Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 1, 2020

15287255 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/287,255 10/06/2016 Robert N. McLellan AMDI:325\HON 7775
16501 7590 06/01/2020
Timothy M. Honeycutt
Attorney at Law
37713 Parkway Oaks Ln.
Magnolia, TX 77355
EXAMINER
MOVVA, AMAR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2898
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
elizabethahoneycutt@earthlink.net
timhoney@sprynet.com
timhoneycutt@earthlink.net
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROBERT N. McLELLAN

Appeal 2019-004112
Application 15/287,255
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, MICHAEL P. COLAIANNI, and
N. WHITNEY WILSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

COLAIANNI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

Appellant’s invention is directed to circuit boards with chip-to-chip
interconnects (Spec. ¶ 1; Claim 1).
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A system, comprising:

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2019-004112
Application 15/287,255

2
a circuit board having a pocket and a conductor layer; and
a chiplet positioned in the pocket, the chiplet being an organic circuit board
and having plural bottom side interconnects electrically connected to
the conductor layer and plural top side interconnects adapted to
interconnect with two or more semiconductor chips.
Appellant appeals the following rejection:
Claims 1–8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Gu
(US 9,368,450 B1; issued June 14, 2016) in view of Starkston (US
2015/0340353 A1; published Nov. 26, 2015).
Appellant argues claims 1, 3, 5, and 6 separately (Appeal Br. 9–15).
Although Appellant provides separate headings for claims 2, 4, 7, and 8,
Appellant’s arguments regarding these claims basically rely on arguments
made regarding claim 1 (Appeal Br. 14–15). Accordingly, claims 2, 4, 7,
and 8 will stand or fall with claim 1.

FINDINGS OF FACT & ANALYSIS
The Examiner’s findings and conclusions regarding the § 103
rejection of claim 1 over Gu in view of Starkston are located on pages 2 to 3
of the Final Action. The Examiner finds that Gu teaches the limitations of
claim 1, except for the requirement that the chiplet comprises an organic
circuit board (Final Act. 2). The Examiner finds that Gu uses a ceramic
circuit board (Final Act. 2). The Examiner finds that Starkston teaches a
high density routing substrate wherein the high density interconnect
comprises an organic circuit board (Final Act. 3). The Examiner finds that
Starkston teaches organic material as an alternative to ceramic materials in
Starkston (Final Act. 3). The Examiner concludes that it would have been
obvious to have made Gu’s chiplet comprise an organic circuit board as a
Appeal 2019-004112
Application 15/287,255

3
simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain predictable
results (Final Act. 3).
The Examiner construes “organic circuit board” in claim 1 as “any
circuit board which includes an organic layer or material.” (Ans. 4). The
Examiner finds that Appellant does not define the phrase “organic circuit
board” in the Specification but does state in paragraph 21 that the chiplets
may be made of organic, ceramic, or even semiconductor materials (Ans. 4).
Appellant argues that Starkston’s teachings as a whole disclose that
the interconnect 104 may be made of a silicon die with a layer of organic
material (Appeal Br. 11–12). Appellant argues that paragraph 14 of
Starkston discloses that interconnect 104 can be a “die” made of silicon and
interconnect can include a layer of organic material (Appeal Br. 12).
Appellant contends that merely adding an organic layer to a silicon die does
not constitute an organic circuit board (Appeal Br. 12–13). Appellant
contends that the Examiner’s interpretation of “organic circuit board” is
unreasonable and not consistent with the Specification (Reply Br. 2–3).
Appellant cites to paragraphs 22, 23, and 26 as allegedly disclosing that
chips are different than circuit boards (Reply Br. 3–5). Appellant contends
that paragraph 29 of the Specification teaches that chips and organic circuit
boards, such as chiplets, are not the same device (Reply Br. 6).
We agree with the Examiner that Appellant does not define the term
“organic circuit board” in the Specification. Indeed, Appellant cites to
portions of the Specification, but cannot direct us to an explicit definition of
phrase “organic circuit board.” The portions cited to in the Specification
provide illustrative embodiments, but do not constitute a limiting definition
on the phrase “organic circuit board.” Appellant does not direct us to any
Appeal 2019-004112
Application 15/287,255

4
definition of “organic circuit board” in the Specification that excludes
having a substrate on which an organic layer is formed. Rather, paragraph
29, which discloses the structure of the chiplet, indicates that if an organic
build-up design is used, then the techniques discussed in the Specification
with regard to circuit board 15 may be used to make the chiplet. Paragraph
25 describes the circuit board 15 and indicates that resin layers as well as
ceramics may be used to make the circuit board. Paragraph 29 in describing
the chiplet structure discloses that the circuit board configurations may
include “other types of laminations of insulating materials.” Appellant has
not shown that the phrase “organic circuit board” as interpreted in light of
the Specification excludes Starkston’s silicon die with an organic layer
thereon.
Appellant argues for the first time on appeal in the Reply Brief that
paragraph 29 of the Specification shows that dies are different than organic
circuit boards (Reply Br. 6). Although arguments were made with regard to
claim 5 that Starkston’s interconnect is a die not a circuit board and that
Starkston’s interconnect is die with a layer of an organic material, Appellant
does not cite to paragraph 29 to embellish the argument (Appeal Br. 12, 15).
We will not consider Appellant’s argument based upon Specification
paragraph 29 because we find it untimely and there is no reason such
argument could not have been raised in the principal Brief. 37 CFR §
41.41(b)(2). Appellant’s untimely argument deprives us of the Examiner’s
interpretation of Appellant’s paragraph 29.
Based on the foregoing claim construction, Appellant’s arguments
that Starkston does not teach a chiplet (i.e, interconnect 104) being an
organic circuit board are not persuasive. We note that Appellant does not
Appeal 2019-004112
Application 15/287,255

5
challenge the Examiner’s reason for substituting Starkston’s organic circuit
board structure for Gu’s ceramic material (Appeal Br. generally). On this
record, we affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 7, and 8
over Gu in view of Starkston.

Claim 3
Appellant argues that Gu’s base 201 is not a build-up structure but is
instead an epoxy molding type of board (Appeal Br. 14). Appellant’s
argument is not persuasive because it fails to address the Examiner’s specific
finding that Gu’s layers 206 and 208 are build up layers (Final Act. 3).
Moreover, Appellant does not direct us to any portion of Gu to substantiate
the argument that layers 206 and 208 are an epoxy molding type of board.
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner reversibly erred in the rejection
of claim 3.
We affirm the § 103 rejection of claim 3.

Claim 5
Appellant argues that Gu does not teach a monolithic organic structure
and Starkston’s interconnect 104 is a die, not an organic circuit board
(Appeal Br. 14–15).
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive in light of our claim
construction above. Moreover, Appellant does not direct us to any definition
of monolithic organic structure. Nevertheless, the Examiner finds that when
Starkston uses a single organic layer that may be considered a monolithic
organic circuit board (Ans. 5). Appellant does not respond to this finding.
On this record, we affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claim 5.
Appeal 2019-004112
Application 15/287,255

6

Claim 6
Appellant argues that the bottom side interconnect structures of the
bridge 210 in Gu are positioned only at the left and right edges thereof,
which limits the number of pathways that can be accommodated by the
bridge (Appeal Br. 15). Appellant argues that Gu’s vias 266 and 268
through the bridge 210 are not located in a central region (Reply Br. 8).
Appellant’s arguments fail to address the Examiner’s finding that the
Specification does not define what edge portions and central portions refer to
beyond their normal generic descriptions (Ans. 6). The Examiner finds that
central portion may include an area from the center of the bridge 210 to both
left and right of the interconnect while the edge portions would include
being the left and right edge portions of the bridge 210 extending inward of
the edges of the bridge 210 (Ans. 6). Based on these descriptions of the
general meaning of central portion and edge portions, we agree with the
Examiner. Appellant has not shown that central portion and edge portion
should be construed more narrowly in light of disclosures in the
Specification. Rather, Appellant merely provides attorney argument that
Gu’s vias 266 and 268 are not in a central region (Reply Br. 8).
On this record, we affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claim 6.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–8 § 103 Gu, Starkston 1–8

Appeal 2019-004112
Application 15/287,255

7
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED