 5). We
are not persuaded.
Each of Appellant’s independent claims requires, inter alia, a
“proprietary token being a mobile device-based token that is proprietary to
the mobile device and provided to the mobile device by a provider of the
mobile device prior to the request to pay” (Appeal Br. 19; see also id. at 21
and 24). Stated differently, the provider, i.e. the token generating entity,
provides an individual user’s mobile device with a unique, i.e. proprietary,
token prior to a request to pay (see, e.g., Spec. ¶ 40 (Appellant discloses that
a “proprietary token . . . is typically tied to [the] mobile device . . . such that
[the] proprietary token . . . has, to date, only been used in conjunction with
mobile device.”); see also Appeal Br. 13–14).
Thus, we find that a person of ordinary skill in this art, reading
Appellant’s claim in light of Appellant’s Specification, would understand
the metes and bounds of the term “proprietary token.” See Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Claims
are in compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), if “the claims, read in light of the
specification, reasonably apprise those skilled in the art and are as precise as
the subject matter permits.”).
(b)
Appellant’s claims 24–26 depend from and further limit Appellant’s
claims 1, 9, and 17, respectively, to require, inter alia, that the “second
merchant,” recited in Appellant’s claims, “is not affiliated with a first
merchant” (see Appeal Br. 25–26). Examiner finds that, because Appellant
“fails to provide any description as to what would be considered as
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affiliated,” the scope of the term “affiliated” is unclear as used in
Appellant’s claimed invention (see Ans. 5–6 (emphasis omitted); see also
Final Act. 6–7). We are not persuaded.
To the contrary, on this record, we find that Appellant has the better
position. In this regard, we agree with Appellant’s contention that a second
merchant that is not associated to a first merchant refers to two different and
distinct merchants (see Appeal Br. 14–15). See In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (In applying a broadest reasonable
interpretation, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary
meaning, as would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art
in the context of the entire disclosure.).
CONCLUSION
The preponderance of evidence fails to support Examiner’s conclusion
that the (a) term “proprietary token,” as set forth in Appellant’s claims 1, 9,
and 17 and (b) phrase “second merchant that is not affiliated with the first
merchant,” as set forth in Appellant’s claims 24–26, are indefinite. The
rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12–18, and 20–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) is
reversed.

Obviousness:
Does the preponderance of evidence relied upon by Examiner support
a conclusion of obviousness?
ANALYSIS
The combination of Hammad, Woo, Kassemi, and APA:
Examiner finds that the combination of Hammad, Woo, and Kassemi
makes obvious the subject matter of Appellant’s claim 1, but for
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a token that is proprietary to the mobile device and provided to
the mobile device by a provider of the mobile device prior to
the request to pay, the provider being at least one of a
manufacturer of a hardware of the mobile device or a developer
of an operating system of the mobile device and being
independent of the first merchant and the universal payment
interface.
(Final Act. 9 (emphasis omitted).) Examiner, however, relies on APA to
make up for this deficiency (see id.). In this regard, Examiner finds that
Appellant discloses, i.e. admits, that the proprietary token may be an Apple
Pay® token, Samsung Pay® token, and Google Wallet® token (see id.; see
also Spec. ¶ 40 (Appellant discloses that examples of a proprietary token
include an Apple Pay® token, Samsung Pay® token, and Google Wallet®
token); Appeal Br. 20 (Appellant’s claim 7 depends from and further limits
the method of Appellant’s claim 1 to require that “the propriet[ar]y token is
at least one of an Apple Pay token, a Samsung Pay token, or a Google
Wallet token”)).
Examiner asserts that “Apple pay inherently involves receiving a
token from Apple when request[ed] to perform a transaction with the
selected card” (Final Act. 9). To support this assertion, Examiner directs
attention to Apple Press Release10 (see Final Act. 3; see also id. at 13
(Examiner relies upon Apple Press Release as rebuttal evidence); Ans. 6).
Apple Press Release discloses that “on Monday, October 20, [2014,] when
Apple PayTM becomes available in the US, Apple Pay offers an easy, secure
and private way to pay using Touch IDTM on iPhone®6 and iPhone 6

10 Press Release, Apple Pay Set to Transform Mobile Payments Starting
October 20, https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2014/10/16Apple-Pay-Set-
to-Transform-Mobile-Payments-Starting-October-20/, 1–4 (October 16,
2014).
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Plus . . . within apps” and “[u]sers of the just-announced iPad AirTM 2 and
iPad miniTM 3 will be able to use Touch ID on their devices for Apple Pay
within apps. The new service will be enabled by a free software update to
iOS 8” (Apple Press Release 1; see id. at 2 (“For online shopping within
apps, Apple Pay is available on iPhone 6, iPhone 6 Plus, iPad Air 2 and iPad
mini 3”)).
Therefore, Examiner reasons that although Appellant’s disclosure, i.e.
admitted prior art,
does not explicitly disclose the exact language of a token that is
proprietary to the mobile device and provided to the mobile
device by a provider of the mobile device prior to the request to
pay, the provider being at least one of a manufacturer of a
hardware of the mobile device or a developer of an operating
system of the mobile device and being independent of the first
merchant and the universal payment interface, the description
of a token that is proprietary to the mobile device and provided
to the device by a developer or manufacturer is certainly within
the realm of obviousness to one of ordinary skill in the art.
(Id. at 9–10.)
Thus, based on the combination of Hammad, Woo, Kassemi, and
APA, Examiner concludes that, at the time Appellant’s invention was made,
it would have been prima facie obvious
to combine the teachings of having a provider generate the
token and provide it to the user as disclosed by APA, to the
teachings of using tokens for transactions and being provided
tokens before a request to pay as disclosed by the combination
of Hammad and Woo in order to ensure that only tokens
designated by the payment provider are utilized in the
transaction and for the payment provider to have more control
on how the token is formatted in order to increase security.
(Final Act. 10.) We find no error in Examiner’s prima facie case of
obviousness.
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For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
contention that although Examiner took Official Notice “that ‘. . . the use of
Apple pay, Samsung Pay, and Google Wallet is old and well known in the
art at the time of applicant’s invention’,”
Examiner never indicates that the “old and well known” nature
of these more generic limitations (e.g., proprietary tokens)
includes, inter alia, their use by transferring them from a
mobile device to a client computer (not e.g., a dedicated
terminal in a brick and mortar store) and/or transferring them
from the client computer to a universal payment interface (not
directly to the processing location). This is because no
proprietary token could be used in this way prior to the filing of
the instant patent application.
(Appeal Br. 16.) Notwithstanding Appellant’s contention to the contrary,
the evidence on this record establishes that Apple Pay® is a proprietary token
within the scope of Appellant’s claimed invention and was available for use
within computer applications as of October 20, 2014, which is prior to the
earliest date to which Appellant claims benefit.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
contention that “Examiner has not supported its allegations with references
that teach the elements of the claimed invention, the rejection is flawed” (id.
at 17).
Appellant discloses that Apple Pay® is an example of a proprietary
token within the scope of its invention (see Spec. ¶ 40). Therefore, we are
not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that it has not made any admissions
with respect to the independent claims” (Appeal Br. 16–17).
Although a user’s “actual [credit] card number is kept private and not
shared with the online merchant,” Apple Press Release discloses that
“[o]nline shopping within apps allows users to pay for physical goods and
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services including apparel, electronics, health and beauty products, tickets
and more” (Apple Press Release 2; cf. Spec. ¶ 41 (Appellant discloses that
the “proprietary token . . . is a package that includes payment information
(e.g., credit card information) of a user . . . of [the] mobile device)). There is
no persuasive evidence on this record to support a finding that the evidence
and reasoning relied upon by Examiner relates to the encryption and transfer
of generic login information, rather than a proprietary token, from a mobile
device to a client computer (see Appeal Br. 17; see Ans. 6 (“Appellant
provides no explanation as to why . . . [Apple Press Release] is not evidence
enough that such tokens were indeed able to be used in online transactions
and therefore . . . [supports a conclusion that] the combination of references
along with APA was correct”)). Therefore, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s contentions regarding “generic login information” (see Appeal
Br. 17).

The combination of Hammad, Woo, Kassemi, APA, and Dayalan:
Examiner finds that the combination of Hammad, Woo, Kassemi, and
APA “does not specifically disclose providing a code that is uniquely
associated with a transaction in the electronic commerce environment to the
customer via a voice-based telephonic connection” and relies on Dayalan to
make up for this deficiency (Final Act. 13). Therefore, based on the
combination of Hammad, Woo, Kassemi, APA, and Dayalan, Examiner
concludes that, at the time Appellant’s invention was made, it would have
been prima facie obvious
to combine the teachings of providing and receiving of tokens
in a voice-based telephonic connection as disclosed by Dayalan
to the teachings of using tokens in transactions as disclosed by
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Hammad in order to ensure that the correct user and only the
correct user is being provided the token and increase security.
(Id.) We find no error in Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness.
Having found no deficiency in Examiner’s combination of Hammad,
Woo, Kassemi, and APA, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention
that “Dayalan fails to cure” Appellant’s asserted deficiency in the
combination of Hammad, Woo, Kassemi, and APA (Appeal Br. 17–18).
CONCLUSION
The preponderance of evidence relied upon by Examiner supports a
conclusion of obviousness.
The rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over the combination of Hammad, Woo, Kassemi, and APA is affirmed.
Claims 2, 4–7, 9, 10, 12–15, 17, 18, 20–22, and 24–26 are not separately
argued and fall with claim 1.
The rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over the combination of Hammad, Woo, Kassemi, APA, and Dayalan is
affirmed. Claims 16 and 23 are not separately argued and fall with claim 8.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–10,
12–18, 20–
26
101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4–10,
12–18,
20–26
1, 2, 4–10,
12–18, 20–
26
112(b) Indefiniteness 1, 2, 4–10,
12–18,
20–26
1, 2, 4–7, 9,
10, 12–15,
17, 18, 20–
22, 24–26
103 Hammad, Woo,
Kassemi, APA
1, 2, 4–7,
9, 10, 12–
15, 17, 18,
20–22,
24–26

8, 16, 23 103 Hammad, Woo,
Kassemi, APA,
Dayalan
8, 16, 23
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 4–10,
12–18,
20–26

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED