Opinion
1:22-CV-00327-SPB-RAL
10-10-2023
LEONARD YOUNG, Plaintiff v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, SUPERINTENDENT LONNIE J. OLIVER, DEPUTY PATRICIA THOMPSON, CHCA MIKE EDWARDS, CORRECTIONS HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATOR; DR. CRAIG RUSH, CHIEF PSYCHOLOGIST OF SCI-ALBION; DR. GODESMAN, DR. EVANS, DR. LUCAS, LT. BASHER, CCPM KURT SUESSER, CORRECTIONS CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM MANAGER; C. GIDDINGS, GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR; AND CPT. JOHNSON, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS ECF NO. 55
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff Leonard Young's Amended Complaint be GRANTED. ECF No. 55.
II. Report
A. Introduction and Procedural History
Plaintiff Leonard Young, an individual in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of corrections (“DOC”), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants are the DOC and nine DOC personnel employed at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”). Young's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14) is the operative pleading. It asserts that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Young's medical and mental health needs, subjected her to excessive force and unconstitutional living conditions, failed to protect her from mistreatment based on her LGBTQ transgender identity, discriminated against her and harassed her based on her transgendered status, retaliated against her, and conspired to violate her rights. See ECF 14. Young seeks a “preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to provide [her] with adequate protection for transgender/woman identity and to treat/diagnose her with the known mental health needs on files/records.” Id, ¶ 42. She also seeks compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages.
Young's pronouns are she/her/hers.
Defendants are Superintendent Lonnie J. Oliver, Deputy Superintendent Patricia Thompson, Corrections Healthcare Administrator (“CHCA”) Mike Edwards, Lt. Bashor, Corrections Classification Program Manager (“CCPM”) Kurt Suesser, Grievance Coordinator C. Giddings, Cpt. Johnson, Dr. Evans, and Dr. Lucas. Young also sued contracted medical providers Dr. Rush and Dr. Gottesman, but she voluntarily dismissed her claims against them pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). ECF Nos. 50, 57.
The Court directed Young to file an amended complaint after it severed the claims of her former co-plaintiff from this suit. See ECF No. 12.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Young's Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and filed a brief in support of their motion. ECF Nos. 55, 56. Young has filed a brief in opposition to the motion and a declaration in support of her brief. ECF Nos. 67, 67-1.
B. Factual Allegations
The following allegations of Young's Amended Complaint are accepted as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss.
Young identifies as a transgender female. She was transferred to SCI-Albion on September 27, 2022. Young has suffered from various mental health conditions since childhood. She maintains that, although she was a “violent” offender when previously incarcerated as a man, she is now a “non-violent . . . transgender woman.” ECF No. 14, ¶ 14. Despite her gender change, Young maintains that Defendants continue to characterize her as a violent inmate, refuse to accept her gender identity, and deprive her of mental health treatment. Even though she “self-identi[fies] as female/woman and transgender,” the prison attempted to place her in a cell “with a Muslim guy who stood about 6'1 280 lbs” when she arrived at SCI-Albion. Id., ¶ 16. Young objected and alerted the officers to her transgender identity. One of the officers replied, “this is what you get if you're a woman who cares if he takes your hole, it ain't going to hurt that much.” Id., ¶ 16 (cleaned up). Young then peered into the cell and observed the inmate with his hands in his pants, “stroking something.” Id., ¶ 17. She again voiced her refusal to cell with this inmate. Thereafter, a “Lt. and escort team” escorted her to the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”), and, subsequently, to a Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”). Id., ¶ 18. Young later filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaint about the “September 27, 2022 incident,” which Defendants have not investigated. Id., 22. Young expressed to Defendant Thompson that she feared returning to general population because of her female identity. In response, Thompson accused her of faking her transgendered status and mental illnesses to try to obtain a single cell.
Defendant Dr. Lucas and another doctor met with Young at her POC every day for the proceeding three days. The doctors accused her of faking her mental illness and transgender identity. Several days later, Dr. Lucas laughed while another doctor, Dr. Godesman, threatened to withhold mental health treatments unless Young admitted that she was a man. Dr. Godesman said to her, “we are all in line at Albion, from the superintendant to the guards.” Id., ¶ 23.
On September 30, 2022, Defendant Dr. Evans came to Young's POC to speak with her about her glasses. Young was not allowed to have the glasses, but she refused to give them to Dr. Evans. Dr. Evans then said: “that's why you're not getting s*** here. I run the mental health staff and you will not get anything. You're not a woman and your mental health treatment just went down the drain.” Id., ¶ 21 (cleaned up).
On October 8, 2022, Dr. Lucas, Dr. Evans, and the rest of the psychiatric review team (“PRT”) met with Young. Young informed them of her “PTSD, Bipolar,” and “Schizophrenia diagnosis.” Id., ¶ 25. One of the doctors responded that her only mental health diagnosis was anti-social personality disorder and then prescribed her blood pressure medication to treat her anxiety. Later that day, Young attempted to eat her asthma inhaler, resulting in her placement in a “hard cell” where “voices told [her] to smear and eat [her] feces.” Id., ¶ 17. Defendant Capt. Johnson “refused to allow [her] to eat for 5 meals until she cleaned [the feces] off by hand.” Id., ¶ 36. Johnson also “refused to allow her access to” a “shower,” “hygiene items,” or “to wash off.” The cell was “freezing cold” and had “24/7 bright light[s],” which “result[ed] in headaches, shivering cold, and sensory deprivation.” Id. She wore only a suicide smock and was denied her medication. She remained in the cell for three days.
Five days later, “after a brief struggle,” an officer ordered her to move cells “on [her] stomach” and placed an object up her rectum, “effectively sexually assaulting [her].” Id., ¶ 28. She began “screaming about it and the officers ran to get a handheld camera.” Id. After the officers returned and began recording, Young described “the sexual assault loudly and clearly.” Id. Thereafter, the “officers ran [her] head into a door and split [her] ear open knocking [her] unconscious.” Id., ¶ 29. They then brought her to medical.
Upon arrival at medical, Young reported her sexual assault. She was told that the “DOC d[id] not do PREA exams.” Id. Young then turned to the camera and described her sexual assault. Afterwards, Captain Johnson said to the camera, “disregard that.” Id. Because of “Defendant Johnson's orders,” medical never performed a rape kit or tended to Young's medical needs. Id. When her medical exam ended, Young “voluntarily walked to” the “strip cage.” Id. Once there, a Lt. informed her that her clothes “need[ed] to be cut off and thrown away.” Id. She “protested but complied.” Id.
On or about October 18, 2022, Young told grievance coordinator C. Giddings about her sexual assault and complained about being denied mental health care. Giddings said, “give it a break Young[,] you're a healthy male and nothing's wrong with you. Matter fact, your grievance days are done too, no more filing grievances we don't want to hear it and that's from the superintendent.” Id., ¶ 31. Young also “attempted to file several PREA complaints to Lt. Basher.” Id., ¶ 30. Young never heard back.
C. Legal Claims
The Court construes Young's legal claims as follows:
• Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process and First Amendment retaliation claims against Giddings and Oliver based on the PREA and grievance allegations. See ECF No. 14, ¶ 34.
• Eighth Amendment excessive force, conditions of confinement, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims against Johnson, Suesser, and Basher based on her alleged sexual assault. See id., ¶ 35.
• Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement and First Amendment retaliation claims against Johnson based on her confinement to the hard cell. See id., ¶ 36.
• An Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Bashor, Suesser, Thompson, and Oliver for placing her in a cell with the male inmate. See id., ¶ 37.
• First Amendment retaliation and civil rights conspiracy claims against all Defendants based on her transgender identity and success in a past lawsuit. See id., ¶ 38.
• Eighth Amendment excessive force and deliberate indifference, First Amendment retaliation, and civil rights conspiracy claims against all Defendants for failing to provide her with adequate mental and medical health care. See id., ¶ 39.
• An Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim based on her “LGBTQ transgender/woman identity.” See id., ¶ 40.
D. Analysis
Defendants first contend that sovereign immunity bars the claims against the DOC and official capacity claims against the individual Defendants for money damages. Defendants next assert that the allegations fail to demonstrate the personal involvement of six of the individual Defendants. Lastly, Defendants argue that the pleading does not state a viable claim for relief under the First, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. The Court will address these arguments in turn.
1. The Eleventh Amendment bars Young's claims against the DOC and her claims for monetary relief against the individual DOC Defendants in their official capacities.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania “is not a ‘person' subject to suit under section 1983.” Whiteford v. Penn Hills Municipality, 323 Fed.Appx. 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1989) (states or governmental entities that are “arms of the State” are not “persons” for purposes of section 1983). The DOC “is a part of the executive department of the Commonwealth,” and thus an entity of the Commonwealth. Pettaway v. SCI Albion, 487 Fed.Appx. 766, 768 (3d Cir. 2012); Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Pa.Stat.Ann., tit. 71, § 61). As such, the DOC also is not a person subject to suit under section 1983. See Adams v. Hunsberger, 262 Fed.Appx. 478, 481 (3d Cir. 2008).
Additionally, a “claim against a state actor in his or her official capacity is tantamount to lodging the claim against the state itself, since it is the real party in interest.” Francis ex rel. Est. of Francis v. Northumberland Cnty., 636 F.Supp.2d 368, 385-86 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). The foregoing principles preclude Young's § 1983 claims for money damages against the DOC, as well as its officials and employees in their official capacities. But “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.'” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (1989) (citations omitted). And “claims requesting prospective injunctive relief from official-capacity defendants do not run afoul of sovereign immunity.” See Iles v. de Jongh, 638 F.3d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Perry v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 441 Fed.Appx. 833, 836 (3d Cir. 2011)).
To avoid the bar of the Eleventh Amendment, however, “[t]he relief sought must be prospective, declaratory, or injunctive relief governing an officer's future conduct and cannot be retrospective....” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 506 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984)). In determining whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the claim, “a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “This exception to the Eleventh Amendment is a very narrow one, permitting plaintiffs to seek prospective relief, and only when a state official and not the State or a state agency is the named defendant.” Doe v. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 148 F.Supp.2d 462, 483 (D.N.J. 2001) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)). “The exception has no application where the lawsuit, although naming a state official, is more correctly construed as a suit against the State, which is completely barred by the Eleventh Amendment regardless of the relief sought.” Id.
Young has sued each individual Defendant in both his or her official and individual capacities. As relief, she seeks compensatory and punitive damages, a declaration that Defendants' conduct violated her constitutional rights, and an injunction “ordering Defendants to provide [her] with adequate protection for” her “transgender/woman identity and to treat/diagnos[e] her based on her known mental illnesses.” ECF No. 14, ¶ 42. Young's claims for compensatory and punitive damages against the Defendants in their official capacity will be dismissed as will her claim for declaratory relief because it is not prospective in nature. Young's official capacity claims for injunctive relief are prospective in nature and, therefore, not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Nevertheless, as discussed below, these claims fail based on the insufficiency of the allegations of the Amended Complaint to support them.
2. The Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support any claim against Oliver, Giddings, Edwards, Suesser, Bashor, and Thompson.
Respondeat superior is not available as a theory of liability against a supervisor in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016). Instead, the plaintiff “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added). This means that each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit ... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). Furthermore, allegations that broadly implicate multiple defendants without delineating individual conduct are legally insufficient. See Van Tassel v. Piccione, 608 Fed.Appx. 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 2015). Absent specific allegations that a defendant helped deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal of the claim is appropriate. See e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
In this case, the Amended Complaint only describes the personal conduct of Evans, Lucas, Giddings, Johnson, Thompson, and Basher. However, Young alleges no specific acts or omissions committed by either Oliver, Suesser, or Edwards that allegedly contributed to her alleged constitutional injuries. Instead, Young lumps these Defendants together under the collective reference, “Defendants.” Further distancing Oliver, Suesser, and Edwards from any actionable involvement, Young attributes much of the conduct upon which she bases her claims to unidentified prison personnel (e.g., the “officer” said ‘this is what you get ...'”; “Lt. and escort team arrived ...”; “officers ran my head into” the “door ...” ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 16, 18, 29). General allegations, without more, are legally insufficient to support a claim against a defendant. See e.g., Davis v. Williams, 354 Fed.Appx. 603, 605 (3d Cir. 2009) (granting motion to dismiss was proper where Defendant was not mentioned “in [Plaintiff's] complaint or amended complaint, and [] there [wa]s no allegation even suggesting that [Defendant FCM] violated Davis's rights.”). Accordingly, the claims against Oliver, Suesser, and Edwards should be dismissed.
With respect to Thompson, Giddings, and Basher, Young attempts to premise their liability on their alleged failure to adequately respond to her grievances and verbal complaints. But a prison official's alleged failure to remedy matters complained of in a grievance or communication is generally insufficient to support personal responsibility. See Alexander v. Fritch, 2010 WL 1257709, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2010) (“[p]laintiff ca[nn]ot impose liability against any of the [d]efendants based solely on his or her involvement with his correspondence, grievances and misconducts as such conduct is insufficient to establish personal involvement as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”), aff'd, 396 Fed.Appx. 867 (3d Cir. 2010). Indeed, it is “well established that the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found personally involved in the alleged unlawful conduct.” Mearin, 951 F.Supp.2d at 782. See Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”). As such, courts have routinely dismissed civil rights claims against prison officials whose only involvement in the alleged violation stemmed from their participation in the grievance process. See, e.g., Stevens v. Winger, 2021 WL 2075585, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2021) (dismissing claims against prison health care administrator whose only awareness of the alleged misconduct was based on receipt of a grievance); Brown v. Nicholson, 2020 WL 610523, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2020) (dismissing claim against prison CHCA who “denied [plaintiff's] grievance [and] stat[ed] that he had received appropriate medical attention for his reported complaint”); Rogers v. United States, 696 F.Supp.2d 472, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“If a grievance official's only involvement is investigating and/or ruling on an inmate's grievance after the incident giving rise to the grievance has already occurred, there is no personal involvement on the part of that official.”). Furthermore, while Young alleges that Thompson, Giddings, and Basher made dismissive and callous comments regarding her concerns, she alleges no facts to support that any of these Defendants was involved in her mental health assessment or treatment or failed to respond to an imminent threat to her safety. Thus, the claims asserted against Thompson, Basher, and Giddings should be dismissed as well.
In her brief in opposition to the pending motion, Young adds that “all defendants refused to provide medical/psychological screening and/or send [her] to the hospital for a rape kit,” and avers specifically that Bashor, Thompson, Oliver, Suesser, and Edwards “all relayed (face-to-face interactions) they don't care and will not report any of what [she] say[s].” ECF No. 67, p. 3. Young further argues that her male cellmate raped her on March 3, 2023 after she had notified Defendants of her history of sexual victimization “from childhood to prison rape that took place at SCI-Houtzdale.” ECF No. 67, p. 5. However, Young may not use her brief to set forth additional factual allegations in response to a motion to dismiss. See Nesmith v. Beaver Cnty. Jail, 2012 WL 3245495, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2012) (citing Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248 (5th Cir.1995); Bos. v. Prime Care Med., Inc., 2018 WL 3032853, at *5 n.6 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2018) (“Boston may not assert new claims or rely on new facts in response to a motion to dismiss.”); Hammond v. City of Philadelphia, 2001 WL 823637, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2001) (listing cases). The Court also notes that it addressed Young's alleged March 2023 rape when it adjudicated her motion for emergency injunctive relief based on this incident. ECF Nos. 49, 51, 59, 63, 69.
3. The Eighth Amendment claims
The Amended Complaint appears to assert Eighth Amendment excessive force, failure to protect, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and conditions of confinement claims against the Defendants arising out of Young's alleged sexual assault, medical and mental health treatment, and confinement to a hard cell. Defendants argue that each of Young's claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Each claim will be addressed in turn.
a. The Amended Complaint fails to state an excessive force claim against any Defendant.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” on inmates. US. Const. amend. VIII. To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on the application of excessive force, an inmate must allege facts to support two elements, one subjective and the other objective. See Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is.. .contextual and responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.'” Id., at 8 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). It asks whether prison officials unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain in a manner that offends “contemporary standards of decency.” Id., at 8-9. The “core judicial inquiry” of the subjective element is whether “force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id., at 6-7. Several factors must be examined when determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, including:
(1) “the need for the application of force”; (2) “the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used”; (3) “the extent of injury inflicted”; (4) “the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to the”; and (5) “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.”Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)). These factors must be assessed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
Young alleges that Defendants used excessive force by (1) “denying [her] medical services (i.e. rape kit, pain treatment and services) after she reported a sexual assault”; (2) denying her mental health treatment for her bipolar, post-traumatic stress, and schizophrenia disorders; (3) allowing her to “suffer in solitary confinement while her condition continues to deteriorate”; and (4) “subjecting her to mental” and “physical injury.” ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 35, 39. Defendants' alleged conduct does not constitute use of force as contemplated by the Eighth Amendment. See e.g., Thorne v. Hammer, 2020 WL 3869086, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 9, 2020) (“Plaintiff's claims of excessive force due to Defendants alleged use of racial slurs are insufficient to state a claim of excessive force.”); Todd v. Walters, 166 Fed.Appx. 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that verbal abuse is not actionable under § 1983). Young does not allege that any Defendant used any force against her.
The Court notes that the Amended Complaint includes vague references to being sexually assaulted by officers, but Young does not allege that any Defendant participated in any assault.
b. The Amended Complaint fails to state a failure to protect claim against any Defendant.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). This duty includes “protect[ing] prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). To state a failure to protect claim, an inmate must allege facts to support three elements. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012). First, the inmate must show that she was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. See id. Second, the “inmate must show that the official ‘knows and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'” Hill v. Patrick, 2008 WL 1752692, at *2 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting Beers-Captiol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001). Third, the inmate must show that the prison official's deliberate indifference caused the inmate to suffer harm. See Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367.
Although Young contends that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by “fail[ing] to protect her for” her “LGBTQ Transgender/woman identity,” ECF No. 14, ¶ 40, the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support this contention. While her transgender identity plausibly heightened her vulnerability to assault, this alone does not demonstrate that her conditions of confinement posed a substantial risk of harm. The Amended Complaint includes multiple references to “sexual assault” and to Young requesting a Rape Kit and filing a PREA complaint, but it does not allege that any inmate raped or sexually assaulted Young after she was transferred to SCI-Albion. Although the Amended Complaint avers that, when she arrived at SCI-Albion, unnamed prison officials attempted to place her in a cell with a male inmate who was “6'1 280 lbs,” ECF No. 14, ¶ 16, it goes on to acknowledge that Young refused to enter the cell and was escorted to the RHU and ultimately to a POC. Young alleges that prior to being escorted to the POC, she observed the male inmate with his hand or hands in his pants, but she does not allege that this inmate had any physical contact with her. Nothing in the Amended Complaint supports an inference that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to Young posed by her conditions of confinement. As such, her Amended Complaint fails to state a failure to protect claim.
c. The Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim.
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)) (internal quotation omitted). To establish a violation of one's constitutional right to adequate medical care, the inmate must allege facts that demonstrate: (1) she had a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that reflect deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A serious medical need exists when a “failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991). Deliberate indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
The Amended Complaint alleges facts sufficient to support that Young's mental health conditions presented a serious medical need within the scope of Eighth Amendment protections. Young's medical needs claim nevertheless fails based on the insufficiency of her allegations to support that her mental health treatment manifested deliberate indifference to her serious mental health needs. “[T]here is a critical distinction ‘between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those alleging inadequate medical treatment.'” Wisniewski v. Frommer, 751 Fed.Appx. 192, 195-96 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2018) (quoting Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017)). “[C]ourts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received some level of medical care.” Hensley v. Collins, 2018 WL 4233021, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (quoting Clark v. Doe, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2000)).
Although Young argues that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs by denying her any mental and medical health treatment and care, the Amended Complaint belies this assertion. According to the pleading, Young spent several days in the psychiatric unit, where she had daily visits from prison doctors, including Defendants Evans and Lucas. Her PRT had diagnosed her with anti-social personality disorder and one of the doctors prescribed her medication to treat her anxiety. The Amended Complaint further acknowledges that officers brought Young to medical for assessment and treatment after she complained of being assaulted. Thus, the allegations of the Amended Complaint demonstrate that Young received mental health and medical care and treatment from the Defendants involved in such care and other medical staff at SCI-Albion. Courts have routinely held that regular assessment, treatment, and care like that provided in this case preclude a finding of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Payo v. Stechschulte, 2022 WL 912588, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2022) (No deliberate indifference found where it was undisputed that “Plaintiff was seen, evaluated and treated on a regular basis and was prescribed medication as medically needed.”); Gause v. Diguglielmo, 339 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2009) (deliberate indifference standard unmet where “[Plaintiff's] medical records show that he was seen many times by the prison medical staff and received medicine, physical therapy, and even treatment outside of the prison”). Young's disagreement with his medical and mental health providers' treatment decisions and his desire for other forms of treatment do not support an Eighth Amendment claim. See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 358 n.18 (3d Cir. 1992) (“disagreement with prison personnel over the exercise of medical judgment does not state a claim for relief.”); Payo, 2022 WL 912588, at *8 (“Without more, however, his disagreement does not support an Eighth Amendment claim or demonstrate deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.).
Although the Amended Complaint includes multiple references to rape and assaults and Young's request for a Rape Kit, it does not identify an inmate or prison employee at SCI-Albion who raped or assaulted her or provide any other supporting information such as where or when this occurred. Thus, the Amended Complaint not only acknowledges that officers brought Young to medical after her vague allegation of sexual assault, but it also fails to allege even the most fundamental facts necessary to support that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to any medical condition associated with a rape, sexual assault, or any other physical assault upon Young.
Although the Court bases this conclusion on the allegations of the Amended Complaint alone, it also notes the significant mental health care that has been and continues to be provided to Young that was described in detail during evidentiary hearings on Young's multiple motions for injunctive relief. See e.g., ECF Nos. 36, 54, 63.
It is also well-settled that “an inmate's dissatisfaction with a course of medical treatment, standing alone, does not give rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim.” Tillery v. Noel, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2018) (collecting cases). Such complaints fail as constitutional claims because “the exercise by a doctor of his professional judgment is never deliberate indifference.” Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F.Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.”)). “Therefore, where a dispute in essence entails nothing more than a disagreement between an inmate and doctors over alternate treatment plans, the inmate's complaint will fail as a constitutional claim under § 1983.” Tillery, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (citing Gause, 339 Fed.Appx. 132 (characterizing a dispute over pain medication as the type of “disagreement over the exact contours of [plaintiff's] medical treatment” that does not violate the constitution)). Similarly, “the mere misdiagnosis of a condition or medical need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice standing alone is not a constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). “Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (citations omitted).
The consistent medical treatment provided to Young also precludes Young's deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against the non-medical DOC Defendants. “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Where, as here, “a prisoner is under the care of medical experts,” “a nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. Accordingly, Young's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against all Defendants should be dismissed.
d. The allegations of the Amended Complaint fail to state a conditions of confinement claim.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes constitutional limitations on a prisoner's conditions of confinement. See Rhondes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Wilson V. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met.” Giblom v. Gillipsie, 435 Fed.Appx. 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). First, the plaintiff must allege a deprivation that is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 125 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The objective component is narrowly defined: only “extreme deprivations” are sufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). A prisoner must show that the condition, either alone or in combination with other conditions, deprived him of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” or at least a “single, identifiable human need.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). These needs include “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety.” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir.1997). “[A] totality of the circumstances test must be applied to determine whether the conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 427 (3d Cir. 1990).
Second, the plaintiff must show that the prison official “subjectively acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., deliberate indifference.” Tillman v. Lebanon County Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). “This subjective component is also narrowly construed.” Henry v. Overmyer, 2013 WL 3177746, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 24, 2013). A prison official's conduct violates the Eighth Amendment “only if he knows that the inmate[ ] face[s] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847) (alterations in original).
Young argues that the Defendants subjected her to cruel and unusual punishment by (1) denying her medical treatment after her alleged sexual and physical assault, (2) proposing that she be placed “in a cell with a hostile 6'2” 280 lb. Muslim at 9:58 PM where she was in position to be sexually violated,” and (3) “placing [her] in a hard cell . . . for days with her feces smeared on the windows and walls.” ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 35, 37, 36. As previously discussed, Young has not alleged facts to support a deprivation of medical and mental health treatment. Moreover, no Defendant is alleged to have any personal involvement in the medical and mental health treatment she did or did not receive after any alleged sexual or physical assault. Likewise, the brief presence of the cellmate initially proposed by officials did not create an unconstitutional condition of confinement.
Her allegations concerning the conditions of the hard cell also fail to support a claim. Young acknowledges that she was placed in the hard cell after she displayed delusional behavior and attempted to eat her inhaler. The Amended Complaint also acknowledges that she was responsible for the presence of feces on the wall of the cell. Young's vague declaration that “Defendants refused to allow her access to” a “shower or hygiene items to wash off” does not provide any information regarding time or circumstances to support an inference that this refusal amounted to a denial of a basic human need. And Young's allegations that “she was kept in a freezing cold cell, denied medications” and meals, and kept “in a 24/7 bright light cell resulting in headaches, shivering cold, and sensory deprivation” likewise fail to support that Young experienced such conditions for a duration violative of the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 14, ¶ 36. Indeed, the Amended Complaint acknowledges that Young had engaged in self-harm (attempting to eat her inhaler) and other delusional behaviors that warranted close observation and restriction of items that could provide a means of aggravation of her condition or other attempts at self-harm. The Amended Complaint also fails to support the personal involvement of any Defendant in creating the conditions of confinement upon which Young bases her claim. See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir.1992)). Cf Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 226 (3d Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Young's conditions of confinement claims should be dismissed.
4. Young fails to allege a First Amendment Retaliation claim.
To state a retaliation claim, Young must allege facts to support plausible inferences that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) officials took an adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) “a causal link” exists “between the exercise of h[er] constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against h[er].” Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). See also Golden v. Perrin, 2022 WL 2791186, at *4-5 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2022). “[A]n otherwise legitimate and constitutional government act can become unconstitutional when an individual demonstrates that it was undertaken in retaliation for h[er] exercise of First Amendment speech.” Anderson v. Davilla, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997).
When analyzing whether an inmate engaged in constitutionally protected activity, courts should be mindful that “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Lab. Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)). Still, “prison inmates retain those constitutional rights that are not inconsistent with their status as prisoners or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 112 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)); Pell v. Procunier, 477 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
An “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). This is an objective inquiry. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012). “Government actions, which standing alone do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.” Id. at 224 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The retaliatory conduct “need not be great in order to be actionable” but must be “more than de minimus.” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
Retaliatory motive can be inferred from either: (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link. Id. (citing Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)). “These are not the exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)). With these principles in mind, the Court will examine each of Young's retaliation claims.
Young first avers that Giddings and Oliver “used retaliatory conduct . . . by giving her [a satirical grievance form] when she asked to report claims of sexual abuse and denial of mental health.” ECF No. 14, ¶ 34. The filing of a grievance is protected activity within the scope of the first element of a retaliation claim. See e.g., Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)). Thus, to the extent Young's retaliation claim is premised on her filing of a grievance or her expression of a desire to do so, she has alleged protected conduct. But it is far less clear that Giddings and Oliver's presenting Young with a spoof complaint form was an adverse action. While doing so belittled Young's concerns and complaints, it did not deny or impede her ability to pursue a grievance or otherwise impact her in any tangible way. Furthermore, any allegation that Giddings and Oliver interfered in Young's access to grievance forms is belied by Young's allegations that she successfully grieved her claims or was excused from doing so because of the nature of the claim. ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 32-33. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint does not support an inference that Oliver or Giddings acted with a retaliatory motive. Given these deficiencies, Young has failed to state a retaliation claim against Giddings and Oliver.
Young also asserts that Johnson used “retaliatory conduct” when he orchestrated her confinement. ECF No. 14, ¶ 36. This threadbare allegation does not plausibly infer constitutionally protected conduct, any adverse action, or causation. Young's similarly conclusory allegation that Defendants “continue to use . . . retaliatory conduct . . . based on [her] past state number and the winning of civil action Young v. Martin” also fails to state a retaliation claim. Id., ¶ 38. Once again, Young does not allege any facts to support an adverse action by any Defendant or connect her prior lawsuit to Defendants' alleged conduct. Finally, Young claims that Defendants' alleged denial of her medical and mental health treatment constitutes “retaliatory conduct,” but she likewise does not expound upon this assertion. Id., ¶ 39. Her invocation of the phrase “retaliatory conduct” is a pure conclusion of law. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim.
5. The Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support an access to courts claim.
Young appears to claim that Giddings and Oliver interfered in her obtaining grievance and PREA forms in violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. “Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners retain a right of access to the courts.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). “Where prisoners assert that defendants' actions have inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must show (1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury'-that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous' or ‘arguable' underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense' for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Id. (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). “[T]he underlying cause of action, ... is an element that must be described in the complaint.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415.
Young is actively pursuing this action. Accordingly, Defendants' alleged conduct has not caused Young to lose any potentially meritorious claim. Young has therefore failed to allege an injury. As such, her access to courts claim fails as a matter of law.
E. The Amended Complaint fails to state a conspiracy claim.
Lastly, Young alleges that Defendants conspired to violate her constitutional rights. To properly plead a civil rights conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must allege: “1) the specific conduct that violated the plaintiff's rights, 2) the time and the place of the conduct, and 3) the identity of the officials responsible for the conduct.” Sanchez v. Coleman, 2014 WL 7392400, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014) (citing Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 431 n.8 (3d Cir.1990)). Critical to this claim is the complaint's “factual allegations of combination, agreement, or understanding among all or between any of the defendants [or coconspirators] to plot, plan, or conspire to carry out the alleged chain of events.” Id. (quoting Spencer v. Steinman, 968 F.Supp. 1011, 1020 (E.D. Pa.1997)). See also Loftus v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 843 F.Supp. 981, 987 (E.D. Pa.1994) (“[w]hile the pleading standard under [Fed. R. Civ. Proc .] Rule 8 is a liberal one, mere incantation of the words ‘conspiracy' or ‘acted in concert' does not talismanically satisfy the Rule's requirements”). Bare allegations that “[d]efendants engaged in a concerted action of a kind not likely to occur in the absence of agreement” are insufficient. Id. It is likewise “insufficient to allege that ‘the end result of the parties' independent conduct caused plaintiff harm or even that alleged perpetrators of the harm acted in conscious parallelism.” Parness v. Christie, 2015 WL 4997430, at *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2015) (quoting Desposito v. New Jersey, 2015 WL 2131073, at *14 (D.N.J. May 5, 2015)). “Additionally, as Section 1983 does not create a cause of action for conspiracy in and of itself, a plaintiff must also allege some underlying deprivation of a constitutional right.” Id. (quoting Holt Cargo Systems, Inc. v. Delaware River Port Auth., 20 F.Supp.2d 803, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1998)).
While Young invokes the word “conspiracy” and “conspired” when she characterizes Defendants' alleged acts and omissions, she does not plead a time, place, or manner of Defendants' purported agreement to ignore her transgender identity and deny her medical and mental health treatment or any other facts or circumstances upon which a conspiracy can be inferred. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint fails to state conspiracy claim.
F. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). And though “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court,” it may not “outright refus[e] to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial.” Id. These instructions are equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
In this case, it would be futile to allow Young to amend her claims against the DOC, her official capacity claims for monetary relief, and the First and Fourteenth Amendment access to courts claim. These claims should therefore be dismissed with prejudice. However, Young may be able to cure her remaining claims if she can sufficiently identify each Defendant's personal involvement in the conduct upon which she bases the claims and cure the other factual pleading deficiencies identified herein. It is therefore recommended that the Court dismiss Young's Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement, excessive force, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and failure to protect claims, her First Amendment retaliation claim, and her civil rights conspiracy claims without prejudice and with leave to file a second amended complaint within twenty days. If Young fails to file a second amended complaint within this time, the Court should enter an order dismissing her claims against Defendants with prejudice.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 55) be GRANTED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).