Section 8-132 - Judicial review of statement of compensation(a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by the statement of compensation filed by the redevelopment agency may, at any time within six months after the statement of compensation has been filed, apply to the superior court for the judicial district in which such property is situated for a review of such statement of compensation so far as it affects such applicant. The court, after causing notice of the pendency of such application to be given to the redevelopment agency, may, with the consent of the parties or their attorneys, appoint a judge trial referee to make a review of the statement of compensation, except that the court shall, upon the motion of either party or their attorneys, refer the application to a judge appointed by the Chief Court Administrator to hear tax appeals pursuant to section 12-39l, who shall consider such application in the manner set forth in subsection (c) of this section. For the purposes of such application, review and appeal therefrom, and for the purposes of sections 52-192a to 52-195, inclusive, such applicant shall be deemed a counterclaim plaintiff.(b) If the court appoints a judge trial referee, the judge trial referee, after giving at least ten days' notice to the parties interested of the time and place of hearing, shall hear the applicant and the redevelopment agency, shall view the property and take such testimony as the judge trial referee deems material and shall thereupon revise such statement of compensation in such manner as the judge trial referee deems proper and promptly report to the court. Such report shall contain a detailed statement of findings by the judge trial referee sufficient to enable the court to determine the considerations upon which the judge trial referee's conclusions are based. The report of the judge trial referee shall take into account any evidence relevant to the fair market value of the property, including evidence of environmental condition and required environmental remediation. The judge trial referee shall make a separate finding for remediation costs and the property owner shall be entitled to a set-off of such costs in any pending or subsequent action to recover remediation costs for the property. The court shall review the report, and may reject the report for any irregular or improper conduct in the performance of the duties of the judge trial referee. If the court rejects the report, the court may appoint another judge trial referee to make such review and report. If the court accepts the report, the statement of compensation in the report shall be conclusive upon such owner and the redevelopment agency.(c) If the court does not appoint a judge trial referee, the court, after giving at least ten days' notice to the parties interested of the time and place of hearing, shall hear the applicant and the redevelopment agency and take such testimony as the court deems material, may view the subject property, and shall make a finding regarding the statement of compensation. The findings of the court shall take into account any evidence relevant to the fair market value of the property, including evidence of environmental condition and required environmental remediation. The court shall make a separate finding for remediation costs and the property owner shall be entitled to a set-off of such costs in any pending or subsequent action to recover remediation costs for the property. The findings of the court shall be conclusive upon such owner and the redevelopment agency.(d) If no appeal to the Appellate Court is filed within the time allowed by law, or if an appeal is filed and the proceedings have terminated in a final judgment finding the amount due the property owner, the clerk shall send a certified copy of the statement of compensation and of the judgment to the redevelopment agency, which shall, upon receipt thereof, pay such property owner the amount due as compensation. The pendency of any such application for review shall not prevent or delay any action that is proposed with regard to such property by the project area redevelopment plan.(1955, S. 490d; 1972, P.A. 148, S. 1; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 127; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 20, 82; P.A. 00-89; 00-192, S. 100, 102; P.A. 01-186, S. 1; 01-195, S. 113, 181; P.A. 02-132, S. 69; P.A. 04-257, S. 93; P.A. 07-141, S. 9; 07-207, S. 2; Sept. Sp. Sess. P.A. 09-7, S. 163.)
Amended by P.A. 09-0007, S. 163 of the Sept. 2009 Sp. Sess., eff. 10/5/2009. Cited. 147 Conn. 321. Compensation may take into consideration moving expenses if these affect fair market value. Id., 362. Referee is not bound by opinion of experts; such opinions only aid trier to arrive at his own conclusion which is reached by weighing such opinions in light of all other relevant circumstances and his own general knowledge. 148 C. 513. Statute permits, and indeed requires, referee to raise, lower or leave unchanged the assessment of damages and there was no reason for precluding referee from revising assessment downward. 152 C. 141. Cited. 153 Conn. 119; 160 Conn. 492; 168 Conn. 135; 179 Conn. 293. Referee did not err in finding that the unique characteristics and special business use of the property were factors enhancing its fair market value. 180 C. 579. Cited. 181 Conn. 217; 184 C. 444; 203 Conn. 364; 215 C. 197. A claim alleging a civil rights violation pursuant to 42 USC 1983 is not barred by doctrine of res judicata because such claim cannot be encompassed within the limited scope of review in a condemnation proceeding pursuant to this section. 294 C. 817. Cited. 1 Conn.App. 20; 2 CA 351; Id., 355; 4 Conn.App. 271; 7 Conn.App. 485. Does not mandate filing of separate action to contest compensation statement. 18 Conn.App. 508. Cited. 20 Conn.App. 148; 21 Conn.App. 359; 23 Conn.App. 554; 37 CA 7; 42 Conn.App. 292. Defendant could not prevail on claim that trial court's valuation of property taken by eminent domain was inherently flawed because it failed to follow its statutory obligation to actually view the property; under the circumstances, court's failure to view the property was harmless because at time of trial the property no longer existed in same condition as it did at time of taking and, therefore, evidence of court's viewing of property would have been irrelevant. 76 CA 678. Cited. 35 Conn.Supp. 157.