SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellants Oleg Zapolski and Sofiya Zapolskaya, each proceeding pro se, appeal from the District Court's sua sponte judgment dismissing their amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.

With respect to the dismissal based upon appellants' failure to state a claim, a court has the inherent authority to dismiss meritless claims. See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff had paid the filing fee rather than requesting permission to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). Although the standard of review to be employed for such dismissals has not been decided, we need not reach that issue, because the district court's dismissal withstands even de novo review. See Fitzgerald, 221 F.3d at 364 n. 2.

Even though all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim will have "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

With respect to the District Court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if a court "determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). This Court reviews a district court's factual findings regarding subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities ACT (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1604, for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See Robinson v. Gov't of Malay., 269 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001). "[T]he FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court." Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989). "Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States [was] a party at the time of enactment of [the FSIA], a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States . . . except as provided in [28 U.S.C] sections 1605-1607." 28 U.S.C. § 1604.

Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the judgment of the District Court for substantially the same reasons stated in its thorough and well-reasoned decision.

We have considered all of the arguments raised by appellants and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.