Adobe Systems Incorporated

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 31, 2020

14016853 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/016,853 09/03/2013 David Rees AD01.3072US01 1006
111003 7590 07/31/2020
Adobe / Finch & Maloney PLLC
50 Commercial Street
Manchester, NH 03101
EXAMINER
WALKER III, GEORGE H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@finchmaloney.com
nmaloney@finchmaloney.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DAVID REES
____________

Appeal 2019-002476
Application 14/016,853
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO,
PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant 0F1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–3, 6–12, and 15–24. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Adobe Systems
Incorporated. Appeal Br. 2.
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THE INVENTION
Appellant claims a method that relates to data processing and more
particularly to techniques for selecting services and locations in the cloud for
performing operations on files. (Spec. ¶ 1).
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving, via a user interface of a local user computing
system, a user request to perform an operation on a file stored
on a remote server computing system by at least one of a
plurality of computing services capable of performing the
operation;
retrieving, from a cache stored on the local user
computing system, historical information about each of the
computing services capable of performing the operation, the
historical information including at least one of a previously
observed monetary cost of performing the operation by the
respective computing service via the local user computing
system and previously observed amount of time to perform the
operation by the respective computing service via the local user
computing system;
calculating, by the local user computing system, an age
of the historical information about each of the computing
services based on at least one of a prior user selection of the
respective computing service via the local user computing
system and a measured outcome of a prior performance of the
operation by the respective computing service and via the local
user computing system;
calculating, by the local user computing system and for
each of the computing services, a weighted value associated
with performing the operation via the local user computing
system as a function of the historical information including at
least one of the previously observed monetary cost of
performing the operation by the respective computing service
and the previously observed amount of time to perform the
operation by the respective computing service, the age of the
historical information, and a user-specified cost criterion;
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generating, by the local user computing system and for
display via the user interface, an ordered list of ranked
computing services indicating the calculated weighted value of
each computing service capable of performing the user-
requested operation according to the user-specified cost
criterion, the list being ordered by the calculated weighted value
corresponding to each computing service capable of performing
the operation on the file;
causing display, via the user interface and in response to
the user request to perform the operation on the file, of the
ordered list of ranked computing services;
receiving, via the user interface, a user selection of one of
the computing services in the displayed list, the user selection
representing a request to perform the operation on the file using
the user-selected computing service; and
causing, in response to receiving the user selection,
automatic performance of the operation on the file stored on the
remote server computing system using the user-selected
computing service.

Appeal Br. 30–31 (Claims Appendix).

THE REJECTION
Claims 1–3, 6–12 and 15–24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because they are directed to non-patentable subject matter. 1F2

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 1–3, 6–12 and 15–24 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents

2 The rejections under 35 U.S.C. §112(a) and 35 U.S.C. §103(a) have been
withdrawn. (Ans. 3).
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that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts. First, . . . determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. . . . If so, . . . then
ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?”
. . . . To answer that question, . . . consider the
elements of each claim both individually and “as
an ordered combination” to determine whether the
additional elements “transform the nature of the
claim” into a patent-eligible application. . . . [The
Court] described step two of this analysis as a
search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is
“sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon
the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–218 (citing Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012))
(citations omitted).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character
as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” See Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the
focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or
on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36.
In so doing we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a
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judicial exception, evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 FR 50, pp. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) “Guidance.”
The Examiner determines that the claims are directed to (1) generating
and displaying a list of evaluated services which employ mathematical
algorithms and on (2) collecting information, analyzing it and displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis. (Final Act. 6–7). The
Examiner finds that the invention employs generic computer functions that
are well-understood, routine and conventional activities that amount to no
more than implementing the abstract idea with a computerized system.
(Final Act. 7–8).
The Specification states that the invention embodiments are directed
to techniques for selecting services and locations in the cloud for performing
user-requested operations on a file. (Spec. ¶ 9). A user interface is used to
search for files by name, date, content, location and/or other parameters.
The search results can be derived from information stored in a local cache
and presented as a list from which the user can select files and perform
operations on the selection. A weighted value associated with a given
service can be computed based on the historical information in the local
cache and the list can be ordered by the weighted values. Id. This
disclosure makes it clear that the invention relates to generating and
displaying a list of evaluated services. The list is derived using a
mathematical algorithm for computing weighted values for the services and
the services are displayed according to the computed weighted values. This
disclosure also makes it clear that after receiving a request from a local user
to perform an operation on a file, information in the form of historical and
other information related to various services is retrieved from cache memory
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and analyzed by calculating weighted values for the services and the list of
services is displayed according to the calculated weighted averages.
Therefore, the Specification discloses that the invention relates to collecting
information, analyzing it and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis.
Consistent with this disclosure, independent claim 1 recites “receiving
. . . a user request to perform an operation on a file stored on a remote server
computing system,” “retrieving . . . historical information about each of the
computing services,” “calculating . . . age of the historical information,”
“calculating . . . a weighted value,” “generating . . . an ordered list,”
“causing display . . . of the ordered list,” and “receiving . . . a user
selection.” These claim limitations relate to generating and displaying a list
of evaluated services using mathematical algorithms and on collecting
information, analyzing it and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis.
We thus agree with the Examiner’s findings that claim 1 is directed to
generating and displaying a list of evaluated services which employ
mathematical algorithms.
Also, we find the steps of receiving, transmitting and analysis of the
information constitute “analyzing information by steps people go through in
their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially
mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC
v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also buySAFE,
Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims directed
to certain arrangements involving contractual relations are directed to
abstract ideas). Thus, we find that the claims recite an abstract idea of
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methods of organizing human activity and in the alternative, a mental
process.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to test”, claim 1 requires
a user interface, a remote server and a local user computing system. The
recitation of these computer components does not impose “a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance 84 Fed.
Reg. at 53. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant
direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 1
invoke any inventive programming, require any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention affects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,”
as that phrase is used in the revised Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55.
In this regard, the recitation does not affect an improvement in the
functioning of the computer components or other technology, does not recite
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a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claims, and does
not transform or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing. Id.
Thus, claim 1 is directed to judicial exceptions that are not integrated into a
practical application and thus is directed to “abstract ideas.”
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claims are directed to abstract ideas, the claims must include an
“inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an
element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012)).
The introduction of a computer components into the claims does not
alter the analysis at Alice step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea
“while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough
for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological
environment.’” Stating an abstract idea while
adding the words “apply it with a computer”
simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a
computer amounts to a mere instruction to
“implemen[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a
computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the
preemption concern that undergirds our § 101
jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers,
wholly generic computer implementation is not
generally the sort of “additional featur[e]” that
provides any “practical assurance that the process
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is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Instead, “the relevant question is whether the claims here do more
than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Id. at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is well-understood, routine and
conventional. Using a computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision
criteria to data and modify the data as a result amounts to electronic data
query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of
these computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the trading industry. See Elec. Power Grp.,
830 F.3d at 1354; see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent
Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower
construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those
functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special
programming”). In short, each step does no more than require a generic
computer to perform generic computer functions. As to the data operated
upon, “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited
to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make
the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claim 1 adds nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis-
access/display is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be
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abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display,
allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor
Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification,
generation, display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was
abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the computer components. As we stated above, claim 1 does not affect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification
spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied
using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing
would entail based on the concept of information access under different
scenarios. In this regard, the Specification discloses that various
components can be integrated to perform the steps of the invention such as a
desktop or laptop computer, workstations, tablets, smartphones, files servers
or such other computing devices. (Spec. ¶ 13). Thus, claim 1 at issue
amounts to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract
idea of information access using some unspecified, generic computer.
Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
We have reviewed all the arguments (Appeal Br. 7–20; Reply Br. 2–
5) Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims
before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
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have been made. But, for purposes of emphasis, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims are patent eligible because they are
similar to the claims found in Core Wireless Licensing v. LG Electronics,
Inc., 2018 WL 542672; Nos. 2016-2684, 2017-1922 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 25,
2018) because the instant claims recite a specific manner of displaying
information. (Appeal Br. 9). We agree with the Examiner’s response to this
argument found on page 5 of the Answer and adopt same as our own.
Specifically, we do not consider claim 1 to improve efficiency or to recite a
particular machine or in a particular technology as were the claims in Core
Wireless. In Core Wireless the court held that claims which recited an
interface were patent eligible because the claims recited specific limitations
of the interface such as: an application summary that can be reached through
a menu, the data being in a list and being selectable to launch an application,
and additional limitations directed to the actual user interface displayed and
how it functions. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363. The court found that the
claims were directed to an improved user interface and not the abstract
concept of an index as the claim “limitations disclose a specific manner of
displaying a limited set of information to the user, rather than using
conventional user interface methods to display a generic index on a
computer.” Id. Claim 1 does not recite an improvement to the user
interface. In fact, claim 1 does not recite any details about the user interface
other than reciting that information is received and displayed via the user
interface which is a function that any general purpose user interface can
perform. The Specification discloses that the functions of the invention can
be performed by similar processors in different configurations and
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arrangements and that various components can be integrated into a desktop
or laptop computer, workstation, tablet, and smartphones which is evidence
that the user interface used to perform the steps of the invention is a well-
understood, routine and conventional user interface and not an improved
user interface. (Spec. ¶ 13). As such, we agree with the Examiner that the
claims are not similar to those in Core Wireless.
Appellant argues that the instant claims are distinguishable from the
claims in Elec. Power because the instant claims identify a particular
computer-implemented tool for generation and presentation of such results.
(Appeal Br. 13). We rely on Elec. Power in making our determination that
as is fully discussed above, claim 1 recites the judicial exception of a mental
process as is explained in Elec Power. As such, we do not rely on Elec
Power to make a finding regarding whether the recitation of the computer
components integrates the mental process recited in claim 1 into a practical
application nor do we rely on Elec. Power in finding that the computer
components recited in claim 1 do not amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea. As fully discussed above, the computer components recited in
claim 1 do not integrate the judicial exception of a mental process into a
practical application because claim 1 does not recite an improvement to the
computer components or other technology. In addition, we also find that the
computer components do not amount to significantly more than the abstract
idea because the computer components are generic components that are well
understood, routine and conventional.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims recite a specific manner of displaying a
limited set of information and a specific, non-generic, non-routine way of
selecting one or more services and locations for performing a user requested
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operation on a file by generating an ordered list (Appeal Br. 14–15). We
agree with the Examiner’s response to this argument found on pages 9–10 of
the Answer and adopt this response as our own. In this regard, we agree
with the Examiner that the displaying and generating steps are part of the
abstract idea of generating and displaying a list of evaluated services which
employ mathematical algorithms and are also part of the mental process
abstract idea. It could not be clearer from Alice, that under step two of the
Mayo/Alice framework, the elements of each claim are considered both
individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the
additional elements, i.e., the elements other than the abstract idea itself,
“transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application.
Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217 (internal quotations and citation omitted);
see Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73 (requiring that “a process that focuses upon the
use of a natural law also contain other elements or a combination of
elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the natural law itself” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)).
In other words, the inventive concept under step two of the Mayo/Alice test
cannot be the abstract idea itself:
It is clear from Mayo that the “inventive concept” cannot
be the abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s]
untouched the numerous cases from this court which have held
claims ineligible because the only alleged “inventive concept”
is the abstract idea.
Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J.,
concurring); see also BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear since Alice that a claimed
invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply
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the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than
that ineligible concept.”) (internal citation omitted).
Appellant argues that claims are patent-eligible in view of the Federal
Circuit's decision in BASCOM Global Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) because the instant claims are tied to a
physical structure (the local computing system). (Appeal Br. 16). Contrary
to Appellant’s arguments, the Federal Circuit did not find that the claims in
BASCOM recited an inventive concept because the claims were tied to a
physical structure. Rather, in BASCOM, the Federal Circuit followed the
Supreme Court's guidance for determining whether the claims recite an
inventive concept set forth in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
International, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357–60(2014).
In Alice, the Supreme Court explained that, under the second step of
the patent-eligibility analysis, “the relevant question is whether the claims
here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract
idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer.” 134 S. Ct. 2347,
2359 (2014). The Supreme Court also provided examples of claims that
represent more than instructions to implement an abstract idea on a generic
computer, such as claims that purport to improve the functioning of the
computer itself and claims that effect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field. Id. at 2359–60.
Turning to BASCOM, the Federal Circuit held “[t]he inventive
concept described and claimed in the '606 patent is the installation of a
filtering tool at a specific location, remote from end-users, with
customizable filtering features specific to each end user.” 827 F.3d at 1350.
In determining this feature to be an inventive concept, the Federal Circuit
explained that the remote location of a filtering tool having customizable
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user-specific filtering features provides the filtering tool both the benefits of
a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server and
is a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering content. Id. at
1350–51. Notably, the Federal Circuit specifically determined that “the
claims may be read to ‘improve[] an existing technological process.”’ Id. at
1351 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358). Here, as discussed above, claim 1
does not recite an improvement to technology or a technological process.
Appellant argues that the claims are similar to the claims in Amdocs
Ltd v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300–1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
because the claims recite techniques for solving an unconventional
technological problem in an unconventional manner.
In Amdocs, the court held that “[claim 1] is eligible under step two
because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.”’ Amdocs, 841 F.3d at
1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting
information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to
enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The court explained that
the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data
in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows
[that] previously required massive databases).” Id. The court noted that,
although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim's
enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components
operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in
computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–01. When determining that the claim
was patent eligible, the Federal Circuit explained that the “enhancing
limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network
devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed
fashion to solve a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The court
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distinguished the claim from the claims held unpatentable on the grounds
that the “enhancing limitation . . . necessarily incorporates the invention's
distributed architecture--an architecture providing a technological solution to
a technological problem.” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1301 (citations omitted).
But unlike the generic components at issue in Amdocs, the generic
components recited in claim 1 here do not operate in an unconventional
manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. Rather, they
merely receive and display data, analyze data, permit updating of the data
and selection of an option, and send notifications, which are basic computer
functions. See Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876
F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (holding that considering
claims reciting data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and
transmission as an “ordered combination” reveals that they “‘amount to
‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply [an] abstract idea'
using generic computer technology”).
Appellant argues that the recitation of “causing . . . automatic
performance of the operation on the file” is significantly more than any
abstract idea recited in claim 1. (Reply Br. 4). This recitation indicates that
after a user has selected a service to perform the operation on the file, the
operation on the file is performed. This subject matter does not reflect a
patent-eligible application of the patent-ineligible abstract idea. To the
contrary, this recitation is recited at a high-level of generality and comprises
routine techniques and post-solution activity that does not impart a sufficient
inventive concept to claim 1. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1298 (“well-
understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by
scientists who work in the field ... is normally not sufficient to transform an
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such law.”);
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see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“The notion that post-
solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form
over substance.”). The prohibition against patenting an abstract idea “cannot
be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular
technological environment or adding insignificant post-solution activity.”
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court in Alice noted that “‘[s]imply
appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality,’ was
not ‘enough’ [in Mayo] to supply an ‘inventive concept.”’ Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300, 1297, 1294). Appellant has not
persuasively shown otherwise.
In view of the foregoing, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. §101. We will also sustain this rejection as it is
directed to the remaining claims because Appellant has not argued the
separate eligibility of these claims.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–3, 6–12,
and 15–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 6–12,
15–24
101 Eligibility 1–3, 6–12,
15–24

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED