Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 1, 2020

14568181 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/568,181 12/12/2014 Mauricio Breternitz JR. 1458-130057 8346
109712 7590 07/01/2020
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
c/o Davidson Sheehan LLP
6836 Austin Center Blvd.
Suite 320
Austin, TX 78731
EXAMINER
BOOK, PHYLLIS A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2454
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
AMD@DS-patent.com
docketing@ds-patent.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MAURICIO BRETERNITZ JR. and LEONARDO PIGA
____________

Appeal 2019-002061
Application 14/568,181
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JOHN A. EVANS, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject Claims 1–20, which constitute all pending claims. Appeal
Br. 28–32 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.2

1 We use “Appellant” to refer to the “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. as the real party
in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed October 4, 2018, “Appeal Br.”), the Reply
Brief (filed January 11, 2019, “Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed
November 13, 2018, “Ans.”), the Final Office Action (mailed March 22,
2018, “Final”), and the Specification (filed December 12, 2014, and as
amended on November 29, 2016 and June 15, 2017, “Spec.”) for their
respective details.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The disclosed and claimed invention “relates generally to processing
systems and more particularly to data storage at a cluster compute server.”
Spec. ¶ 1.
Invention
Claims 1, 11, and 15 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative and is
reproduced below.
1. A server system, comprising:
a fabric interconnect;
a plurality of compute nodes coupled to the fabric
interconnect to execute services for the server system, each of
the plurality of compute nodes coupled to a corresponding
dedicated storage volume, the corresponding dedicated storage
volume storing configuration data modified by its compute
node; and
a common storage volume coupled to the plurality of
compute nodes, the common storage volume storing default
configuration data that corresponding compute nodes do not
modify, wherein:
in response to a first read request from a first compute
node of the plurality of compute nodes targeted to a first
location of the common storage volume, the common storage
volume provides data stored at the first location to the first
compute node; and
in response to a first write request from the first compute
node targeted to the first location of the common storage
volume of the first compute node, the first compute node writes
data to a location of a first corresponding dedicated storage
volume indicated by the first write request.
Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.).
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References
Name Reference Date
Kiselev US 6,839,740 B1 Jan. 4, 2005
Colgrove et al.
(“Colgrove”) US 2013/0097380 A1 Apr. 18, 2013
Veerla et al.
(“Veerla”) US 2015/0143164 A1 May 21, 2015
Goel et al. (“Goel”) US 2015/0212760 A1 July 30, 2015
Watanabe et al.
(“Watanabe”) US 2017/0024142 A1 Jan. 26, 2017
Wang et al.
(“Wang”) US 9,619,429 B1 Apr. 11, 2017
Rejections
The Examiner rejected Claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea) without significantly more. Final 2–8.
The Examiner rejected Claims 1, 2, 5–7, 10, 15, 16, 19, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Veerla and Goel. Id. at 9–20.
The Examiner rejected Claims 3 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Veerla, Goel, and Watanabe. Id. at 20–21.
The Examiner rejected Claims 4 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Veerla, Goel, Watanabe, and Colgrove.3 Id. at 22.

3 The Final Office Action states that claims 4 and 18 stand rejected as
unpatentable over the combination of Veerla, Goel, and Colgrove. Final 22.
Claims 4 and 18, however, depend from claims 3 and 17, respectively,
which stand rejected as unpatentable over the combination of Veerla, Goel,
and Watanabe. Id. at 20–21. Accordingly, because the Final Office Action
relies on findings from Veerla, Goel, Watanabe, and Colgrove to meet the
elements of claims 4 and 18 (including all of the elements of parent claims 3
and 17, respectively), along with a rationale to combine Veerla, Goel,
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The Examiner rejected Claims 8 and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Veerla, Goel, and Kiselev. Id. at 23–25.
The Examiner rejected Claims 11–14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Veerla, Goel, and Wang. Id. at 26–32.

ANALYSIS
I. CLAIMS 1–20: PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER.
Appellant argues the § 101 rejection of Claims 1–20 as a group.
Appeal Br. 4–21; Reply Br. 2–10. Therefore, we analyze the § 101 rejection
of Claims 1–20 with reference to illustrative Claim 14 and refer to the
rejected claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157,
1162 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
We have reviewed the record de novo. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn
to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.”).
Based on our review of the record in light of recent guidance on patent
subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101,5 we decline to sustain the §

Watanabe, and Colgrove, we consider claims 4 and 18 as rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Veerla, Goel,
Watanabe, and Colgrove. We treat this irregularity in the record to be a
harmless, ministerial error.
4 Our § 101 analysis for claim 1 applies with equal force to claims 2–20,
which are argued together with claim 1.
5 USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84(4)
Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance” or “Rev. Guid.”); see
also USPTO, October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update (Oct. 17,
2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“Oct. 2019 Update”).
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101 rejection of Claims 1–20, as discussed in greater detail below.
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has
long recognized, however, that § 101 implicitly excludes “[l]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from the realm of patent-eligible
subject matter, as monopolization of these “basic tools of scientific and
technological work” would stifle the very innovation that the patent system
aims to promote. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–78 (2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981).
Under the mandatory Revised Guidance, we consider whether
Appellant’s claims recite:
1. any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas
(i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
interactions such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
2. additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim, (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then reach the
issue of whether the claim:
3. adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
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“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
4. simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
B. Step 2A(i): Whether the claims recite a judicial exception
The Revised Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts
identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract-idea
exception includes the following groupings of subject matter, when recited
as such in a claim limitation(s) (that is, when recited on their own or per se):
(a) mathematical concepts,6 i.e., mathematical relationships, mathematical
formulas, equations,7 and mathematical calculations8; (b) certain methods of
organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices
(including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or

6 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“The concept of hedging . . .
reduced to a mathematical formula . . . is an unpatentable abstract idea.”).
7 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“A mathematical formula as such is not accorded
the protection of our patent laws”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594
(1978) (“[T]he discovery of [a mathematical formula] cannot support a
patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”).
8 SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(holding that claims to a “series of mathematical calculations based on
selected information” are directed to abstract ideas).
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instructions)9; and (c) mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).10
The preamble of independent claim 1 recites “[a] server system
comprising.” The steps recited in the body of the claim are analyzed in
Table I against the groupings of abstract ideas as set forth in the Revised
Guidance.
Claim 1 Revised Guidance
[a] 11 a fabric interconnect; Does not fall within any of the
mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human
activity, or mental processes
groupings of subject matter. See
Rev. Guid., 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
[b] a plurality of compute nodes
coupled to the fabric interconnect to
execute services for the server
system, each of the plurality of
compute nodes coupled to a
corresponding dedicated storage
volume, the corresponding dedicated
storage volume storing configuration
data modified by its compute node;
and
Id.
[c] a common storage volume
coupled to the plurality of compute
Id.

9 Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20 (concluding that use of a third party to mediate
settlement risk is a “fundamental economic practice” and thus an abstract
idea); see Rev. Guid., 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.13 for a more extensive listing of
“certain methods of organizing human activity” that have been found to be
abstract ideas.
10 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (“‘[M]ental processes[ ] and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.’” (Quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972))).
11 Step designators, e.g., “[a],” are added to facilitate discussion.
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nodes, the common storage volume
storing default configuration data
that corresponding compute nodes
do not modify, wherein:
[d] in response to a first read request
from a first compute node of the
plurality of compute nodes targeted
to a first location of the common
storage volume, the common storage
volume provides data stored at the
first location to the first compute
node; and
Id.
[e] in response to a first write request
from the first compute node targeted
to the first location of the common
storage volume of the first compute
node, the first compute node writes
data to a location of a first
corresponding dedicated storage
volume indicated by the first write
request.
Id.
In view of Table I, steps [a]–[e] of claim 1 recite a computer server
architecture with specific computing elements including a fabric
interconnect, a plurality of compute nodes, each having a corresponding
dedicated storage volume and being coupled to the fabric interconnect for
executing services, and a common storage volume coupled to the compute
nodes. The claim describes a computerized technique with a specific set of
rules for redirecting the writing of data—that was targeted for a common
storage volume—to a dedicated storage volume of a corresponding compute
node.
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We agree with Appellant that, like the claims in DDR, 12 the claims
here “recite language familiar to the technical reader and one of ordinary
skill in the art” and “solve a problem specifically arising in the realm of
computer networks.” Appeal Br. 15. As Appellant explains, the claims
are directed to substantially reducing storage requirements in a
server, thereby allowing a cluster compute server to “operate
with smaller storage devices or to make more efficient use of
existing storage devices,” . . . reducing “the number of
components implemented at each compute node, which in tum
enables the compute nodes to have a smaller form factor while
consuming less energy than [a] conventional server.”
Id. (citing Spec. ¶¶ 11, 16). Contrary to the Examiner’s determinations,
Claim 1 does not recite subject matter that falls within one of the enumerated
groupings of subject matter identified as abstract ideas, i.e., mathematical
concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, or mental processes.
See Final 4–6; Ans. 4–8. The Examiner’s characterization of claim 1 as
reciting an abstract idea analogous to “classifying and storing digital images
in an organized manner” or “migrating a user’s configuration settings from
one computer to another computer” oversimplifies and does not fairly
characterize the claim language. See Final 4–6; Ans. 4–8.
Thus, at prong one of Step 2A of the Guidance, we determine claim 1
does not recite a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, and we terminate
our analysis. Rev. Guid., 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. Accordingly, because we
determine claim 1 is patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and claims 2–20

12 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257, 1259 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
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include similar limitations, we decline to sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
II. CLAIMS 1–20: OBVIOUSNESS.
The burden is on the Examiner to set forth a prima facie case of
obviousness. See, e.g., In re Glaug, 283 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Here, we determine the Examiner’s evidence does not adequately support a
prima facie case of obviousness. “[O]bviousness requires a suggestion of all
limitations in a claim.” CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Intern. Corp., 349 F.3d 1333,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 985 (CCPA 1974)).
In particular, the Examiner has not provided adequate evidence that the cited
prior art teaches or suggests “in response to a first write request from the
first compute node targeted to the first location of the common storage
volume of the first compute node, the first compute node writes data to a
location of a first corresponding dedicated storage volume indicated by the
first write request,” as recited in independent Claim 1, and similarly recited
in independent Claims 11 and 15. Appeal Br. 28, 30–31 (Claims App.).
Appellant argues that
the proposed combination of Veerla and Goel fails to describe
or suggest all of the features of claims 1, 11, and 15 since
neither Veerla nor Goel, nor their combination, teaches a
mechanism of protecting a volume or aggregate from a write
operation or redirecting access requests such as a write request
to a particular volume or aggregate volume.
Appeal Br. 22. Appellant further argues that [t]he combination of Veerla
and Wang fails to disclose or reasonably suggest all of the features of Claim
11, including . . . “the storage controller . . . configured to ‘redirect . . . [a
first] access request from the common storage volume to . . . [a]
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corresponding dedicated storage volume to fulfill the [first] access
request.’” Id. at 26. Appellant’s arguments are persuasive.
Goel teaches a shared storage architecture including container disks
partitioned such that the partitions may be shared between nodes. See Goel
¶¶ 21, 27. With respect to the limitation at issue, the Examiner cites Goel’s
disclosure that a write access to a particular partition may be provided only
to the node with which the partition is associated. See Final 12–13 (citing
Goel ¶ 27), see also id. at 11–13 (citing Goel ¶¶ 26, 46, 101); Goel ¶ 102.
Although the cited disclosures of Goel may suggest the concept of
requesting to write and writing data to a location in a corresponding
dedicated storage volume, we find no evidence to suggest a write request
targeted to the common storage volume but written instead to the
corresponding dedicated storage volume.
Veerla discloses a clustered storage system having nodes operating on
shared storage volumes. See Veerla ¶¶ 2–3. The Examiner finds that in
Veerla, during the processing of a write request, a storage controller may
detect a redirection condition due to a failover or a request to a storage
device not owned by the storage controller. Final 27 (citing Veerla ¶¶ 2, 29,
Fig. 1). In response, the storage controller may redirect the request by
forwarding it to another controller for writing the data on a mirror storage
device. Id. Although Veerla may suggest the concept of redirecting a write
request from one storage device to a mirror storage device, we find no
evidence to suggest a request targeted to a “common storage volume” as
claimed, nor that the mirror storage device is a “corresponding dedicated
storage volume” that may only be accessed by a corresponding compute
node or virtual server. See Spec. ¶ 10 (“The dedicated storage volumes, in
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contrast, store data to be accessed only by a corresponding compute node (or
corresponding virtual server).”). We also find no evidence to suggest that
Veerla teaches Claim 11’s requirement that the redirect operation be
performed “responsive to an address of an access request not being stored at
a modified locations entry.” The Specification describes a modified
locations entry as corresponding to a location of the common storage volume
that has been modified (written to) by the virtual server executing at a
compute node. See Spec. ¶¶ 12, 33, 34. In addition, the modified locations
entry may be stored in a table of modified locations. Id. ¶ 12. Although
Veerla’s redirect operation may occur in response to an address not being
stored at a target location, we find no evidence that the target location is a
“modified locations entry” as the claim requires.
In rejecting Claim 11, the Examiner additionally relies on the
disclosure of Wang. Final 26–30. Wang discloses a data storage system
environment in which nodes are allocated to one or more tiered resource
pools and addressable via a virtual address given for each tiered resource
pool. Wang 1:7–8, 1:44–49. The Examiner finds that, in Wang, when an
the tenant’s application moves to another node, the storage can also be
moved to another storage node, such that the destination may be modified to
the storage node’s IP address and forwarded to the port to which the storage
node is connected for accessing the volume. Final 28–29 (citing Wang
4:14–21, 6:32–35, 6:47–61). But we find no evidence to suggest that
Wang’s move operation is from a “common storage volume” to a
“corresponding dedicated storage volume” as claimed. Nor are we
persuaded that modifying the IP address of the storage node as part of the
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move operation equates to performing the move operation “responsive to an
address of an access request not being stored at a modified locations entry.”
In view of the foregoing, the Examiner has not shown that the cited
prior art teaches or suggests the limitations at issue. Nor does the Examiner
provide any persuasive reasoning or rationale to fill the gaps in the
rejections. See Final 13, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28–32. Therefore, on this record,
we determine the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of
obviousness for independent Claims 1, 11, and 15. Accordingly, we decline
to sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of independent Claims 1 and 11
over Veerla and Goel. We likewise decline to sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of independent Claim 15 over Veerla, Goel, and Wang. For similar
reasons, we also decline to sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of
dependent claims 2–10, 12–14, and 16–20, for which the Examiner fails to
provide any finding or reasoning that cures the above deficiencies. See id. at
13–25, 30–32.
CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We REVERSE the rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
1, 2, 5–7, 10,
15, 16, 19, 20
103 Veerla, Goel 1, 2, 5–7,
10, 15, 16,
19, 20
3, 17 103 Veerla, Goel,
Watanabe
3, 17
4, 18 103 Veerla, Goel,
Watanabe,
Colgrove
4, 18
8, 9 103 Veerla, Goel,
Kiselev
8, 9
11–14 103 Veerla, Goel,
Wang
11–14
Overall
Outcome
1–20

REVERSED