AirWatch LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 12, 2020

15232280 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/232,280 08/09/2016 Kar Fai Tse W014.C3 (500102-1353) 3864
152577 7590 08/12/2020
Thomas | Horstemeyer, LLP (VMW)
3200 Windy Hill Road, SE
Suite 1600E
Atlanta, GA 30339
EXAMINER
KING, JOHN B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2498
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/12/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@thomashorstemeyer.com
ipadmin@vmware.com
uspatents@thomashorstemeyer.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte KAR FAI TSE

Appeal 2019-002832
Application 15/232,280
Technology Center 2400

Before ELINI MANTIS MERCADER, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21–40, which are all of the pending
claims in the application. Appeal Br. 12. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Airwatch
LLC, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of VMware, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed invention generally relates to controlling physical access
to a location by providing physical asset credentials to a client device. Spec.
¶¶ 2–3. The client device, which may be a laptop computer, a cell phone, or
similar, stores a device identifier and user access credentials. Spec. ¶¶ 15–
16. The device identifier may be a unique hardware identifier such as a
MAC (media access control) address or a CPU (central processing unit) ID.
Id. ¶ 16. The user access credentials may include a username, password,
and/or biometric data. Id. The client may communicate with a server to
receive a security identifier corresponding to approved user access
credentials and/or approved device identifiers. Id. ¶ 36. Such a security
identifier may have been encoded as a hash at the server, and decoded at the
client device. Id. The client device may send a request to a physical access
point, which may be an electromechanical device capable of receiving and
sending information, and additionally having a physical lock actuator to
open a physical barrier. Id. ¶ 32. For example, a door may have a signal
transceiver that, in response to signals from a laptop, actuates a solenoid to
physically unlock the door. Id. ¶ 34.
Independent claim 21 is illustrative:
21. A method, comprising:
receiving, by a physical access point, a request to cause a
physical lock actuator associated with the physical access point
to be in an unlocked state, the request being associated with a
client device;
receiving, by the physical access point, at least one
authentication credential and a security identifier from the client
device, the security identifier uniquely identifying the physical
access point, and the security identifier being generated using a
hash function;
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determining, by the physical access point, that the request is
authorized, the determination that the request is authorized
being based at least in part on at least one authentication
credential associated with the client device and the security
identifier; and
causing, by the physical access point, the physical lock actuator
associated with the physical access point to be in the unlocked
state.
Appeal Br. 13 (Claims App.).
Independent claims 30 and 36 recite, respectively, a computer system
and a computer-readable medium that perform the method of claim 21.
Appeal Br. 15, 17. Dependent claims 21–29, 31–35, and 37–40 each
incorporate the limitations of their respective independent claims. Id. at 13–
18.

REFERENCES
Name Reference Date
Lin et al. (Lin) US 6,052,785 Apr. 18, 2000
Amitai et al.
(Amitai)
US 2008/0134296 A1 June 5, 2008
Adams et al.
(Adams)
US 2011/0271331 A1 Nov. 3, 2011
Pineau et al.
(Pineau)
US 2014/0002236 A1 Jan. 2, 2014
Tse (Tse ’416) US 9,148,416 B2 Sept. 29, 2015
Tse (Tse ’635) US 9,438,635 B2 Sept. 6, 2016

REJECTIONS
Claims 21–40 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double
patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1–19 of Tse ’416 and claims
21–40 of U. S. Patent Application No. 15/216236, now issued as Tse ’635.
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Claims 21 and 30–40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
obvious over the combination of Pineau, Adams, and Lin.
Claims 22–29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious
over the combination of Pineau, Adams, Lin, and Amitai.
Claims 21–40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being ineligible
subject matter.

OPINION
A. Double Patenting
We have reviewed the Examiner’s nonstatutory double patenting
rejection (Final Act. 6–7) and Appellant’s statements in the Appeal Brief
(Appeal Br. 11). We have further reviewed the discussion in the Examiner’s
Answer (Ans. 21–55). The Reply Brief contains no further statements or
discussion. At the time of the Final Rejection, the rejection was made over
copending application 15/216,236. During the briefing of this appeal, that
application issued as Tse ’635. Because the conflicting claims have now
been patented, the rejection is no longer a “provisional” rejection. See
MPEP 1504.06 (“A provisional double patenting rejection will be converted
into a double patenting rejection when the first application, which is the
basis for the rejection, publishes as an application publication or issues as a
patent”).
Appellant has not argued substantive error in the Examiner’s double
patenting rejection. Instead, Appellant states that Appellant “shall consider
filing a terminal disclaimer upon disposition of this appeal and a decision on
the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 103.” Appeal Br. 11.
Accordingly, we sustain, pro forma, the rejection of claims 21–40 on the
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ground of nonstatutory double patenting. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv);
see also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) §1205.02 (9th ed.
Rev. 08. 2017, Jan. 2018).2
B. Obviousness
1. Claims 21 and 31–40
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments against the obviousness
rejections over the combination of Pineau, Adams, and Lin. Appeal Br.
9–11. Appellant argues that the combination does not teach or suggest the
following element of claim 21:
[R]eceiving, by the physical access point, at least one
authentication credential and a security identifier from the client
device, the security identifier uniquely identifying the physical
access point, and the security identifier generated using a hash
function
Id. at 10.
We begin with the Examiner’s rejection. The Examiner finds Pineau
to teach or suggest this limitation, except for the security identifier
comprising a hash function. Final Act. 8, 11. The Examiner cites to
Pineau’s description of sending a request to open a door lock, where the
request includes a door lock identifier, user credentials, and a mobile device
identifier. Id. at 8. The Examiner further cites to Pineau’s description of
sending the request to a server, the server determining if the user has
permission to open the door lock and sending a signal to a door if the request
is authorized. Id. The Examiner finds Lin to teach or suggest a security
identifier being generated using a hash function. Id. at 11; Ans. 17. The

2 See MPEP 1214.06 (I) for procedures for seeking to overcome a
nonstatutory double patenting rejection following a Board decision.
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Examiner cites to Lin’s description of hashing a credential for storage. Final
Act. 11; Ans. 17–18 (citing Lin 5:15–56). The Examiner finds that these
teachings of Pineau and Lin (and, for other limitations, Adams) would be
combined for the purpose of increasing the speed of the comparing
credentials to stored credentials by hashing the credentials. Final Act. 11;
Ans. 18.
We turn to Appellant’s arguments. Appellant argues that neither
Pineau nor Adams discloses a “security identifier uniquely identifying the
physical access point and generated using a hash function.” Appeal Br. 10–
11. In the Reply Brief, Appellant repeats those arguments, and additionally
argues that Lin does not teach that the security identifier is generated using a
hash function.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner has
relied upon Lin for teaching the hashing function recited in the claims. Final
Act. 11. We agree that the Examiner’s reliance on Lin is supported in the
cited sections of Lin. Id. In the Appeal Brief, Appellant argues that neither
Pineau nor Adams teaches such a function, but neither argues nor explains
why Lin does not teach such a function. Nor does Appellant explain why
the combination of Pineau, Adams, and Lin fail to teach the disputed
limitation. In the Reply Brief, Appellant further asserts that Lin does not
teach the disputed limitation. Because this argument was not presented in
the Appeal Brief, we need not consider it. 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). We
further note that, even in the newly presented argument in the Reply Brief,
Appellant neither argues nor explains why the combination of Pineau,
Adams, and Lin fails to teach or suggest the disputed limitation. Reply Br.
5–6. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments.
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For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 21. Claims 30–40 are rejected
under the same grounds of rejection as claim 21. Appellant has not argued
those claims separately, and they fall with claim 21. 37 C.F.R.
§41.37(c)(1)(iv). Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claims 21 and 30–40.
2. Claims 22–29
Appellant argues that the rejections of claims 22–29 should be
overturned for the same reasons as claim 21. Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 6.
For the reasons expressed in the discussion of the rejection of claim 21,
supra, we are not persuaded that the rejections of claims 22–29 are in error.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 22–
29.
C. Subject Matter Eligibility
1. Principles of Law
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
There is, however, an implicit, longstanding exception to patent-
eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted). This exception precludes
patenting of “the basic tools of scientific and technological work” from
which all inventions spring. Id. at 216–17 (quotation marks and citation
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omitted). Invention or discovery under § 101 is distinguished as being the
application of such tools to an end otherwise satisfying the requirements of
the patent statutes. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
The Supreme Court has established a framework for this eligibility
determination. Where a claim is directed towards a law of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract idea, the elements of the claim as a whole must
ensure that the claim, in practice, amounts to significantly more than a patent
on the law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea itself. Alice, 573
U.S. at 217–18. In applying this eligibility analysis, our reviewing court has
stated, “the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier
cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen[,] . . . the
classic common law methodology for creating law when a single governing
definitional context is not available.” Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom,
Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
To address the growing body of precedent, the USPTO published
revised examination guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (hereinafter 2019 Guidance). The 2019 Guidance seeks to improve
the clarity of the subject matter eligibility analysis and improve consistency
of this analysis across the USPTO. Id.
Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim is
directed to a judicial exception because:
(1) the claim recites a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea, the last of which includes certain groupings, identified as
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity
and mental processes; and
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(2) the claim as a whole fails to recite additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE (hereinafter “MPEP”)
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or instead,
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Guidance, passim.
2. Analysis
We have reviewed the Examiner’s subject matter eligibility rejection
(Final Act. 6–7) in light of Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has
erred (Appeal Br. 4–9). We have further considered the Examiner’s Answer
(Ans. 3–10) and Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–5). We are not persuaded by
Appellant’s contention of Examiner error in rejecting claims 21–40 under 35
U.S.C. § 101. We begin with claim 21.
a) “Recites an Abstract Idea”
The Examiner has determined claim 21 to be directed to “the abstract
idea of user authentication using a credential to access a physical location.”
Final Act. 6. The Examiner describes this idea as comparing known
passwords/credentials with stored passwords/credentials, where the claim
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recites additional elements of a client device and a physical lock actuator.
Id.; Ans. 7. We understand the corresponding limitations to be:
receiving a request to cause . . . to be in an unlocked state,
receiving at least one authentication credential and a security
identifier . . . , the security identifier uniquely identifying the
physical access point, and the security identifier being
generated using a hash function;
determining that the request is authorized, the determination
that the request is authorized being based at least in part on at
least one authentication credential associated with the client
device and the security identifier.
The Examiner has found these limitations to be similar to concepts
previously identified by the courts as abstract, such as “Classen, collecting
and comparing known information, and Electric Power Group, collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis).” Id. (citing Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659
F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011), Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom,
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Examiner further finds that
the comparison is performed by receiving a security identifier that was
generated using a hash function, and that generating a hash function is a
mathematical operation. Ans. 6. Appellant has not directly addressed the
issue of whether the claim recites an abstract idea. See generally Appeal Br.
4–9.
The USPTO’s 2019 Guidance states that the abstract idea exception
includes mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing activity, and
mental processes. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. USPTO Guidance
describes mental processes as observations, evaluations, judgments, and
opinions, where such can be practically performed in the human mind.
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October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 7, accessible at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df. Cases reciting steps of collecting, comparing, and analyzing known
information, which are practically performed in the human mind, are
provided as examples of such mental processes. Id. at 7–8 (citing Classen,
Electric Power).
We determine that claim 21 recites an act of judgment and evaluation
in the form of “determining . . . that the request is authorized . . . based at
least in part on one authorization credential associated with the client device
and the security identifier”). We further determine no error in the
Examiner’s determination that one could practically perform this act
mentally, or with the aid of pen and paper. Ans. 9. Such an act is
characteristic of mental processes, which comprise a category of abstract
ideas. October 2019 Update 7–9.
Claim 21 recites a further step of “receiving . . . a security identifier
[that is] generated using a hash function.” Appeal Br. 13 (Claims App.).
The Examiner has characterized the hash function as a mathematical
operation, which, under USPTO Guidance, falls within the mathematical
concept grouping of abstract ideas. October 2019 Update 4. Appellant has
not specifically argued against such a characterization. Reply Br. 2–6. And,
we note Federal Circuit precedent finding abstract certain claim limitations
reciting encoding of data and organizing data into a new form. Digitech
Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,
1350–51 (“taking two data sets and combining them into a single data set);
RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co, Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“cod[ing] data using ‘at least one multiplication operation’ and end[ing]
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with a new form of data”). Furthermore, claims reciting two abstract ideas
have been analyzed in the same manner as claims reciting a single judicial
exception. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (analysis of claim 4);
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012);
RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1327 (“Adding one abstract idea (math) to another
abstract idea (encoding and decoding) does not render the claim non-
abstract”).
However, we do not address this limitation here under Step 2A, Prong
1, because the more appropriate characterization of this limitation is under
Step 2A, Prong 2. The claim does not require performing a hash function,
but instead, merely requires receiving data that has been generated using a
hash function.3 Claim 21 contains two distinct steps of receiving data, both
of which require only receiving data having a certain informational content.
Accordingly, both steps are more properly treated as steps of gathering data;
i.e., as limitations in addition to those forming the abstract idea, and not as
part of the abstract idea itself.
Thus, we determine that the above-identified “determining” limitation
recites an abstract idea, and address the remaining limitations of claim 21
under Step 2A, Prong 2. Under our controlling guidance, consistent with
Court precedent, claim 21 satisfies Step 2A, Prong 1, such that the claim
recites an abstract idea.
b) “Directed to an Abstract Idea”
Having determined that claim 21 recites an abstract idea, we next
determine, under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Guidance, whether the claims

3 See discussion infra at 16.
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are directed to that abstract idea, or whether the claims have additional
elements that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application of that
abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
i. Additional Elements
As discussed, supra, the claim recites additional steps of receiving
data, namely:
[R]eceiving a request to cause . . . to be in an unlocked state,
receiving at least one authentication credential and a security
identifier . . . , the security identifier uniquely identifying the
physical access point, and the security identifier being
generated using a hash function
Furthermore, as identified by the Examiner, claim 21 also recites a physical
lock actuator associated with a physical access point, and a client device.
Final Act. 6.
ii. Examiner’s Findings
The Examiner characterizes the physical lock actuator, physical
access point, and client device limitations as merely instructions to
implement the abstract idea on a computer, requiring no more than generic
computer functions, without improvement to another technology or technical
field, or as exhibiting no meaningful limitation beyond generally linking the
identified abstract idea to a particular technological environment. Id. at 7.
The Examiner finds that the claim lacks details as to what causing the lock
actuator to be in a unlock state actually means. Ans. 8–9. The Examiner
considers this limitation as requiring the state of the device to be in an
unlocked state, but not requiring the actuator to physically actuate. Id. at 9–
10.
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iii. Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant argues that the claims are directed to an improvement over
existing computer technology, in the form of:
(1) identifying a physical access point that includes a physical
lock actuator, (2) identifying an authentication credential, (3)
generating a request comprising the authentication credential,
and (4) transmitting the request to a computing device that
provides an access credential comprising a hash of at least one
security identifier.
Appeal Br. 5. Appellant further argues that the claimed improvement “does
not preempt approaches that use rules of a different structure or different
techniques.” Id. at 6, citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellant next argues that the claims are directed to a unique physical
access point, in the form of the process of
(1) receiving at least one authentication credential and a
security identifier from the client device, where the security
identifier uniquely identifies the physical access point and is
generated using a hash function; (2) determining, by the
physical access point, that the request is authorized based upon
the authentication credential; and (3) causing the physical lock
actuator associated with the physical access point to be in the
unlocked state.
Appeal Br. 7 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Appellant argues that these limitations are meaningful
limitations on the abstract idea. Reply Br. 4.
Appellant further argues that the claims solve a specific problem with
a specific technical solution. Appeal Br. 8 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC. v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Appellant frames the
problem as the need for “low cost means of authorizing physical access for
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individuals and dynamically changing the bounds of such authorization
depending on relevant conditions pertaining thereto.” Id. (quoting Spec.
¶1). Appellant frames the inventive solution as “creating a hash of a
plurality of security identifiers that will be accepted by various physical
access points 150 to allow physical access.” Id. (quoting Spec. ¶ 36).
Appellant states that existing technologies fail to perform such a process.
Reply Br. 4.
iv. Analysis
The USPTO’s 2019 Guidance provides considerations, drawn from
prior court precedent, indicating that an additional element or combination
of elements may have integrated a recited abstract idea into a practical
application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. One such consideration is whether the
additional element(s) reflect an improvement in the functioning of a
computer or another technology or technical field. Id. Considerations
indicating a lack of a practical application of the recited abstract idea include
additional element(s) that amount to an instruction to implement the abstract
idea on a computer or to otherwise instruct to “apply [the abstract idea].” Id.
Other such considerations indicating a lack of a practical application include
additional elements that add insignificant extra-solution activity to the
abstract idea, or that merely link the abstract idea to a particular
technological environment. Id. Under this framework, we analyze the
additional elements in claim 21.
Claim 21 begins with two “receiving” steps in which a physical access
point receives certain data. To the extent that the “receiving” limitations are
not part of the mental process of comparing data, we determine that they are
steps of gathering data for the determining step, and thus a necessary
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precursor for performing the recited abstract idea (the “determining” step),
and thus are considered insignificant extra-solution activity. See October
2019 Update 14–15.
With respect to the limitation of “receiving . . . the security identifier
being generated using a hash function,” we additionally determine that this
does not meaningfully limit the identified abstract idea. In this limitation,
the claimed act is the receiving of data by the physical access point from the
client device. The received data includes a security identifier, previously
generated by a hash function. However, the security identifier is not claimed
as being hashed (encoded) when it is received by the physical access point
from the client device. The Specification discusses the hash function as
being generated by a server (not claimed) to communicate the security
identifier to the client device, which in some embodiments, may then decode
the security identifier prior to sending it to the physical access point. Spec.
¶36. The claim is not limited to an embodiment in which the physical
access point itself decodes an undecoded hash of the security identifier.
Compare claim 21 with Spec. ¶ 36 (discussing embodiments where either
the client or the access point performs decoding of a hashed security
identifier). Thus, while the security identifier was generated using a hash
function, it may be in a decoded state when it is being received by the
physical access point. Id. Read in light of the Specification, the claim
neither recites a positive act of generating a hashed identifier, nor requires
that the security identifier still be hashed when it is received by the physical
access point. Accordingly, the limitation that the security identifier was (at
one point prior to receipt by the physical access point) generated using a
hash function (e.g., by an unclaimed server) does not meaningfully limit the
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claimed act of receiving the security identifier by a physical access point
from a client device.
We further agree with the Examiner’s assessment of the client device
and the physical access point as generic computers performing generic
computer functions, such that they add no more than an instruction to
implement the identified idea on a general-purpose computer. Final Act. 7–
8. The client device is described in the Specification as a device having a
processor and wireless connectivity, “includ[ing] a laptop computer, a
personal digital assistant, a cellular telephone, a set-top device, music
players, web pads, tablet computer systems, game consoles, and/or
other devices with like capability.” Spec. ¶ 16. Furthermore, claim 21’s
client device is limiting only to the extent that it limits the type of data being
received by the physical access point device. The physical access point
device is described in the independent claims as receiving data from the
client device and communicating with an associated lock actuator. Appeal
Br. 13, 15, 17 (Claims App.). The physical access point may include
communications, data storage, and processing capabilities to carry out the
claimed receiving of data and determining whether the received data meets
the requirements for authorization. Spec. ¶¶ 32–34. Reading the claims in
light of the Specification, we agree with the Examiner that the client device
and physical access point provide no more than an instruction to implement
the identified idea on a general-purpose computer.
Nor do we determine that the remaining limitation, causing a physical
lock actuator to be in an unlocked state, integrates the claim into a specific
practical application. The Examiner finds that this limitation does not
require a physical actuation in the sense of an electromagnetic actuation.
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Ans. 9–10. This finding is consistent with the usage of the limitation in
independent claims 30 and 36, which recite, respectively, a computer system
and a computer-readable medium. As these claims are directed solely to the
capabilities of a computer, are argued together with claim 21, and contain
the same relevant language as independent claim 21, we agree that the
limitation of “causing” an actuator to be in a particular state may require no
more than transmitting a particular signal. Spec. ¶ 39 (“If the verification
request is authorized, then at optional block 245, an unlock command is sent
to the physical access point 150”). While the claim requires the signal to
have certain informational content; i.e., that it will be understood by an
actuator as to which state it should be in, the claims do not recite an act of
actuation of the associated actuator itself. In this manner, the “causing” step
represents post-solution activity, in the sense that it transmits the results of
the determining step, and represents an intended field of use for the
determining step, in the sense that the determination of whether the received
credentials are sufficient is limited to the field of regulating physical access
using lock actuators.
To the extent that claim 21 requires an “unlocked state” of an
actuator, the final step of causing the actuator to be in a particular state is no
more than an invocation to “apply [the abstract idea]” to a generically
claimed actuator without details of how the change of state is accomplished.
Spec. ¶ 34 (“The physical access point 150 may also include a physical lock
actuator 152, for example, a solenoid and/or other electro-mechanical
actuator, which is operable to physically unlock the physical barrier upon
command to do so by the physical access point 150.”). Although the
physical lock actuator may be an electro-mechanical actuator such as a
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solenoid, the claimed “physical lock actuator” is not limited to the provided
examples or to any particular structure or class of structures. Id. Such mere
instructions to apply a judicial exception have been found not to
meaningfully limit the judicial exception. See, e.g., Internet Patents
Corporation v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(recitation of maintaining the state of data in an online form without
restriction on how the state is maintained and with no description of the
mechanism for maintaining the state does not provide a meaningful
limitation); Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262-63
(Fed. Cir. 2016), In re Brown, 645 Fed. App'x 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(final step of using scissors to cut hair according to a determined hair design
did not provide eligibility) (non-precedential).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the additional
limitations represent an improvement to a computer or another technology or
technological field. Appellant’s arguments based on McRO and DDR
Holdings are grounded in either the transmission or creation of a hashed
credential. Appeal Br. 6, 8. However, we have here determined that the
claim recites neither the step of creating a hashed credential nor the step of
transmitting a hashed credential. See supra at 16. Further, Appellant has
not explained how the claimed invention comprises an improvement to a
computer or other technology in the manner of McRO, DDR Holdings, or
Enfish, beyond stating what the claimed invention recites and alleging that
the claims either improve a computer, a technology, or include meaningful
limitations. Appeal Br. 6–8; Reply Br. 4. In relying on generic data-
gathering processes and generic post-solution machinery, and lacking a clear
explanation of the manner by which a computer or other technology is
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improved, the claimed invention is distinguished from claims that improve a
computer or other technology. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314 (“We therefore look
to whether the claims in these patents focus on a specific means or method
that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or
effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery.”). Furthermore, the courts have recognized that “the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. at 1315
(citing Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2015)). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by those arguments.
Based upon our controlling guidance and court precedent, we
determine that claim 21 is directed towards the recited abstract idea, and that
the recited abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application of that
idea.
c) Significantly More than the Abstract Idea
Having determined that claim 21 is directed to an abstract idea, we
next determine, under Step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, whether the claims
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. 2019 Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 56. A determination that the claims are significantly more
may be indicated where additional limitations, either alone or in
combination, are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field. Id.
The Examiner finds the additional elements to be limitations that are
generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities. Final Act. 6. Appellant has not specifically
traversed the Examiner’s finding.
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21
In the absence of argument to the contrary, we are not persuaded that
the Examiner erred in finding the additional limitations, taken alone or as an
ordered combination, to be more than well-understood, routine, conventional
activity. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Review of the Appellant’s Specification supports the Examiner’s finding,
describing the claimed physical access point as using any appropriate known
means to receive information from the client, perform the claimed
determination through comparison of data, and transmit information to the
actuator. Spec. ¶¶ 33 (communicating by either network or non-networked
storage unit), 34 (using a “processor” and “data store”). Furthermore,
receiving and transmitting data over a network, and storing and retrieving
information in a memory, when claimed in a merely generic manner, are
recognized by the courts as insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g.,
OIP Techs.v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
d) Summary
In view of the foregoing, under the 2019 Guidance, including the
October 2019 Update, informed by our governing case law concerning 35
U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in concluding
claim 21 is directed to a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, without
significantly more. We therefore affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim
21. Because Appellant argues claims 22–40 on the same grounds as claim
21, we also affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 21–40. 37 C.F.R.
41.37 (c)(iv).
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22

CONCLUSION
For the above-described reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 21–40 under nonstatutory double patenting, and as being obvious
over the applied combinations of prior art, and as lacking subject matter
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Grounds Affirmed Reversed
21–40 Nonstatutory Double
Patenting, Tse ’416,
Tse ’635
21–40
21, 30–40 103(a) Pineau, Adams, Lin 21, 30–40
22–29 103(a) Pineau, Adams, Lin,
Amitai
22–29
21–40 101 Eligibility 21–40
Overall
Outcome
21–40

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED