Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 18, 2011
0220080010 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 18, 2011)

0220080010

02-18-2011

Agency.


Sharon Johnson,

Grievant,

v.

Shaun Donovan,

Secretary,

Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0220080010

Agency No. HUD-000102008

DECISION

On April 4, 2008, Grievant timely filed an appeal from the Agency's

March 10, 2008, final Step 3 decision concerning her grievance alleging

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402(d).

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final

Step 3 decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the final grievance decision properly

determined that Grievant failed to prove that the Agency engaged in race

discrimination when it issued her a letter of reprimand.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Grievant worked as

a Senior Project Manager at the Agency's Tampa, Florida Field Office.

In a letter dated October 18, 2007, Grievant's supervisor (S1)

issued her a letter of reprimand on the basis that Grievant failed to

follow instructions and accomplish tasks within specified time frames.

Exhibit C. The letter relayed nine instances from March 22 to October 1,

2007, in which Grievant allegedly failed to follow instructions, including

incidents wherein Grievant failed to participate in a conference call;

failed to update a Tampa housing project's rents in the Real Estate

Management (REM) System; failed to prepare certification and documentation

for the Departmental Enforcement Center (DEC) in a timely manner; failed

to provide a housing corporation with "permission to occupy" forms in

a timely manner; failed to obey S1's order to clear the back table of

project files; and responded to a request to provide a list of subsidized

apartments by stating that this was not a function performed by her.

Additionally, the letter stated that the tone of some of Grievant's emails

was disrespectful, and quoted portions of emails sent by Grievant to S1

from February 7, 2007 to September 21, 2007.

On December 3, 2007, Grievant filed a grievance in which she alleged

that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of race

(African-American) when the Agency issued her a letter of reprimand

dated October 18, 2007.

On December 10, 2007, S1 issued a Step 1 decision in which she found that

Grievant was not subjected to race discrimination. On December 20, 2007,

Grievant requested that her grievance be advanced to Step 2. On February

30, 2008, the Agency issued a Step 2 decision, which also found that

Grievant was not subjected to race discrimination. On February 4, 2008,

Grievant requested that her grievance be advanced to Step 3, and in a Step

3 decision dated February 15, 2008, the Agency again found that Grievant

was not subjected to race discrimination. On February 29, 2008, Grievant

requested that the union invoke arbitration for her grievance, but on

March 10, 2008, the union denied Grievant's request for arbitration.

Consequently, the Step 3 decision became the Agency's final decision.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Grievant argues that the Agency improperly found no

discrimination on her grievance. Grievant argues that the Agency's

explanations for reprimanding her are pretextual because she did not

receive any feedback before the issuance of the reprimand that reflected

that she had problems following instructions or filing matters in a timely

manner. Grievant further argues that emails cited by S1 as a basis for

the reprimand were taken out of context, and that S1 only quoted excerpts

from the emails in the letter of reprimand, instead of the entire emails.

The Agency requests that we affirm its final decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.401(d) provides that a grievant

may appeal to the Commission from a final decision of the agency,

the arbitrator, or the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) on a

grievance when an issue of employment discrimination was raised in a

negotiated grievance procedure that permits such issues to be raised. The

Commission will only review that portion of the decision which pertains

to the grievant's employment discrimination claim, as it does not have

jurisdiction over any alleged violations of the collective bargaining

agreement. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.301(a).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, grievant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Grievant must

initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or she was

subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would

support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending

on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804

n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail,

grievant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's

explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

519 (1993).

In this case, for purposes of analysis, we assume that Grievant

established a prima facie case of race discrimination. Nevertheless,

we find that the Agency provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

for issuing Grievant a letter of reprimand. Specifically, S1 stated

that she issued Grievant the reprimand because, on several occasions,

Grievant failed to follow instructions, complete work assignments in a

timely manner, and disrespected her in emails.

Grievant contends that the Agency's explanation for reprimanding her is

pretextual because she did not receive any feedback before the reprimand

that reflected that she had problems following instructions or filing

matters in a timely manner. However, the record contains copies

of emails in which S1 raised concerns about Grievant's performance

on the Tampa Heights case and failure to timely supply forms to a

development corporation. Grievant further notes that she received a

"Fully Successful" annual performance rating a month after the issuance

of the reprimand, which contradicts the Agency's explanation for the

reprimand. Exhibit A. However, we find it significant that Grievant

did not receive the higher "Higher Successful" or "Outstanding" ratings

in 2007. Instead, she received a mid-level rating of "Fully Successful,"

which is not inconsistent Agency's explanations for her reprimand.

Grievant further argues that emails cited by S1 as a basis for the

reprimand were taken out of context, and that S1 only quoted excerpts

from the emails in the letter of reprimand, instead of the entire emails.

Although the reprimand letter only contained excerpts from Grievant's

emails, the record contains copies of the relevant emails in their

entirety. The emails reflect that in response to S1's inquires about

Grievant's performance, Grievant often responded in a manner that arguably

bordered on insubordination. For instance, when S1 expressed concerns

to Grievant about her failure to process rents into the REMS system

and inquired about the status of the matter, Grievant responded in the

following manner: "You can look in REMS and click on the 'finance radio

button.' And there at your finger tips is all the information you need to

answer the question you posed to me about the sale of Tampa Heights II."

Exhibit K. Additionally, when S1 asked Grievant to process a request

for "permission to occupy forms," Grievant responded, "Let's not pile on

multiple requests for the same item, it simply takes more of my time to

answer a subject email that I have already answered. Obviously, if I have

not sent it, it is my error and I intended to correct it ASAP." Id.

Grievant maintains that she was treated differently than a Caucasian

co-worker who sent disrespectful emails to her and other employees.

However, although the record reflects that the co-worker engaged in what

might be termed sarcastic exchanges with Grievant, there is no record

evidence that the co-worker's sarcastic comments were directed toward S1.

Exhibit D. As such, there is no evidence that the co-worker was similarly

situated to Grievant in this case.

Consequently, we find that Grievant failed to prove that the Agency's

legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for reprimanding Grievant

was a pretext for unlawful race discrimination. Thus, we find that the

Agency properly found no discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's

final decision for the reasons set forth in this decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Grievant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

GRIEVANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 18, 2011

Date

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0220080010

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0220080010