Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 10, 2021

2020002934 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 10, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/257,286 09/06/2016 Arkaprava Basu AMD-150297-US-NP 4915
25310 7590 08/10/2021
Volpe Koenig
DEPT. AMD
30 SOUTH 17TH STREET -18TH FLOOR
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
EXAMINER
GHAFFARI, ABU Z
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2195
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/10/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eoffice@volpe-koenig.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ARKAPRAVA BASU, JOSEPH L. GREATHOUSE,
GURU PRASADH V. VENKATARAMANI, and
JAN VESELY
Appeal 2020-002934
Application 15/257,286
Technology Center 2100

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3–10, 12–19, 21, and 22. See Final
Act. 1. Claims 2, 11, and 20 have been canceled. Id. at 2. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42 (2019). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. Appeal Br. 3. Furthermore, the Specification states that
“[t]he government has certain rights in this invention.” Spec. ¶ 1.
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We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “preserving quality of service constraints in
heterogeneous processing systems” by, “upon detecting that certain
operating conditions that indicate a processor slowdown are present,”
performing one or more system service adjustment techniques. Spec. ¶ 10;
Title. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method for reducing processing overhead in a
processor of a computer system, the processor executing an
operating system, the processing overhead associated with
processing system service requests by the operating system and
received from one or more accelerators external to the processor,
the method comprising:
detecting at least one change in an operating parameter of
the computer system, wherein changes to the operating
parameter indicate an increase or decrease in the processing
overhead associated with processing system service requests
requested by an accelerator processor that is unable to process
the system service requests and that is configured to request the
operating system to perform the system service requests;
responsive to detecting the at least one change in the
operating parameter, modifying at least one setting for at least
one technique for reducing the processing overhead, the
modifying of the setting including one or more of: turning on a
technique for reducing the processing overhead, or changing
which technique is used to reduce the processing overhead,
wherein the technique includes one of: disabling operation or
updating of branch prediction while processing the system
service requests, or disabling operation or updating of a cache
while processing the system service requests; and
performing the at least one technique to reduce processing
overhead in accordance with the at least one modified setting,
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wherein the system service requests comprises one or
more operations performed by an operating system that cannot
be performed by the accelerator processor.
Appeal Br. 18 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Metcalf US 8,327,187 B1 Dec. 4, 2012
Alexander et al.
(“Alexander”)
US 2013/0339703 A1 Dec. 19, 2013
Archibald et al.
(“Archibald”)
US 2015/0046676 A1 Feb. 12, 2015
Filippo et al.
(“Filippo”)
US 2016/0110202 A1 Apr. 21, 2016
Jayasena et al.
(“Jayasena”)
US 2017/0371805 A1 Dec. 28, 2017
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 3–7, 9, 10, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, and 22 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Metcalf, Archibald, and Alexander.
Final Act. 3.
Claims 8 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Metcalf, Archibald, Alexander, and Filippo. Final Act. 11.
Claim 19 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Metcalf and Jayasena. Final Act. 12.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues, with respect to representative claim 1, that the
Examiner’s rejection is in error as the combination of Metcalf, Archibald,
and Alexander does not teach “disabling operation or updating of branch
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prediction,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 10–13; Reply Br. 8–9.
According to Appellant, Alexander does not teach modifying a setting for
the branch prediction technique in response to detecting an increase or
decrease in processing overhead associated with processing system service
requests, as claim 1 requires. Appeal Br.. at 12–13 (citing Alexander ¶ 530).
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection. Claim 1
recites in pertinent part:
responsive to detecting the at least one change in the
operating parameter, modifying at least one setting for at least
one technique for reducing the processing overhead, the
modifying of the setting including one or more of: turning on a
technique for reducing the processing overhead, or changing
which technique is used to reduce the processing overhead,
wherein the technique includes one of:
disabling operation or updating of branch prediction
while processing the system service requests, or
disabling operation or updating of a cache while
processing the system service requests.
Appeal Br. 18 (Claims App.) (formatting and emphasis added). The
Examiner found that the italicized claim limitations are met by Alexander’s
teaching of taking corrective actions to eliminate exception conditions and,
in the case of a transaction executing within the computing environment that
is delaying committing transactional stores to main memory, performing an
action to restrict processing of the processor. Ans. 13 (citing Alexander
¶¶ 6–8). As the Examiner found, Alexander teaches speculative processing
during transaction execution that can lead to transaction aborts due to a
conflict with the transaction. Id. (citing Alexander ¶ 529). The Examiner
found that Alexander teaches interrupting processors in cases of likely
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conflict, and disabling branch prediction upon the abort count reaching a
certain threshold. Id. (citing Alexander ¶¶ 529, 540–542).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the claimed
features require that a setting for the technique (disabling operation of or
updates to branch prediction), is modified in response to detecting an
increase or decrease in the processing overhead associated with processing
system service requests,” whereas “Alexander teaches disabling branch
prediction in response to detecting that a transaction has aborted due to
failure in speculative execution a specified number of times.” See Appeal
Br. 12 (citing Alexander ¶ 530). The Examiner explained in the Answer that
an artisan of ordinary skill would have understood that transaction aborts
delay committing transactional stores to main memory and, thus, responding
to transaction aborts is an example of responding to an increase in
processing overhead. Ans. 13–14. Appellant has not persuasively rebutted
the Examiner’s finding through objective evidence or persuasive argument.
See Reply Br. 9.
Moreover, Appellant attacks Alexander separately whereas the
Examiner relied on the combination of Metcalf, Archibald, and Alexander in
rejecting claim 1. See Appeal Br. 11–12; Final Act. 3. The test for
obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly suggested in
any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject matter
would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the
combined teachings of those references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425
(CCPA 1981). The Examiner found that Metcalf teaches “responsive to
detecting the at least one change in the operating parameter” (Final Act. 4
(citing Metcalf col. 23:25–30; col. 11:20–25)), “modifying at least one
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setting for at least one technique for reducing the processing overhead” (id.
(citing Metcalf col. 11: 30–40, 45–55, 64–67)), “the technique includes one
of: ... while processing the system service requests” (id. at 5 (citing Metcalf
col. 58:23–30)), “or disabling operation or updating of a cache while
processing the system service requests” (id. (citing Metcalf col. 14:7–11,
col. 16:27–31, col. 58:23–30)). The Examiner relied on Alexander as
teaching “disabling operation or updating of branch prediction” (Final Act. 7
(citing Alexander ¶ 542)). Appellant has not sufficiently addressed whether
the disputed limitation would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in
the art in light of the combined teachings of Metcalf, Archibald, and
Alexander.
Turning to the alternative technique recited in claim 1, Appellant
argues that “no combination of references teaches, in response to detecting
an increase or decrease in processing overhead associated with processing
system service requests, switching on or modifying the technique of
disabling operation or updating of a cache while processing the system
service requests.” Appeal Br. 15 (emphasis added). In particular, Appellant
argues that “the act of avoiding cache flushes as described in Metcalf does
not occur while processing system service requests,” as claim 1 requires. Id.
at 16.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. The Examiner found
that Metcalf teaches avoiding cache flush interrupts by configuring to run in
low overhead mode. Ans. 10–11 (citing Metcalf col. 16:27–40). In response,
Appellant points to and summarizes Metcalf’s teaching that “the computing
system can be configured to ensure that such cache flushes (performed via
IPI) are not performed on a Low-Overhead mode processor, at least while in
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user mode, avoiding a potentially substantial interrupt.” See Reply Br. 8
(citing Metcalf col. 16:40–41). Based on this disclosure in Metcalf,
Appellant argues in the Reply Brief that
[C]ache flushes are avoided . . . while executing in user mode,
which is a term that typically refers to user-processes, as
compared with operating system (or “kernel”) processes. In fact,
nowhere does Metcalf describe its “user mode” as being the same
as “during processing of system service requests by an operating
system” as recited in the pending claims.
Reply Br. 8. Appellant, however, does not provide any basis for this
argument. It is well settled that mere attorney arguments and conclusory
statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little
probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is
not evidence). Moreover, there is no requirement that Metcalf describe its
“user mode” as being the same as “during processing of system service
requests by an operating system,” as recited in claim 1. Again, the test for
obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would have
suggested to those having ordinary skill in the art. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d
at 425. Appellant also has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s reliance
on Metcalf as teaching a low overhead operating that includes servicing the
read requests of an I/O device and using configuration registers to cause the
status of the cache lines involved in a transfer not to be updated. Ans. 10
(citing Metcalf col. 58:23–30); Final Act. 5 (citing same).
We are also unpersuaded by Appellant’s contention that the Examiner
has not articulated a reasoning with rational underpinning to combine the
teachings of Alexander with the teachings of the other references. Appeal
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Br. 13. The Examiner determined that an ordinarily skilled artisan would
have combined the teachings of the prior art because
Metcalf teaches Low-Overhead operating system by disabling
predetermined task such a cache flush or system interrupt to
improve efficiency (col 1 lines 40-67 col 3 lines 1-12 col 16 lines
28-43). Archibald teaches data path and hardware optimization
by determining the load and transitioning processor to low power
mode ([0006]). Alexander also teaches restricting transaction
processing beyond certain attempt/abort event to improve
efficiency ([0008]). Since, all three applied references are
motivated to improve efficiency by manipulating either the
process steps or the processor status, therefore the combination
would have been obvious for one of ordinary skills in the art
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to reach
optimum performance with reasonable expectation of success.
Ans. 14. Appellant argues that “this rationale is grossly insufficient, and
does not even make logical or technical sense.” Reply Br. 9. Appellant also
argues that “the rationale to combine must actually explain why two
references are to be combined.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Supreme Court
has rejected the rigid requirement of demonstrating a teaching, suggestion,
or motivation to combine references in order to show obviousness. See KSR
Int’l Co., v. Teleflex Co., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). Instead, a rejection
based on obviousness only needs to be supported by “some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning” to combine known elements in
the manner required by the claim. Id. at 418. We find the Examiner provides
“articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
The Examiner has articulated reasons to combine the teachings of Metcalf
with those of Archibald (Final Act. 6–7), and the teachings of Metcalf and
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Archibald with those of Alexander (id. at 7). We note that substituting one
element for another known in the field or combining known elements to
yield no more than a predictable result supports a conclusion of obviousness.
See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.
Moreover, we agree with the Examiner that Alexander is an optional
reference because the disclosure of one alternative claim element is
sufficient for anticipation or obviousness. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“When a claim covers several structures or
compositions, either generically or as alternatives, the claim is deemed
anticipated if any of the structures or compositions within the scope of the
claim is known in the prior art.”). Here, Metcalf teaches “disabling operation
or updating of a cache while processing the system service requests,” which
is recited as an alternative to the “disabling operation or updating of branch
prediction while processing the system service requests,” taught by
Alexander. See Ans. 10. Thus, the Examiner’s obviousness analysis does not
depend on Alexander’s teachings or their combinability with Metcalf and
Archibald.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s rationale
to combine the teachings of Alexander with those of Metcalf and Archibald
is unsupported or conclusory or amounts to impermissible hindsight. Appeal
Br. 13–15; Reply Br. 9.
For these reasons, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of
error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1.
Independent claims 10 and 19 recite limitations of similar scope and are not
separately argued. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Accordingly, we sustain
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1, 10, and 19, and claims 3–
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7, 9, 12–16, 18, 21, and 22 depending therefrom, over Metcalf, Archibald,
and Alexander. We also sustain the Examiner’s separate obviousness
rejections of claims 8, 17, and 19, not argued separately with particularity.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3–10, 12–19, 21, and 22
is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–7, 9,
10, 12–16,
18, 19, 21,
22
103 Metcalf,
Archibald,
Alexander
1, 3–7, 9,
10, 12–16,
18, 19, 21,
22

8, 17 103 Metcalf,
Archibald,
Alexander, Filippo
8, 17
19 103 Metcalf, Jayasena 19
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–10, 12–
19, 21, 22

RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED