675 West End Owners Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 26, 2005

345 N.L.R.B. 324 (N.L.R.B. 2005)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
345 NLRB No. 27
324
675 West End Owners Corp., Salomon Management
Co., LLC; Niv Realty, LLC; Solomon Manage-
ment Co., LLC; Sharon Realty, LLC; Dan Co.,
LLC; and Tal Co., LLC-A Single Employer and
Gal Realty, LLC; Salomon Realty; Niv Realty;
Solomon Realty; Sharon Realty; Uzi EINY d/b/a
Dan Co.; Tal Co.; and Riv Realty-A Single Em-
ployer, Joint Employers and Stationary Engi-
neers, Firemen, Maintenance and Building Ser-
vice Union Local 670, RWDSU, UFCW, AFL–
CIO. Cases 2–CA–33940, 2–CA–34059, and 2–
CA–34587
August 26, 2005
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND SCHAUMBER
On December 27, 2002, Administrative Law Judge El-
eanor MacDonald issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondents filed exceptions, supporting briefs, and reply
briefs.1 The General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,2 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified and set forth in full below.
The judge found, and we agree for the reasons stated
by her, that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) by
hiring a security guard company to perform bargaining
unit work without prior notice to and bargaining with the
Union, refusing to meet and negotiate with the Union on
this matter, and refusing to provide information to the

1 The Board accepted separate exceptions filed by both individual
Respondent Uzi Einy and attorney Morris Tuchman on behalf of the
Respondents. Accordingly, we are referring to arguments made in both
Einy’s and Tuchman’s briefs when we reference arguments made by
the “Respondents.”
2 The Respondents have excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
The Respondents contend that the judge’s rulings, findings, and con-
clusions demonstrate bias and prejudice, and that it was not afforded a
full opportunity to be heard. On careful examination of the judge’s
decision and the entire record, we are satisfied that the Respondents’
contentions are without merit. Accordingly, we also find no merit in
the Respondents’ exception to the judge’s refusal to recuse herself.
Finally, in adopting the judge’s findings, we find it unnecessary to
rely on the judge’s reference to Uzi Einy’s religious practices in her
finding that the Respondents did not mail a letter to the Union request-
ing bargaining.
Union.3 Further, the judge found, and we agree for the
reasons stated by her and discussed below, that the Re-
spondents’ ownership and management companies are
each a single employer and together are joint employers,
and that the Respondents’ argument that the Board in its
earlier representation case did not properly certify the
Union is meritless. Additionally, we find that the judge
did not abuse her discretion in dismissing the Respon-
dents’ other procedural arguments.4 Finally, we agree
with the judge’s recommendation, as discussed below,
that a hearing should be held to determine the litigation
costs expended by the Union and the General Counsel as
a result of Respondent Uzi Einy’s (Einy) willful violation
of the judge’s instructions regarding subpoenas. How-
ever, for the reasons discussed below, we do not adopt
the judge’s further recommendation that the Board warn
and reprimand Einy for his conduct during the hearing.
1. Background
The Respondents own and manage residential build-
ings in New York City. Each of the Respondents’ seven
residential rental properties is respectively owned and
managed by a different limited liability company and a
partnership of the same name.5 Einy has substantial
ownership interest in all of the Respondents’ affiliated
business entities.
In 1999, the Respondents’ doormen began organizing.
In a Decision and Direction of Election issued on De-
cember 20, 1999 (Case 2–RC–22120), the Regional Di-
rector determined, among other things, that the Respon-
dents’ ownership companies are a single employer, that
the Respondents’ management companies are a single
employer, and that together they are joint employers.

3 We find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s conclusion that the
Respondents’ hiring of nonunit security guards violated Sec. 8(a)(3) in
addition to Sec. 8(a)(5) because the additional finding of the Sec.
8(a)(3) violation would not materially affect the remedy. We have
modified the Order accordingly, and we have substituted a new notice
to comport with these modifications.
4 We adopt the judge’s decision to revoke the Respondents’ post-
hearing subpoena, which requested from the court reporter audiotapes
of the hearing. We have reviewed the transcript of the hearing cited by
the Respondents in support of their exceptions to the judge’s ruling.
Even if the audiotapes support the Respondents’ contentions that the
judge raised her voice in addressing Uzi Einy on one occasion and, on
another occasion, mistakenly accused him of speaking when he had not,
the judge’s conduct in this regard would not establish bias. In light of
Einy’s conduct at the hearing, as described in detail in the judge’s deci-
sion, the judge’s rulings occurred in the context of Einy’s disputing or
ignoring the judge’s rulings and instructions. Such evidence does not
show bias on the part of the judge or require a different result than we
reach here. Member Schaumber does not join with his colleagues on
this point.
5 All of the ownership companies are managed by a company of the
same name except 675 West End Owners Corp., which is managed by
Gal Realty.
675 WEST END OWNERS CORP. 325
The Respondents requested review of this determination,
which the Board denied by unpublished decision on Feb-
ruary 29, 2000.
An election was conducted on January 28, 2000.
Thereafter, the Respondents filed objections alleging
conduct during the election showing Board bias. The
Regional Director has correctly determined that the Re-
spondents withdrew this objection. The Respondents
also filed challenges to the ballots of six doormen on the
ground that they were statutory guards, which a hearing
officer overruled. The Respondents excepted to the
Hearing Officer’s Report; the Regional Director adopted
the hearing officer’s recommendations regarding the
challenges and the Board denied the Respondents’ re-
quest for review. A corrected tally of ballots issued after
the ballots were opened and counted, reflecting that the
Union received a majority of the valid votes cast. There-
after, the Respondents filed further objections to the elec-
tion, again disputing, among other things, the single em-
ployer and joint employer findings.6 On May 23, 2001,7
the Acting Regional Director disposed of the Respon-
dents’ objections and issued a Certification of Represen-
tative.
2. The Respondents’ arguments concerning
the representation case
The Respondents argue that the Union was not prop-
erly certified and that the Respondents’ ownership and
management companies were not properly determined to
be each a single employer and together joint employers
in the earlier representation case. The Respondents al-
lege that the Board never dealt with the Respondents’
objections to the corrected tally of ballots, which dis-
puted, among other things, the single employer and joint
employer findings.
We find no merit in the Respondents’ assertion. The
Acting Regional Director disposed of the Respondents’
objections on May 23, concluding that the objections
were either untimely, had been resolved with finality by
the Board’s denials of the Respondents’ requests for re-
view, or were meritless. The Respondents did not request
Board review of the Acting Regional Director’s disposi-
tion of its objections. Under Section 102.67(f) of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, “[f]ailure to request re-
view shall preclude such parties from relitigating, in any
related subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding, any
issue which was, or could have been, raised in the repre-

6 As stated earlier, the Respondents requested Board review of these
findings after the Regional Director issued the Decision and Direction
of Election, which the Board denied.
7 Unless otherwise stated, all dates are in 2001.
sentation proceeding.” Accordingly, we find that the
Respondents are barred from raising this argument now.
3. Conduct of Einy
The judge recommended that the Board warn Einy for
evading and delaying the processes of the Board by re-
fusing certified mail, and reprimand him for submitting
an essentially groundless answer on behalf of the Re-
spondents and failing to follow the judge’s instructions
during the hearing. The judge’s recommendation does
not comport with Section 102.177(e) of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations.8 Accordingly, we decline to fol-
low that recommendation.
Under Section 102.177(b) of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations,9 the judge had the authority to reprimand or
admonish Einy for his conduct during the hearing. Ac-

8 Apart from the authority of a judge to reprimand or admonish for
conduct during the course of a hearing, Sec. 102.177(e) sets out a care-
fully delineated procedure for the investigation and institution of disci-
plinary procedures designed to ensure that allegations of misconduct
will be handled according to established procedures with appropriate
due process safeguards. Sec. 102.177(e) states in relevant part:
All allegations of misconduct pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section,
except for those involving the conduct of Agency employees, shall be
handled in accordance with the following procedures: (1) Allegations
that an attorney or party representative has engaged in misconduct
may be brought to the attention of the Investigating Officer by any
person. The Investigating Officer, for purposes of this paragraph,
shall be the Associate General Counsel, Division of Operations-
Management, or his/her designee. (2) The Investigating Officer or
his/her designee shall conduct such investigation as he/she deems ap-
propriate and shall have the usual powers of investigation provided in
Section 11 of the Act. Following the investigation, the Investigating
Officer shall make a recommendation to the General Counsel, who
shall make the determination whether to institute disciplinary proceed-
ings against the attorney or party representative. The General Coun-
sel’s authority to make this determination shall not be delegable to the
Regional Director or other personnel in the Regional Office. If the
General Counsel determines not to institute disciplinary proceedings,
all interested persons shall be notified of the determination, which
shall be final. (3) If the General Counsel decides to institute discipli-
nary proceedings against the attorney or party representative, the Gen-
eral Counsel or his/her designee shall serve the Respondent with a
complaint which shall include: a statement of the acts which are
claimed to constitute misconduct including the approximate date and
place of such acts together with a statement of the discipline recom-
mended; notification of the right to a hearing before an administrative
law judge with respect to any material issues of fact or mitigation; and
an explanation of the method by which a hearing may be requested.
Such a complaint shall not be issued until the Respondent has been
notified of the allegations in writing and has been afforded a reason-
able opportunity to respond.
See also Sec. 102.177(f).
9 Sec. 102.177(b) states, “Misconduct by any person at any hearing
before an administrative law judge, hearing officer, or the Board shall
be grounds for summary exclusion from the hearing. Notwithstanding
the procedures set forth in par. (e) of this section for handling allega-
tions of misconduct, the administrative law judge, hearing officer, or
Board shall also have the authority in the proceeding in which the mis-
conduct occurred to admonish or reprimand, after due notice, any per-
son who engages in misconduct at a hearing.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD326
cording to the judge, Einy talked loudly at counsel table
and interrupted while witnesses were testifying, claiming
he did not know what was going on; interfered with op-
posing counsel’s questions by demanding to know their
purpose; communicated with testifying witnesses by tes-
tifying himself in response to opposing counsel’s ques-
tions; interposed baseless objections for the purpose of
delay; and repeatedly attempted to evade the ruling that
he could only testify if another person at counsel table
posed the questions. The judge did not exercise her au-
thority under Section 102.177(b), but instead recom-
mended that the Board discipline Einy. However, such
allegations of misconduct are not to be presented to the
Board in the first instance. McAllister Towing & Trans-
portation, 341 NLRB 394 fn. 7 (2004).10 See also Beth-
lehem Temple Learning Center, 330 NLRB 1177, 1178
(2000). Accordingly, we do not pass on the judge’s rec-
ommendation, but shall transmit the judge’s recommen-
dation to the investigating officer under Section
102.177(e), with whom the judge should have filed her
recommendation.
The judge also recommended that a hearing be held to
determine the litigation costs owed by Einy to the Union
and the General Counsel for Einy’s violation of the
judge’s instructions regarding subpoenas. The subpoe-
nas in question involved the Respondents’ requests for
(1) information already in the Respondent’s possession
and revoked by the judge for that reason, and (2) audio-
tapes of the hearing. Specifically, the judge found that
Uzi disobeyed her instructions that a revoked subpoena
may not be served again and that issuance of a subpoena
after the close of the hearing is an abuse of Board proc-
ess. Because we find that Uzi’s actions regarding the
subpoenas amounted to “bad faith in the conduct of the
litigation,” we agree with the judge’s recommendation
that a hearing be held to determine litigation costs owed
to the Union and the General Counsel. See, e.g., Service
Employees District 1199 (Staten Island University Hos-
pital), 339 NLRB 1059 fn. 2 (2003) (rejecting charging
party’s request that the Board order the respondent to pay
its legal fees but noting that the Board has the power to
do so); Teamsters Local 122 (August A. Busch & Co.),
334 NLRB 1190, 1193 (2001) (Board has remedial au-
thority to award litigation costs where a party exhibits
bad faith in the conduct of the litigation), enfd. No. 01-
1513, 2003 WL 880990 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Lake Holiday
Manor, 325 NLRB 469 (1998) (Board has inherent
power to control its own proceedings through the appli-

10 While Member Schaumber disagreed with his colleagues on the
application of the law to the facts in McAllister Towing & Transporta-
tion, supra, he did not disagree with the use of the procedure under Sec.
102.177(e).
cation of the bad-faith exception to the American Rule
against awarding litigation costs). Cf. Alwin Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 192 F.3d 133, 143–144 (D.C. Cir. 1999), enforc-
ing 326 NLRB 646 (1998) (not deciding whether the
Board has the authority to award litigation costs under its
inherent authority). We have modified the Order and
notice accordingly.11
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondents, 675 West End Owners Corp., Salomon
Management Co., LLC, Niv Realty, LLC, Solomon Man-

11 We emphasize that although the D.C. Circuit in Unbelievable, 118
F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997), reversing in relevant part Frontier Hotel &
Casino, 318 NLRB 857 (1995), found that the Board does not have the
power to impose litigation costs under Sec. 10(c), it expressly did not
reach the issue of whether the Board has the power to award litigation
costs under appropriate circumstances such as here: bad faith in the
conduct of litigation. Unbelievable at 800 fn. *. Further, in Alwin,
supra at 143 fn. 13, the D.C. Circuit declined to find a litigation cost
remedy “patently in excess of the Board’s authority” and referred to its
caveat in Unbelievable regarding the “bad-faith” exception to the
American Rule on litigation costs. We further note that relevant cases
cited above awarding costs for “bad-faith” litigation involve discrete
misconduct that is similar to the misconduct at issue here, contrary to
the Chairman’s statement, below. For example, in Teamsters Local
122 (August A. Busch & Co.), supra at 1194, the Board awarded litiga-
tion costs linked to a portion of the proceedings involving particular
complaint allegations because the respondent refused to put on a de-
fense and engaged in lengthy, “abusive” cross-examination designed to
delay the hearing. Similarly, in Lake Holiday Manor, supra at 470, the
Board awarded that portion of litigation costs associated with the re-
spondent’s repeated reneging on settlement agreements and attempting
to delay the hearing at the last minute, contrary to the judge’s instruc-
tions. Finally, we do not address the Chairman’s assertion that the
allegation of misconduct here is “cognizable” under Sec. 102.177 of the
Rules involving possible discipline because we find that the award of
litigation costs is appropriate in any event.
Chairman Battista would not award litigation costs assertedly in-
curred because of the Respondent’s counsel’s alleged disobedience of
the judge’s instructions. The majority finds that this conduct consti-
tuted “bad faith in the conduct of litigation.” However, there is a seri-
ous and substantial question as to whether the Board has the power to
award litigation costs. See Unbelievable, Inc., 118 F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir.
1997), reversing in relevant part Frontier Hotel and Casino, 318 NLRB
857. My colleagues say that the D.C. Circuit, in Unbelievable, did not
pass on whether the Board has the power to award litigation costs for
bad faith in litigation. I disagree. The court clearly held that, absent
clear language in Sec. 10(c), the Board lacked the remedial power to
award litigation costs. Although the court did not pass on whether the
Board had inherent authority to award such costs, the award here is
granted as part of the remedial order, and Sec. 10(c) does not permit
this.
Chairman Battista does not reach the issue of Board power to award
litigation costs. He notes that the cases cited by the majority are cases
where a party litigates a case frivolously, e.g., with no reasonable de-
fense to the allegation of the complaint, or no defense at all; or where
there would have been no litigation at all if settlement had been hon-
ored. By contrast, the misconduct here was a discrete event, viz an
alleged failure to follow specific instructions from the judge. If the
allegation is true, it is cognizable under Sec. 102.177 of the Rule, as is
the other alleged misconduct by counsel in this case.
675 WEST END OWNERS CORP. 327
agement Co., LLC, Sharon Realty, LLC, Dan Co., LLC,
Tal Co., LLC, Gal Realty, LLC, Salomon Realty, Niv
Realty, Solomon Realty, Sharon Realty, Uzi Einy d/b/a
Dan Co., Tal Co., and Riv Realty, New York, New York,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
a. Refusing to meet and negotiate with the Union and
refusing to provide information to the Union.
b. Hiring nonunit employees to perform unit employ-
ees’ work without notice to the Union and without af-
fording the Union an opportunity to bargain over its de-
cision and the effects of the change.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, recognize and bargain with the Union
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the
following appropriate unit concerning terms and condi-
tions of employment and continue such bargaining as if
the initial year of certification had not expired, and, if an
understanding is reached, embody the understanding in a
signed agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time doormen, porters,
maintenance employees and superintendents employed
by the joint employer at the residential apartment house
buildings located in Manhattan at 675 and 700 West
End Avenue, 215 West 101st Street, 309 and 317 West
99th Street, and 214 West 102nd Street, and in the
Bronx at 665 and 690 Allerton Avenue, excluding all
guards and supervisors as defined under the Act.
(b) Furnish the Union with the information requested
in the Union’s letter of August 3, 2001.
(c) Restore the status quo ante by assigning a unit em-
ployee to perform the work currently performed by a
nonunit employee of Command Security Corporation.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its office and in all the buildings in which unit employees
are employed in New York, New York, the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice, in Eng-
lish and Spanish, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 2, after being signed by the Respon-
dent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all

12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respon-
dent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since March 12, 2001.
(e) Pay to the Stationary Engineers, Firemen, Mainte-
nance, and Building Service Union, Local 670, and the
General Counsel all litigation costs incurred by them in
the conduct of this proceeding as a result of the Respon-
dents’ failure to follow the judge’s instructions regarding
subpoenas, all such costs to be determined in the compli-
ance stage of this proceeding.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the alleged misconduct by
Respondent Uzi Einy, for which the judge recommended
the Board discipline Einy, as set forth in Section I. of the
judge’s decision, is referred to the Investigating Officer,
the Associate General Counsel, Division of Operations-
Management, pursuant to Section 102.177(e) of the
Board’s Rules.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to meet and negotiate with and
furnish information to Stationary Engineers, Firemen,
Maintenance and Building Service Union Local 670,
RWDSU, UFCW, AFL–CIO, as the representative of our
employees in the following unit:
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD328
All full-time and regular part-time doormen, porters,
maintenance employees and superintendents employed
by the joint employer at the residential apartment house
buildings located in Manhattan at 675 and 700 West
End Avenue, 215 West 101st Street, 309 and 317 West
99th Street, and 214 West 102nd Street, and in the
Bronx at 665 and 690 Allerton Avenue, excluding all
guards and supervisors as defined under the Act.
WE WILL NOT hire nonbargaining unit employees to
perform your work without notice to Local 670 and
without affording Local 670 the opportunity to bargain
over this decision and its effects.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
set forth above.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with Local 670 and fur-
nish the Union with information necessary to represent
you and put in writing and sign any agreement reached
on terms and conditions of employment for our employ-
ees.
WE WILL pay to the Union and the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board all litigation costs
incurred by them in the trial of that portion of these pro-
ceedings dealing with our willful violation of the judge’s
instructions regarding subpoenas.
675 WEST END OWNERS CORP.
Judith M. Anderson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Morris Tuchman, Esq., of New York, New York, for NIV Re-
alty, LLC., Tal Co., Tal Co., LLC, Zvi Eyny, Solomon
Management, LLC., Solomon Realty, 675 West End Own-
ers Corp., Salomon Realty, Salomon Management Co.,
LLC.
Mr. Uzi Einy, of New York, New York, for Uzi Einy, Sharon
Realty, LLC., Dan Co., Dan Co., LLC.
Mr. Zvi Eyny, of New York, New York, for NIV Realty, NIV
Realty, LLC, TAL Company and Tal Company, LLC.
Ms. Sofia Einy, of New York, New York, for Sharon Realty,
Salomon Realty, Salomon Realty, LLC.
Jamin R. Sewell, Esq., (Law Offices of Richard M. Greenspan,
P.C.) of Elmsford, New York, for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ELEANOR MACDONALD, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was tried in New York, New York, on June 3 through 7, 2002.
The amended consolidated complaint alleges that the Respon-
dent, in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act,
refused to bargain with the Union, refused to furnish informa-
tion to the Union, and hired nonunit security guards to replace
bargaining unit employees in retaliation against employees for
their union activities.1
On June 2, Uzi Einy served an amended answer headed “Uzi
Einy, Employer,” in which he denied service of the amended
consolidated complaint and denied all the allegations in the
complaint. In addition, he appended a “cross-complaint” ad-
dressed to the underlying representation case.
At the hearing, Attorney Tuchman interposed a statute of
limitations defense to the allegations in paragraphs 8 and 10 of
the amended consolidated complaint relating to the demand for
information. Uzi Einy joined in this defense.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the parties in September, 2002, I make the following2
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondents filed an answer denying all allegations of the
complaint. At the close of the instant hearing, Respondent ad-
mitted the jurisdiction of the Board. Based on the admission of
Respondent I find that 675 West End Owners Corp., Salomon
Management Co., LLC; Niv Realty, LLC; Solomon Manage-
ment Co., LLC; Sharon Realty, LLC; Dan Co., LLC; and Tal
Co., LLC are affiliated business enterprises with common offi-
cers, ownership, directors, management, and supervision; have
formulated and administered a common labor policy; have
shared common premises and facilities; have provided services
for and made sales to each other; have interchanged personnel
with each other, have held themselves out to the public as a
single-integrated business enterprise and constitute a single
employer within the meaning of the Act engaged in the owner-
ship of various residential apartment buildings in New York
City, including 675 and 700 West End Avenue, 215 West 101st
Street, 309 and 317 West 99th Street, 214 West 102nd Street,
Manhattan and 665 and 690 Allerton Avenue, Bronx, New
York. I find that Gal Realty, LLC; Salomon Realty; Niv Realty;

1 On May 31, counsel for the General Counsel mailed a Notice of In-
tent to Amend Complaint at Hearing. The General Counsel’s motion to
amend was granted. The amendments relate to a Union’s demand for
information dated August 3, September 5 and 20, 2001. At the hearing,
the date alleged in new par. 11(a) relating to the hiring of nonunit secu-
rity guards to replace unit employees was changed to February 18,
2001.
2 The record is hereby corrected so that at page 34, line 9 the correct
title is “Judge Davis”; at p. 65, L. 6, the record should show that the
ALJ was speaking; at p. 68, L. 19, the correct phrase is “doorman posi-
tion”; at p. 105, L. 25, the correct phrase is “Fed Ex Way Bill”; at p.
135, L. 11 and p. 136, LL. 8 and 20 the correct name is “Zachi Einy”;
at p. 138, LL. 22–23 the correct phrase is “stopped calling”; at p. 188,
L. 3 the correct phrase is “replacement of a doorman”; at p. 242, L. 10,
the answer ends and the next question begins after the phrase “I don’t
recall.”; at p. 347, L. 7 the date is August 3; at p. 348, L. 16, the phrase
should read “prefer not to have it”; at p. 350, L. 1, Anderson was speak-
ing; at p. 353, L. 19, Anderson was speaking; at p. 373, L. 20, the first
word is “here”; at p. 445, L. 3, the phrase is “you don’t know how to
ask a non-leading question,”; at p. 780, L. 18, the phrase should read
“we’re going to celebrate Shabbat”; at p. 804, L. 17, Ms. Anderson was
speaking; at p. 831, L. 1, Uzi Einy was speaking; at p. 897, L. 24, the
word should be “closed.”
675 WEST END OWNERS CORP. 329
Solomon Realty; Sharon Realty; Uzi Einy d/b/a Dan Co.; Tal
Co.; and Riv Realty are affiliated business enterprises with
common officers, ownership, directors, management and su-
pervision; have formulated and administered a common labor
policy; have shared common premises and facilities; have pro-
vided services for and made sales to each other; have inter-
changed personnel with each other; have held themselves out to
the public as a single-integrated business enterprise and consti-
tute a single employer within the meaning of the Act engaged
in providing building management and maintenance services at
the buildings listed above. Respondents, engaged in the busi-
ness of owning and managing residential apartment buildings
located within New York City, are joint employers of the unit
employees described below. Respondents annually derive reve-
nues in excess of $500,000 and purchase and receive at their
places of business in New York City goods and materials val-
ued in excess of $5,000 indirectly from points located outside
the State of New York or directly from suppliers located out-
side the State of New York. Respondents are employers en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act. Based on my discussion below, I find that
Stationary Engineers, Firemen, Maintenance and Building Ser-
vice Union, Local 670 RWDSU, UFCW, AFL–CIO is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Status of the Union, Appropriate Unit, Exclusive
Representative of the Unit Employees
My findings concerning the status of the Union, the appro-
priate unit and the exclusive representative of the unit employ-
ees are based on prior Board proceedings which I will briefly
summarize herein. A Decision and Direction of Election was
issued on December 20, 1999. On February 29, 2000, the Board
denied Respondent’s request for review. The election was con-
ducted on January 28, 2000. Respondents challenged the ballots
of six doormen who worked at 675 West End Avenue and 215
West 101st Street on the ground that they were statutory
guards. The hearing on challenged ballots was held on June 12,
14, July 18, August 14, September 11, and October 3, 2000. On
December 29, 2000 a hearing officer’s report on challenges and
recommendations issued recommending that the ballots be
opened and counted. Following the filing of exceptions to the
report and recommendations by the Respondents, the Regional
Director issued a Supplemental Decision and Order on March
14, 2001. The Supplemental Decision adopted the hearing offi-
cer’s findings and recommendations and ordered the opening
and counting of the contested ballots. The Board denied Re-
spondents’ request for review of the Supplemental Decision
and Order on April 25, 2001 and May 3, 2001. On May 18,
2001, a corrected Tally of Ballots issued showing that the Un-
ion had received a majority of the valid votes counted. On May
23, 2001, the Regional Director issued a Certification of Repre-
sentative. Based on the foregoing proceedings, the record
shows that Respondents as joint employers manage seven rental
properties and a cooperative apartment building listed above.
Each of the seven residential rental properties is owned by a
different limited liability company and managed by a partner-
ship of the same name. Uzi Einy has substantial ownership
interests in all of the LLCs and has the same percentage owner-
ship in the parallel management company. Thus, Uzi Einy owns
some of the buildings outright, owns some in partnership with
his brothers Shlomo Eini and Zvi Eyny or his wife Sofia Einy
and some are owned by Uzi Einy with more than one other
family member. 675 West End Owner’s Corp. is a cooperative
corporation that owns the building at that address. Uzi Einy is
president of the Board, Sofia Einy is vice-president and daugh-
ter Galit Ben-Baruch is the assistant vice-president. Gal Realty,
LLC, the managing agent for this building, is owned by Uzi and
Sofia Einy and Gal Realty, LLC owns about 60 percent of the
shares in 675 West End Corp.
The Decision and Direction of Election of December 20,
1999, found that Stationary Engineers, Firemen, Maintenance
and Building Service Union Local 670, RWDSU, UFCW,
AFL–CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act. The Union is the certified exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the employees in the follow-
ing appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time doormen, porters, mainte-
nance employees and superintendents employed by the joint
employer at the residential apartment house buildings located
in Manhattan at 675 and 700 West End Avenue, 215 West
101st Street, 309 and 317 West 99th Street, and 214 West
102nd Street, and in the Bronx at 665 and 690 Allerton Ave-
nue, excluding all guards and supervisors as defined under the
Act.
B. Background
The record shows that Uzi Einy and his family control all of
the entities involved in the instant hearing. Uzi Einy hires em-
ployees, assigns employees and makes decisions concerning
manning, security, and subcontracting for all of the related
businesses. Zvi Eyny testified that he takes over for his brother
when Uzi Einy is away. The record also shows that Uzi Einy
directs the legal affairs of all of the entities and that he appears
at hearings and proceedings representing all of the related busi-
nesses. Further, it is clear that Uzi Einy is responsible for deal-
ing with the Union on behalf of Respondent. During the instant
hearings Uzi Einy, Zvi Eyny, Sofia Einy, and Morris Tuchman,
Esq., made appearances on various days of the hearing, claim-
ing to represent some but not all of the entities. However, it was
clear that Uzi Einy spoke for all of the entities and that he made
the decisions concerning the conduct of the instant case.3 Al-
though Zvi Eyny purportedly sent letters to the NLRB in Wash-
ington, D.C. concerning this case, he testified that he was out of
the country when at least one such letter was sent, that he did
not write the letter and that he had authorized his brother to
sign the letter.
The Respondents are not satisfied with the outcome of the
earlier representation proceedings in Case 2–RC–22120, which
led to the certification of the Union. In various motions, letters,
statements on the record and in the amended answer which
contains a “cross-complaint” the Respondents seek to reopen

3 Indeed, at one point Uzi Einy stated on the record that he was rep-
resenting Shlomo Einy, whom he had claimed not to represent previ-
ously, “for the next five minutes.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD330
the representation case. I informed the parties in the unfair la-
bor practice case before me that I had no authority to reopen the
representation case nor to disturb the findings in that case in
any way.4 I did not permit the Respondents to litigate the rep-
resentation issues on the record before me. In order to prevent
my decision in this case from being unnecessarily complicated
by matters extraneous to the unfair labor practice allegations
before me, I shall not deal in detail with any motions or argu-
ments which go to the validity of the certification. Thus, the
parties are advised that all motions, whether in writing or oral,
addressed to me to reopen the representation case are denied.
It is the practice of Respondents to refuse certified mail de-
livery of documents from the Regional Office and from other
correspondents. Uzi Einy testified that his office is located at
700 West End Avenue. He testified that mail addressed to all of
the entities at issue in this complaint is properly addressed to
him at 700 West End Avenue. In one of the lengthy submis-
sions by Respondents a document was inadvertently included
that showed that tenants from the various buildings write letters
to Uzi Einy at 700 West End Avenue. The record shows that
other people work at the office at 700 West End Avenue: there
was testimony about secretaries, desks and various rooms in
this office. Yet several copies of the complaint and notice of
hearing herein addressed to Uzi Einy at 700 West End Avenue
and sent by certified mail were returned to the Regional Office
marked “unclaimed.” The Postal Service attempted delivery of
the items on more than one occasion.5 Jamin R. Sewell, Esq.,
counsel for the Union, stated on the record that he was in-
formed by Fed Ex that Uzi Einy had refused to accept delivery
of the Union’s petition to revoke Subpoena which was being
served on Respondents at 700 West End Avenue. Further, Zvi
Eyny stated that his address is 215 West 101st Street and he
signed the appearance sheet accordingly. Yet certified mail
addressed from the Regional Office to Zvi Eyny at his address
was also returned unclaimed after several delivery attempts.
Other correspondence from the Regional Office concerning
Respondents’ failure to file a timely Answer suffered a fate
similar to that described above. Because of its inability to de-
liver correspondence to Respondents, the Regional Office had
adopted a policy of sending copies of all notices and letters to
all of the buildings involved in the instant case. At the hearing,
the ALJ informed all of Respondents’ representatives that
henceforth mail would only be addressed to them according to
the signed appearance sheet and the ALJ cautioned them to stop
refusing certified mail from the NLRB. It is well established
that a Respondent’s failure or refusal to accept or claim certi-
fied mail cannot defeat the purposes of the Act. ITAL General
Construction, Inc., 331 NLRB No. 64 (2000) (not reported in
Board volumes); Michigan Expediting Service, 282 NLRB 210
fn. 6 (1986), enfd. 869 F.2d 1492 (6th Cir. 1989).
On the first day of the instant hearing the ALJ informed Uzi
Einy that before the hearing opened the New York Division of

4 Rules and Regulations Section 102.67(f).
5 In fact, notations made by the Postal Service on some of the copies
addressed to the other buildings involved herein show that the Postal
Service also attempted to deliver those items to 700 West End Avenue
without success.
Judges had received multiple copies of 45-page faxes, appar-
ently a motion from Einy, in which the sending number of the
fax machine had been obliterated so that it was not possible to
determine who was sending the faxes.6 There was no cover
sheet on these faxes with a proper telephone number. While
these documents were being faxed the machine at the Division
of Judges was tied up and it was impossible to contact the per-
son operating the machine to ask that the process be halted. Uzi
Einy stated that his fax machine is not always working and that
he gave the documents to another person to send. He denied
responsibility for the fact that a 45-page document was sent
three times in succession on the same day. Counsel for the
General Counsel stated that the Regional Office had encoun-
tered difficulties in communicating with Respondent and in
replying to faxed documents because there was sometimes no
indication of the source of the fax. The ALJ warned Uzi Einy
that it was unlawful to send improperly identified faxes.7
The record is clear that certain representatives of Respon-
dents made statements designed for Respondents’ advantage or
designed to delay the proceedings without regard for the accu-
racy of the facts. For example, on August 13, 2001, Uzi Einy
wrote to the Union “in response to your letter dated August 3rd,
2001.” Yet on October 26, Uzi Einy wrote to a Board agent
that, “The union did not have any contact with us at all in Au-
gust 2001.” During the hearing, apparently wishing to continue
the claim that he had not received the Union’s August 3 letter,
Uzi Einy attempted to cross examine the witness who hand
delivered the letter to Respondents’ office on minute details
concerning who was in the office and where the furniture was
placed. Another example occurred on a day when the official
translator was present during the instant hearing for the exami-
nation of a Spanish speaking witness. Uzi Einy objected to a
Spanish word used by the translator. Einy explained that Sofia
Einy is a licensed English-Spanish translator and that she had
heard the mistake by the translator.8 Yet on another occasion
Sofia Einy gave as the reason for a request she was making the
fact that she could not understand English. Further, the record
shows that Uzi Einy conducted the majority of the case for
Respondents from counsel table speaking in English. When
Counsel for the General Counsel called Uzi Einy as a witness
pursuant to FRCP Section 611(c) an English-Hebrew translator
was present. However, despite instructions from the ALJ, Uzi
Einy did not wait for the translator. Einy answered questions,
speaking in English, before the translator could translate the
questions into Hebrew. Attorney Tuchman, one of Respon-
dents’ representatives that day, remarked that Einy was not
waiting for the Hebrew translation. Later in the proceeding,
when Attorney Tuchman called Uzi Einy to testify for the Re-
spondents without providing a translator Einy was able to an-
swer his questions without any problem. But as soon as Coun-
sel for the General Counsel rose to begin cross-examination,
Uzi Einy asked for a translator. When counsel for the General

6 Respondent introduced a different version of the motion at the
hearing.
7 United States Code, Title 47, Chapter 5, Subchapter II, Part I, Sec-
tion 227, (d)(1)(B).
8 Sofia Einy was seated at Respondent’s counsel table.
675 WEST END OWNERS CORP. 331
Counsel asked Uzi Einy to identify letters he himself had writ-
ten in English, Sofia Einy objected that he could not read Eng-
lish and that the letters had to be translated.
On June 5, the third day of the hearing, during a procedural
discussion Counsel for the General Counsel remarked that tran-
scripts and exhibits from previous hearings involving Respon-
dents had been in the hearing room since the first day of the
instant hearing. Representatives for Respondents including Uzi
Einy and Attorney Tuchman were present during this colloquy
and they did not object to the remark. On the fourth day of the
hearing, June 6, Uzi Einy opened a discussion concerning a
subpoena addressed to Region 2. The ALJ had granted a peti-
tion to revoke the subpoena based on Respondents’ failure to
follow proper procedure. Thereafter, Respondents by Shlomo
Eini sought the General Counsel’s consent to production of the
material.9 On June 6, the General Counsel responded to Shlomo
Eini, stating, inter alia, that transcripts and exhibits would be
made available. These were the transcripts and exhibits that had
been present in the hearing room since the first day of the hear-
ing. Thereafter, Uzi Einy asked for a delay in the proceedings
suggesting that he needed time to consult the transcripts and
exhibits because they had only just been made available. He
stated that he had not felt free to look at the documents before.
The ALJ stated that the documents had been in the hearing
room since the first day and that Uzi Einy and Attorney
Tuchman had been consulting them the day before. Counsel for
the General Counsel stated on the record that after the conclu-
sion of the previous days’ proceedings she had suggested that
Attorney Tuchman and Uzi Einy stay in the hearing room after
hours and consult the documents further. Uzi Einy then stated
that he needed an adjournment so that he could order copies
from the reporting company. When it was pointed out again
that the documents had been in the hearing room since the first
day of the hearing, Uzi Einy persisted in his statement that he
had not had access to the transcripts and exhibits. Thus, in an
attempt to delay the proceedings and obtain an adjournment,
Uzi Einy baldly maintained that he had not been able to look at
documents which he had been openly consulting during the
hearing.
Attorney Tuchman stated in a letter dated June 2, 2002, that
he represented Zvi Eyny and his related companies, and at the
hearing, he listed various companies named in the complaint
whom he represented. Uzi Einy appeared on behalf of Sharon
Realty, LLC; Dan Co., and Dan Co., LLC. Shlomo Eini signed
the appearance sheet herein and his name appears as the signa-
tory on many communications on behalf of Respondents, but
Shlomo Eini did not speak on the record.10 As the hearing pro-
gressed, Sofia Einy and Zvi Eyny made appearances on behalf
of various entities comprising the Joint Employer. Attorney
Tuchman was present on the first day of the hearing and he did
not request any adjournment on the record due to an inability to
be present on any subsequent days. Attorney Tuchman was not
present on the second day of the hearing. No adjournment was

9 Shlomo Eini did not participate in the instant hearing. He was pre-
sent at certain times during the hearing.
10 It appears from the record that Shlomo Eini does not speak Eng-
lish.
requested on the second day. On the third day of the instant
hearing Sofia Einy asked for an adjournment due to the absence
of Tuchman. The request was denied. That afternoon Tuchman
appeared on behalf of Respondent. He did not request any ad-
journments on the record due to an inability to be present on
subsequent hearing days. Throughout the hearing, however,
other representatives of Respondent constantly requested ad-
journments, citing the absence of Tuchman. Because Tuchman
did not request any of these adjournments himself and did not
advise the ALJ that he wished to attend the hearing but was
unable to be present at a certain time, I conclude that the other
representatives of Respondent were acting in bad faith and for
the purpose of delaying the proceedings when they used
Tuchman’s absence as the basis for a requested adjournment.
Uzi Einy engaged in various types of behavior on the record
which served to disrupt and delay the proceedings. The record
is replete, beginning in the first minutes of the instant proceed-
ing and continuing every day thereafter, with occasions when
the ALJ was required to tell Uzi Einy that he was talking out
loud to other people at counsel table during the questioning of a
witness or during procedural discussions and to warn him that
this behavior was unacceptable. On numerous occasions Uzi
Einy complained that he could not hear and the ALJ was re-
quired to inform him that he couldn’t hear because he was talk-
ing to other people. On various occasions Uzi Einy asked wit-
nesses to raise their voices because he did not hear well, but he
continued the constant buzz of talk from counsel table which
prevented him from paying attention to the proceedings. As a
result, people in the hearing room raised to their voices to cap-
ture the attention of Uzi Einy. On more than one occasion Uzi
Einy returned late from a break in the hearing and then inter-
rupted the proceedings and demanded to know what had been
going on. At various times Uzi Einy had to be warned by the
ALJ that it was impermissible to speak to a witness while that
witness was in the witness box actually being questioned by
opposing counsel.11
On numerous occasions Uzi Einy had to be warned by the
ALJ that he was impermissibly interfering with the questioning
of witnesses by opposing counsel. On one occasion Uzi Einy
interfered with questioning of a 611(c) witness by Counsel for
the General Counsel, constantly interrupting her questions and
demanding to know why she had called the witness. On this
occasion, as on many others, the ALJ warned Einy that he was
risking possible sanctions and exclusion from future NLRB
proceedings. During questioning of witnesses by counsel for
the General Counsel Uzi Einy often interposed baseless objec-
tions because he did not listen to the questions. On various
occasions Uzi Einy argued with the ALJ after rulings on objec-
tions, refusing to accept those rulings. Uzi Einy often inter-
rupted questioning by opposing counsel demanding to know the
purpose of the questioning even though the questions were not
objectionable. These tactics were especially troublesome while
employee witnesses were testifying through an interpreter as
they had the effect of confusing the witnesses and breaking the
train of thought of the interpreter. While Uzi Einy was himself

11 On one occasion Uzi Einy sat at counsel table and issued instruc-
tions in Hebrew to a witness who was testifying in English.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD332
questioning witnesses he was not prepared with relevant and
proper questions. He had constantly to be prompted to ask his
next question because he often let several minutes go by be-
tween the answer to a question and posing the next question.
On these occasions Uzi Einy was warned by the ALJ that he
was using this tactic to prolong and delay the proceedings. Of-
ten when Uzi Einy asked a question he interrupted the answer
and did not permit the witness to finish. This led to confusion
and delay in the proceedings. Uzi Einy argued with his own
witnesses. When his own witness answered “no” to a question,
Einy asked him what he meant by “no.”
Uzi Einy tried to put in the Respondents’ case through wit-
nesses called by the General Counsel. Thus, instead of calling
his own witnesses who had direct knowledge of facts relevant
to Respondents’ defense, Einy tried to get evidence by cross
examining General Counsel’s witnesses who knew none of the
facts. When these witnesses denied knowledge of a fact Einy
wished to establish he tried to introduce tapes and videos. The
ALJ often explained to Uzi Einy that he had to prove his own
case by calling witnesses who had knowledge of the facts. The
ALJ often explained to Uzi Einy that he could not simply intro-
duce audio tapes and video tapes to prove facts that his wit-
nesses should be testifying to. Apparently, Respondents did not
wish to call witnesses and so attempted to resort to the intro-
duction of photographs and tapes to prove Respondents’ case.
Moreover, Respondents did not call witnesses to lay a founda-
tion to show why tapes and photographs should be used to take
the place of sworn testimony by a witness.
On the occasion when Respondents called their own witness
Uzi Einy persisted in examining him by the use of leading
questions. The ALJ constantly warned Einy that this was not
proper. Further, Uzi Einy repeatedly attempted to obtain hear-
say testimony from his own witness. The ALJ warned Einy that
he could not prove his case by hearsay testimony. Apparently
not wishing to be called himself to testify about facts of which
he alone had first hand knowledge, Einy called Zvi Eyny who
did not have such first hand knowledge. Uzi Einy then posed
leading questions to Zvi Eyny and showed him documents in an
attempt to have Eyny testify about the contents of the docu-
ments and thus give hearsay testimony. The ALJ warned Uzi
Einy that Zvi Eyny’s testimony would be terminated if he was
not asked questions about which he had first hand knowledge.
Instead of establishing that Zvi Eyny had knowledge of an
event and of when and where it occurred, Uzi Einy wanted to
submit exhibits in place of Eyny’s testimony, saying “I have
thousand pictures.” The ALJ repeatedly warned Einy that he
could not show his witness a picture and introduce the picture
into evidence as a substitute for testimony from that witness.
On more than one occasion the ALJ warned Uzi Einy of the
dangers inherent in his insistence on personally representing
Respondents in this case. The ALJ warned Einy that in view of
the great value of the real estate owned and managed by Re-
spondents he was putting Respondents and himself in jeopardy
by personally representing Respondents, seemingly without a
proper understanding of the legal proceeding in which he was
engaged.12 The ALJ warned Uzi Einy that it appeared that he
did not understand the issues in the case nor the facts that the
General Counsel had to prove and he did not understand the
applicable law. Einy was warned that he did not seem to under-
stand what was relevant and that he did not seem to be able to
pose a nonleading question. Further, Einy was told that he did
not seem to want to follow the ALJ’s instructions. The ALJ
warned Uzi Einy that his tactics were producing delay and pre-
venting the conclusion of the proceeding. This warning was
given before the close of General Counsel’s case and the com-
mencement of the Respondents’ case.
The ALJ informed Uzi Einy that if he intended to testify he
had to do so in a question and answer format in which a person
sitting at counsel table would ask him questions. This ruling
was made after the hearing had been going on for 3 days and
after sufficient opportunity to observe Uzi Einy’s behavior in
the courtroom. Yet after this ruling Uzi Einy took the witness
stand and attempted to ask himself questions and argued with
the ALJ about the prior ruling. Further, after Sofia Einy stated
that she was going to pose questions to Uzi Einy and after she
was directed to commence questioning Uzi Einy he began
communicating with her in Hebrew from the witness stand.
By Order dated May 30, 2002, the ALJ revoked subpoena
duces tecum B-370219 issued by Shlomo Eini.13 On June 7 Uzi
Einy requested on the record in the instant hearing that the Un-
ion produce the materials listed in that subpoena. The ALJ in-
formed Einy that the subpoena had been revoked. On the record
Uzi Einy stated that he had amended the subpoena and served it
on the Union.14 The ALJ informed Uzi Einy that he could not
take a copy of a subpoena which had been revoked and write
the word “amended” at the top and then serve the document on
a party. Einy was told that a new subpoena had to be issued. On
the last day of the hearing, after the record had been closed and
after the ALJ had left the hearing room, Uzi Einy served a sub-
poena on the audiotape reporter in the instant hearing. By Order
dated June 13, 2002, the ALJ revoked Respondent’s subpoena
duces tecum B–370220, stating that a subpoena is properly
used to obtain material for use during a hearing and that the
issuance of a subpoena after the close of a hearing is an abuse
of Board process.15 By Order dated July 18, 2002, the ALJ
noted that in a letter from Uzi Einy he claimed to have served
an “Addendum subpoena” B–370219.16 The “Addendum” pur-
ports to be issued by Shlomo Eini. The Order of July 18 pro-
vides that the Respondents shall cease and desist from serving
further subpoenas and solicits the views of the other parties
whether sanctions should be imposed and whether litigation
costs should be assessed for the willful disregard of prior orders
concerning the issuance of subpoenas.

12 The ALJ warned Uzi Einy that he might leave himself open to a
charge that he was violating a fiduciary duty to other shareholders in
those buildings that had a cooperative form of ownership.
13 The Order is ALJ Exh. 1.
14 The “amended” subpoena is R. Exh. 21.
15 This Order is ALJ Exh. 6.
16 This Order is ALJ Exh. 7. The letter dated July 16, 2002 is ap-
pended to the Order.
675 WEST END OWNERS CORP. 333
C. Service of the Charges and Amended Charges
The record shows that the charges and amended charges in
the instant cases were properly served by the Regional Office.
It is not necessary to detail the proof of the various mailings as
those are clear on the record and amply discussed in the Gen-
eral Counsel’s brief. Although Respondents’ answers signed by
Uzi Einy include a blanket denial, including a denial of receipt
of the charges, the record contains letters from Einy to the Re-
gional Office discussing the charges. Thus on August 29, 2001
Einy wrote to a Board agent, “In response to your charge. . . .”
Einy’s letter was headed “Re.: Case No 2–CA–33940–1; it
went on to discuss in detail the rationale for hiring a security
guard company and it states, “Employers have not fired or re-
placed employees with other security guard employees.” On
November 8, 2001 Uzi Einy wrote to a Board agent heading his
letter “Case Nos. 2–CA–33940/34059” and discussing those
charges. Additionally, the record establishes that the charge in
Case 2–CA–3457 was sent by certified mail, by regular mail
and by fax in May 2002, not long before the commencement of
the instant hearing. Yet the Respondents did not admit receipt
of that document when the hearing started. As detailed above,
the various owners of Respondents have a practice of refusing
mail from the Regional Office and they have a practice of deny-
ing receipt of mail from the Regional Office and from the Un-
ion even when their own evidence makes it clear that they have
indeed received the letters. I conclude that the denial of receipt
of the Charges was made in bad faith.
D. Credibility of the Witnesses
I credit Jose Moran, Jose Urena, and Robert Goldstein who
testified in a forthright and cooperative manner.
I do not credit the testimony of Uzi Einy. As discussed
above, the record is replete with occasions when Einy said any-
thing that came to mind that he thought might assist the litiga-
tion of Respondents’ case without regard for the truth and the
actual facts. Uzi Einy contradicted his own documentary evi-
dence on occasion and he wrote letters, including letters to
Board agents, that did not accurately reflect the facts as he
knew them. The tape recordings of Uzi Einy’s conversations
with Urena, discussed below, are clear that Einy wanted Urena
to testify to certain facts even though Urena repeatedly insisted
he did not remember the incidents the way Einy wanted them
presented. These tapes show that Uzi Einy does not understand
the importance of giving truthful statements and accurate testi-
mony and that he would encourage the presentation of facts for
which there was no basis.
I do not credit the testimony of Zvi Eyny. His testimony was
given in response to leading questions and he did not seem to
have an independent recall of the incidents or dates about
which he was asked.
E. Supervisors and Agents of Respondents
The evidence is overwhelming that Uzi Einy and Zvi Eyny
are supervisors and agents of Respondents. The Respondents
made no argument on the record to support the answer’s denial
that they are supervisors and agents. Indeed, the testimony of
Uzi Einy and Zvi Eyny was all about the managerial and per-
sonnel decisions they constantly make in running the various
buildings at issue herein. I conclude that Uzi Einy’s answer
denying the status of both himself and Zvi Eyny was made in
bad faith, without any ground to support it and for the purpose
of delay.
Urena’s testimony, discussed below, that Zachi Eini in-
formed him that he was no longer to report to Uzi Einy but that
he was to call Zachi Eini was uncontested on the record. Zachi
Eini did not testify herein. Similarly, Urena’s testimony that he
was instructed to come to work only when Zachi Eini called
him and that eventually he was fired by Zachi Eini was unre-
butted. Manifestly, Zachi Eini had the authority to decide when
employees would work and to assign them work and he had the
authority to discharge employees. I find that Uzi Einy, Zvi
Eyny and Zachi Eini are supervisors and agents of the Respon-
dents within the meaning of Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act.
F. The Hiring of Command Security Corporation
1. Facts
Robert Goldstein, senior vice president for client relations of
Command Security Corporation, testified that he met Uzi Einy
at a trade show in June 2000. After he and Uzi Einy discussed
the services that could be provided by Command Security,
Goldstein thought he had a deal. On December 6 Goldstein
wrote to Einy that “ever since we met . . . our conversations
have been truly excellent and contributory towards excellent
reception/doorman/security services for your buildings. . . .”
The letter went on to commend the quality of service provided
by Command and mentioned that the “Post Instructions” al-
ready provided by Uzi Einy would be followed by the Com-
mand employees at both 675 West End Avenue and 215 West
101st Street. Goldstein enclosed a contract with this letter in the
expectation that Uzi Einy would sign and return it. Goldstein
stated that it is the practice at his company to send out succes-
sive contracts for signature by a prospective client in the event
that the company does not receive the initial contract submitted
for signature. Thus, after December 6, Command sent succes-
sive contracts to Uzi Einy dated December 12 and 20, 2000,
and January 31, 2001. Goldstein testified that Uzi Einy actually
signed the contract on February 27, 2001. Goldstein filled out
an internal Command form on March 5 showing that the effec-
tive date of service was expected to be March 7. In the event,
on March 12, 2001 Command employee Raymond Cumber-
batch began working at 675 West End Avenue.17 Goldstein
stated that he did not know why there had been a delay in
commencing service by Command from the time he first spoke
to Uzi Einy in June 2000. He recalled that Uzi Einy told him
that he had sent back a signed contract before February 27, but
no such contract could be found in the Command offices.
Uzi Einy testified that he had signed a proposed contract
sent to him by Goldstein on December 20, 2000. Command
Security did not provide service until March 2001. Einy ex-
plained that the reason for the delay was that he did not want to
fire the employee working at the building in order to replace
him with a Command employee.

17 Cumberbatch works Monday through Friday from 4 p.m. to 12
midnight.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD334
Uzi Einy testified that the employees’ support for the Union
did not play any role in his decision to retain Command Secu-
rity. He stated that he had begun looking into the possibility of
hiring a security guard company in 1984. In the year 2000, he
installed a security video camera and monitor in 675 West End
Avenue. According to Einy, this was part of his plan to hire a
security guard: he wanted the guard to be able to check the
monitor. Einy said that the reason he hired a security guard
company was to rid himself of responsibilities such as payroll,
finding a replacement for the doorman in case he does not re-
port for his shift, supervising the doorman and dealing with the
NLRB concerning employee problems. Einy also said that in
case a crime is committed the guard company is responsible.
Zvi Eyny testified that the Respondents engaged Command
Security because the guards wear uniforms, Respondents do not
have to supervise the guards, the company provides any needed
replacements, and Command Security has liability insurance to
handle claims.
The contract of February 27 is between Command Security
Corporation and 675 West End Ave. Owners Corp./215 West
101st Street Owners Corp. It provides that Command will pro-
vide “reception/doormen/security officers” for $11 per hour.
Command agrees to pay all wages and social security taxes and
it agrees to provide supervision for its employees. The contract
provides that Command “is not an insurer” and that the contract
does not “confer any rights on any other party.” The Client
“agrees to indemnify Command” against any claims by third
parties. However, Command agrees to be liable for injury or
damage “resulting directly from the negligent performance of
the services” up to an amount of one million dollars. The Client
“waives any and all rights of subrogation that any Insurer of
Client may have against Command Security Corporation.”
Goldstein identified the post instructions for the Command
Security employee at 675 West End Avenue. This is a docu-
ment entitled “Security Guidelines.” It requires visitors to sign
in and out of the building and it requires, among other things,
that “the doorman” shall check with the tenant before admitting
visitors, that “the doorman” shall check that doors are locked,
and that his replacement has arrived before he leaves. The
document also details “duties of doormen in different shifts” for
the entire 24 hour period. The duties for the 4 p.m. to 12 mid-
night shift require “the doorman” to sweep and mop floors,
wipe and clean other surfaces, and take care of the rain mats.
The testimony of Jose Moran who has worked as a doorman
at 675 West End Avenue for 6 or 7 years shows that Cumber-
batch replaced Waldo Guerra, the former doorman. Moran
stated that he and Cumberbatch perform the same work. The
only difference between them is that Cumberbatch wears a
uniform and Moran does not. Employee Jose Urena who works
at 675 West End Avenue identified a document entitled “Secu-
rity Guidelines for 675 West End Avenue.” These contain the
same substantive instructions concerning security and the same
“duties of doormen in different shifts” as were given to Com-
mand Security by Uzi Einy. Urena testified that his duties have
not changed since he was hired as a doorman in 1999. Urena
also stated that the security measures in use at the building have
remained constant. Employees have access to a key pad to
punch in their hours and a telephone for use in emergencies.
Moran testified without contradiction that there has never
been a robbery in the building during his shift. When ques-
tioned about security in the building, Moran replied that Uzi
Einy sends the superintendent from another one of his buildings
to perform repairs in 675 West End Avenue.18 On occasion the
super has left the basement door unlocked contrary to the appli-
cable security rules. Uzi Einy testified that from 1998, there
have been burglaries at both 675 West End Avenue and 215
West 101st Street. He did not present any evidence of police
reports or tenant complaints concerning these events. In fact,
Einy did not give any dates or particulars concerning these
incidents. Zvi Eyny also testified that there had been a robbery
at 675 West End Avenue but he could not recall when this oc-
curred. He also recalled that a tenant had complained that the
superintendent had taken the tenant’s property. Zvi Einy testi-
fied that there had been a rape at 215 West 101st Street before
1987. Respondents introduced a letter from the 215 West 101
Tenants Union dated March 31, 1987, relating to pending legal
action concerning the number of hours of doorman service the
Respondents were required to provide. Zvi Eyny stated that a
tenant in 215 West 101 had complained that she heard a person
in her apartment but a search turned up no evidence of any
intruder.
Moran identified a security guard application which Uzi
Einy gave him and asked him to fill out. Moran recalled that
Einy spoke to him about the application about 2 weeks after the
election.19 The application consists of a form prepared by the
New York Department of State Division of Licensing Services.
Moran testified that he did not fill out the application because
he is a doorman and not a security guard.
Uzi Einy testified that he asked all the employees at the
buildings to fill out the security guard application. None of
them did so. Einy stated that he could not recall whether he
presented the applications to the employees before or after the
election.
The General Counsel contends that the Respondents decided
to replace the unit employees with employees of Command
Security in retaliation for the protected and Union activities of
the unit employees. To support its contention of anti-union
animus the General Counsel presented the testimony of Jaime
Urena that he had been interrogated by Uzi Einy and that his
hours had been reduced. Urena testified that he had been hired
by Uzi Einy in early 1999.20 Einy informed him that he would
work as a doorman at 215 West 101st Street from 9 a.m. to 5
p.m. on Friday and on 3 other days from 5 p.m. to 1 am. He
would also work as a doorman at 675 West End Avenue at
various hours. Urena testified that he worked a total of 40 to 48
hours per week in the two buildings.
Soon after Urena began work Uzi Einy telephoned him and
instructed him to tell the other employees at the buildings that
employees could not work 16 hours in a row and that the em-

18 The superintendent is based at 700 West End Avenue.
19 When Moran had testified in a prior matter in July 2000 concern-
ing when he was given the application he stated, “I don’t remember but
I think it was after the election.”
20 Urena, who testified through a Spanish interpreter, stated that he
was able to speak English. He said that Uzi Einy always spoke to him
in English.
675 WEST END OWNERS CORP. 335
ployees must not punch each others’ time cards. Urena trans-
mitted Einy’s instructions to employees Orlando Cabrera,
Waldo Guerra and Jose Moran.21 On March 23, 1999, Urena
spoke to Uzi Einy in the latter’s office and he told Einy that he
had passed on the message but that the others did not like this
because Urena was a new employee and they believed that Einy
should speak to them directly. Urena said that Einy should not
use him for that type of message. The other employees were
upset that Urena, a new employee, was being used as a conduit
and possibly as a plant or informer by Uzi Einy. On June 29,
Urena again spoke to Einy in his office. Einy wanted Urena to
say that Cabrera had been threatening him and he wanted Urena
to come to the NLRB to testify against Cabrera.
The record shows that Uzi Einy used a tape recorder when-
ever he had a conversation in his office with an employee.
Some transcripts of these tapes were admitted into evidence in
prior hearings in other cases. The parties stipulated into evi-
dence transcripts of the March 23 and July 29, 1999 conversa-
tions between Urena and Uzi Einy.
Uzi Einy testified that in March 1999, Urena telephoned and
said that he had been threatened and was afraid for his life.
The transcript of the March 23 1999 conversation shows that
Uzi Einy attempted to obtain from Urena a statement that the
employees had threatened him because he told them that he did
not want to be in the Union. Einy repeatedly tried to get Urena
to acknowledge that he had previously told Einy that he did not
want to be in the Union. In the face of these efforts by Einy,
Urena steadfastly maintained that he had been threatened by the
employees because they did not want him to transmit instruc-
tions from Einy. Urena kept repeating that he had been told not
to go near 675 West End Avenue on the day that he informed
employees of Einy’s instructions about not working 16 hours
straight and not punching each others’ cards. And Einy kept
trying to get Urena to say that he had been threatened before
that because he did not want to join the Union. Urena con-
cluded his rendition to Uzi Einy by saying that that Cabrera had
called him a liar when Urena transmitted Einy’s message but
that later Cabrera asked Urena’s forgiveness and said to forget
about it. The transcript of the June 29 conversation shows that
Urena did not want to talk to Uzi Einy about purported threats
from other employees and he repeatedly asked Einy to leave
him alone. In response, Einy threatened to subpoena Urena. As
stated by General Counsel, the tapes show that Uzi Einy did not
give Urena the assurances required by Johnnie’s Poultry, 146
NLRB 770 (1964), when he questioned him about his own
desires for Union membership and about statements other em-
ployees may have made about Union activities. Shortly after
June 29, Respondents tried to give Urena subpoenas for an
NLRB hearing. Urena did not want to accept the subpoenas and
he did not want to testify.
Urena testified that after the June 29 conversation Uzi Einy
made changes to his working conditions. In August 1999, Uzi
Einy told Urena that he could not work at 675 West End Ave-
nue any longer.22 After that, Urena worked at 215 West 101st

21 Moran is Urena’s half-brother.
22 Urena recalled that this conversation took place in Uzi Einy’s of-
fice.
Street, but the times were changed and he worked fewer hours.
Urena testified that after he got into the Union Uzi Einy’s
nephew Zachi Eini worked in place of Urena. In September
1999, Zachi told Urena that he would henceforth report to him
instead of to Uzi Einy. Zachi Eini told Urena not to come to
work unless he were called. Eventually, Zachi stopped calling
Urena for work and he informed Urena in late September or
early October that Uzi Einy did not need him any longer. Urena
filed a charge with the NLRB on October 5, 1999.23 In No-
vember 2000, Urena began to work full time as a doorman at
675 West End Avenue. Urena denied that when he began to
work at 215 West 101st Street Uzi Einy had informed him that
the job belonged to Zachi Eini. Urena also denied that Zachi
paid him out of his own pocket. Respondent did not call Zachi
Eini to testify in this hearing. Uzi Einy testified that he never
fired Urena and he never told Zachi that Urena could not re-
place him.
At the hearing the Respondents sought to show that although
they had provided a uniform or jacket for employees they did
not wear them. Apparently this would be an argument to sup-
port the hiring of security guards, although the rationale was
not made clear. Respondents also showed that they gave name
tags to the employees. The Respondents did not offer testimony
to show when they had provided uniform jackets, to whom they
were given or what the instructions were concerning the jack-
ets. Urena testified that when he was working at 675 West End
Avenue he found an old jacket in the basement with the number
675 printed on the front. Urena said that he had the jacket
cleaned and he used it until it wore out. Urena denied that Uzi
Einy gave him a jacket to wear and he denied that he had been
instructed to wear a jacket. The Respondents did not call any
witness to testify that a uniform was given at a certain time to a
named employee but that the employee refused to wear the
jacket.
The Respondents intimated that the doormen did not keep
good records of visitors to the buildings and that this was a
reason for hiring the security guard company. However, Urena
testified that he was careful to keep the visitors logs accurately.
Apparently Uzi Einy reads all the visitor logs to the buildings.
He once berated Urena because no visitors were logged in be-
tween 10:45 p.m. and 1 a.m. at 215 West 101st Street. Further,
Uzi Einy had instructed Urena to monitor the comings and
goings of a certain tenant named McKofsky and he criticized
Urena for failing to see this tenant often enough. Urena said he
could not invent the times McKofsky went in and out of the
building.
In a letter to a Board agent dated August 29, 2001, Uzi Einy
denied that employees were replaced with security guard em-
ployees. Einy explained his reasons for hiring the security
company as follows: “[I]n another building I manage we had a
. . . verdict of $2.5 millions for improper security. . . .” The
security company was hired “for the security of tenants and to
protect the tenants’ and the employers’ property and not in
retaliation for employees’ bargaining and protected activities.”
The $2.5 million verdict referred to was in a case entitled
Cabral v. Champ Broadway Company c/o C & E Associates.

23 Apparently this case was eventually settled.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD336
LLC. According to Einy the lawsuit concerned a rape. When
questioned about this verdict Uzi Einy testified that he has a 48
percent interest in C & E but that he is not the manager and
does not receive the rent. Einy did not explain why he had
claimed to be the manager in the letter to the Board agent. Einy
claimed not to know the address of the building involved in the
lawsuit. Einy acknowledged that the building involved in the
lawsuit he cited as justification for hiring the security company
had nothing at all do with any of the buildings involved in the
instant case. In fact it is in Washington Heights, a very different
part of Manhattan from the Upper West Side locations of the
buildings on West End Avenue and West 101st Street.
Zvi Eyny testified that there have been security problems
since 1988. He took a picture of some doorman uniforms in the
basement of 675 West End Avenue but he could not recall
when this was. The uniforms had been purchased when the
building was converted to cooperative ownership.24 He was
shown his passport which refreshed his memory that he entered
the United States on April 15, 2000, and left on July 24. Zvi
Eyny stated that he took the picture during this period but that
the uniforms disappeared a few weeks later. Eyny testified that
he gave out name tags to the doormen on August 9, 2000 and
Respondent introduced a picture of various names tags bearing
that date. Eyny did not explain how this meshed with his depar-
ture from the country on July 24. Zvi Eyny also testified to a
number of misdeeds engaged in by a former doorman named
Bobby. This person, the subject of a prior unfair labor practice
case, was fired long before the instant hearing according to
Eyny.
2. Discussion and Conclusions
Respondents’ brief argues that the 8(a)(3) allegation relating
to the hiring of Command Security is time-barred. As shown
above, the security guard began working on March 12, 2001.
The charge in Case 2–CA–33940–1 was filed on July 20, 2001,
well within the period allowed by Section 10(b) of the Act. The
Charge alleged that Respondents “hired a security guard to
replace a bargaining unit employee and to perform bargaining
unit work in retaliation for employees engaging in protected
activities.” This Charge cited a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. On October 31, the Union filed an amended charge in
Case 2–CA–33940–1 using the identical language to describe
the alleged unfair labor practice but also citing Section 8(a)(3)
and (5) of the Act. Manifestly, the charge filed on July 20 gave
Respondents full notice of the allegation against them: hiring a
security guard to perform unit work in retaliation for the em-
ployees’ protected activities. The Respondents’ statute of limi-
tations argument is without merit. Nickles Bakery of Indiana,
Inc., 296 NLRB 927 fn. 5 (1989).
A vivid demonstration of Respondents’ antiunion animus is
provided by Uzi Einy’s relentless attempts on March 23 and
June 29, to obtain a statement from Urena that the other em-
ployees had threatened him in connection with the Union. Even
though, as shown on the transcripts of the two conversations,
Urena persisted in denying that he had been threatened because

24 At one point in the proceedings Uzi Einy stated that the building
had been converted in 1988.
he did not want to join the Union, Einy would not stop trying to
get Urena to change his story. It is clear that Uzi Einy wished to
use a statement from Urena to fight the Union. When Urena
refused to go along, Einy threatened to subpoena him even
though Urena begged to be left alone. Moreover, Einy did not
give Urena the assurances required by Johnnie’s Poultry: this is
another indication of antiunion animus on the part of Respon-
dents. When it became clear that Urena would not make the
statements he was trying to obtain from Urena, Uzi Einy re-
duced Urena’s hours of work. Eventually, Urena had no work
at all at Respondents’ buildings. The timing of the reduction
and cessation of Urena’s work leads to the conclusion that it
was in retaliation for Urena’s refusal to cooperate with Einy.
This is another example of Respondents’ antiunion animus.
Finally, Respondents’ asserted reasons for replacing the unit
employee doormen with employees from Command Security
do not seem credible. Although Respondents assert that they
were motivated by concerns for the security of the tenants and
the property the evidence does not support that claim. Respon-
dents produced evidence to show that a rape occurred at 215
West 101st Street before 1987. Yet Respondents did not hire a
security guard company in response to that violent occur-
rence.25 Respondents introduced testimony that there had been
robberies at both 675 West End Avenue and 215 West 101st
Street but the witnesses could not recall when these had taken
place and no details were furnished. As has been amply demon-
strated, Respondents maintain documentary evidence from the
earliest days of their real estate operations in New York City
and Respondents maintain tape recordings of management-
employee conversations in their offices. Respondents have
copies of the visitors’ logs from buildings where such logs are
kept. Yet Respondents had no documentation for the purported
robberies. This failure to document the assertions combined
with the absence of any firm testimonial details leads me to
doubt that they occurred. Further, Moran and Urena denied that
they knew of any robberies.
Respondents asserted that the security guard company re-
lieved them of liability for incidents at the buildings. However,
a reading of the contract with Command Security shows that
the opposite is true. The contract specifically states that Com-
mand is not an insurer and that Command does not agree to
defend Respondents in any actions brought against it. In fact,
the contract provides that Respondents agree to indemnify
Command against any third party claims.
Respondents assert that a benefit of Command Security is
that its employees wear uniforms. The evidence shows that at
some point Respondents purchased uniforms for the unit door-
men.26 Respondents offered vague testimony that the uniforms
“disappeared” and that the men did not wear them. Yet Re-
spondents offered no testimony that any named doorman re-

25 The rape in the building managed by C & E occurred prior to the
verdict in 2001, but Respondents furnished no evidence as to its actual
timing.
Moreover, that building is far removed from the buildings at issue in
the instant case. Respondents did not show that they hired a security
guard service for the building where the actual event occurred.
26 Based on the statements of Zvi Eyny, it seems likely that the uni-
forms were purchased in 1988.
675 WEST END OWNERS CORP. 337
fused to wear the uniform issued to him or that any named
doorman improperly disposed of his uniform. Urena, the only
witness who was questioned about wearing a uniform, testified
that he found a uniform jacket in the basement, had it cleaned
and wore it until it was past wearing. He firmly denied that he
had ever been issued a uniform. Zvi Eyny’s testimony identify-
ing the picture of uniforms in the basement is not credible.
Eyny did not recall when he took the picture until prompted by
being shown his passport. There is no reason to believe that the
date given was accurate. Significantly, Respondents had many
pictures of uniforms but no invoice showing when they had
been purchased. I a.m. not convinced that Respondents’ em-
ployees refused to wear their uniforms. It is just as likely on the
record before me that the uniforms wore out long before the
events relevant to the instant case.
The record shows that sometime around the election in Janu-
ary 2000, Respondents gave New York State security guard
applications to the unit employees. The asserted reason for this
was to improve the security of Respondents’ buildings. I can
find no convincing reason in the record for the timing of this
effort. There is no evidence that any incident occurred which
would prompt new security measures in January 2000. Fur-
thermore, the proffered reasons for preferring a security com-
pany employee are not convincing. The evidence is undisputed
that the unit employees perform the same duties as Cumber-
batch, the security guard company employee. The unit employ-
ees and Cumberbatch follow the same post instructions about
punching in, maintaining security and the like. And Cumber-
batch performs the same cleaning chores on his shift as any
other unit employee. Respondents did not dispute the wit-
nesses’ testimony that Cumberbatch does the same work they
do and the same work as the man he replaced.
Moreover, the evidence shows that Respondents took various
security measures such as installing a video camera and moni-
tor in the years before the Union was on the scene. Yet Re-
spondents did not hire the security guard company until after
the January 2000 election and after the December 29, 2000
hearing officer’s report on challenges and recommendations
finding that the doormen at 675 West End Avenue and 215
West 101st Street were not statutory guards.
The pretextual nature of Respondents’ asserted reasons for
hiring the security guard company and the timing of the com-
mencement of the guard service in March 2001 points to a con-
clusion that it was effected in retaliation for the Union activities
of the unit employees. The Board has held that “contracting out
a portion of the business for antiunion considerations violates
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.” Hood Industries, Inc., 248
NLRB 597, 601 (1980). See also Caguas Asphalt, Inc., 296
NLRB 785, 790–791 (1989). Thus, I find that the Respondents
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by hiring nonunit
security guards to replace bargaining unit employees to perform
bargaining unit work in retaliation for the unit employees’ pro-
tected activities.
G. Alleged Refusal to Bargain
1. Facts
Local 670 representative David Green testified that he organ-
ized the unit employees. Green testified that he had a problem
with mail sent to the Respondent being returned. As a result, on
August 3, 2001 he hand delivered a letter to Respondent’s of-
fice at 700 West End Avenue. After gaining admittance to the
office Green handed the letter to Zvi Eyny. The letter requested
the following information:
1. A list of all bargaining unit employees arranged by classi-
fication and shift including names, addresses, phone numbers,
present wage rates, date and amount of last wage increase, date
of hire and average number of hours worked per week that each
has worked during the last 12 months.
2. The total number of overtime hours paid each for the last
12 months.
3. The total gross pay for each bargaining unit employees
(sic) for the last calender (sic) year.
4. A copy of the staffing patterns or schedules for all units
including a shift-by-shifts breakdown for each classification in
each unit, as well as the staffing patterns on weekends per unit.
5. A copy off (sic) all current job descriptions.
6. A copy off (sic) all current work rules.
7. A copy of all policies related to employment conditions
and employees’ benefits, including a copy of all employees
handbooks and manuals.
8. Copies of any Summary Plan Description Booklets or ma-
terials for all insurance plans, including premium rates and
contributions rates for all coverages for each of the last three
years; and Pension Plans.
9. Names of employees enrolled in each insurance category
(employee only, employee plus 1, family, etc.) For each Plan
Pension Plan.
The letter closed by stating:
Your prompt attention to the foregoing is required. Upon re-
ceipt of the requested information, we suggest that the follow-
ing dates for the commencement of negotiations subject to
your expeditious confirmation: August 15, 22 and 29. To be
held at the Union office located at 299 Broadway, Ste. 1000,
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Green testified that he received one letter in response to his
hand delivered letter of August 3. This letter from Uzi Einy was
dated August 13, 2001. It read as follows:
This is in response to your letter dated August 3rd ,
2001. As you are aware, we have wrote (sic) a letter to
Region two stating that their certification of the election is
in error.
We are awaiting for a response from the Region to our
letter dated July 27th, 2001. I have herewith attached a
copy of said letter, of which a copy was previously sent to
you.
Despite the mention of an attached July 27 letter to the Region,
no such letter was in fact attached to the letter Green received.
On September 5, 2001 Green again wrote to Uzi Einy
as follows:
Local 670 wishes to meet with you on September 18,
2001 at 10:00 a.m. in the Union office to negotiate a Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement. The Union has yet to re-
ceive it’s [sic] prior request for information.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD338
Green testified that he personally mailed this letter in the
mailbox across the street from his office. Green testified that
the Respondent did not meet to negotiate with the Union on
September 18 and it did not submit any of the requested infor-
mation to the Union. Uzi Einy denied that he received the letter
of September 5 from the Union.
On September 20, 2001 Green again mailed a letter to
Uzi Einy. This letter stated:
Local 670 wishes to meet with you on October 3, 2001
at 10:00a.m. in the Union office to negotiate a Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The Union has yet to receive it’s
(sic) prior request for information.
Green testified that Respondents did not meet and negotiate
with the Union and did not supply the requested information.
Uzi Einy testified that he did not receive the Union’s letter of
September 20.
On October 11, 2001 Uzi Einy wrote to the Board agent in-
vestigating the refusal to bargain charge as follows:
I have wrote [sic] to the union that I would meet with
their representative in my office. The union has never re-
sponded to my letter or come to the appointment or sched-
ule with the parties another appointment date. I have never
refused to bargain.
I wrote another letter to the union in which I men-
tioned my letter to the Region about the certification be-
cause at the time of making the certification the Region
did not take into consideration the objections to the elec-
tion timely filed by the parties.
On October 26, Uzi Einy wrote another letter to the Board
agent stating that he denied the charge that he refused to bar-
gain since on or about August 20. Einy’s letter stated:
I deny said charge. The union did not have any contact
with us at all in August 2001 and did not provide us with
the union terms of an initial bargaining agreement, and I
have never refused to bargain with the union.
With regard to your request for a copy of the letter that
we wrote to the union, I have to say that currently I cannot
locate this letter. The person who has this letter is out of
the country and will be back probably at the end of No-
vember 2001. I do not know why you do not believe what
I say and you ask me to provide you a copy of the letter
. . . .
On cross examination by Respondent, Green recalled that he
had received only one letter from Einy in 2001; he received
Respondents’ letter of August 13, in which Einy stated that
Respondents were challenging the certification.27 When shown
a letter addressed to the Union from Uzi Einy dated September
5, 2001, Green said that he did not recognize the letter and had
not received it. This letter, which was admitted through Re-
spondent’s witness as will be described below, states as fol-
lows:

27 Green did not recall receiving R. Exh. 23, a letter dealing
with a different case, and this letter was not admitted through
any witness called by Respondent.
As I wrote you in my last letter, I am disputing the
Certification of the Union as exclusive collective-
bargaining representative for the employees.
As I previously wrote you in response to your previous
letter, I am ready to meet you in my office at the above
address on September 19, 2001 at 4:00 pm.
With regard to the information that you have re-
quested, your letter does not use exact language. Most of
the information has been provided to your representative
and to the Board at prior hearings. When we meet in my
office, you can clarify your request and may be able to
give you the remaining of the information while you are in
my office.
The Respondents did not produce any letter dated earlier
than September 5 in which Uzi Einy offered to meet with the
Union on September 19, 2001.
The letter of September 5, 2001 is the letter referred to in
Einy’s letter to the Board agent of October 26, quoted above,
which he asserts he cannot locate because the person who has
the letter is out of the country. In response to leading questions
Zvi Eyny testified that he saw Uzi Einy put this letter into an
envelope while both of them were in Respondents’ office and
Eyny testified that he mailed the letter. Eyny did not give any
testimony at all as to when this took place. Uzi Einy did not
testify that he wrote the letter and did not testify that he gave it
to Zvi Eyny to mail.
2. Discussion and Conclusions
The Charge in Case 2–CA–34059 alleging that the Respon-
dents have refused to bargain with the Union on the terms of an
initial collective-bargaining agreement was filed on September
10, 2001. The charge was served on Respondents by regular
mail on September 24, and was further served by regular and
certified mail on October 31, 2001. The charge in Case 2–CA–
34587 was filed on May 6, 2002 alleging that the Respondents
have refused to provide information requested by the Union in
order for the Union to negotiate the terms of an initial collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. This charge was served on Respon-
dents on May 10, May 17 and 22, 2002.
Respondents maintain that the allegation in the Amended
complaint based on the refusal to provide information is barred
by Section 10(b) of the Act. I do not find that the allegation is
time-barred. The refusal to bargain charge in Case 2–CA–
34059 is based on the Respondent’s failure to negotiate pursu-
ant to the Union’s requests dated August 3, September 5 and 20
in the letters set forth above. Those letters not only requested
that Respondents meet and negotiate but they also requested
information about the bargaining unit. The charge in Case 2–
CA–34587 refers to the information requests set forth in the
Union’s letters of August 3, and September 5 and 20.
The earlier charge, which was timely served, would have
supported a complaint alleging both a refusal to meet and nego-
tiate an initial agreement and a refusal to provide information.
The duty to provide information is a part of the duty to bargain.
Thus, the complaint allegation that Respondents refused to
provide information involves the same legal theory as the alle-
gation that Respondents refused to bargain for an initial con-
tract. Both allegations arise from the same factual circum-
675 WEST END OWNERS CORP. 339
stances, namely that Respondent did not bargain with the Union
pursuant to its requests of August 3 and September 5 and 20,
2001. Finally, the Respondent has raised the same defense to
the allegations: it maintains that it is not obliged to bargain with
the Union because it is challenging the certification. Thus, even
without the filing of a charge in Case 2–CA–34587 I would
have permitted amendment of the complaint to allege a refusal
to furnish information because it is closely related to the charge
that Respondents refused to bargain. Redd-I, 290 NLRB 1115,
1118 (1988)
I do not believe that the letter from Uzi Einy to the Union
dated September 5 purportedly setting a date of September 19
to meet and bargain is genuine, nor do I believe that it was ever
sent to the Union. There is no testimony on the record by any of
Respondents’ witnesses that the supposed letter of September 5
was in the witness’ possession while he was out of the country
as asserted in Einy’s October 26 letter to the Board agent. Thus,
no reason has been given to explain why Respondents did not
have this letter as asserted by Uzi Einy in his letter to the Board
agent. It strains credulity to suppose that Respondents, who
maintain videotapes and audio tapes of employees going back
many years and who retain letters from tenants going back to
1987, did not retain a copy of a very important letter that was
typed and put into an envelope in their own office. Further Uzi
Einy did not testify that he caused the supposed letter to be
typed nor when this might have occurred. Significantly, Zvi
Eyny did not state when he was given the letter to mail and he
did not testify when he mailed it. Thus, there is no testimony in
the record as to when the letter was prepared, who prepared it
and when it was mailed.
My finding that the purported letter of September 5 is not
genuine and was not mailed to the Union on or about Septem-
ber 5 is based on the discussion in the paragraph above. How-
ever, there is another reason why I find it hard to believe that
the letter from Uzi Einy dated September 5, 2001 is genuine. In
the year 2001, the Jewish New Year began on the night of Sep-
tember 17. The following 2 days, September 18 and 19, were
two of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar. Uzi Einy identi-
fied himself as an observant person, requesting and receiving
an expeditious end to the hearing on a Friday so that he could
be present for the Sabbath observance before candle lighting
time. Furthermore, Urena testified that he did not telephone Uzi
Einy on Saturday because Einy did not answer the telephone on
the Sabbath.28 It seems well nigh impossible that Uzi Einy
would have written a letter to the Union offering to meet on the
second day of Rosh Hashanah.29
Respondents’ letter of August 13, 2001 to Green did not con-
tain an agreement to negotiate with the Union. Instead, the
letter said that Respondent disputed the Certification. By impli-
cation, Respondents’ letter constituted a refusal to meet and
bargain with the Union and a refusal to furnish information to

28 Although Einy stated that he did answer the telephone on Satur-
day, he at first avoided giving this answer. Based on my findings that
he is not credible and that Urena is a truthful witness, I do not rely on
Einy’s answer.
29 The administrative law judge is herself Jewish and does not work
on the first 2 days of the New Year.
the Union. I find, based on Green’s testimony, that he mailed
the letters of September 5 and 20 to Respondents. I do not
credit Uzi Einy that Respondents did not receive the Union’s
requests for bargaining dated September 5 and 20, 2001. This is
based on my finding above that Einy is not a reliable witness
and that he wrongly denied receipt of the hand delivered letter
of August 3 from the Union. I find that the Respondents did not
answer Green’s letters of September 5 and 20. I have found
above that the letter from Uzi Einy to Green dated September 5
is not genuine. Green categorically denied ever receiving this
letter and neither Uzi Einy nor Zvi Eyny offered testimony as to
when this letter had been mailed. Uzi Einy’s written claim to a
Board agent that someone had a copy of this letter was never
substantiated by testimonial proof. Further, the Union’s letter of
September 20 would have elicited a response from Respondents
if the employer had been willing to meet with the Union. In
summary, Respondents’ refused to meet with the Union, did not
respond to further Union requests to meet for negotiations and
did not attend any meetings.
The information requested by the Union relates to wages,
hours and working conditions of the unit employees and it is
presumptively necessary for and relevant to the Union’s func-
tion as a bargaining representative. Indeed, Respondents did not
articulate any claim that that the Union’s request for informa-
tion was overbroad.
I find that the Respondents refused to bargain with the Union
and refused to provide information to the Union in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The fact that the Respon-
dents maintained that the certification was issued in error did
not suspend the duty to bargain. East Coast Equipment, 229
NLRB 825, 829–830 (1977); enfd. 577 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1978).
H. Hiring of Command Security
Green stated that Waldo Guerra had been a doorman in the
bargaining unit when Green was organizing the employees.
Guerra was replaced by a Command Security Corporation em-
ployee. Green testified that Respondents did not bargain with
the Union over the decision to replace a bargaining unit em-
ployee with a Command Security employee. Respondents do
not contend that they gave notice to or bargained with the Un-
ion concerning the hiring of the Command Security to perform
bargaining unit work. Thus, it is undisputed that on March 12,
2001 Command Security employee Cumberbatch began per-
forming the duties formerly performed by unit employee
Guerra on the 4 p.m. to midnight shift at 675 West End Ave-
nue. This change took place after the Report on Challenges and
Recommendations issued on December 29, 2000 recommend-
ing that the ballots of the doormen at Respondents’ buildings
should be opened and counted. An employer acts at its peril in
making changes in terms and conditions of employment during
the period of post election challenges and objections. As the
Board said in Mike O’Connor Chevrolet, 209 NLRB 701, 703
(1974):
To hold otherwise would allow an employer to box the union
in on future bargaining positions by implementing changes of
policy and practice during the period when objections or de-
terminative challenges to the election are pending. Accord-
ingly, since we have already determined in this case that the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD340
Union should be certified, we find, . . . that Respondent was
not free to make changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment during the pendency of postelection objections and chal-
lenges without first consulting with the Union.
I find that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
by hiring a security guard company to perform bargaining unit
work commencing on March 12, 2001 without prior notice to
and without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain over
its decision to do so and the effects of this change.
I. Conduct of Uzi Einy
Uzi Einy, as “Employer,” filed an answer and an amended
answer consisting of a blanket denial and a denial of receipt of
the complaint.30 The ALJ cautioned him that he might wish to
reconsider his position because a finding that the answer was
interposed for the purpose of delay might result in an imposi-
tion of sanctions. Section 102.21 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations provide with respect to the signing of an answer:
The signature of the attorney or non-attorney party representa-
tive constitutes a certification by him/her that he/she has read
the answer; that to the best of his/her knowledge, information,
and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay. . . . For a willful violation of this section
an attorney or non-attorney party representative may be sub-
jected to appropriate disciplinary action.
On the last day of the instant hearing just as the ALJ was go-
ing to close the record, Uzi Einy stated that he wished to admit
the jurisdiction of the Board over the Respondents, including
all the separate entities that make up Respondents. In making
this admission at the last possible moment, Respondents did not
admit the other portions of the complaint such as the supervi-
sory status of Uzi Einy and Zvi Eyny, the status of the labor
organization under the Act, receipt of the charges and the com-
plaint, and the receipt of the hand delivered August 3, 2001
letter.31 Thus, the Answer signed by Uzi Einy failed to admit
facts and events as to which he could not be in doubt and which
he spoke of freely during the hearing. Moreover, admitting
jurisdiction at the last possible moment did not relieve Counsel
for the General Counsel of the necessity of proving jurisdiction
during the presentation of General Counsel’s case. Together
with the dilatory tactics of Uzi Einy during the trial, detailed
above, there is a preponderance of evidence that he was aware
that the Answer signed by him was not supported by good
ground and that the Answer was interposed for delay. More-
over, Uzi Einy was warned on the record by the ALJ that it was
improper to file a blanket denial to a complaint for the purposes
of delay and not in good faith. Section 102.77(b) of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations provide that “the administrative law

30 The amended answer also contains a “cross complaint” requesting
decertification of the Union. I shall not deal with any issues raised in
the cross complaint.
31 The status of the Union was determined by the Board in the repre-
sentation case. One of the Respondents’ defenses in the instant case is
that they did indeed offer to meet with and bargain with the Union on
behalf of the unit employees. Finally, at no time during the testimony of
Union representative Green or at any other time did Respondents at-
tempt to litigate the status of the Union under the Act.
judge . . . or Board shall also have the authority in the proceed-
ing in which the misconduct occurred to admonish or repri-
mand, after due notice, any person who engages in misconduct
at a hearing.”
I therefore recommend that the Board reprimand Uzi Einy
for submitting an Answer on behalf of Respondent without any
belief that there was good ground to support major portions of
it and for the purpose of delay. I find that this misconduct was
willful; it followed a specific warning to Uzi Einy on the re-
cord. Uzi Einy has represented Respondents in various prior
unfair labor practice cases and in the representation case before
the Board. He should be held accountable for failing to admit
the jurisdiction of the Board, the status of the labor organiza-
tion, and the supervisory status of himself and his brother Zvi
Eyny. Further, his actions in refusing certified mail addressed
to him at the office where he conducts all the business relating
to the real estate holdings of himself and his family constitute a
conscious effort to evade and delay the processes of the Board
and the effectuation of the Act. Thus, his denial of receipt of
charges and complaint is a further instance of willful behavior
engaged in without good ground and for the purpose of delay. I
recommend that the Board warn Uzi Einy that if he engages in
this conduct in the future he will be barred from appearing in
Board proceedings.
I recommend that the Board also reprimand Uzi Einy for
failing to follow the administrative law judge’s instructions
during the hearing by repeatedly talking loudly at counsel table
while witnesses were testifying and then interrupting the ques-
tioning of witnesses because he did not know what was going
on, interfering with questioning of opposing counsel by de-
manding to know the purpose of the questions, communicating
with witnesses who were on the stand actually giving testimony
in response to opposing counsel, interposing baseless objec-
tions for the purpose of delay and repeatedly attempting to
evade the ruling that he could only testify if another person at
counsel table posed the questions. I recommend that the Board
reprimand Uzi Einy for willfully disobeying the ALJ’s instruc-
tions that once a subpoena is revoked a copy of it may not be
served again and for willfully disobeying the ALJ’s instructions
that a subpoena may only be used to obtain evidence for use
during a hearing before an ALJ and may not be issued after the
close of the hearing. I recommend that the Board warn Uzi
Einy that if he engages in the same or similar conduct in future
Board proceedings he will be barred from appearing in any
proceedings before the Board.
As discussed in detail above, Uzi Einy failed to heed my in-
structions that (1) subpoenas may only be issued for the pro-
duction of testimony or evidence for use during the hearing and
that issuance of a subpoena after the close of a hearing is an
abuse of Board process and (2) copies of previously issued and
revoked subpoenas may not be labeled “amended” and served
again. I recommend that a hearing be held to determine the
litigation costs expended by the Union and the General Counsel
as a result of Uzi Einy’s willful violation of this instruction and
that Respondents be ordered to reimburse these litigation costs
to the General Counsel and the Union. Tiidee Products, 194
NLRB 1234, 1236 (1972).
675 WEST END OWNERS CORP. 341
J. Motions and Other Papers Filed After Close of Hearing
On July 31, 2002, Morris Tuchman, Esq., filed a motion for
recusal of the ALJ. This motion is hereby admitted into evi-
dence as ALJ Exhibit 8. On August 9, counsel for the General
Counsel filed an opposition. This opposition is hereby admitted
into evidence as ALJ Exhibit 9. On October 1, 2002, Uzi Einy
filed a motion to disqualify the ALJ. This motion is hereby
admitted into evidence as ALJ Exhibit 10. On October 2, 2002,
counsel for the General Counsel filed an opposition. The oppo-
sition is hereby admitted into evidence as ALJ Exhibit 11. The
recusal motions of Morris Tuchman, Esq. and Uzi Einy are
hereby denied.
On July 10, 2002, Uzi Einy wrote to the ALJ requesting an
order directed to Region 2. The ALJ responded in a letter dated
July 10. The July 10 letter of the ALJ together with letters dated
June 26, July 2 and 10, from Uzi Einy, and July 3 from Judith
M. Anderson, Esq. are hereby admitted into evidence as ALJ
Exhibit 12.32
On July 19, 2002 Uzi Einy filed a motion seeking reconsid-
eration of the ALJ order of July 18 which was admitted as ALJ
Exhibit 7. The July 19 motion, including various attachments,
is hereby admitted into evidence as ALJ Exhibit 13. The July
19 motion argues that Respondents wish to present newly dis-
covered evidence. This evidence consists of (1) an NLRB press
release dated November 15, 2001 which states that the mail-
room at the federal building has been reopened following an
October 30 shutdown for anthrax testing and (2) a September
20, 2001 NLRB press release stating that the regular phone
lines to the Manhattan Regional Office are down and that pub-
lic access to the Federal building is denied until further notice.
These two press releases are attached to ALJ Exhibit 12. In
addition the July 19 motion argues that the Respondents have
further newly discovered evidence consisting of (1) a map
showing the Union’s office at 299 Broadway and (2) a Postal
Service press release dated September 17, 2001 stating the
locations where certain businesses may pick up mail. These two
documents are attached to ALJ Exhibit 13. Respondents argue
that these documents prove that the Union office was closed
and had no telephone lines and that there was no delivery of
mail or pick up of mail near the Union’s office. On July 30,
2002, counsel for the General Counsel filed an opposition to the
July 19 motion of Uzi Einy. This opposition is hereby admitted
into evidence as ALJ Exhibit 14. Manifestly, public documents
dated in 2001 do not qualify as newly discovered evidence in
July 2002.33 Moreover, it is clear that the documents proffered
by Respondents do not show whether the Union’s office, which
is not located in the Federal building, was open after September
11, and they do not show what arrangements the Union may
have made to pick up mail or send outgoing mail nor do they
show when regular mail service was restored to 299 Broadway.
The Respondents’ motion of July 19, 2002 is hereby denied.

32 These letters, including attachments, relate to the same subject
matter.
33 Fitel/Lucent Technologies, Inc., 326 NLRB 46 fn. 1 (1998). The
exercise of due diligence by Respondents before the instant hearing
would have led to the public information which they now seek to intro-
duce into the record.
On July 31, 2002 Uzi Einy filed another request. This docu-
ment is hereby admitted into evidence as ALJ Exhibit 15. This
document requests the admission of certain documents into
evidence. I believe that most of these documents are in evi-
dence either as a result of actions taken during the hearing or
pursuant to the instant Decision. To admit them again would
only serve to further complicate an already overburdened re-
cord. The Respondents’ request of July 31 is hereby denied.
On August 21, 2002, counsel for the General Counsel filed a
response to Respondents’ July 31 request. The response is
hereby admitted into evidence as ALJ Exhibit 16. I do not be-
lieve that any further action is warranted as to the matters dis-
cussed in the General Counsel’s response.
On August 2, 2002, counsel for the General Counsel filed a
letter concerning errors by the reporting service in dealing with
the exhibits in the instant hearing. That letter is hereby admitted
into evidence as ALJ Exhibit 17.
On September 6, 2002, Uzi Einy filed a motion to reopen the
record to accept transcripts and exhibits from prior hearing as
exhibits, to take judicial notice and application for subpoena
forms. The motion is hereby admitted into evidence as ALJ
18.34 On September 9, 2002, Uzi Einy filed a letter concerning
typographical errors in the motion of September 6. That letter is
hereby admitted into evidence as ALJ 19. On September 24,
2002, counsel for the General Counsel filed an opposition to
Respondents’ motion of September 6. The opposition is hereby
admitted into evidence as ALJ Exhibit 20. The Respondents’
motion is an attempt to relitigate rulings of the ALJ on the re-
cord in the instant hearing and to admit evidence already re-
jected by the ALJ. Further, the motion seeks to introduce evi-
dence based on transcripts of prior hearings in which Respon-
dents were involved. No valid reason appears why, with due
diligence, this could not have been done during the instant hear-
ing. As noted above, the transcripts were available in the hear-
ing room throughout the hearing and the ALJ noted that Attor-
ney Tuchman and Uzi Einy consulted the transcripts during the
hearing. The Respondents’ Motion of September 6 is hereby
denied.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is the certified exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the Respondents’ employees in the following
unit:
All full-time and regular part-time doormen, porters, mainte-
nance employees and superintendents employed by the joint
employer at the residential apartment house buildings located
in Manhattan at 675 and 700 West End Avenue, 215 West
101st Street, 309 and 317 West 99th Street, and 214 West
102nd Street, and in the Bronx at 665 and 690 Allerton Ave-
nue, excluding all guards and supervisors as defined under the
Act.
2. By hiring nonunit security guards to replace bargaining
unit employees to perform bargaining unit work in retaliation

34 This motion was accompanied by various audio tapes and video
tapes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD342
for the employees’ protected activities the Respondents violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. By refusing to meet and negotiate with the Union and by
refusing to provide information to the Union the Respondents
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. By hiring a security guard company to perform bargain-
ing unit work without prior notice to the Union and without
affording the Union an opportunity to bargain over its decision
and the effects of the change the Respondents violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The General Counsel seeks an extension of the Union’s certi-
fication year in order that the Union may enjoy the same period
of good faith bargaining uninterrupted by challenges to its pre-
sumption of majority that it would have enjoyed had Respon-
dents bargained in good faith after the Union was certified. I
have found above that the Respondents have refused to bargain
with the Union and have refused to provide information re-
quested by the Union. This conduct began with the first request
for bargaining after the Union was certified and continued
through the pendency of the instant proceedings. I shall grant
the remedy sought. Accordingly, I shall include in my recom-
mended remedy a one year extension of the certification period
after Respondents have actually commenced to bargain in good
faith, including supplying in a prompt manner the information
requested by the Union. Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 NLRB 785
(1982); Valley Inventory Service Inc., 295 NLRB 1163, 1167
(1989).
Further, as the Board said in Colfor, Inc., 282 NLRB 1173,
[11]75 (1987):
While the certification period will be extended . . . the
Respondent’s duty to bargain will not stop when the certi-
fication year expires. It is well settled that on the expira-
tion of the certification year a certified union enjoys a re-
buttable presumption that its majority representative status
continues.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]