Colo. R. App. P. 4
The lower court continues to have jurisdiction to hear and decide a motion under C.R.C.P. 59 regardless of the filing of a notice of appeal, provided the C.R.C.P. 59 motion is timely filed under C.R.C.P. 59(a) and is timely ruled on or is deemed denied under operation of C.R.C.P. 59(j). All proceedings in the appellate court are stayed while the motion is pending in the lower court.
If the court determines that the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, or that, as a matter of law, the sentence is not supported by the evidence, a sentence of death will not be imposed.
C.A.R. 4
C.A.R. 4(a) provides for the notice of appeal to be filed with the appellate court and a copy to be served upon the trial court. Time for filing the notice of appeal is increased to 49 days.
C.A.R. 4(b) has been altered to make it conform more closely to C.A.R. 4(a).
The change in the title and deletion of subsection (d) of this rule became necessary because of repeal of C.R.S. 18-1-409 (2.1) and (2.2) and repeal of C.R.S. 18-1-409.5 effective July 1, 1981. In 1984 this rule was changed to make it conform more closely to C.A.R. 4(a) and (b).
Annotation I. General Consideration. Law reviews. For article, "Defects in Ineffective Assistance Standards Used By State Courts", see 50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 389 (1979). For article, "The Problem of Delay in the Colorado Court of Appeals", see 58 Den. L.J. 1 (1980). For article, "Colorado Felony Sentencing", see 11 Colo. Law. 1478 (1982). Compliance with the rules of court is prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction, and actions undertaken to avoid application of those rules, whether by the parties or by the trial court, cannot operate to confer jurisdiction. Dill v. County Court, 37 Colo. App. 75, 541 P.2d 1272 (1975); Moore & Co. v. Williams, 657 P.2d 984 (Colo. App. 1982). Although adherence to strict jurisdictional notions may sometimes create a needless waste of judicial resources. In re Ross, 670 P.2d 26 (Colo. App. 1983). Rule is procedural requirement without jurisdictional significance. Trial court's preparation and transmission of findings with an order nunc pro tunc to date of original sentencing was valid because trial court did not lose jurisdiction by initial oversight. People v. Abeyta, 677 P.2d 393 (Colo. App. 1983). New requirement that notice of appeal be filed with the appellate court with an advisory copy served on the clerk of the trial court is jurisdictional, and strict compliance with the rule is required. Therefore, a notice of appeal erroneously filed in the trial court was of no effect under the new rules, and the trial court was without authority to grant an extension of time to correctly file a notice of appeal. Collins v. Boulder Urban Renewal Auth., 684 P.2d 952 (Colo. App. 1984). The timely filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review. Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241 (Colo. 1988); Hillen v. Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth., 883 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1994). Reduction of charge. In reducing a charge, the court in effect dismisses the greater charge and substitutes a lesser one. Through such action, the court does not dismiss the case in its entirety; therefore, the appeal of the case is governed by the procedures set forth in subsection (b)(3) of this rule and in C.A.R. 4.1, not subsection (b)(2), and must be filed within 10 days of the date of the order. People v. Severin, 122 P.3d 1073 (Colo. App. 2005). Court does not pass upon plaintiff's claim that stay order was improperly entered where he did not formally protest that order by filing either a notice of appeal under this rule or a motion under C.A.R. 8. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993). This rule is inapplicable to review of orders of the industrial appeals panel. Picken v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 874 P.2d 485 (Colo. App. 1994). Trial court may not correct jurisdictional defects in the appeal. Dill v. County Court, 37 Colo. App. 75, 541 P.2d 1272 (1975). Rule on appellate review of criminal sentences controls over conflicting statute, § 18-1-409 , which had not been amended after rule was changed. People v. Arevalo, 835 P. 2d 552 (Colo. App. 1992). However, § 18-1-409 prevails over a conflicting supreme court rule in substantive matters. To the extent that subsection (c)(1) of this rule provides that every defendant may seek review of the propriety of his or her sentence, it conflicts with the substantive provisions of § 18-1-409(1). People v. Prophet, 42 P.3d 61 (Colo. App. 2001). A nunc pro tunc judgment may not be used to circumvent the time requirements of the rules of procedure. Dill v. County Court, 37 Colo. App. 75, 541 P.2d 1272 (1975). Applied in Carr v. District Court, 157 Colo. 226, 402 P.2d 182 (1965); City & County of Denver v. Bd. of Adjustment, 31 Colo. App. 324, 505 P.2d 44 (1972); People v. Samora, 188 Colo. 74, 532 P.2d 946 (1975); People v. Martinez, 190 Colo. 507, 549 P.2d 758 (1976); People v. Hinchman, 40 Colo. App. 9, 574 P.2d 866 (1977); Emerick v. Greene, 40 Colo. App. 246, 575 P.2d 441 (1977); Schenk v. Indus. Comm'n, 40 Colo. App. 350, 579 P.2d 1171 (1978); People v. McKnight, 41 Colo. App. 372, 588 P.2d 886 (1978); People v. Reyes, 42 Colo. App. 73, 589 P.2d 1385 (1979); People v. Mikkleson, 42 Colo. App. 77, 593 P.2d 975 (1979); People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 (1980); Widener v. District Court, 200 Colo. 398, 615 P.2d 33 (1980); People v. Foster, 200 Colo. 283, 615 P.2d 652 (1980); People v. Martinez, 628 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1981); People v. Francis, 630 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1981); People v. Hunt, 632 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1981); People v. Byerley, 635 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1981); People v. District Court, 638 P.2d 65 (Colo. 1981); People v. Boivin, 632 P.2d 1038 (Colo. App. 1981); In re Van Camp, 632 P.2d 1062 (Colo. App. 1981); Danielson v. Kerbs AG., Inc., 646 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1982); People v. Rafferty, 644 P.2d 102 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Dennis, 649 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1982); People v. Cole, 648 P.2d 687 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Peterson, 656 P.2d 1301 (Colo. 1983); Acme Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Samsonite Corp., 663 P.2d 621 (Colo. 1983); Church v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 742 P.2d 971 (Colo. App. 1987); People v. Harmon, 3 P.3d 480 (Colo. App. 2000); People v. Banuelos-Landa, 109 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2004); Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 155 P.3d 583 (Colo. App. 2006). II. Civil Cases. Timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Chapman v. Miller, 29 Colo. App. 8, 476 P.2d 763 (1970); Concelman v. Ray, 36 Colo. App. 181, 538 P.2d 1343 (1975); In re Foster, 39 Colo. App. 130, 564 P.2d 429 (1977). Compliance with section (a) is mandatory. Failure to comply deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction and precludes a review of the merits. Bosworth Data Servs., Inc. v. Gloss, 41 Colo. App. 530, 587 P.2d 1201 (1978). Time limitation contained in section (a) is jurisdictional. Federal Lumber Co. v. Hanley, 33 Colo. App. 18, 515 P.2d 480 (1973). The filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review of a lower court decision. People v. Silvola, 198 Colo. 228, 597 P.2d 583 (1979). Strict compliance with section (a) is essential. Laugesen v. Witkin Homes Inc., 29 Colo. App. 58, 479 P.2d 289 (1970). Any appeal of the dismissal of a claim as barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, article 10 of title 24, C.R.S., must be sought immediately within the time limits specified in this rule, or it is barred. Buckles v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 952 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1998). Jurisdictional defect created which warranted dismissal. Where trial court took no action with respect to appellant's posttrial motion within 60 days after that motion was filed, that motion was "deemed denied", pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(j), so that appellant's failure to file notice of appeal within 45 days after the posttrial motion was "deemed denied" created a jurisdictional defect in the appeal which warranted dismissal under this rule. Baum v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 715 P.2d 346 (Colo. App. 1986); Anderson v. Molitor, 738 P.2d 402 (Colo. App. 1987). Lack of a proper order determining a C.R.C.P. 59 motion was not fatal to appeal where party appealed from underlying order of dissolution of marriage, not from denial of the rule 59 motion. In re Christen, 899 P.2d 339 (Colo. App. 1995). Temporary orders as to maintenance are reviewable as a final judgment even if there has not been a final judgment in the form of a decree of dissolution. In re Nussbeck, 899 P.2d 347 (Colo. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 974 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1999). Post-trial motions for attorney fees are subject to the provisions of C.R.C.P. 59 and the effect of such motions upon the time limitations of this rule are as specified in C.R.C.P. 59. Torrez v. Day, 725 P.2d 1184 (Colo. App. 1986). Requirements of this rule must be met for appeals of judgments for attorney fees. The award of attorney fees in a case is sufficiently separate from an underlying judgment on the merits to require that a separate notice of appeal be filed within the time limits of this rule from the judgment awarding attorney fees independently of the judgment entered on the merits of the underlying case. If this is not done, the court of appeals is not vested with subject matter jurisdiction to determine issues related to the award of attorney fees. Dawes Agency v. Am. Prop. Mortg., 804 P.2d 255 (Colo. App. 1990). Judgment awarding prejudgment interest is not final until the amount of such interest is reduced to a sum certain. Grand County Custom Homebuilding, LLC v. Bell, 148 P.3d 398 (Colo. App. 2006). Timely filing of motion for reconsideration of a completed post-trial ruling on an attorney fees issue tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal under this rule until the court determines the motion or the motion is deemed denied after 60 days pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(j). Jensen v. Runta, 80 P.3d 906 (Colo. App. 2003). The court of appeals is not usually precluded from reviewing an appeal merely because the notice of appeal was premature. Bush v. Winker, 892 P.2d 328 (Colo. App. 1994). Calculation of timeliness of notice of appeal. The timeliness of a notice of appeal is calculated from the date the judgment appealed from is entered on the register of actions. Moore & Co. v. Williams, 672 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1983). Construction given "announced" within context of section (a) for purposes of resolving timeliness of notices of appeal. Oral ruling on posttrial motions in presence of parties and their counsel did not constitute "announcement" of trial court's judgment. Judgment was not "announced" until signing of the order in its final form thereby deferring commencement of the running of the time to appeal until the parties were notified by mail of such action. City of Colo. Springs v. Timberland Assocs., 783 P.2d 287 (Colo. 1989). For purposes of timeliness of notice of appeal, order of dismissal is final judgment and motion for reconsideration operated to suspend the running of time until the ruling thereon. Small v. General Motors, 694 P.2d 374 (Colo. App. 1984). Failure to file timely notice of appeal requires dismissal. An appeal must be dismissed when appellant has failed to file a timely notice of appeal under section (a). Federal Lumber Co. v. Hanley, 33 Colo. App. 18, 515 P.2d 480 (1973). Jurisdictionally defective notice insufficient. A notice of appeal which is jurisdictionally defective is not a "timely notice of appeal" as contemplated in section (a). Watered Down Farms v. Rowe, 39 Colo. App. 169, 566 P.2d 710 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 195 Colo. 152, 576 P.2d 172 (1978). Notice of appeal not timely filed. Earlier notice of appeal, which related to probate of will, did not provide notice of appeal of order vacating notices of lis pendens to estate property, and since no timely appeal was filed, court lacked jurisdiction over appeal. Matter of Estate of Anderson, 727 P.2d 867 (Colo. App. 1986). Proponent's notice of appeal as to the probate court's November order denying a partial summary judgment was timely filed in March since the November court order adjudicated fewer than all of proponent's pending claims in the proceedings and, therefore, did not constitute a final judgment, but the court's intervening February order resolved the remaining issue pending between the parties. In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd, 136 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2006). Notice of appeal timely filed when filed within 45 days of amended order. In trial involving title to a road segment, original order expressly deferred determination of road segment's width to a later date, and the notice of appeal was timely filed after trial court amended the order to incorporate the road segment's width. Camp Bird Colo., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Ouray, 215 P.3d 1277 (Colo. App. 2009). Defendant's notice of appeal from automatic denial of motion to alter and amend judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(j) was untimely and prevents prosecution of the appeal. Sandoval v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 752 P.2d 1062 (Colo. App. 1988). When second motion to alter or amend not prerequisite to filing of notice. Where an appellant seeks no greater or different relief on appeal than that asked of the trial court in the motion directed to the original judgment, where appellant is not urging any new alleged errors arising from the amended judgment, and where the amended judgment is not the result of a post-judgment hearing involving controverted issues of fact, the appellant need not file another motion to alter or amend or for a new trial after entry of the amended judgment as a prerequisite to the filing of his notice of appeal. In re Foster, 39 Colo. App. 130, 564 P.2d 429 (1977). Effect of filing motion for new trial. The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal is terminated upon the timely filing of a motion for new trial, and the time begins to run anew when that motion is denied. A subsequent motion for new trial that raises issues that either were or could have been raised in the movant's prior motion does not affect the running of the time for filing the notice of appeal. Wright Farms, Inc. v. Weninger, 669 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1983); United Bank of Boulder, N.A. v. Buchanan, 836 P.2d 473 (Colo. App. 1992). Denial of motion for new trial starts filing period. Until such time as the motion, for new trial is denied, plaintiff's time within which it may file an appeal in the supreme court does not even start to run. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Frederick, 164 Colo. 5, 431 P.2d 1016 (1967). Where final order appealed from is denial of a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, and C.R.C.P. 59 motion to reconsider such denial has been filed, time for filing notice of appeal runs from denial of C.R.C.P. 59 motion, not from the date of the underlying judgment. United Bank of Boulder, N.A. v. Buchanan, 836 P.2d 473 (Colo. App. 1992). Final entry of judgment for purposes of timely notice of appeal under this rule based on denial of new trial motion is date on which court filed written judgment in fixed amount on special verdict. Vallejo v. Eldridge, 764 P.2d 417 (Colo. App. 1988). Rule 60(b) motion is appealable independently of an underlying judgment, and, where the notice of appeal was timely as to the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to set aside the judgment dismissing the action, the appellate court has jurisdiction to consider it. Guevara v. Foxhoven, 928 P.2d 793 (Colo. App. 1996). A notice of appeal must be filed within 45 days from the entry of an order granting or denying a motion filed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59. Campbell v. McGill, 810 P.2d 199 (Colo. 1991). When a party timely files a C.R.C.P. 59 motion, the running of the 45 days for the notice of appeal under section (a) of this rule is terminated and does not begin to run anew until either a ruling on the motion within 60 days or when the motion is deemed denied at the end of the 60-day period. Stone v. People, 895 P.2d 1154 (Colo. App. 1995). If a C.R.C.P. 59 motion is timely filed, the time for filing a notice of appeal commences when the trial court determines that motion or when the motion is deemed denied under the rule. Guevara v. Foxhoven, 928 P.2d 793 (Colo. App. 1996). Filing notice gives extra time to all parties. The timely filing of a notice of appeal by any party affords an additional 14 days to all other parties, regardless of whether the party subsequently appealing was an appellee in the initial appeal. Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo. App. 374, 570 P.2d 544 (1977). Effect of filing motion to alter or amend judgment. The filing of a motion to alter or amend a judgment tolls the running of the time for filing notice of appeal. Valenzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 34 Colo. App. 5, 521 P.2d 1287 (1974). Amendment of judgment does not extend filing period. Generally where an appellant procures an amendment of a judgment, the time period in which to file an appeal will not be extended. In re Everhart, 636 P.2d 1321 (Colo. App. 1981); Mosley v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 78 P.3d 1150 (Colo. App. 2003). Neither does petition to show cause. The filing of a petition to show cause in the supreme court within a 10-day period following entry of final judgment, coupled with the filing of a motion in a trial court to suspend proceedings, does not stay the time to file a motion for a new trial under C.R.C.P. 59 or the time to proceed under C.A.R. 11 or this rule. Walter v. Walter, 136 Colo. 405, 318 P.2d 221 (1957). Nor does pendency of motion for attorney fees and costs. The pendency of such a motion does not preclude a judgment on the merits from becoming final or toll the running of the 45-day period for filing a notice of appeal, at least where attorney fees are sought pursuant to a statutory fee-shifting provision rather than as damages. Goodwin v. Homeland Cent. Ins. Co., 172 P.3d 938 (Colo. App. 2007). Parties may not waive requirement of timely filing. Parties may not by their independent action amend or waive the jurisdictional requirement of timely filing of a notice of appeal under section (a). Concelman v. Ray, 36 Colo. App. 181, 538 P.2d 1343 (1975). Court may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect only in cases that are appealed from a trial court. Section (a) does not apply to appeals from rulings of an administrative agency. Martinez v. Colo. State Pers. Bd., 28 P.3d 978 (Colo. App. 2001). Upon showing of excusable neglect, trial court may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days. Chapman v. Miller, 29 Colo. App. 8, 476 P.2d 763 (1970). Finding of excusable neglect is supported by the record and binding upon review. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. State Dept. of Rev., 699 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1984). Reason for late filing critical in determination of excusable neglect. Although the number of days that a filing is late may be one factor in determining whether neglect is excusable for purposes of extending time to file notice of appeal, the critical question is the reason for the late filing. Bosworth Data Servs., Inc. v. Gloss, 41 Colo. App. 530, 587 P.2d 1201 (1978). Negligence of counsel generally is not considered "excusable neglect" which would justify the late filing of a notice of appeal under section (a). Trujillo v. Indus. Comm'n, 648 P.2d 1094 (Colo. App. 1982). Nor attorney's press of work. The press of work or other activities of an attorney do not constitute excusable neglect. Cox v. Adams, 171 Colo. 37, 464 P.2d 513 (1970); Laugesen v. Witkin Homes, Inc., 29 Colo. App. 58, 479 P.2d 289 (1970). Miscounting days within which to file notice of appeal does not constitute excusable neglect. Bosworth Data Servs., Inc. v. Gloss, 41 Colo. App. 530, 587 P.2d 1201 (1978); Kronkow, Inc. v. Wood, 44 Colo. App. 462, 615 P.2d 71 (1980). Reliance on post office's assurance of timely delivery of notice of appeal did not constitute excusable neglect. Ford v. Henderson, 691 P.2d 754 (Colo. 1984). Reliance on office staff to make appropriate filings did not constitute excusable neglect. Hillen v. Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth., 883 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1994). Doctrine of "unique circumstances" and finding of excusable neglect. When counsel erroneously filed motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal of an order terminating parental rights with trial court instead of appellate court within 45-day period and counsel relied on trial court's erroneous extension of deadline and filed notice of appeal after the 45-day period but within the 30-day extension period for excusable neglect, court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider a request for late filing under "unique circumstances" doctrine and failure to find excusable neglect to justify extension of time was abuse of discretion. P.H. v. People in Interest of S.H., 814 P.2d 909 (Colo. 1991). Refusal of extension was not abuse of discretion. Where there is no showing of excusable neglect, there is no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in its refusal to extend the time for filing the notice of appeal. Long v. Ross, 30 Colo. App. 436, 494 P.2d 128 (1972). Forty-five-day time limit for filing appeal with court of appeals in tax assessment cases, rather than statutory time period, is applicable when appeal has first been filed with state board of assessment appeals and not in district court. Denver v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 748 P.2d 1306 (Colo. App. 1987). "Unique circumstances" doctrine may be applied to allow the filing of notice of appeal in a kinship adoption proceeding governed by C.A.R. 4(a) beyond the 75-day jurisdictional deadline. Court shall consider the totality of the circumstances in decision to apply doctrine. In re C.A.B.L., 221 P.3d 433 (Colo. App. 2009). III. Criminal Cases. Appellate court may, for good cause shown, enlarge the time for filing under section (b). People v. Allen, 182 Colo. 395, 513 P.2d 1060 (1973); People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893 (Colo. 2005). Where public defender was notified of appointment to represent petitioner on last day on which petitioner could file late notice of appeal, court of appeals should have either allowed notice of appeal or given petitioner additional time to gather more supporting information rather than denying motion for out of time filing. Weason v. Colo. Court of Appeals, 731 P.2d 736 (Colo. 1987). A motion filed after entry of the order challenged on appeal does not extend the time for the prosecution to file its notice past the 45 days allowed by this rule. People v. Retallack, 804 P.2d 279 (Colo. App. 1990). But trial court cannot extend time for filing past 75 days. A trial court has no authority or jurisdiction to extend the time for filing of notice of appeal from criminal conviction past 60 days (now 75 days) after the entry of the judgment. People v. Allen, 182 Colo. 395, 513 P.2d 1060 (1973). The excusable neglect provision does not apply to appeals by the people. People v. Gilmore, 97 P.3d 123 (Colo. App. 2003). The civil cross-appeal rule that allows for sequential submissions does not apply in criminal cases. People v. Gilmore, 97 P.3d 123 (Colo. App. 2003). An order granting a new trial is a final order pursuant to § 16-12-102 , therefore, prosecution must file its appeal within 45 days of the order. People v. Curren, 228 P.3d 253 (Colo. App. 2009). Order granting motion for a new trial not final judgment for purposes of appeal, and therefore people's failure to file appeal within 45 days of such order did not render subsequent appeal untimely. People v. Campbell, 738 P.2d 1179 (Colo. 1987). Alleged errors must be preserved by objection and motion. Proper procedure necessitates that alleged error, including errors of a constitutional nature, be preserved by raising same by objection during the trial and by motion for a new trial. People v. Sanchez, 180 Colo. 119, 503 P.2d 619 (1972). Timely but defective notice was adequate to invoke appellate jurisdiction. People v. Bost, 770 P.2d 1209 (Colo. 1989). Perfection of appeal divests trial court of jurisdiction. Unless otherwise specifically authorized by statute or rule, once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue further orders in the case relative to the order or judgment appealed from. Consequently, should it be necessary for the trial court to act, other than in aid of the appeal or pursuant to specific statutory authorization, the proper course would be for a party to obtain a limited remand from the appellate court. People v. Dillon, 655 P.2d 841 (Colo. 1982). Sentence imposed after revocation of probation is final judgment. Where the trial court has initially imposed sentence on a defendant and has suspended execution of the sentence and granted probation, which is thereafter revoked, the resulting sentence imposed after revocation of probation is the final judgment. People v. Jenkins, 40 Colo. App. 140, 575 P.2d 13 (1977). As is reversal of order imposing costs. The final judgment for purposes of appeal was entered when trial court reversed its previous order imposing costs on the defendant, and therefore state's appeal taken more than 30 days after sentencing was proper. People v. Fisher, 189 Colo. 297, 539 P.2d 1258 (1975). IV. Review of Sentences. Misdemeanor sentence. There is no provision for appellate review of the propriety of a misdemeanor sentence. People v. Roberts, 668 P.2d 977 (Colo. App. 1983). Sentencing by its very nature is a discretionary decision which requires the weighing of various factors and striking a fair accommodation between the defendant's need for rehabilitation or corrective treatment and society's interest in safety and deterrence. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). Wide latitude will be given the trial court's final decision since it is in the best position to balance the many factors which must be considered in tailoring an appropriate sentence in each individual case. People v. Valencia, 630 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981). But discretion not unrestricted. The discretion implicit in the sentencing decision is not an unrestricted discretion devoid of reason or principle. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). Sentencing decisions should reflect rational selection from various sentencing alternatives in a manner consistent with the dominant aims of the sentencing process. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). Record to include reasons for imposition of sentence. Hereafter in felony convictions involving the imposition of a sentence to a correctional facility, the sentencing judge must state on the record the basic reasons for the imposition of sentence. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). The statement of reasons that sentencing judge must state on record need not be lengthy, but should include the primary factual considerations bearing on the judge's sentencing decision. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). Factors considered in sentencing. Some of the more common considerations significant to the sentencing process are: The gravity of the offense in terms of harm to person or property; the gravity of the offense in terms of the culpability requirement of the law; the defendant's history of prior criminal conduct; the degree of danger the defendant might present to the community if released forthwith; the likelihood of future criminality in the absence of corrective incarceration or treatment; the prospects for rehabilitation under some less drastic sentencing alternative, such as probation, and the likelihood of depreciating the seriousness of the offense were a less drastic sentencing alternative chosen. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). In reviewing the district court's imposition of sentence, the supreme court is to consider the following factors: The nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the public interest in safety and deterrence, and the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which the sentence was based. People v. Mattas, 645 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1982). An appellate court must consider the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the public interest in safety and deterrence in reviewing a sentence claimed to be excessive. People v. Valencia, 630 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981). Review of propriety of sentence limited. Neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court of Colorado has jurisdiction to review the propriety of a sentence except on direct appeal from the initial sentence, and then only under the limitations established in this rule and in § 18-1-409. Mikkleson v. People, 199 Colo. 319, 618 P.2d 1101 (1980). Record to justify extended term sentence. Where a sentence is imposed for an extended term, the record must clearly justify the decision of the sentencing judge. People v. Valencia, 630 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981). Sentence cannot be modified absent abuse of discretion. In reviewing the record in a proceeding under this rule, the sentence imposed cannot be modified unless it appears to the appellate court that the trial judge abused his discretion in imposing the sentence. People v. Walker, 189 Colo. 545, 542 P.2d 1283 (1975). Trial court does not err in failing to hold hearing. When a defendant does not raise a question or move for a new trial, but raises the question for the first time on appeal of conviction, the trial court does not err in failing to hold a hearing "sua sponte" to determine such. People v. Sanchez, 180 Colo. 119, 503 P.2d 619 (1972). Invoking fifth amendment at codefendant's trial. Where a defendant is appealing his sentence and fears that his testimony in the trial of his codefendant might be used at a subsequent hearing to enhance the sentence should it be vacated, he may invoke his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. People v. Villa, 671 P.2d 971 (Colo. App. 1983). The language of subsection (b)(2) is plain and unambiguous and dictates that if an appeal by the People is authorized by statute, the court of appeals must issue a written decision. People v. Jackson, 972 P.2d 698 (Colo. App. 1998).