AirWatch LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 12, 2021

2020006024 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 12, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/203,836 03/11/2014 William DeWeese W030.02 (500103-1280) 8029
152577 7590 07/12/2021
Thomas | Horstemeyer, LLP (VMW)
3200 Windy Hill Road, SE
Suite 1600E
Atlanta, GA 30339
EXAMINER
CALDERON IV, ALVARO R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2173
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/12/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@thomashorstemeyer.com
ipadmin@vmware.com
uspatents@thomashorstemeyer.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte WILLIAM DEWEESE, JONATHAN BLAKE BRANNON, and
ERICH STUNTEBECK
Appeal 2020-006024
Application 14/203,836
Technology Center 2100
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.

DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 seeks review of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–6 and 10–23. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 This Decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the original
Specification, filed March 11, 2014, which claims the benefit of a
provisional application; “Final Act.” for the Final Office Action, mailed
December 26, 2019; “Appeal Br.” for Appellant’s Appeal Brief, filed June 1,
2020; “Ans.” for Examiner’s Answer, mailed June 25, 2020; and “Reply
Br.” for Appellant’s Reply Brief, filed August 21, 2020.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is
AirWatch, LLC, a subsidiary of VMware, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 14/203,836

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BACKGROUND
Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to
managing multiple separate entities or personas on an individual user device.
Spec. ¶¶ 3–8; Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A system, comprising:
a client device comprising at least one hardware processor and
memory; and
program instructions stored in the memory and executable by
the at least one hardware processor that, when executed, cause
the client device to:
virtually separate the at least one hardware processor, the
memory, and access to at least one battery of the client
device into a first virtual segment for a first user persona
and a second virtual segment for a second user persona,
the first user persona being different from the second user
persona;
communicate with a remote computing device over a
network to enroll the first user persona with a
management service that configures the first user persona
of the client device for secure access to at least one
enterprise resource, the management service executing in
the remote computing device and acting as an
intermediary between the first user persona and the
second user persona;
receive, by a persona management module in a
hypervisor of the client device, data from the
management service and deliver the data to one of the
first user persona or the second user persona;
receive, by the persona management module, a first
compliance rule and a second compliance rule from the
management service;
implement, by the persona management module, the first
compliance rule in a first environment associated with
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the first user persona that utilizes the first virtual segment
and the second compliance rule in a second environment
associated with the second user persona that utilizes the
second virtual segment, wherein the first environment is
not capable of accessing data stored in the second virtual
segment and the second environment is not capable of
accessing data stored in the first virtual segment;
detect an attempt to toggle between the first environment
associated with the first user persona and the second
environment associated with the second user persona;
in response to the attempt to toggle between the first
environment and the second environment being detected:
identify that the first user persona is enrolled with
the management service; and
in response to the first user persona being
identified as enrolled with the management
service, determine, from a device profile generated
for the first environment, that a state of the first
environment is in compliance with the first
compliance rule;
in response to the state of the first environment being in
compliance with the first compliance rule, receive an
authorization from the management service that indicates
that the attempt to toggle between the first environment
and the second environment is authorized; and
provide the at least one enterprise resource received from
the management service in the first environment
associated with the first user persona.
Appeal Br. 23–24 (Claims App.) (emphasis added to disputed limitations).
REJECTIONS
R1. Claims 21–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
indefinite. Final Act. 2–3.
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Application 14/203,836

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R2. Claims 1–4, 10–15, and 17–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over Rjeili (US 2014/0344420 A1, published Nov. 20,
2014) and Lam (US 2014/0344922 A1, published Nov. 20, 2014). Final
Act. 4–28.
R3. Claims 5, 6, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over Rjeili, Lam, and Kim (US 2012/0157165 A1, published June
21, 2012). Final Act. 28–31.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Moreover, to the extent Appellant presents new
arguments in its Reply Brief that address the rejection as originally provided
in the Final Action, rather than positions raised in the Answer, those
arguments are untimely. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2).
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.
Indefiniteness Rejection of Claims 21–23
The Examiner rejected claims 21–23 as indefinite. Final Act. 2–3.
Appellant does not show error in this rejection, but instead states that “in the
event prosecution is reopened, Applicant will amend [these] claims” to
address the rejection. Appeal Br. 21.
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We deem Appellant to have waived any arguments as to this rejection.
See Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When the
appellant fails to contest a ground of rejection to the Board, . . . the Board
may treat any argument with respect to that ground of rejection as waived.”);
see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“The arguments shall explain why the
examiner erred as to each ground of rejection contested by appellant.”).
Accordingly, we summarily sustain Rejection R1.
Obviousness Rejection R2 of Claims 1–4, 10–15, and 17–23
The Examiner rejected claims 1–4, 10–15, and 17–23 as obvious over
Rjeili and Lam. Final Act. 4–28. Appellant argues these claims as a group,
using independent claim 1 as the representative claim (see Appeal Br. 13–
20), so we limit our discussion to claim 1 (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)).
Appellant contends that the combination of Rjeili and Lam fails to
teach or suggest the following limitations of claim 1:
[A] in response to the attempt to toggle between the first
environment and the second environment being detected:
[B] identify that the first user persona is enrolled with the
management service; and
[C] in response to the first user persona being identified
as enrolled with the management service, determine,
from a device profile generated for the first environment,
that a state of the first environment is in compliance with
the first compliance rule.
Appeal Br. 14–15 (quoting claim 1) (emphasis removed; reference
designations and emphasis added); see id. at 15–19 (advancing arguments in
support). Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error.
The Examiner found Rjeili discloses an “attempt to toggle between [a]
first and [a] second environment,” recited in limitation A. See Final Act. 7
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(addressing predicate claim limitation, reciting “detect[ing] an attempt to
toggle . . .”). Rjeili teaches a mobile device that is separated into: (1) a
managed partition 310 for enterprise data and applications, used in a secure
mode, and (2) an unmanaged partition 312 for personal data and
applications, used in an unsecure mode. See Rjeili ¶¶ 54–58 (cited by Final
Act. 4–7) (managed partition is used for enterprise/work purposes and
unmanaged partition is used for personal purposes), Fig. 3. The Examiner
found (and we agree) that the managed partition 310 and secure mode
correspond to the claimed “first environment.” See, e.g., Final Act. 6–7.
The Examiner further found (and we also agree) that Rjeili teaches detection
of an attempt to toggle between that first environment and a second
environment. See Final Act. 7 (citing Rjeili ¶ 118, Figs. 8J, 8K, 8L); see
also Rjeili ¶¶ 104–105 (configuring mobile device in accordance with a
context, which may correspond to home or work). Appellant does not
appear to dispute these findings. See generally Appeal Br.
With regard to limitation B, the Examiner also pointed to Rjeili. See
Final Act. 7 (citing Rjeili ¶ 110, Fig. 7, step 703). Rjeili explains that, in
response to an attempt to toggle environments, the mobile device can
“initiate . . . enrollment of the device to an enterprise system, if [this]
function ha[s] not previously been performed for the device,” and “prompt
the user for authentication credentials to login.” Rjeili ¶¶ 110, 113
(discussing steps 703 and 705 of Figure 7); see id. ¶¶ 108 (Figure 7 shows a
flow diagram for configuring a client device’s context with an NFC tag), 118
(NFC tag may be used to change the context between work and home).
Thus, the Examiner found that Rjeili teaches or suggests “identif[ying]
whether the first persona is already enrolled with [the] management service”
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in response to detecting the attempt to toggle environments. See Final
Act. 7; see also id. at 8–9 (also relying on Lam to “explicitly recite”
triggering enrollment identification in response to an attempt to toggle
environments). We agree with these findings. Cf. Appeal Br. 17 (“Rjeili
describes ‘devices enrolled in an enterprise system,’ and states that
‘verification and/or authentication using the enterprise system resources,
such as the access gateway active directory may be used to authenticate the
device users before pairing the devices.’”); Reply Br. 4–5.
With regard to limitation C, the Examiner found that Rjeili teaches
determining that the state of the first environment is in compliance with the
first compliance rule. See Final Act. 7–8. We agree with this finding: Rjeili
states, “[t]he managed partition 310 may have policies applied to it to secure
the applications running on and data stored in the managed partition,” and
the policy files “define one or more security parameters, features, resource
restrictions, and/or other access controls that are enforced by the mobile
device management system when that application is executing on the
device.” Rjeili ¶ 55 (quoted by Final Act. 6, 8); see also id. ¶ 54 (“The
policies may be implanted . . . in such a way that the mobile device may be
identified, secured or security verified, and provided selective or full access
to the enterprise resources.”). Appellant does not appear to dispute this
finding. See Appeal Br. 17 (acknowledging, without disputing, the
Examiner’s mapping of Rjeili’s policies to the claimed compliance rule).
Appellant, however, contends that Rjeili fails to teach or suggest
limitation C’s requirements that this compliance determination be:
(1) “from a device profile generated for the first environment,” and (2) “in
response to” the enrollment identification of limitation B. See Appeal Br. 17
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(“Specifically, nothing in Rjeili shows or suggests a device profile, nor
consulting a device profile ‘in response to . . . .’”).3 Appellant’s arguments
are not persuasive.
First, we agree with the Examiner that the references teach or suggest
the claimed “device profile.” The Examiner concluded that the broadest
reasonable construction of “device profile” in light of the Specification is “a
data structure containing information about a device.” Final Act. 32 (citing
Spec. ¶ 62). Appellant does not address this conclusion (see generally
Appeal Br. 17) and, thus, does not show error in it.4 Accordingly, we apply
this construction in this Decision.
We agree with the Examiner’s finding (see Final Act. 32–35) that
Rjeili at least suggests determining compliance from data generated for the
managed environment that contains information about a device, as required
by limitation C. E.g., Rjeili ¶¶ 105–106. Appellant argues:
Appellant respectfully submits that a “policy file” is not a
device profile (e.g., a profile describing a state of a device), nor

3 To the degree Appellant advances other arguments in the Appeal Brief,
these arguments are not persuasive because they are not presented with
sufficient clarity and/or merely recite the claim language. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“The arguments shall explain why the examiner erred as
to each ground of rejection contested by appellant. . . . A statement which
merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument
for separate patentability of the claim.”).
4 Appellant’s claim construction arguments regarding this term (see Reply
Br. 7–8) are untimely—they address the rejection as originally articulated in
the Final Action, but were presented for the first time in its Reply Brief. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). However, even if the arguments had been timely,
they would not have been persuasive because Appellant fails to clearly
identify any error in the Examiner’s proposed construction. See Reply
Br. 7–8 (failing identify alleged inconsistency with Specification or explain
alleged error in the Examiner’s construction).
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could one determine whether a state of an environment on a
device “is in compliance with [a] compliance rule,” based on a
“policy file,” as now alleged by the Examiner's Answer.
Reply Br. 7. Appellant’s argument is premised on the erroneous assumption
that the claimed “device profile” must be the same as Rjeili’s policies in
order for Rjeili to teach or suggest this claim limitation. However, we are
persuaded that Rjeili’s description of its policies at least suggests that
information about the mobile device is used when verifying that device’s
compliance with those policies. E.g., compare Rjeili ¶¶ 105–106
(explaining that the mobile device “may control which . . . enterprise
applications the user will be able to access, based on the location or
proximity of the device”), with Spec. ¶ 62 (“Device profile 230 may
comprise an indication of the current position of user device 103 . . . .”).
Appellant’s arguments that Rjeili fails to teach or suggest the claimed device
profile are not persuasive. See Appeal Br. 17–18; Reply Br. 4–9.
Moreover, the Examiner finds (and we agree) that Lam also teaches or
suggests use of device profile data to confirm compliance. See Final
Act. 35–38 (citing Lam ¶¶ 25, 38, 44, 54–55, 83, 102); see also e.g., Lam
¶ 55 (“The device software application or agent can be provisioned with
application access policy rules to identify network access activity associated
with individual applications and allow network access to one or more
approved enterprise applications 40 when the VPN device client function is
in operation . . . .”). Appellant’s arguments that Lam fails to teach or
suggest the claimed device profile are not persuasive. See Appeal Br. 18–
19; Reply Br. 9.
With regard to Appellant’s second alleged distinction, we agree with
the Examiner that Rjeili at least suggests that compliance with the security
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policies is determined “in response to” the enrollment verification of
limitation B. See Final Act. 8 (explaining finding); Ans. 4–5 (citing Rjeili ¶¶
55, 98); see also e.g., Rjeili ¶¶ 54 (“The policies may be implanted . . . in
such a way that the mobile device may be identified, secured or security
verified, and provided selective or full access to the enterprise resources.”),
67–70 (explaining that the mobile device includes a component that enforces
the policies), 98 (“After enrollment, the [mobile] device may be ‘governed’
. . . using . . . policies that are pushed to the device.”), 105–106 (explaining
that the mobile device “may control which . . . enterprise applications the
user will be able to access, based on the location or proximity of the
device”), 112–116 (explaining that, after identifying that the mobile device
is enrolled, the client agent configures itself based on the context, which
may include accessing associated applications), 118 (stating that applications
can be automatically launched by a context switch). Appellant fails to
persuasively explain its position that Rjeili is deficient in this regard. Cf.
Reply Br. 4 (“Appellant respectfully submits that, in its past arguments, it
has never argued that Rjeili does not show or suggest ‘enrollment
identification and subsequent/responsive compliance rule
determination/verification,’ as alleged by the Examiner's Answer.”).
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 1, nor do
we find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 1, as well as claims 2–4, 10–15, 17–23, which fall
therewith.
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Obviousness Rejection R3 of Claims 5, 6, and 16
The Examiner rejected claims 5, 6, and 16 as obvious over Rjeili, Lam
and Kim. Final Act. 28–31. For each of these claims, Appellant relies on
the arguments made with respect to the rejection of claim 1. Appeal Br. 20.
These arguments, however, are not persuasive for the reasons discussed
above. Consequently, we find Appellant’s arguments do not show error in
the Examiner’s factual findings and the conclusion of obviousness of claims
5, 6, and 16.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
21–23 112(b) Indefiniteness 21–23
1–4, 10–
15, 17–23
103 Rjeili, Lam 1–4, 10–
15, 17–23

5, 6, 16 103 Rjeili, Lam, Kim 5, 6, 16
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 10–23
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED