ADP, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 5, 2021

2020004487 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/546,555 11/18/2014 Roberto Rodrigues Dias ES2014055.1 7852
126105 7590 03/05/2021
Duke W. Yee
Yee & Associates, P.C.
P.O. BOX 6669
MCKINNEY, TX 75071
EXAMINER
MEINECKE DIAZ, SUSANNA M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/05/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptonotifs@yeeiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROBERTO RODRIGUES DIAS,
JARISMAR CHAVES DA SILVA, LEANDRO RICARDO EIDELWEIN,
and LEANDRO DA SILVA BIANCHINI
____________

Appeal 2020-004487
Application 14/546,555
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
SEAN P. O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.

O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1, 3, 6–14, and 17–21.2 We have jurisdiction over
this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Automatic Data
Processing, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Claims 2, 4, 5, 15, and 16 are canceled. Amendment 3, 5 (filed August 27,
2019).
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In explaining our Decision, we refer to the Specification filed
November 18, 2014 (“Spec.”), the Final Office Action mailed June 27, 2019
(“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed January 13, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”), the
Examiner’s Answer mailed April 3, 2020 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief filed
May 28, 2020 (“Reply Br.”).
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention relates to ride sharing. Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1, 12, and 21 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below from
pages 15–16 (Claims Appendix) of the Appeal Brief, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method for coordinating ride sharing for an event, the
method comprising:
identifying, by a computer system, a route between a
starting location and an ending location;
receiving, by the computer system, driver-selected
preferences, wherein the driver-selected preferences include
distance from route, teammates to ride with, and rider
anonymity;
receiving, by the computer system, an organizational
structure name of a potential rider, wherein, based on the
organizational structure name of the potential rider, a
determination as to whether a driver and the potential rider are
teammates is made;
selecting, by the computer system, potential riders for the
route from employees in an organization based on locations of
the employees and the driver-selected preferences, wherein the
locations of the employees are based on global positioning
system information about data processing systems carried by
the employees, and wherein the potential riders will attend the
event;
sending, by the computer system, information for the
potential riders to the driver for the route;
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displaying, by the computer system, a graphical user
interface that shows the potential riders along the route and
identification information for the potential riders as allowed by
rider anonymity preferences;
receiving, by the computer system through the graphical
user interface, a selection of a set of potential riders from the
driver;
responsive to receiving the selection of the set of
potential riders from the driver, sending, by the computer
system, invites to the set of potential riders;
receiving, by the computer system, a set of acceptances
of the invites from at least one of the set of potential riders;
identifying, by the computer system, the set of riders
from the set of potential riders based on the set of acceptances
received from the at least one of the set of potential riders;
coordinating, by the computer system, setup of ride
sharing for the driver and the set of riders responsive to
receiving the user input selecting the set of potential riders,
receiving the set of acceptances, and identifying the set of riders
from the set of potential riders; and
responsive to receiving the set of acceptances,
confirming, by the computer system, the set of riders for the
driver by sending a confirmation notification to the driver and
the set of riders, wherein the confirmation notification identifies
the driver and the set of riders for the route.
REJECTION
Claims 1, 3, 6–14, and 17–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.3

3 The statement of the rejection also included claims 4 and 15 (see Final
Act. 3), but these claims were canceled in the amendment filed August 27,
2019, which the Examiner entered per the Advisory Action dated
September 5, 2019.
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ANALYSIS
Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
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rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and
Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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The USPTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”). Under the 2019 Revised
Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (“Step 2A,
Prong Two”).
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Discussion
In contesting the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant argues
claims 1, 3, 6–14, and 17–21 together. Appeal Br. 8–13; Reply Br. 2–3. We
select claim 1 to decide the appeal of this rejection, with claims 3, 6–14, and
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17–21 standing or falling with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv)
(2019).
The Examiner determines that “[t]he claimed invention is directed to
coordinating ride sharing (Spec. ¶ 1) without significantly more.” Final
Act. 3. The Examiner explains that
[t]he claims recite identifying a route between a starting and
ending location, selecting potential riders, sending information
for potential riders to a driver, receiving from the driver a
selection of potential riders, sending invites to the potential
riders, receiving acceptance of the invites by at least one of the
potential riders, identifying a set of riders, confirming the set of
riders, allowing a user to select various preferences, presenting
potential rider information, and details thereof. These details
exemplify the abstract idea of a method o[f] organizing human
activity (since the recited claim details present examples of
commercial or legal interactions, including sales activities or
behaviors and/or business relations and managing personal
behavior or relationships or interactions between people).
Id.; see also Ans. 6 (explaining that “[t]he claims organize rides among
people, which is clearly an example of organizing human activity, including
by facilitating interactions and activities among various people”). The
Examiner also determines that claim 1 does not recite additional elements
that integrate the identified abstract idea into a practical application. Final
Act. 3. The Examiner explains that
[t]he process claims include the additional elements of a
computer system. . . . The claims as a whole merely describe
how to generally “apply” the abstract idea in a computer
environment. The claimed processing elements are recited at a
high level of generality and are merely invoked as a tool to
perform the abstract idea. The claims also generally receive
data, which is an example of insignificant extra-solution
activity.
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Id.; see also Ans. 3 (finding that “[t]he process claims include the additional
elements of a computer system and a graphical user interface”). The
Examiner also explains that the computer system and graphical user
interface elements are described in the Specification as well-known general
purpose computer elements. Ans. 4 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 41–43). The Examiner
determines that “there is nothing in the claims as a whole that adds
significantly more to the abstract idea.” Final Act. 3.
Step 1: Does claim 1 fall within a statutory category of § 101?
We first consider whether claim 1 recites one of the enumerated
statutory classes of subject matter, i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 1 recites “[a] method for coordinating ride sharing for an event”
(Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.)), which is one of the statutory classes (i.e., a
process) under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Step 2A, Prong One: Does claim 1 recite a judicial exception?
Appellant argues that claim 1 does not recite an abstract idea falling
within any of the groupings identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance.
Appeal Br. 8–10. Appellant asserts that the claim is “directed towards
coordinating a [ride share] between a driver and a set of riders through
identifying geographic routes, the locations of potential participants through
global positioning data, and verifying the identity of the riders.” Id. at 9.
According to Appellant, “coordinating a [ride share] between individuals
does not involve managing the personal behavior, relationships, or
interactions between people.” Id. at 10. This argument is unpersuasive.
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Claim 1 recites a ride sharing method including steps of “identifying”
a route between start and end locations, “receiving” driver-selected
preferences, “receiving” an organizational name for a potential rider to
determine whether a driver and potential rider are teammates, “selecting”
potential riders from employees in an organization based on global
positioning system location information and driver-selected preferences,
“sending” potential rider information to the driver, “displaying” potential
riders along the route and their identification information, “receiving” a
selection of potential riders made by the driver, “sending” invites to the
potential riders, “receiving” acceptances from at least one rider,
“identifying” the riders that accepted the invitation, “coordinating” the ride
sharing setup of driver and riders, and “confirming” by sending a
notification to the driver and riders. Appeal Br. 15–16 (Claims App.). In
other words, as explained by Appellant, the claimed method coordinates ride
sharing for a driver and at least one rider employed by the same organization
based on location data and driver-selected preferences. See id. at 11
(explaining that coordinating a ride share involves “matching a driver with a
rider who [is] employed by the same organization”). The limitations in
claim 1 describe what the 2019 Revised Guidance calls “managing . . .
interactions between people,” which is a variety of judicially excepted
abstract ideas—specifically, “[c]ertain methods of organizing human
activity.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see also NetSoc, LLC
v. Match Group, LLC, Nos. 2020-1195, -1430, 2020 WL 7828777, at *3
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 31, 2020) (unpublished) (“‘[M]aintaining’ a list of
participants, ‘presenting’ a user with selectable categories, ‘displaying’
participant information based on the selected category, ‘shielding’ contact
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information, ‘enabling’ the user to send a message to participants, ‘tracking’
a response time of participants, and ‘updating’ participant ratings are all
human activities that the claims more efficiently organize by applying them
to a ‘network computer system.’”). Thus, the Examiner correctly determines
that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, namely, an abstract idea. See Final
Act. 3.
Step 2A, Prong Two: Does claim 1 recite additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application?
Having found that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, namely, an
abstract idea, we are instructed by the 2019 Revised Guidance to determine
“whether the claim recites additional elements that integrate the exception
into a practical application.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). This evaluation requires us to
determine whether an additional element or a combination of additional
elements in the claim applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If the recited
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim is not
“directed to” the judicial exception.
Appellant argues that claim 1 recites limitations that integrate the
identified judicial exception into a practical application. Appeal Br. 10–13.
Appellant asserts that claim 1 is analogous to the claims at issue in DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (id.
at 10) because the claim is “rooted in computer technology (i.e., computer
implemented [ride share] programs) to overcome a problem specifically
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arising in the realm of computer networks (i.e., computer implemented [ride
share] programs inability to pair individuals with a degree of familiarity)”
(id. at 11). Appellant also asserts that claim 1 “recite[s] a specific
implementation of a computer system which provides for the concrete
implementation of improving a ride sharing experience by reducing the
probability that strangers will be paired together resulting in an increase of
comfort level for both the driver and riders.” Id. at 12; see also Reply Br. 3
(asserting that “the claimed invention does not simply apply the concept of
‘[ride sharing]’ using general computer hardware, but rather includes a
specific implementation of computer system and specific computerized
technology such as utilizing global positioning information, verification of
credentials through graphical user interface, and identifying geographic
routes using the information provided”). We are not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument.
The claims at issue in DDR address the problem of retaining website
visitors who would otherwise be transported away from the host website
after clicking on an advertisement on the host website and activating a
hyperlink. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. The DDR claims automatically generate
a hybrid web page that permits users visiting a host website to view and
purchase products from a third-party merchant, whose ads are displayed with
hyperlinks on the host website, without leaving the host website and entering
that merchant’s website. Id. The Federal Circuit determined that the claims
are directed to patent-eligible subject matter because they “specify how
interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result—a
result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events
ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” Id. at 1258. Thus, the
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solution set forth in the DDR claims “is necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks.” Id. at 1257.
In contrast, Appellant’s claim 1 coordinates ride sharing by matching
drivers and riders employed by the same organization so that drivers and
riders have a degree of familiarity. Appeal Br. 11. As discussed above, the
Examiner finds that the claim “include[s] the additional elements of a
computer system and a graphical user interface.” Ans. 3. We agree with the
Examiner that these elements are recited at a high level of generality and
appear to merely serve as a tool to perform the abstract idea in a generic
computing environment. Final Act. 3. Claim 1 does not purport to improve
the functioning of the computer system itself or overcome a problem arising
in the realm of computer networks. The problem with which the invention is
concerned is that “lack of convenience, lack of familiarity with other riders,
difficulty in finding a group of riders for ride sharing, and other factors may
reduce the use of ride sharing” (Spec. ¶ 31)—a problem existing before
computer systems and not rooted in technology. In order words,
“coordinating ride sharing for people in an organization” (id. ¶ 1) is a
concept that is not unique to the Internet or computer technology, and is not
rooted in computer technology. See also Ans. 7 (the Examiner explaining
that “Appellant’s integration of [ride sharing] in a computerized
environment simply amounts to a general application of the processing
elements to the abstract idea and the computerized environment is only
recited as a general link of the abstract idea to a technology or field of use”).
Appellant argues that the claimed “ride sharing coordination also
entails the use of global positions information for devices carried by the
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employees/riders.” Appeal Br. 11. This argument is unpersuasive. Claim 1
recites “selecting, by the computer system, potential riders for the route from
employees in an organization based on locations of the employees and the
driver-selected preferences, wherein the locations of the employees are
based on global positioning system information about data processing
systems carried by the employees.” Id. at 15 (Claims App.). The Examiner
takes the position that the claim “do[es] not recite any specific details about
how GPS is used to determine location data, for example. Even as described
in Appellant’s Specification, locations are identified using known devices
and the location identification is performed at a high level of generality that
amounts to mere data gathering.” Ans. 5. We agree that the use of
employee device global positioning system data in selecting potential riders
does not appear to amount to more than mere data gathering, which
constitutes insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We
have held that mere ‘[data-gathering] step[s] cannot make an otherwise
nonstatutory claim statutory.’” (alterations in original) (quoting In re Grams,
888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989))); see also 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “add[ing] insignificant extra-solution activity to
the” abstract idea as an example of when an abstract idea has not been
integrated into a practical application).
Appellant argues that “[c]oordinating a [ride share] is a concrete
action with real-world consequences. Appellant submits that this
coordinating step is analogous to the ‘opening the press step’ in . . . Diehr
. . . and/or the immunization step in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v.
Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).” Appeal Br. 13. This
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argument is unpersuasive. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Bilski,
“although the machine-or-transformation test is not the only test for
patentability, this by no means indicates that anything which produces a
‘useful, concrete, and tangible result,’ State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (C.A.Fed. 1998), is
patentable.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 659 (Breyer, J., concurring). Thus, “not
every claim that recites concrete, tangible components escapes the reach of
the abstract-idea inquiry.” In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d
607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In other words, that coordinating a ride share
may involve real-world steps and concrete results, the coordinating activity
represents the abstract idea itself (i.e., organizing humans to ride in the same
car) and, thus, does not transform the claim into patent-eligible subject
matter.
Appellant has not provided any specificity regarding any particular
inventive technology associated with the additional elements in claim 1.
The “computer system” element described in the Specification and recited in
the claim appears to function in a generic manner to gather data, execute
program instructions and operations, and output results. See, e.g., Spec.
¶¶ 43, 74–75. There is no further description, in the claim or the
Specification, of any particular technology for performing the steps recited
in the claim other than generic computer components used in their ordinary
capacity as tools to apply the abstract idea. In this regard, the “recitation of
generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim
patent-eligible.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 222).
As for the argument that “Appellant is not attempting to preempt all
manner of coordinating ride sharing but is appropriately limiting the claims
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to an improvement in security in filtering and verification of potential
participants in a specific ride sharing architecture” (Appeal Br. 13), we note
that claim 1 does not recite any limitations regarding security, filtering, or
verification. In other words, the purported improvement argued by
Appellant is not within the scope of claim 1. Thus, Appellant’s argument is
not persuasive. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (“Many of
appellant’s arguments fail from the outset because . . . they are not based on
limitations appearing in the claims.”). Moreover, although “preemption may
signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption
does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In other words,
merely that claim 1 does not preempt all forms of ride sharing coordination
does not make the claim any less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the
claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”).
For the above reasons, we determine that the additional elements
recited in independent claim 1 beyond the judicial exception, whether
considered alone or in combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application.
Step 2B: Does claim 1 add any specific limitations beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine, and conventional”
in the field?
Because we determine that claim 1 fails to recite additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, in
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accordance with the 2019 Revised Guidance, we next consider whether the
claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or instead “simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Appellant argues that
the claims recite more than routine and conventional activities
performed by generic computer components but rather recite a
specific implementation of a computer system which provides
for the concrete implementation of improving a ride sharing
experience by reducing the probability that strangers will be
paired together resulting in an increase of comfort level for both
the driver and riders.
Appeal Br. 12. This argument is not persuasive.
The functions performed by the computer system to improve a user’s
ride sharing experience represents the judicial exception itself (i.e., the
abstract idea, namely, managing interactions between people). However, the
inventive concept under step two of the Mayo/Alice test cannot be the
abstract idea itself. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (“It is clear from Mayo that the ‘inventive
concept’ cannot be the abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s]
untouched the numerous cases from this court which have held claims
ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.”);
see also BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290–91 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (“Our precedent has consistently employed this same approach.
If a claim’s only ‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea
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using conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been
transformed into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.”).
For the reasons discussed above, we find no element or combination
of elements recited in claim 1 beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional” in the field or that contains any
“inventive concept” or adds anything “significantly more” to transform the
abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and claims 3, 6–14, and
17–21 falling therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter.
CONCLUSION
In summary,
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 6–14,
17–21
101 Patent Ineligible
Subject Matter
1, 3, 6–14,
17–21

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED