01972121
03-03-1999
______________________________
Cynthia M. Reynolds, )
Appellant, )
)
v. )
) Appeal No. 01972121
William J. Henderson, ) Agency No. 4-C-190-1040-95
Postmaster General, ) Hearing No. 170-95-8544X
United States Postal Service, )
(Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region) )
Agency. )
______________________________)
DECISION
Appellant timely appeals the final agency decision (�FAD�) concerning her
complaint of unlawful employment discrimination, in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.
Appellant alleged that the agency discriminated against her on the bases
of her race (African-American) and sex (female) when: (1) she was placed
on nonduty/nonpay status on October 6, 1994; and (2) she was terminated
on October 24, 1994, for failure to report an accident. This appeal is
accepted in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.
For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.
The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant was employed
by the agency as a part-time flexible letter carrier in the Elkins Park,
Pennsylvania Post Office (�facility�). The agency hired appellant on
September 3, 1994, and during her first month, provided her training
which included a week of driver's training. After completing her
training, appellant reported to the facility and initially assisted
an experienced carrier in delivering the mail. On October 4, 1994,
appellant was given her first individual route and vehicle. Because the
facility did not have a vehicle ready for appellant, one was borrowed
from the Hunting Park facility. After appellant inspected the vehicle,
she commenced with delivering her route. Later that afternoon, appellant
stated that she was stopped by a gas station attendant and informed that
her vehicle's front wheels were �wobbling.� She parked the vehicle and
telephoned a supervisor at the facility. The Customer Service Supervisor
and another postal employee came out to meet appellant and gave her a
replacement vehicle so she could finish her route. The Customer Service
Supervisor confirmed that the wheels were misaligned and decided to have
the vehicle towed. Appellant finished her route. The vehicle was towed
the following day to the Hunting Park facility, where a facility mechanic
determined that the vehicle had been in an accident. On October 6,
1994, after receiving the information from the Hunting Park facility
about the suspected accident, the Customer Service Supervisor informed
appellant that she was being placed on nonduty/nonpay status pending
investigation of the incident. The facility's Operations Manager sent
appellant a letter dated October 24, 1994, stating that after further
investigation, she was being terminated for failure to report an accident.
Believing that she was the victim of discrimination, appellant sought
EEO counseling and, thereafter, filed a formal EEO complaint on March
14, 1995. Following the agency's investigation of the complaint,
appellant requested a hearing before an Administrative Judge (�AJ�).
After conducting a hearing and reviewing the evidence of record, the
AJ issued a recommended decision (�RD�) finding no discrimination.
Specifically, the AJ found that appellant established prima facie
cases of race and sex discrimination. The AJ then found that the
agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
disputed actions. In her pretext analysis, the AJ found that the
agency's articulated reasons were not credible. The AJ found that
the record revealed many discrepancies in the testimonies of several
agency witnesses and that the agency's determination that appellant
had an accident on October 4, 1994, was based on insufficient evidence.
However, the AJ found that even though the agency's reasons were flawed,
appellant had not met her ultimate burden of proving that the agency's
actions were motivated by a discriminatory animus toward her race or sex.
The agency's FAD adopted the AJ's RD. On appeal, appellant contends that
where the AJ finds that appellant establishes her prima facie case and
rejects the agency's proffered reasons for its action, it is permissible
for the AJ to infer discrimination. Appellant further contends that the
weight of the evidence in this case supports a finding of discrimination.
The agency provides no response to the appeal.
After a careful review of the record in its entirety, the Commission
finds that the AJ's RD sets forth the relevant facts and properly
analyzes the appropriate regulations, policies and laws. On appeal,
appellant correctly states that where a prima facie case has been
established and the proffered reasons are rejected, the trier-of-fact
can infer discrimination. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) Number 915.002 (April 12,
1994). However, it is also permissible for the trier-of-fact to find
that notwithstanding the prima facie case and rejected agency reasons,
appellant had failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the agency's actions were motivated by unlawful discrimination.
See St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 514-15; Galbraith v. Northern
Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1991). In this case, the
AJ serving as the trier-of-fact found that the weight of the evidence
did not support a finding of discrimination. Therefore, after a
thorough review of the evidence of record, including arguments and
evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, the Commission
discerns no basis to disturb the AJ's finding of no discrimination.
Nothing proffered by appellant on appeal differs significantly from
the arguments raised before, and given full consideration by, the AJ.
Accordingly, it is the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the agency's
final decision which adopted the AJ's finding of no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from
the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil
action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY
(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or
to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the
jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil
action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON
WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT
PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or
department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right
to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
March 3, 1999
__________________ _______________________________
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations