AINGEL CORP.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 31, 2020

15332848 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/332,848 10/24/2016 Amr Shady 397107-991100 5006
26379 7590 07/31/2020
DLA PIPER LLP (US )
2000 UNIVERSITY AVENUE
EAST PALO ALTO, CA 94303-2248
EXAMINER
KONERU, SUJAY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PatentDocketingUS-PaloAlto@dlapiper.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_____________

Ex parte AMR SHADY1
_____________

Appeal 2020-001599
Application 15/332,848
Technology Center 3600
______________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JOHN A. EVANS, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicants” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). The Appeal Brief identifies Aingel Corp., as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of Claims 1–15, all claims on appeal. Final Act.
1. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

Invention
The invention is directed to an apparatus and method for predicting an
expected success rate. See Abstract. Claims 1, 3, 8, and 10 are independent.
Claim 1, reproduced in Table I, infra, is illustrative of the invention.

Prior Art
Name Reference Date
Goodson US 2010/0030722 A1 Feb. 4, 2010
Wu US 2011/0004509 A1 Jan. 6, 2011
Drucker US 2011/0307422 A1 Dec. 15, 2011

2 Throughout this Decision, we refer to the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed
October 2, 2019, the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed December 27, 2019, the
Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed May 3, 2019, the Examiner’s
Answer mailed October 29, 2019, and the Specification (“Spec.”) filed
October 24, 2016.
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Rejections3
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis
1–15 101 Subject Matter Eligibility
Final Act. 4–6.
15 103(a),
Obviousness
Goodson, Drucker
Final Act. 7–8.
1, 2, 8, 9 103(a),
Obviousness
Goodson, Drucker, Wu
Final Act. 8–12.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1–15 in light of
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this
Decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any
other arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in
the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We
provide the following explanation to highlight and address specific
arguments and findings primarily for emphasis. We consider Appellant’s
arguments as they are presented in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief.

CLAIMS 1–15: INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant argues the merits of the claims as a group and contends the
independent claims “describe the design and activity of a computing device
and not human beings.” Appeal Br. 15. Therefore, we decide the appeal of
the § 101 rejection on the basis of representative Claim 1 and refer to the

3 The Application was examined under the first inventor to file provisions of
the AIA. Final Act. 2.
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rejected claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
We reviewed the record de novo. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn
to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.”).
Based upon our review of the record in light of recent policy guidance with
respect to patent-eligible subject matter rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101,4
we affirm the rejection of Claims 1–15 for the specific reasons discussed
below. Appellant argues:
the Examiner cited to the entirety of MPEP section 2106.05(d).
Applicant respectfully submits that PTO Guidelines require an
Examiner to cite to a specific court decision that forms the basis
for an abstract idea finding and that citing to an MPEP section
is not sufficient to satisfy this requirement.
Appeal Br. 15. Our analysis, below, based upon the cited Guidance, renders
Appellant’s argument moot.
35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has
long recognized, however, that § 101 implicitly excludes “[l]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from the realm of patent-eligible
subject matter, as monopolization of these “basic tools of scientific and

4 See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”).
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technological work” would stifle the very innovation that the patent system
aims to promote. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–78 (2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981).
Under the mandatory Revised Guidance, we reconsider whether
Appellant’s claims recite:
1. any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas
(i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes), and
2. additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim, (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then reach the
issue of whether the claim:
3. adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
4. simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
A. Whether the claims recite a judicial exception
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The Revised Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts
identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract-idea
exception includes the following groupings of subject matter:
(a) mathematical concepts,5 i.e., mathematical relationships, mathematical
formulas, equations,6 and mathematical calculations7; (b) certain methods of
organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices
(including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or

5 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“The concept of hedging . . .
reduced to a mathematical formula . . . is an unpatentable abstract
idea . . . .”).
6 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“A mathematical formula as such is not accorded
the protection of our patent laws . . . .”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594
(1978) (“[T]he discovery of [a mathematical formula] cannot support a
patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”).
7 SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(holding that claims to a “series of mathematical calculations based on
selected information” are directed to abstract ideas).
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instructions)8; and (c) mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).9
The preamble of independent Claim 1 recites a: “method of
calculating an expected success rate for a business entity using a computing
device comprising a background analysis engine, a prediction engine, and a
display engine, the method comprising.” The limitations recited in the body
of the claim are analyzed in Table I against the categories of abstract ideas
as set forth in the Revised Guidance.
Appellant contends that under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised
Guidance, the claims are not directed to an abstract idea because the claims
do not recite a “method of organizing human activity,” as found by the
Examiner. Appeal Br. 13.
The Examiner finds the claims are related to organizing commercial
interactions such as business relations by modelling business data to make
calculations related to a business entity. Ans. 3.

8 Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20 (concluding that use of a third party to mediate
settlement risk is a “fundamental economic practice” and thus an abstract
idea); see Revised Guidance, at 52 n.13 for a more extensive listing of
“[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” that have been found to be
abstract ideas.
9 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (“[M]ental processes[] and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.” (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972))).
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As set forth in Table I below, we find limitations [c] – [h] of
independent Claim 1 recite abstract ideas, i.e., “mental processes” and
“mathematical concepts.” In agreement with the Examiner, we find the
individual steps of the claimed method are organized around “modelling
business data to make calculations related to a business entity.” See Ans. 3.
Table I
Claim 1 Revised Guidance
[a]10 receiving, by the background
analysis engine, a model dataset and
a first dataset;

An additional element that adds
insignificant extra-solution activity
to the judicial exception, i.e., mere
data-gathering. See 84 Fed. Reg. at
55.
[b] acquiring, by the background
analysis engine, a second dataset
from a plurality of web servers;

An additional element that adds
insignificant extra-solution activity
to the judicial exception, i.e., mere
data-gathering. See 84 Fed. Reg. at
55.
[c] processing, by the background
analysis engine running one or more
personality analysis algorithms, the
first dataset and the second dataset
to generate a third dataset
comprising data regarding
personality attributes of persons
associated with the business entity;
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion). See
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.

10 Step designators, e.g., “[a],” were added to facilitate discussion.
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[d] splitting, by the prediction
engine, the model dataset into i
groups, each of the i groups
comprising a training dataset and a
testing dataset, using i splitting
algorithms, wherein each of the i
splitting algorithms generates one of
the i groups;
Mathematical concepts, i.e.,
mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations,
mathematical calculations11. See 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.
[e] adjusting, by the prediction
engine running m machine learning
algorithms, a set of models, wherein
the adjusting occurs in response to
each of the m machine learning
algorithms operating on each
training dataset in the i groups;
Mathematical concepts, i.e.,
mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations,
mathematical calculations. See 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.
[f] testing, by the prediction engine,
the set of models using each testing
dataset in the i groups and adjusting
the second set of models based on
the testing;
Mathematical concepts, i.e.,
mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations,
mathematical calculations. See 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.
[g] generating, by the prediction
engine, i merged datasets, wherein
each of the i merged datasets
comprises the third dataset merged
with a different testing dataset from
the i groups; and
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion). See
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
[h] processing, by the prediction
engine, the i merged datasets to
generate i * m ranked lists, each of
the ranked lists generated from one
Mathematical concepts, i.e.,
mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations,

11 Alternatively, these mathematical concepts may be considered mental
processes.
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of the i merged datasets and one of
the m machine learning algorithms
and indicating the expected success
of the business entity and other
entities in the one of the i merged
datasets.
mathematical calculations. See 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.

Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
If the claims recite a patent-ineligible concept, as we conclude above,
we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) wherein the “claims are
considered in their entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quotes and citation
omitted). This test determines whether the recited judicial exception is
integrated into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying
whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the
judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application.
Appellant argues: “the specificity of the claims guarantees that the
Applicant is not seeking a monopoly on the human activity that the
Examiner found in the claims.” Appeal Br. 16. Monopolization concerns
are subsumed under the Mayo-Alice analytical framework, thus rendering
Appellant’s argument moot. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 216.
Appellant contends “the Specification indicates that the human mind
is not capable of performing the level of calculations and determinations that
the invention provides.” Appeal Br. 17 (citing Spec. ¶ 3).
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The cited paragraph of the Specification reads:
It is impossible for a human being to consider all of the possible
factors, to determine how strongly each one correlates to
eventual success, to identify the degree of importance of each
factor, and to arrive at a quantitative assessment of the
venture’s expected success rate. This makes it particularly
difficult for potential investors to decide whether or not to
invest in the venture.
Spec. ¶ 3.
Appellant’s citation to their Specification amounts to conclusory
statements, unsupported by factual evidence, which are thus entitled to little
probative value. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Appellant proffers no evidence that the claims could not be performed in the
mind with the aid of paper and pencil. “If a claim, under its broadest
reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the
recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental
processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the
mind.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, n.14 (citing Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the
exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the
claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human,
mentally or with pen and paper.”)). Indeed, Appellant discloses the claimed
method is performed by people. See Spec. ¶ 2 (“Predicting the chances of
success of a new business venture is a difficult exercise that often entails
guesswork and a great deal of subjectivity.”).
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s finding that the claims recite a
mathematical concept. Reply Br. 2. Appellant argues the claims might
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involve mathematical concepts, but such concepts are not recited because
“the claims do not recite relationships between variables and numbers,
mathematical formulas or equations, or mathematical calculations.” Id.
We disagree with Appellant. The claims may not recite the low-level
mathematical details argued by Appellant. However, as detailed in Table I,
we find the claims, nonetheless, recite mathematical concepts.
For the reasons which follow, we conclude that Appellant’s claims do
not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
MPEP § 2106.05(a) “Improvements to the Functioning of a
Computer or to Any Other Technology or Technical Field”
“In determining patent eligibility, examiners should consider whether
the claim ‘purport(s) to improve the functioning of the computer itself’ or
‘any other technology or technical field.’” MPEP § 2106.05(a).
Appellant does not proffer any argument that the claims improve
either the functioning of a computer, or improve any other technology.
MPEP § 2106.05(b): Particular Machine
The Bilski machine-or-transformation test is only applicable to
method (process) claims. However, “[r]egardless of what statutory category
(‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’ 35 U.S.C.
§ 101) a claim’s language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the
underlying invention for patent-eligibility purposes.” CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, it is
clear that the invention underlying the computing device of Claims 8 and 10
is the method of Claim 1. We therefore, analyze the machine prong of the
Bilski machine-or-transformation test.
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Appellant proffers no argument that the claims satisfy the machine
prong of Bilski. However, Appellant’s Specification discloses only
conventional computer equipment is required:
Computing device 110 can be a server, desktop, notebook,
mobile device, tablet, or any other computer with network
connectivity.
Spec. ¶ 18.
Data acquisition module 340 can use screen scraping or other
known data acquisition techniques. Data acquisition module
340 can obtain data, for example, from LinkedIn, facebook,
Twitter, and other social media accounts; email accounts; blogs;
business and industry websites; college and university websites;
and other sites and data sources available on Internet 350.
Spec. ¶ 22.
We find no indication, nor does Appellant so direct our attention, that
the claimed invention relies on other than generic devices uses other than
generic software. We, therefore, conclude Appellant’s claims fail to satisfy
the machine prong of the Bilski machine-or-transformation test.

MPEP § 2106.05(c): Particular Transformation
This section of the MPEP guides: “Another consideration when
determining . . . whether a claim recites significantly more . . . is whether the
claim effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing.” “Transformation and reduction of an article to a
different state or thing is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that
does not include particular machines.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 658 (quoting
Benson, 409 U.S. at 70).
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The claims select and analyze certain electronic data. The selection of
electronic data is not a “transformation or reduction of an article into a
different state or thing constituting patent-eligible subject matter[.]” In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“The mere manipulation or reorganization
of data . . . does not satisfy the transformation prong.”). Applying this
guidance here, we conclude Appellant’s method claims fail to satisfy the
transformation prong of the Bilski machine-or-transformation test.
MPEP § 2106.05(e): Other Meaningful Limitations
This section of the MPEP guides:
Diamond v. Diehr provides an example of a claim that recited
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment.
450 U.S. 175 . . . (1981). In Diehr, the claim was directed to
the use of the Arrhenius equation (an abstract idea or law of
nature) in an automated process for operating a rubber-molding
press. 450 U.S. at 177-78 . . . . The Court evaluated additional
elements such as the steps of installing rubber in a press,
closing the mold, constantly measuring the temperature in the
mold, and automatically opening the press at the proper time,
and found them to be meaningful because they sufficiently
limited the use of the mathematical equation to the practical
application of molding rubber products. 450 U.S. at 184, 187
. . . . In contrast, the claims in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea of
mitigating settlement risk. 573 U.S. . . . In particular, the Court
concluded that the additional elements such as the data
processing system and communications controllers recited in
the system claims did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea
because they merely linked the use of the abstract idea to a
particular technological environment (i.e., “implementation via
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computers”) or were well-understood, routine, conventional
activity.
MPEP § 2106.05(e).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. In the instant appeal, Appellant
specifically discloses the claims merely perform an abstract idea, performed
by humans, on a computer. See Spec. ¶ 2 (“Predicting the chances of
success of a new business venture is a difficult exercise that often entails
guesswork and a great deal of subjectivity.”). Similarly as in Alice, we find
that “[t]aking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” 573 U.S. at
225 (citation omitted). “In short, each step does no more than require a
generic computer to perform generic computer functions.” Id.
We find that Appellant’s claims do not add meaningful limitations
beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment.
MPEP § 2106.05(f): Mere Instructions to Apply an Exception
Appellant does not persuasively argue that their claims do any more
than to merely invoke generic computer components merely as a tool in
which the computer instructions apply the judicial exception.
MPEP § 2106.05(g): Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
The claims acquire and display data, which are classic examples of
insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (en
banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski, 561 U.S. 593.
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MPEP § 2106.05(h): Field of Use and Technological
Environment
[T]he Supreme Court has stated that, even if a claim does not
wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still will not be limited
meaningfully if it contains only insignificant or token pre- or
post-solution activity—such as identifying a relevant audience,
a category of use, field of use, or technological environment.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
Appellant argues: “the claims recite methods and apparatuses that are
significantly more than a mere abstract idea. For example, the claims recite
performing algorithms on datasets to generate a quantitative assessment of
the expected success of a business entity, which is significantly more than
the abstract idea of organizing human activity that formed the basis for the
Examiner’s rejection.” Appeal Br. 16–17.
We find the claimed data-manipulation is simply a field of use that
attempts to limit the abstract idea to a particular technological environment.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments because the mere application
of an abstract idea in a particular field is not sufficient to integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 55, n.32.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude the claims are “directed to” a judicial
exception.
Step 2B (Inventive Concept).
Well-understood, routine, conventional
Because the claims recite a judicial exception and do not integrate that
exception into a practical application, we must then reach the issue of
whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
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that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56. As discussed above, the written description describes the
claimed computer system consistent with its being “well-understood,
routine, [and] conventional.”
C. Specified at a high level of generality
It is indicative of the absence of an inventive concept where the
claims simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The claims fail to recite any specific steps of an algorithm, nor does
Appellant cite any Specification disclosure for the required specificity.
We find the limitations are specified at such a high level of generality
consistent with the absence of an inventive concept. Considering the claim
limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing to the abstract idea that
is not already present when the limitations are considered separately. See
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79. The ordered combination of limitations amounts to
nothing more than certain mental processes implemented with generic
computer components that operate “in a conventional way.” See also Alice,
573 U.S. at 225–26. Therefore, we conclude that none of the claim
limitations, viewed “both individually and as an ordered combination,”
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in order to
sufficiently transform the nature of the claims into patent-eligible subject
matter. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79).
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In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of Claims 1–15
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

CLAIMS 1, 2, 8, AND 9: OBVIOUSNESS OVER GOODSON, DRUCKER, AND WU.
Claim 1 recites, inter alia:
processing, by the background analysis engine running one or
more personality analysis algorithms, the first dataset and the
second dataset to generate a third dataset comprising data
regarding personality attributes of persons associated with the
business entity.
Claim 1.
The Examiner finds Goodson teaches the claimed “data regarding
personality attributes of persons associated with the business entity.” Final
Act. 9 (citing Goodson ¶¶ 69–72).
Appellant argues Specification paragraph 24 discloses the claimed
“personality attributes of persons associated with the business entity.”
Appeal Br. 17. Appellant contends Goodson (nor Drucker and Wu) fails to
disclose this limitation. Id. Appellant’s reply does not present further
arguments. See Reply Br. 3 (“Applicant rests upon the arguments presented
in its Appeal Brief as to why the claims are not obvious.”).
The Examiner finds the term “personality attributes” is very broad and
is generally taught in paragraphs 69–72 of Goodson. Ans. 6.
Appellant fails to explicitly define “personality attributes,” but gives a
non-limiting list of attributes. See Spec. ¶ 24. Goodson discloses “social
network analysis.” Goodson ¶ 70. Goodson further discloses: “The social
network platform may observe interactions between users, such as following
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other entities, and may convert such behavior into tangible information
about the social network of users.” Goodson ¶ 71. Moreover, Goodson
discloses: “characteristics of successful entities and their team members may
be determined 512 in order to simulate a network characteristic to determine
the key network factors for success.” Goodson ¶ 72. In the absence of a
specific definition for the claimed “personality attributes,” we find that term
reads on “characteristics of successful entities and their team members,” as
disclosed by Goodson.
In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs. We
sustain the rejection of Claims 1, 2, 8, and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

CLAIM 15: OBVIOUSNESS OVER GOODSON AND DRUCKER.
Appellant contends Drucker fails to teach “personality analysis
algorithms,” as claimed. Appeal Br. 19.
The Examiner finds the claimed “personality analysis algorithms” was
taught by Goodson, not Drucker. Ans. 7–8.
Appellant’s reply does not present further arguments. See Reply Br. 3
(“Applicant rests upon the arguments presented in its Appeal Brief as to why
the claims are not obvious.”).
In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs. We
sustain the rejection of Claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

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CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–15 101 Eligibility 1–15
1, 2, 8, 9 103 Goodson, Drucker,
Wu
1, 2, 8, 9
15 103 Goodson, Drucker 15
Overall
Outcome
1–15

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED