Adobe Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 1, 2020

14054238 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/054,238 10/15/2013 Vineet Gupta 3583US01 1026
108982 7590 06/01/2020
SBMC
116 W. Pacific Avenue
Suite 200
Spokane, WA 99201
EXAMINER
ANDREI, RADU
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3682
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@sbmc-law.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte VINEET GUPTA, HARSH JHAMTANI, DEVESH VARSHNEY,
DEEPAM KEDIA, and SHWETA M. KARWA
Appeal 2019-005166
Application 14/054,238
Technology Center 3600

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JOYCE CRAIG, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 1, 3, 5–7, 9, 16, 18, 19, 22–24, and 26–32 are pending, stand
rejected, are appealed by Appellant,1 and are the subject of our decision
under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). See Final Act. 1; Appeal Br. 3.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Adobe
Incorporated. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Throughout our decision we refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”)
filed Oct. 15, 2013; Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed Apr. 9, 2019; and
Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed June 18, 2019. We also refer to the
Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) dated Nov. 5, 2018; and
Answer (“Ans.”) dated Apr. 22, 2019.
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We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention relates to “techniques for identifying purchase intent in
social posts.” Spec. ¶ 13. Claims 1 (reciting a “computer-implemented
method”), 16 (reciting a “computer-readable storage media”), and 27
(reciting a “system”) are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:

receiving, by a computing device, a topic;

collecting, by the computing device, social posts from a
social networking system that are related to the topic;

receiving, by the computing device, a purchase intent
model that is generated by analyzing annotated historical posts
of a training corpus, said analyzing comprising determining
purchase intent words and non-purchase intent words based on a
comparison of a number of times that a particular word appears
in historical social posts that are annotated as expressing
purchase intent with a number of times the particular word
appears in historical social posts that are annotated as not
expressing purchase intent;

for each of the collected social posts:

computing, by the computing device, a confidence
level that the collected social post is a purchase intent post
that expresses purchase intent towards the topic by
applying the purchase intent model to the collected social
post, the confidence level comprising a percentage
confidence of the collected social post being a purchase
intent post;

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comparing, by the computing device, the computed
confidence level for the collected social post to a
confidence threshold; and

determining, by the computing device, that the
collected social post is a purchase intent post in response
to the confidence level for the collected social post being
above the confidence threshold, and determining that the
collected social post corresponds to a non-purchase intent
post in response to the confidence level for the collected
social post being below the confidence threshold;

causing, by the computing device, display of
representations of at least one purchase intent post and at least
one non-purchase intent post in a user interface;

receiving, by the computing device, a selection of one of
the displayed representations; and

displaying, by the computing device, an identifier of a user
that submitted the post corresponding to the selected
representation, at least a portion of text of the post corresponding
to the selected representation, and the computed confidence level
of the post corresponding to the selected representation being a
purchase intent post.

Appeal Br. 71–72 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Christianson et al.
(“Christianson”)
US 2008/0046317 A1 Feb. 21, 2008
Lukose et al.
(“Lukose”)
US 2010/0114654 A1 May 6, 2010
Dilip et al. (“Dilip”) US 2011/0179114 A1 July 21, 2011
Nanba et al.
(“Nanba”)
US 2014/0089104 A1 Mar. 27, 2014
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Murray US 8,688,602 B1 Apr. 1, 2014 (filed Feb.
21, 2012)
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3, 5–7, 9, 16, 18, 19, 22–24, and 26–
32 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter. See Final Act. 4–7.
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3, 5–7, 9, 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 27, and
29–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Dilip, Murray,
Christianson, and Nanba. See Final Act. 8–17.
The Examiner rejects claims 23, 26, and 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Dilip, Murray, Christianson, Nanba, and Lukose. See
Final Act. 17–18.
ANALYSIS
Subject Matter Eligibility—35 U.S.C. § 101
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 77–80 (2012). “[F]or distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The
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framework requires us first to consider “whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
If so, we then examine “the elements of [the] claim both individually and ‘as
an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements
‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). That is, we examine the
claim for an “‘inventive concept,’” “an element or combination of elements
that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office has published revised guidance concerning this
framework and the application of § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(hereinafter “2019 Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance, after
determining that a claim falls into a statutory category of invention
(USPTO’s Step 1), we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes, or
certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people) (hereinafter
“USPTO’s Step 2A, Prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (hereinafter
“USPTO’s Step 2A, Prong 2”).3
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55.

3 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08-2017
(rev. Jan. 2018).
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A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so
integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent
eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an inventive concept. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
For example, we look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.4
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the § 101
rejection. The Examiner rejects Appellant’s claims 1, 3, 5–7, 9, 16, 18, 19,
22–24, and 26–32 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See
Final Act. 4–7; Ans. 3–6. Appellant relies on the same arguments presented
for claim 1 as for all claims, and thus Appellant does not separately argue

4 Items (3) and (4) are collectively referred to as “USPTO’s Step 2B”
hereinafter and in the 2019 Revised Guidance.
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the claims with specificity. See Appeal Br. 15–36. We thus consider the
rejected claims to be argued together for this rejection, and we address the
Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 as representative, as permitted
by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Statutory Subject Matter
Claim 1 recites a “method” that uses a “computing device” to perform
various steps. Appeal Br. 71–72 (Claims App.). Accordingly, we analyze
Appellant’s method as a process, which is a statutory category of invention
(subject matter) (USPTO’s Step 1).
Abstract Idea
The Examiner finds claim 1 covers “a process aimed at identifying
social post purchase intent that exceeds a confidence level and displaying the
identified intent post together with a non-purchase intent post,” which falls
within the abstract ideas category of certain methods of organizing human
activity, specifically, advertising, marketing, or sales activities. Ans. 4. The
Examiner also finds claim 1 includes steps that “could be performed by a
human being . . . mentally or manually, i.e. with pen and paper.” Final Act.
4.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Appeal Br. 15–36;
Reply Br. 2–9. Specifically, Appellant contends, with respect to USPTO’s
Step 2A, Prong 1, that claim 1 “represent[s] a technological improvement
that clearly distinguishes the claim from an abstract idea” (Appeal Br. 16),
that the Examiner has “oversimplified claim 1” (Appeal Br. 19), that specific
limitations do not fall within an abstract idea category (see Appeal Br. 19–
25; Reply Br. 3–4), and that claim 1 “is similar to claim 1 of McRO, in that it
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defines a method that uses a combined order of specific rules that considers
specific information that is used and applied to create desired results”
(Appeal Br. 25) (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1
recites abstract ideas that are not integrated into a practical application and
does not include an inventive concept. In view of the 2019 Revised
Guidance, we clarify and expand the Examiner’s reasoning as follows.
We begin our analysis by broadly but reasonably construing, as
necessary, the limitations of Appellant’s claim 1. See Appeal Br. 71–72
(Claims App.). Omitting the portions of the claim invoking use of generic
technology (which are discussed separately below), claim 1 recites the
following: “receiving . . . a topic”; “collecting . . . social posts from a social
networking system that are related to the topic”; “receiving . . . a purchase
intent model”—that is, receiving a model that is built through a known
machine-learning technique and used for distinguishing between social posts
that have purchase intent and social posts that do not have purchase intent
(see Spec. ¶¶ 43–53, 59–62); “for each of the collected social posts:
computing . . . a confidence level that the collected social post is a purchase
intent post . . . by applying the purchase intent model to the collected social
post, the confidence level comprising a percentage confidence of the
collected social post being a purchase intent post”—in other words, using
the text of a given social post as input to the purchase intent model and
calculating a percentage-based confidence level as output (see Spec. ¶¶ 30–
32); “comparing . . . the computed confidence level for the collected social
post to a confidence threshold”; “determining . . . that the collected social
post is a purchase intent post” or “determining . . . that the collected social
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post corresponds to a non-purchase intent post”—that is, classifying a given
social post as a purchase intent post or non-purchase intent post based on
whether the confidence level is greater than or equal to a predetermined
confidence threshold (see Spec. ¶¶ 27, 33); “causing . . . display of
representations of at least one purchase intent post and at least one non-
purchase intent post”; “receiving . . . a selection of one of the displayed
representations”; and “displaying . . . an identifier of a user that submitted
the post corresponding to the selected representation, at least a portion of the
text of the post . . . , and the computed confidence level.”
The claim 1 limitations identified above include receiving a topic,
collecting social posts related to the topic, receiving a purchase intent model,
and then performing an interaction whereby representations of social posts
that have been analyzed according to the purchase intent model are
displayed, a selection is received, and details related to the selection are
displayed. This process is essentially a way of determining which social
posts on a given topic are most likely to express a purchase intent, and are
therefore most worth targeting with advertisements. For example, the
Specification discloses “a mobile phone company may be able to use
purchase intent module 110 to cause an advertisement or promotion to be
displayed to users that make social posts expressing purchase intent towards
a phone.” Spec. ¶ 42. Such process is an advertising, marketing, or sales
activity that falls within the abstract ideas category of certain methods of
organizing human activity. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The other claim 1 limitations identified above include computing a
confidence level for a given social post by applying the purchase intent
model, comparing the confidence level to a pre-determined confidence
threshold, and then determining whether to classify the social post as a
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purchase intent post or non-purchase intent post. These limitations are part
and parcel of the process discussed above that is properly categorized as an
advertising, marketing, or sales activity. In addition, the “computing,”
“comparing,” and “determining” limitations are essentially “data analysis
steps [that] are recited at a high level of generality such that they could
practically be performed in the human mind.” October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility 7, available at https://www.
uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf
(hereinafter “October 2019 Update”). In other words, these limitations are
evaluations that fall within the mental processes category of abstract ideas.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Because each of the limitations discussed above encompasses a step
that is either part of an advertising, marketing, or sales activity, or that
people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper, claim 1 recites a
combination of abstract ideas. Appellant’s arguments regarding specific
limitations in claim 1 (Appeal Br. 19–25) have not persuaded us otherwise.
See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332,
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the abstract idea of collecting, displaying,
and manipulating data); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells
Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(finding the “claims generally recite . . . extracting data . . . [and]
recognizing specific information from the extracted data” and that the
“claims are drawn to the basic concept of data recognition”). Even where
the analysis requires one to access and gather data, or utilize a pen and paper
in the analysis, such analysis may still be an abstract mental process. See
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“[E]ven if some physical steps are required to obtain information
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from the database . . . such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer
patentability.”). Moreover, Appellant’s argument that the Examiner has
oversimplified claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 19) is not persuasive because, as we
have identified above, specific claim 1 limitations recite abstract ideas.
With respect to Appellant’s arguments that claim 1 is directed to a
technological improvement and is similar to the claims at issue in McRO
(see Appeal Br. 16, 25), we address the purported technical improvements
with respect to the “Practical Application” of the abstract idea (below).
In summary, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1 recites a judicial
exception (USPTO’s Step 2A, Prong 1; see 2019 Revised Guidance).
Practical Application
Having determined that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., a
combination of abstract ideas, we next determine, under USPTO’s Step 2A,
Prong 2 of the 2019 Revised Guidance, whether the claims are directed to
those abstract ideas, or whether the claims integrate the abstract ideas into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. That
is, we consider any additional elements recited in the claim along with the
limitations that recite abstract ideas to determine whether the claim
integrates the abstract ideas into a practical application. See October 2019
Update 12.
Claim 1 recites the additional elements of “a computing device” and
“a user interface.” Appeal Br. 71–72 (Claims App.). Appellant’s
Specification describes that “[c]omputing device 102, for instance, may be
configured as a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a mobile device . . .
and so forth.” Spec. ¶ 16. The Specification also notes that a computing
device for performing the invention may be “a server of a service provider, a
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device associated with a client (e.g., a client device), an on-chip system,
and/or any other suitable computing device or computing system.” Spec.
¶ 64 (emphasis added). Further, the Specification describes, for example,
that “user interface 112 includes a topic control 302 that enables a user to
identify a particular topic, a confidence threshold control 304 which enables
the user to specify the confidence threshold, and a social network control
306 which enables the user to select which social networks are to be
monitored.” Spec. ¶ 28. User interface 112 can also “display
representations of PI posts 308 and non-PI posts 310” and “enable[] the user
to select a representation of one of PI posts 308 or non-PI posts 310 to view
additional information about the selected post.” Spec. ¶¶ 34–35.
In summary, Appellant’s written description portrays the claimed
“computing device” as a general purpose computer, and the claimed “user
interface” as a component that can receive user control input and display
information output, but without any specific details as to how the user
interface performs these functions. Accordingly, Appellant’s written
description does not define the additional elements as operating in a new
way, but rather depicts these elements as generic computer components
operating in their accustomed manner. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A] patent need not
teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.”); Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation details that it
amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware, or firmware)
that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-
specific resources.”).
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None of the additional elements, whether taken alone or in the context
of the claims as a whole, integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application. For example, the “computing device” may improve the mental
process of “computing . . . a confidence level . . . by applying the purchase
intent model,” but it does not describe an improvement in the functioning of
a computer, or an improvement to another technology or technical field. See
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Appellant contends claim 1 is analogous to the claims at issue in
McRO and DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed.
Cir. 2014). Appeal Br. 25–27. In other words, Appellant contends claim 1
recites a technological improvement that amounts to more than simply
utilizing a computer as a tool, and includes features that “are clearly more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize ‘marketing, sales activities or
behaviors, processes.’” Reply Br. 6.
We disagree with Appellant’s contentions. The additional elements in
claim 1 do not apply or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See Alice, 573 U.S. at
221–24 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–85). Rather, Appellant’s claim recites
generic computer components (e.g., the computing device and user
interface) that are utilized as tools to carry out the claimed steps. Utilizing
computers as tools to perform common data collection, analysis, and display
functions that can be mental processes or advertising, marketing, and sales
activities (abstract ideas) does not impose a meaningful limit on the abstract
ideas. See MPEP § 2106.05(f); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (finding “if
[the] recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to implement an
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abstract idea on a computer that addition cannot impart patent eligibility”)
(quotations and citations omitted).
Appellant’s claim 1 can be distinguished from patent-eligible claims
such as those in McRO and DDR Holdings that are directed to “a specific
means or method that improves the relevant technology” (McRO, 837 F.3d
at 1314), or a method “rooted in computer technology in order to overcome
a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer [technology]” (DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257). Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, claim 1 is
not a technological improvement or an improvement in a technology.
Appellant’s claim 1 does not “improve the functioning of the computer
itself” or “any other technology or technical field.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225.
Nor does it provide a technological solution to a technological problem. See
DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257; MPEP § 2106.05(a). Appellant fails to
explain sufficiently and persuasively how claim 1 is directed to an
improvement in the way computers operate, nor has Appellant identified any
technical advance or improvement or specialized computer components. See
Appeal Br. 26–31.
In summary, “the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement
in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use
computers as tools.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also MPEP § 2106.05(f) (instructing Examiners
to consider “[w]hether the claim invokes computers or other machinery
merely as a tool to perform an existing process” in determining whether the
claim recites mere instructions to apply the exception) (cited in 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.30) (emphasis omitted). Thus, we
conclude that claim 1, and the other claims grouped therewith, are directed
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to a combination of abstract ideas that are not integrated into a practical
application.
Inventive Concept
Having concluded Appellant’s claims are directed to a judicial
exception under the 2019 Revised Guidance (USPTO’s Step 2A analysis),
we consider whether claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is, whether the
claim has additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 78, 79). As discussed above, this requires us to evaluate whether the
additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field” or “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.”
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determined that Appellant’s claim 1 does not include
additional elements that, when considered individually and in combination,
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. See Final Act. 5–6;
Ans. 5.
Appellant contends claim 1 includes features that are not well-
understood, routine, or conventional, including “causing . . . display of
representations of at least one purchase intent post and at least one non-
purchase intent post in a user interface,” and in response to receiving a
selection, “displaying . . . an identifier of a user that submitted the post
corresponding to the selected representation, at least a portion of text of the
post . . . , and the computed confidence level of the post.” Appeal Br. 32.
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Appellant fails to persuade us of error in the Examiner’s rejection
with respect to USPTO’s Step 2B. Appellant’s arguments are directed to
claim 1 limitations that we find to be abstract ideas, as discussed above
regarding USPTO’s Step 2A, Prong 1. “It is clear from Mayo that the
‘inventive concept’ cannot be the abstract idea itself.” Aatrix Software, Inc.
v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
To the extent Appellant argues the “user interface” in claim 1 is not
well-understood, routine, or conventional (see Appeal Br. 32), we disagree
for the same reasons discussed above regarding USPTO’s Step 2A, Prong 2.
In particular, the Specification describes the “user interface” as a component
that can receive user control input and display information output, but
without any specific details as to how the user interface performs these
functions. See Spec. ¶¶ 34–35. The “user interface” in claim 1, therefore, is
a conventional computer component that functions as one would expect
well-known user interfaces to function.
For at least the reasons above, Appellant has not persuasively shown
the additional elements amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception when considered either individually or as a combination, and we
are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 1, and the
claims grouped therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of independent claims 1, 16, and
27, and dependent claims 3, 5–7, 9, 18, 19, 22–24, 26, and 28–32, which
depend from claims 1, 16, and 27, respectively.

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Obviousness—35 U.S.C. § 103
Claims 1, 3, 5–7, 9, 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 27, and 29–32
The Examiner rejects independent claim 1 as being obvious over
Dilip, Murray, Christianson, and Nanba. See Final Act. 8–17; Ans. 6–9.
Appellant contends, inter alia, that the cited references do not teach or
suggest “receiving . . . a selection of one of the displayed representations”
and “displaying . . . an identifier of a user that submitted the post . . . , at
least a portion of text of the post . . . , and the computed confidence level,”
as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 39–43; Reply Br. 16–20.
The Examiner relies on Nanba for the disputed limitations. See Final
Act. 11–12. Nanba “relates to an advertising providing system that takes
advantage of the comment function of an SNS [(social networking service)]
to expand Internet advertising.” Nanba, Abstract. The Examiner cites to
Nanba’s Figure 7, which shows a personal page for a user along with
comments made by the user and another user. See Nanba ¶¶ 76–77.
The Examiner, however, has not specifically identified (see Final Act.
11–12; Ans. 7), and we have not found, any features in Nanba’s Figure 7 or
the accompanying description that meet the claim 1 limitations of “receiving
. . . a selection of one of the displayed representations” and “displaying”
various information such as a user identifier, a portion of text, and a
computed confidence level “corresponding to the selected representation.”
Consequently, we are constrained by the record before us to find that
the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Dilip, Murray,
Christianson, and Nanba renders obvious Appellant’s claim 1. Independent
claims 16 and 27 include limitations of commensurate scope. Claims 3, 5–7,
9, 18, 19, 22, 24, and 29–32 depend from and stand with their respective
base claims.
Appeal 2019-005166
Application 14/054,238
18
Claims 23, 26, and 28
The Examiner rejects dependent claims 23, 26, and 28 as being
obvious over Dilip, Murray, Christianson, Nanba, and Lukose. See Final
Act. 17–18. The Examiner does not suggest, and we do not find, that the
additional cited reference, Lukose, cures the deficiency of Dilip, Murray,
Christianson, and Nanba discussed above. Therefore, we reverse the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claims 23, 26, and 28 for the
same reasons set forth for claim 1.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 5–7, 9,
16, 18, 19,
22–24, 26–32
101 Eligibility 1, 3, 5–7, 9,
16, 18, 19,
22–24, 26–32

1, 3, 5–7, 9,
16, 18, 19,
22, 24, 27,
29–32
103 Dilip,
Murray,
Christianson,
Nanba
1, 3, 5–7, 9,
16, 18, 19,
22, 24, 27,
29–32
23, 26, 28 103 Dilip,
Murray,
Christianson,
Nanba,
Lukose
23, 26, 28
Overall
Outcome
1, 3, 5–7, 9,
16, 18, 19,
22–24, 26–32

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f) (2017).
Appeal 2019-005166
Application 14/054,238
19
AFFIRMED