N.M. R. Civ. P. Dist. Ct. 1-026

As amended through August 23, 2024

Rule 1-026 - General provisions governing discovery

A.Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by any of the following methods: depositions; interrogatories; requests for production or to enter land; physical and mental examinations and requests for admission.

B.Scope of discovery. Unless otherwise limited by the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:

(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery of any information, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. The information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. A party responding to discovery requests shall provide all non-privileged responsive information then known to the party, subject to the limitations in these rules or as ordered by the court.

(2) Limitations. The court shall limit use of discovery methods set forth in this rule if it determines that:

(a) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;

(b) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or

(c) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.

(3) Witnesses and exhibits. Parties may obtain discovery of the identity of each person expected to be called as a witness at trial, the subject matter of the witness's expected testimony and the substance of the witness's testimony. Parties may also discover the name, address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information that another party may use to support its claims or defenses as well as the subjects of such information. Parties may obtain a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that a party may use to support its claims or defenses.

(4) Insurance agreements. A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insurance is not part of an insurance agreement.

(5) Trial preparation materials. Subject to the provisions of Subparagraph (6) of this paragraph, a party may obtain discovery of documents, electronically stored information and tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subparagraph (1) of this paragraph and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or that party's representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.

A party may obtain without the required showing a statement that the party made concerning the action or its subject matter. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement that the person made concerning the action or its subject matter. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order compelling production of the statement. The provisions of Rule 1-037 NMRA apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a statement is:

(a) a written statement signed, adopted or approved by the person making it, or

(b) a contemporaneous, substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by a person.

(6) Experts.

(a) A party may through interrogatories and requests for production discover the identity of each person the other party may call as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. In addition, a party may discover the qualifications of the expert, including a copy of or the name and address of the custodian of any reports prepared by the expert regarding the pending action, a list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten (10) years, and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four (4) years.

(b) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.

(c) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert that another party has retained or specially employed in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 1-035 NMRA or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.

(d) Unless manifest injustice would result, the party seeking discovery shall pay the expert a reasonable fee related to the deposition or for time spent in responding to discovery under this subparagraph

(7) Claims of privilege or protection of trial preparation materials.

(a) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection pursuant to Subparagraph (5) of this paragraph as trial preparation materials, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.

(b) Information produced. If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the specified information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. By motion, a receiving party may promptly present the information to the court for in camera review and a determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.

C.Protective orders. Upon motion by any party or interested person for good cause, the court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:

(1) prohibiting the disclosure or discovery;

(2) limiting the terms or conditions of the disclosure or discovery;

(3) designating the time or place of the disclosure or discovery;

(4) directing the method of discovery including a method different than the party seeking discovery selected;

(5) barring or limiting inquiry into certain matters;

(6) directing that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court;

(7) sealing disclosures, responses or deposition transcripts;

(8) authorizing, prohibiting or limiting the discovery of a trade secret or other confidential research, development or commercial information; and

(9) directing that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.

If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 1-037 NMRA apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.

A motion filed pursuant to Paragraph C of this rule shall set forth or attach a copy of the discovery request at issue.

D.Sequence and timing of discovery. Unless the court for good cause orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not delay any other party's discovery. A party responding to discovery requests may not refuse to provide responsive information on grounds that discovery is continuing or that future scheduling deadlines exist such as those for exchange of trial witness and exhibits lists.

E.Supplementation of responses. A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the court, agreement of the parties or at any time prior to trial through new requests for supplementation of prior responses. In addition, a party has a duty to seasonably supplement or amend a prior response to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission if a party learns that the response is materially incomplete or incorrect and if additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the parties during the discovery process or in writing.

F.Discovery conference. At any time the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear for a discovery conference. The court shall also conduct a discovery conference upon motion by any party, unless the court determines that good cause exists not to conduct such a conference.

Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determining such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for the proper management of discovery in the action. Upon request of a party or when good cause otherwise exists, the court shall establish deadlines for identifying expert witnesses and conducting discovery related to expert testimony. An order may be altered or amended for good cause or by stipulation of the parties with court approval.

The court may combine the discovery conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 1-016 NMRA.

N.M. R. Civ. P. Dist. Ct. 1-026

As amended, effective 10/15/1986;8/1/1989;1/1/1998;5/1/2002; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 09-8300-007, effective 5/15/2009.

Committee commentary for 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendments to Rule 1-026 NMRA consist of numerous changes as described below.

Stylistic and Grammatical Changes

The stylistic and grammatical changes to Rule 1-026 are numerous. Unless otherwise noted below, these changes were not intended to impact the substantive provisions of Rule 1-026.

Discovery Methods. The new language in Rule 1-026(A) is more concise. The provisions for requests for production or to enter land apply to both Rule 1-034, which has to do with such discovery requests made upon parties, as well as Rule 1-045, which has to do with such discovery via a subpoena to non-parties.

Scope of Discovery. The amendments consolidate the prior language in Rule 1-026(B)(1) to express the well-established standard for liberal pretrial discovery. E.g., Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982). The parties may obtain discovery of any information not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. The amendment retains the provision that the information sought need not be admissible at trial if the information appears to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The rule further explains that parties responding to discovery requests seeking such information must provide responsive information then known to the party and may not delay discovery of such information simply because discovery is not complete or future pretrial deadlines may exist.

Witnesses and Exhibits. This paragraph explicitly provides for discovery related to witnesses, documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things. One of the principal purposes of these provisions is to facilitate early discovery of necessary pretrial information to focus later discovery. Early identification of potential witnesses and exhibits should expedite the litigation process.

Insurance information. Although Rule 1-026(B)(4) does not include an insurance application as part of an insurance agreement, such applications may be discoverable when reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The revisions to Rule 1-026(B)(4) are not intended to change existing law governing the admissibility of information concerning insurance agreements. The Rules of Evidence continue to control the admissibility of insurance information.

Expert Discovery. Rule 1-026(B)(4) concerns discovery of experts. The previous rule required a court order for taking a deposition of an expert, a procedure not uniformly followed. The rule now provides for requests for production and interrogatories as well as depositions of experts without court order.

Privilege Issues. These revisions consist mostly of stylistic changes. It is desirable that a party comply with the provisions of Rule 1-026(B)(7)(a) by producing a privilege log of any information being withheld from discovery on the grounds of privilege. The provisions in Rule 1-026(B)(7)(b) are new. They are modeled after amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted with provisions for the discovery of electronically-stored information as explained in more detail below.

Protective Orders. The amendments consist essentially of stylistic changes with one notable exception. The rule previously provided that a party or other person could seek a protective order from the court in which the action is pending or, alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, from a court in the district where the deposition is to be taken. The provision applicable "to the district where the deposition is to be taken" is a vestige from the adoption of portions of the federal rule, which envisions discovery outside the federal district of the pending action. The federal rule has a nationwide application. New Mexico has a much smaller geographic area, and consequently, the committee felt that the burdens imposed by requiring parties or non-parties to seek a protective order in the district court where the action is filed did not outweigh the judicial economy and consistency of having that particular court decide the issue.

Supplementation. The amendments to Paragraph E concern a party's duty to supplement and amend discovery responses. The rule does not require supplementation or amendment if the additional or corrective information has otherwise been made known to the parties during the discovery process or in writing. The amendment does not otherwise significantly change the substantive requirements of the existing rule; it is intended to restate those requirements more concisely.

Discovery Conferences. The revisions streamline the procedures applicable to discovery conferences and eliminate provisions that litigants were not typically following in routine practice. The rule provides parties the opportunity to have the court enter scheduling deadlines related to expert witnesses.

Discovery of Electronically Stored Information. In September, 2005, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The committee found that discovery of electronically stored information "raises markedly different issues from conventional discovery of paper records" and that existing discovery rules "provide inadequate guidance to litigants, judges, and lawyers in determining discovery rights and obligations in particular cases." September 2005 Report of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. The advisory committee submitted proposed amendments to Federal Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45 and Form 35 to address these problems. The proposals were adopted and went into effect in the federal courts in December, 2006.

The New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts Committee reviewed these new federal rules and the advisory committee's accompanying commentary. With three substantive changes and additional minor editing changes, the committee recommended that New Mexico amend Rules 1-016, 1-026, 1-033, 1-034, 1-037 and 1-045 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts to incorporate the new federal rules concerning discovery of electronically stored information.

One recommended change occurs in Rule 1-026(B)(7)(b) NMRA, which deals with the assertion of privilege or other protection for information already produced by a party. Both Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(B) and Rule 1-026(B)(7)(b) provide that the party who is notified that the party has received information subject to the claim of privilege or protection must sequester it and not use it until the claim is resolved. Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides that the party in possession of the disputed information "may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim." Because New Mexico law provides that documents are sealed only after a motion to seal has been made and granted, see, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 1999-NMCA-135, 128 N.M. 177, 991 P.2d 7 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting that a party sought a protective order to seal the district court record of the proceedings); LR2-111 NMRA [withdrawn] ("... a court may seal a file or other record upon a party's written motion or the court's own motion, and showing of good cause."), New Mexico Rule 1-026(B)(7)(b) provides instead: "By motion, a receiving party may promptly present the information to the court for in camera review and determination of the claim." The committee does not intend that the adoption of Rule 1-026(B)(7) will otherwise affect the burdens of production and persuasion that apply when claims of privilege are made. See Rule 1-026(B)(7)(a)); see also Pina v. Espinoza, 2001-NMCA-055, 130 N.M. 661, 29 P.3d 1062.

The second change is the omission from the amendments to New Mexico Rule 1-037 of that portion of the 2006 amendment that added Rule 37(f) to the Federal Rule. Federal Rule 37(f) provides:

(f) Electronically Stored Information. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.

The committee is of the view that nothing in the nature of discovery of electronically stored information requires curtailment of the existing discretion of the district court to determine an appropriate sanction for violation of discovery rules.

The third change is the omission of a provision in Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B), which provides:

(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.

The committee is of the view that the discovery of electronically stored information should be subject to the same provisions in these rules for motions to compel discovery and motions for protective orders that currently govern the discovery of non-electronic information.

[As amended by Supreme Court Order No. 09-8300-007, effective May 15, 2009.]

ANNOTATIONS The 2009 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 09-8300-007, effective May 15, 2009, in Paragraph A, after "Plaintiff may obtain discovery by", changed "one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of document or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, under Rule 12-034 or Rule 1-045(A)(1)(c) NMRA, for inspection or other purposes" to "any of the following methods: depositions; interrogatories; requests for production or to enter land"; in Paragraph B, in the first line, after "otherwise limited by", deleted "order of"; in Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph B, after "Parties may obtain discovery", deleted "regarding any matter" and added "of any information", after "which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action", deleted the former qualification concerning whether the information relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discover or to the claim or defense of any other party, and added the last sentence; in Subparagraph (2) of Paragraph B, at the beginning of the sentence, deleted "frequency or extent of" and added "court shall limit", after "discovery methods set forth in", changed "Paragraph A of this rule shall be limited by the court" to "this rule"; in Paragraph B, added Subparagraph (3), relettered former Subparagraphs (3), (4) and (5) as Subparagraphs (4), (5) and (6), and relettered former Subparagraph (8) as Subparagraph (7); in Subparagraph (4) of Paragraph B, deleted the former second sentence, which provided that information concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in evidence at trial, and in the second sentence, after "an application for insurance", changed "shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement" to "is not part of an insurance agreement"; in Subparagraph (5) of Paragraph B, in the first sentence, after "a party may obtain discovery of documents", added "electronically stored information" and in the first and second sentences of the second paragraph, after "the required showing a statement", in two places, added "that the party made", after "its subject matter", in two places, deleted "previously made by that party", in the third sentence of the second paragraph, after "the party may move for a court order", added "compelling production of the statement", and in the last sentence, after "a statement", deleted "previously made"; in Subparagraph (5)(b) of Paragraph B, at the beginning of the sentence, changed "stenographic, mechanical, electronic or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a" to "contemporaneous", and after "oral statement by a person", deleted "making it and contemporaneously recorded"; in Paragraph B, deleted former Subparagraph (5), which provided that discovery of facts known or opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial could be obtained only as provided in Subparagraphs (5)(a) and (5)(b); in Subparagraph 6(a) of Paragraph B, in the first sentence, after "A party may through interrogatories", deleted "require any other party to identify each person whom" and added "and requests for production discover the identity of each person" and after "the other party", deleted "expects to" and added "may", and added the last sentence; in Subparagraph (6)(b) of Paragraph B, deleted the former sentence, which provided that upon motion the court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and provisions concerning fees or expenses as the court may deem appropriate, and added the new sentence; in Subparagraph (6)(d) of Paragraph B, after "Unless manifest injustice would result", changed "the court shall require that the party seeking discover pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subparagraph (b) of Subparagraph (5) and under Subparagraph (6), of" to "the party seeking discovery shall pay the expert a reasonable fee related to the deposition or for time spent in responding to discovery under", and deleted former Subparagraph (7)(b) of Paragraph B, which provided for the payment of a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by a party in obtaining facts and options from an expert; in Subparagraph (7)(a) of Paragraph B, after "Subparagraph (5) of this paragraph", added "as trial preparation materials"; added Subparagraph (7)(b) of Paragraph B; in Paragraph C, in the first sentence, between "Upon motion by" and "may make any order", changed "party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken" to "any party or interested person for good cause, the court"; in Paragraph C, in Subparagraph (1), changed "that the disclosure or discovery not be had" to "prohibiting the disclosure of discovery"; in Paragraph C, in Subparagraph (2), changed "that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place" to "limiting the terms or conditions of the disclosure or discovery"; in Paragraph C, added Subparagraph (3) and in Subparagraph (4), deleted the former sentence, which provided that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other that that selected by the party seeking discovery and adds the new sentence; in Paragraph C, in Subparagraph (5), changed "that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters" to "barring or limiting inquiry into certain matters"; in Paragraph C, in Subparagraph (7), deleted the former sentence, which provided that a deposition after being sealed could be opened only by order of the court and adds the new sentence; in Paragraph C, in Subparagraph (8), added "authorizing, prohibiting or limiting the discovery" and deleted "not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way"; in the second to the last paragraph of Paragraph C, after "the court may", deleted "on such terms and conditions as are just"; in Paragraph D, after "Unless the court", deleted "upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice" and added "for good cause", and added the last sentence; in Paragraph E, deleted the first sentence, which provided that a party who responds to a request for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement the response except with respect to the identity of persons expected to be called as witnesses at trial, the subject matter on which the party is expected to testify and the substance of the testimony and except with respect to information which renders the response incorrect when made or if the response though correct when made is no longer true, and added the last sentence; in Paragraph F, in the first sentence, after "At any time", deleted "after commencement of an action" and in the second sentence, after "The court shall", added "also conduct a discovery conference upon motion by any party, unless the court determines that good cause exists not to conduct such a conference", deleted the remainder of the sentence, which specified the contents of the motion, deleted the third sentence, which provided the attorneys for the parties are under a duty to participate in framing a discovery plan if one attorney proposes a discovery plan, deleted the fourth sentence, which provided for notice to all parties, and deleted the fifth sentence, which provided for the service of objections and additions to matters in the motion; in Paragraph F, in the second subparagraph, added the second sentence, and in the last sentence, after "An order may be altered or amended", deleted "whenever justice so requires" and added "for good cause or by stipulation of the parties with court approval"; and in Paragraph F, in the last subparagraph, deleted "Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference to prompt convening of the conference". The 2002 amendment, effective May 1, 2002, added Paragraph B(8). The 1997 amendment, effective January 1, 1998, inserted "under rule 1-034 or Rule 1-045(A)(1)(c)" in Paragraph A, substituted "the burden of expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit" for "the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive" in Subparagraph B(2)(c), inserted "disclosure or" in Subparagraphs C(1), C(2) and C(4), substituted "revealed or be revealed" for "disclosed or be disclosed" in Subparagraph C (7), substituted "discovery at issue" for "question and response at issue" in the last undesignated paragraph in Paragraph C, and made stylistic changes and gender neutral changes throughout the rule. The 1989 amendment, effective for cases filed in the district courts on or after August 1, 1989, added the last sentence in Paragraph C and, in Paragraph E, substituted "seasonably" for "reasonably" near the beginning of Subparagraph (2). The 1987 amendment, effective Oct. 15, 1986, substituted "Subparagraph (b) of Subparagraph (5)" for "Subparagraph (a) of Subparagraph (5)" in Subparagraphs (7)(a) and (7)(b) of Paragraph B. Compiler's notes. - LR2-111 NMRA, referenced in the committee commentary, was withdrawn by Supreme Court Order No. 16-8300-015, effective December 31, 2016.

For restrictions on statements of injured patients, see 41-1-1 and 41-1-2 NMSA 1978. Procedure and guidelines for protecting trade secrets. Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2008 -NMSC-049, 144 N.M. 601, 190 P.3d 322, aff'g 2007-NMCA-094, 142 N.M. 283, 164 P.3d 982. Undue hardship. - The passage of time or the exposure of original documents to hantivirus and water damage may create undue hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent of information contained in work product. Santa Fe Pacific Gold Corp. v. United Nuclear Corp., 2007-NMCA-133, 143 N.M. 215, 175 P.3d 309. Presumption in favor of discovery. - The deposition rules intend a liberal pretrial discovery to enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the facts before trial; although a trial court's decision to limit discovery will not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion, the presumption is in favor of discovery. Where the conduct of defendant's attorney during the taking of the first deposition thwarted the intent of the discovery rule and prevented plaintiff from obtaining knowledge of at least some of the facts, it was an abuse of discretion to limit discovery in the second deposition to questions appearing on specified pages of the first deposition. Griego v. Grieco, 1977-NMCA-018, 90 N.M. 174, 561 P.2d 36 (decided before 1979 amendment). The general rule governing discovery is toward liberality rather than limitations. Ruiz v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 1981 -NMCA-094, 97 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406. The pretrial discovery rules, including this rule, intend a liberal pretrial discovery, to enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the facts before trial. Notwithstanding any objections, the presumption is in favor of discovery. Marchiondo v. Brown, 1982-NMSC-076, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462. Requirements of rule met. - Where February 25, 2004, letter from the city to plaintiffs indicates compliance with the court's written order to identify the expert and describe generally the nature of his expected testimony, and expert's report, which reportedly was completed on March 9, 2004, was provided to plaintiffs on the same day, the combination of the letter and the report met the requirements of this rule. New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-007, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149. Summary of grounds for expert's opinion sufficient. - Where expert's report has a methodology section and appendices and identifies the public data sets used for the analysis, this is clearly enough to suffice as a "summary" of the grounds for his opinion. New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-007, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149. Right to examine defendant as to all issues in pleadings. - As to all issues made by the pleadings in the case, plaintiff had the right to examine defendant fully and exhaustively; such a right is basically fundamental to our system of jurisprudence, and no court has power to restrict or limit it. Griego v. Grieco, 1977-NMCA-018, 90 N.M. 174, 561 P.2d 36 (decided before 1979 amendment). Term "relevant" interpreted liberally in antitrust cases. - The term "relevant" is subject to a broad interpretation as it is generally used in the discovery context, but it is also given a particularly liberal interpretation for purposes of discovery in antitrust cases. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 1980-NMSC-094, 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231, appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 901, 101 S. Ct. 1966, 68 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1981). "Subject matter" of action liberally construed. - Subdivision (b) (see now Paragraph B) does not require a strict interpretation of "subject matter" such as negligence, proximate cause, injuries and damages as opposed to the entire process of the litigation, including collection of a judgment; the subject matter should not be delimited by technical or confining definitions. Thus, matter relevant to the subject matter of the action could conceivably include information concerning the fund available to pay any judgment, specifically, public liability insurance. Fort v. Neal, 1968-NMSC-149, 79 N.M. 479, 444 P.2d 990 (decided before 1979 amendment). Information on sales of allegedly injurious drug discoverable in products liability suit. - In a products liability suit against a drug manufacturer, an interrogatory requesting information on the amount and dollar volume of sales of the drug alleged to have caused the injury should be allowed. Such information is relevant and is not privileged or a trade secret. Richards v. Upjohn Co., 1980-NMCA-062, 95 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192, cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992. Rule forbids discovery of insurance coverage. - Subdivision (b) (see now Paragraph B) cannot be used to force a party to disclose the amount of insurance coverage available to satisfy judgments that may be recovered in civil actions. Fort v. Neal, 1968-NMSC-149, 79 N.M. 479, 444 P.2d 990 (decided before 1979 amendment). Scope of attorney-client privilege. - The attorney-client privilege should only be applied to protect communications, not facts. Perhaps an expert's report may under some circumstances amount to a communication falling within the scope of the privilege, but his observations and conclusions themselves, whether or not contained in a report, are facts which, if relevant, constitute evidence, and such expert's testimony has no blanket protection under the attorney-client privilege. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Steinkraus, 1966-NMSC-134, 76 N.M. 617, 417 P.2d 431. Statements plaintiff sought, though they fell outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege, were the statements of witnesses whose identity was known and who could have been deposed by plaintiff or their statements obtained directly, and therefore the statements were not proper objects for discovery techniques. Carter v. Burn Constr. Co., 1973 -NMCA-156, 85 N.M. 27, 508 P.2d 1324, cert. denied, 85 N.M. 5, 508 P.2d 1302. Application of work-product privilege. - The work-product privilege does not apply to documents subpoenaed by a grand jury where such documents were not prepared for the client in anticipation of litigation. Vargas v. United States, 727 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819, 105 S. Ct. 90, 83 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1984). Graphs, maps, charts, and reports pertaining generally to waterflood and well production information prepared by employees of the defendant oil company were not prepared pursuant to the request, direction, or supervision of legal counsel and were not subject to the work product rule. Hartman v. Texaco, Inc., 1997-NMCA-032, 123 N.M. 220, 937 P.2d 979. Party seeking lawyer's work product must show good cause. - A burden rests upon the party who seeks the production and inspection by subpoena or court order of any information, memoranda, briefs, communications, reports, statements or other writings prepared by a lawyer or at his direction for his own use in prosecuting his client's case to establish that there is good cause why said desired material should be made available to him. To establish good cause a party must show that the material sought is not available upon the exercise of diligent effort and that it is necessary for the preparation of his case or that the denial of the production and inspection of the material sought will unfairly prejudice his case or cause him undue hardship or injustice. Carter v. Burn Constr. Co., 1973 -NMCA-156, 85 N.M. 27, 508 P.2d 1324, cert. denied, 85 N.M. 5, 508 P.2d 1302. Statements obtained by hospital after incident raising litigation possibility constitute attorney work product. - Statements obtained by a hospital employee from various persons involved in the treatment of a patient constitute attorney work product when those statements are obtained shortly after an incident in the patient's treatment that raises the possibility of litigation and are obtained for and on behalf of the hospital's attorney in anticipation of such litigation. Knight v. Presbyterian Hosp. Center, 1982-NMCA-125, 98 N.M. 523, 650 P.2d 45. Any pretrial statement obtainable upon showing substantial need and undue hardship. - Any statement "prepared in anticipation of litigation" by and for a party's attorney, whether or not a work product, can be obtained upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship. "Good cause" is no longer required. Knight v. Presbyterian Hosp. Center, 1982-NMCA-125, 98 N.M. 523, 650 P.2d 45. Procedure as to privilege. - All discovery, including discovery under Rule 1-045 NMRA, is limited by this rule to the acquisition of information "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action". Thus, once a privilege is asserted in response to interrogatories, counsel cannot unilaterally disregard the privilege and then issue subpoenas to sidestep the procedure outlined in Rule 1-033 NMRA for resolving the dispute. Wallis v. Smith, 2001-NMCA-017, 130 N.M. 214, 22 P.3d 682, cert. denied, 130 N.M. 254, 23 P.3d 929. Limitation on deposition proper only as provided by rules. - Upon motion of plaintiff to compel discovery, the trial court was in error to limit the examination of defendant to the subject matter of questions that appeared on 10 pages of the deposition and to order that the examination shall not extend beyond those questions; there is no rule of law that allows a district court to limit the examination of a witness absent a motion by the opposing party pursuant to Subdivision (c) (see now Paragraph C) (formerly Rule 30(b) ) and Rule 30(d) (see now Rule 1-030 NMRA). Griego v. Grieco, 1977-NMCA-018, 90 N.M. 174, 561 P.2d 36. Rights of deponent's attorney. - Prior to the taking of the deposition, the attorney for a deponent may ascertain what the deponent knows and the extent and limitation of his memory, but he does not have the right to go beyond proper objections; if necessary, he can seek relief from the court pursuant to Subdivision (c) (see now Paragraph C) (formerly Rule 30(b) ) and Rule 30(d) (see now Rule 1-030 NMRA). Griego v. Grieco, 1977-NMCA-018, 90 N.M. 174, 561 P.2d 36. During the taking of a deposition the attorney for the deponent has the right to object to questions asked and state his reasons, without comment, to protect the rights of the deponent, but he should not continuously object to questions asked that are relevant to the issues in the case on insubstantial grounds, nor teach the deponent what he ought to know, nor suggest and dictate answers to the deponent nor wrongfully interfere with the progress of the deposition, since it is equally necessary to ensure the due administration of justice and the proper protection of the rights of the parties. Griego v. Grieco, 1977-NMCA-018, 90 N.M. 174, 561 P.2d 36. Court order required to delay or quash taking deposition. - Motions to quash the taking of a deposition or for protective orders, or to terminate or limit examinations under Rule 30 (see now this rule) do not have the effect of automatically accomplishing what is sought therein. The rule specifically provides for protective orders which the court may make, upon proper motion by the party on whom notice has been served. Such motions must be made prior to the date designated for the taking of the deposition, and until an order is made in connection therewith, there is nothing to delay the taking of deposition. Wieneke v. Chalmers, 1963-NMSC-158, 73 N.M. 8, 385 P.2d 65. Party seeking protective order to stay taking of deposition of witness to perpetuate testimony until court first determined competency of witness must file such motion prior to the date designated for the taking of the deposition; until a protective order is issued, there is nothing to delay the taking of the deposition. In re Bartow, 1984-NMCA-074, 101 N.M. 532, 685 P.2d 387. Plaintiff seeking to exclude affidavit of physician filed in support of defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, because physician had previously treated plaintiff, had burden of establishing that the physician was in fact hired as an expert within purview of Subdivision (B)(3)(b) (see now Paragraph B(6)) of this rule. Trujillo v. Puro, 1984-NMCA-050, 101 N.M. 408, 683 P.2d 963. Subpoena must be shown unreasonable to allow quashing. - Before the trial court can enter a protective order quashing a subpoena, or modify the subpoena, there must be some showing that the subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive; that burden rests upon the party seeking to quash. Blake v. Blake, 1985-NMCA-009, 102 N.M. 354, 695 P.2d 838. Release of information obtained through discovery. - Those who obtain information through discovery should not be restrained from disclosing that information absent a showing of good cause why disclosure of particular information would be inappropriate. Does I ex rel. Doe II v. Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of Santa Fe, Inc., 1996-NMCA-094, 122 N.M. 307, 924 P.2d 273. Protection granted in light of liberal discovery policy. - The discretion granted to the trial court in Rule 30(b) (see now Paragraph C of this rule) to issue protective orders must be read in the light of the purpose of these rules, which is to permit discovery. Salitan v. Carrillo, 1961-NMSC-176, 69 N.M. 476, 368 P.2d 149; Marchiondo v. Brown, 1982-NMSC-076, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462. Power to be flexible depending on circumstances. - Power of the court under Rule 30(b) (see now Paragraph C of this rule) to make protective orders must be flexible according to the particular facts and issues of the case, the relative positions of the parties, the necessity of mutual discovery and the overall fairness to the parties themselves. State ex rel. N.M. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Taira, 1967-NMSC-180, 78 N.M. 276, 430 P.2d 773. Protective order erroneously granted. - Trial court erred in granting a blanket protective order covering 66,000 pages of documents, where movant did not assert a specific privilege covering the documents, or point out with particularity the basis for according confidentiality to any particular document. Krahling v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 1998 -NMCA-071, 125 N.M. 228, 959 P.2d 562. Protective order improper where relevant inquiry unduly restricted. - Third-party vendee of land allegedly the subject of an option contract between plaintiff and vendor is not entitled to a protective order that his deposition not be taken by plaintiff on grounds that he is not a party, and would be subject to annoyance, embarrassment and oppression, since under plaintiff's first refusal theory, plaintiff has the right to discover whether third party made a bona fide offer to purchase defendants' land, and all matters relevant thereto. Kirby Cattle Co. v. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children, 1975-NMCA-140, 88 N.M. 605, 544 P.2d 1170, rev'd on other grounds, 1976-NMSC-013, 89 N.M. 169, 548 P.2d 449. Denial of protective order held not appealable. - Order denying motion for protective order which sought to have court order a stay in taking of deposition of patient was not an appealable final judgment, and was not appealable as interlocutory order where order did not comply with 39-3-4 NMSA 1978. In re Bartow, 1984-NMCA-074, 101 N.M. 532, 685 P.2d 387. Denial of protective order not an abuse of discretion. - Where a county sought to circumvent the procedure outlined in State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 1977-NMSC-076, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236 for in camera review of disputed documents requested under the Inspection of Public Records Act by filing a motion for a protective order and asserting to the district court that it could only consider the settlement records if the motion for protective order was granted, the county's decision to bypass established procedure effectively obstructed full review by the district court and the court of appeals and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for protective order. Board of Comm'rs v. Las Cruces Sun-News, 2003-NMCA-102, 134 N.M. 281, 76 P.3d 36. Court determines whether party pays opposing party's attorney's travel costs to out-of-state deposition. - A district court has discretion to determine whether one party will pay the costs for the opposing party's attorney to travel to an out-of-state deposition and the district court's determination will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. California v. Ramirez, 1982-NMSC-141, 99 N.M. 92, 654 P.2d 545. Such as where resident obligor provides strong defense to out-of-state child support obligation. - Where a resident obligor of an out-of-state child support obligation has provided evidence that constitutes a strong and convincing defense to the payment of support, the district court may order that the case be continued to allow the out-of-state obligee the opportunity to provide further evidence, either by appearing in person or by providing deposition testimony. Furthermore, the district court may order that if the obligee chooses to provide evidence by a deposition, then the petitioner-obligee must pay the costs of the obligor's attorney to travel to an out-of-state deposition. It would be unjust and inequitable to limit interrogation to written questions under these circumstances. State ex rel. California v. Ramirez, 1982-NMSC-141, 99 N.M. 92, 654 P.2d 545. Deponent may refuse to answer questions tending to incriminate him. - The defendant did not willfully fail to answer questions propounded during a deposition where he claimed the privilege of the U.S. Const., amend. V, seeking a ruling of the court pursuant to Rule 30(b) (see now Paragraph C of this rule) on whether the answers to questions propounded would reasonably tend to incriminate him and are privileged. Defendant's refusal to answer depositional questions was with substantial justification, and therefore the trial court improperly assessed attorneys' fees and costs against him. Rainbo Baking Co. v. Apodaca, 1975-NMCA-122, 88 N.M. 501, 542 P.2d 1191, cert. denied, 89 N.M. 6, 546 P.2d 71. Summary judgment premature where rendered before information in exclusive control of defamer examined. - The finding of summary judgment is premature where it is rendered before the thoughts, editorial processes and other information in the exclusive control of an alleged defamer can be examined. Marchiondo v. Brown, 1982-NMSC-076, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462. Remedies for the violation of discovery rules or orders are discretionary with the trial court. Chavez v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2001-NMCA-065, 130 N.M. 753, 31 P.3d 1027. Dismissal as a sanction. - Where the State sued defendant for medicare fraud because defendant knowingly submitted bills for services by caregivers, because the caregivers provided services before the Department of Health had confirmed that the caregivers had a clear criminal history and issued clearance letters; the date of the clearance letter for each caregiver was critical to the State's theory of liability; the State's prosecutor asked an investigator for the Attorney General's office to obtain copies of the caregivers' clearance letters for use in a deposition of defendant's president; the investigator could not locate copies of the original clearance letters; even though the Department's computer system had updated several fields in the clearance letter template since the caregiver's clearance letters had been issued, the investigator asked the Department to print copies of the letters with the updated data; the Department delivered the letters to the investigator with a cover sheet informing the investigator that the letters were false and fictitious; the investigator gave the letters to the prosecutor without telling the prosecutor that the letters were false and fictitious; and the prosecutor used the letter in the deposition to impeach defendant's president, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the State's complaint with prejudice as a sanction. State ex rel. King v. Advantageous Cmty. Servs., LLC, 2014-NMCA-076. Prejudice required. - A party is not entitled to relief for a discovery violation unless the party has been prejudiced by the violation. Chavez v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2001-NMCA-065, 130 N.M. 753, 31 P.3d 1027. Sample remedies cases. - Where plaintiff supplemented her answer to defendants' interrogatory approximately one week before trial, indicating the content of her proposed expert witness's testimony and there was no evidence that plaintiff acted willfully or in bad faith, the trial court was within its discretion in limiting the expert's testimony to rebuttal, rather than imposing dismissal as a sanction. Chavez v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2001-NMCA-065, 130 N.M. 753, 31 P.3d 1027. Some law enforcement investigative materials are immune from discovery. - The expression of legislative intent in Section 14-2-1(A)(4) NMSA 1978 of the Inspection of Public Records Act to protect police investigative materials in an on-going criminal investigation from disclosure creates an immunity from discovery of some police investigative materials in civil litigation which requires the district court to balance the interests at stake and requires the party seeking to preclude disclosure to prove that the investigative materials requested are confidential because the materials meet the policy interest expressed in Section 14-2-1(A)(4) NMSA 1978. Estate of Romero v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMSC-028, 139 N.M. 671, 137 P3d 611. Law reviews. - For comment, "Discovery - Disclosure of Existence and Policy Limits of Liability Insurance," see 7 Nat. Resources J. 313 (1967). For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Civil Procedure," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 53 (1981). For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to civil procedure, see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 97 (1982). For note, "Discovery - Executive Privilege - Overcoming Executive Privilege to Discover the Investigative Materials of the 1980 New Mexico Penitentiary Riot: State ex rel. Attorney General v. First Judicial District," see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 861 (1982). For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to civil procedure, see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 251 (1983). For annual survey of civil procedure in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 287 (1988). For note, "Evidence: Protecting Privileged Information - A New Procedure for Resolving Claims of the Physician-Patient Privilege in New Mexico - Pina v. Espinoza," see 32 N.M.L. Rev. 453 (2002). Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. - 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §88 et seq.; 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions and Discovery §§1 to 198. Jurisdiction of action involving inspection of books of foreign corporation, 155 A.L.R. 1244, 72 A.L.R.2d 1222. Pretrial conference procedure as affecting right to discovery, 161 A.L.R. 751. Blood grouping tests, 163 A.L.R. 939, 46 A.L.R.2d 1000. Constitutionality, construction and effect of statute or regulation relating specifically to divulgence of information acquired by public officers or employees, 165 A.L.R. 1302. Compelling production of object in custody of court or officer for use in evidence, 170 A.L.R. 334. Dismissal of action for failure or refusal of plaintiff to obey court order, 4 A.L.R.2d 348, 27 A.L.R.4th 61, 32 A.L.R.4th 212, 3 A.L.R.5th 237. Necessity and sufficiency under statutes and rules governing modern pretrial discovery practice, of "designation" of documents, etc., in application or motion, 8 A.L.R.2d 1134. Discovery and inspection of article or premises in aid of action to recover for personal injury or death, 13 A.L.R.2d 657. Discovery or inspection of trade secret, formula or the like, 17 A.L.R.2d 383. Mode of establishing that information obtained by illegal wire tapping has or has not led to evidence introduced by prosecution, 28 A.L.R.2d 1055. Fingerprints, palm prints or bare footprints as evidence, 28 A.L.R.2d 1115, 45 A.L.R.4th 1178. Statements of parties or witnesses as subject to pretrial or other disclosure production or inspection, 73 A.L.R.2d 12. Reports of treating physician delivered to litigant's own attorney as subject of pretrial or other disclosure, production or inspection, 82 A.L.R.2d 1162. Construction of statute or rule admitting in evidence deposition of witness absent or distant from place of trial, 94 A.L.R.2d 1172. Discovery, inspection, and copying of photographs of article or premises the condition of which gave rise to instant litigation, 95 A.L.R.2d 1061. Mandamus or prohibition as available to compel or to prevent discovery proceedings, 95 A.L.R.2d 1229. Discovery in aid of arbitration proceedings, 98 A.L.R.2d 1247. Right of defendant in criminal case to inspection or production of contradictory statement or document of prosecution's witness for purpose of impeaching him, 7 A.L.R.3d 181. Pretrial examination or discovery to ascertain from defendant in action for injury, death or damages, existence and amount of liability insurance and insurer's identity, 13 A.L.R.3d 822. Scope of defendant's duty of pretrial discovery in medical malpractice action, 15 A.L.R.3d 1446. Disclosure of name, identity, address, occupation or business of client as violation of attorney-client privilege, 16 A.L.R.3d 1047. Compelling party to disclose information in hands of affiliated or subsidiary corporation, or independent contractor, not made party to suit, 19 A.L.R.3d 1134. Physician-patient privilege, commencing action involving physical condition of plaintiff or decedent as waiving, as to discovery proceedings, 21 A.L.R.3d 912. Application of privilege attending statements made in course of judicial proceedings to pretrial deposition and discovery proceedings, 23 A.L.R.3d 1172. Pretrial testimony or disclosure on discovery by party to personal injury action as to nature of injuries or treatment as waiver of physician-patient privilege, 25 A.L.R.3d 1401. Personal representative's loss of rights under dead man's statute by prior institution of discovery proceedings, 35 A.L.R.3d 955. Assertion of privilege in pretrial discovery proceedings as precluding waiver of privilege at trial, 36 A.L.R.3d 1367. Admissibility of physician's testimony as to patient's statements or declarations, other than res gestae, during medical examination, 37 A.L.R.3d 778. Privilege against self-incrimination as ground for refusal to produce noncorporate documents in possession of person asserting privilege but owned by another, 37 A.L.R.3d 1373. Confidentiality of proceedings or reports of judicial inquiry board or commission, 5 A.L.R.4th 730. Formal sufficiency of response to request for admissions under state discovery rules, 8 A.L.R.4th 728. Attorney's conduct in delaying or obstructing discovery as basis for contempt proceeding, 8 A.L.R.4th 1181. Propriety of discovery order permitting "destructive testing" of chattel in civil case, 11 A.L.R.4th 1245. Photographs of civil litigant realized by opponent's surveillance as subject to pretrial discovery, 19 A.L.R.4th 1236. Work product privilege as applying to material prepared for terminated litigation or for claim which did not result in litigation, 27 A.L.R.4th 568. Abuse of process action based on misuse of discovery or deposition procedures after commencement of civil action without seizure of person or property, 33 A.L.R.4th 650. Right of independent expert to refuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50 A.L.R.4th 680. Discovery: right to ex parte interview with injured party's treating physician, 50 A.L.R.4th 714. Discovery of defendant's sales, earnings, or profits on issue of punitive damages in tort action, 54 A.L.R.4th 998. Insured-insurer communications as privileged, 55 A.L.R.4th 336. Discovery of identity of blood donor, 56 A.L.R.4th 755. Propriety of allowing state court civil litigant to call expert witness whose name or address was not disclosed during pretrial discovery proceedings, 58 A.L.R.4th 653. Propriety of allowing state court civil litigant to call nonexpert witness whose name or address was not disclosed during pretrial discovery proceedings, 63 A.L.R.4th 712. Discovery, in civil proceeding, of records of criminal investigation by state grand jury, 69 A.L.R.4th 298. Discovery of trade secret in state court action, 75 A.L.R.4th 1009. Propriety and extent of state court protective order restricting party's right to disclose discovered information to others engaged in similar litigation, 83 A.L.R.4th 987. Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information, 84 A.L.R.4th 15. Right of defendant in criminal contempt proceeding to obtain information by deposition, 33 A.L.R.5th 761. Existence and nature of cause of action for equitable bill of discovery, 37 A.L.R.5th 645. Use of Freedom of Information Act (5 USCS §552 ) as substitute for, or as means of, supplementing discovery procedures available to litigants in federal civil, criminal or administrative proceedings, 57 A.L.R. Fed. 903. Power of court under 5 USCS §552(a)(4)(B) to examine agency records in camera to determine propriety of withholding records, 60 A.L.R. Fed. 416. Right of immune jury witness to obtain access to government affidavits and other supporting materials in order to challenge legality of court-ordered wiretap or electronic surveillance which provided basis for questions asked in grand jury proceedings, 60 A.L.R. Fed. 706. Fraud exception to work product privilege in federal courts, 64 A.L.R. Fed. 470. Restriction on dissemination of information obtained through pretrial discovery proceedings as violating Federal Constitution's First Amendment - federal cases, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 471. Protection from discovery of attorney's opinion work product under Rule 26(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 779. Modification of protective order entered pursuant to Rule 26(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 538. Academic peer review privilege in federal court, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 691. Illegal drugs or narcotics involved in alleged offense as subject to discovery by defendant under Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 109 A.L.R. Fed. 363. Propriety and scope of protective order against disclosure of material already entered into evidence in federal court trial, 138 A.L.R. Fed. 153. Crime-fraud exception to work product privilege in federal courts, 178 A.L.R. Fed. 87. 26A C.J.S. Depositions §§ 33, 58, 61, 66 to 69, 72, 73, 88 to 100; 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 5, 7, 8, 55.