Opinion
Civil Action No. 17-86 Erie
08-15-2018
JOSEPH HENSLEY, Plaintiff, v. JOHN COLLINS, et al., Defendants.
District Judge Hornak
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the motions to dismiss filed on behalf of Defendant Wenzel [ECF No. 16] and Defendant Collins [ECF No. 24] be denied; that Defendant Wenzel's motion for more definite statement be denied; and that both Defendants' motions to strike Plaintiff's request for unliquidated damages of $3.5 million and his demand for immediate release from prison be granted and that such relief be stricken. It is recommended further that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 51] be denied. II. REPORT
A. Relevant Procedural History
On April 12, 2017, Plaintiff Joseph Hensley, an inmate formerly incarcerated at the Warren County Prison in Warren, Pennsylvania ("WCP"), brought this pro se civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants John Collins, Deputy Warden at WCP ("Collins"), and Abby Wenzel, a health care provider at WCP ("Wenzel") Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at WCP from September 9, 2015, to November 3, 2016. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Collins denied him the right to adequate medical treatment and denied him law library access, while Defendant Wenzel allegedly failed to provide appointments for psychiatric treatment.
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette in LaBelle, Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff incorrectly identifies Defendant Wenzel as a psychiatrist when she is, in fact, a Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner licensed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (See ECF No. 17-1, Declaration of Abby Wenzel, at ¶ 1).
On November 20, 2017, Defendant Wenzel filed a motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement, and motion to strike [ECF No. 16], arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his claims against her, and that he failed to state a claim against her upon which relief may be granted in any event. On December 12, 2017, Defendant Collins filed his own motion to dismiss [ECF No. 24], essentially raising the same arguments as Defendant Wenzel. Defendant Wenzel subsequently filed a motion to join Defendant Collins' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 33], which has been granted by this Court. In response to Defendants' motions, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Amended Complaint," although the document essentially reiterates the allegations of the original complaint and is more akin to a brief in opposition. [ECF No. 38].
On March 13, 2018, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") to dismiss this case due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies [ECF No. 45]. In response to this R&R, Plaintiff filed objections arguing, for the first time, that many of his grievances and request slips were being destroyed by staff members at WCP, and that he was occasionally refused grievance forms, all of which interfered with his ability to exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 46, at p. 2). Based on these objections, District Judge Mark R. Hornak declined to adopt this Court's R&R and denied Defendants' motions to dismiss insofar as they are based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies; however, the matter was referred back to the undersigned to consider the remaining arguments raised by Defendants in their respective motions. Plaintiff subsequently filed a one-page motion for summary judgment, without an accompanying brief or statement of facts, [ECF No. 51], to which each Defendant has filed a response. [ECF Nos. 54, 55]. This matter is now ripe for consideration on the underlying claims with these filings and the original filings for review.
B. Standards of Review
1. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and the complaint's well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act).
A court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Emps'. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see also McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."). A plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004). Although the United States Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") does "not require heightened pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, No. 07-528, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 19, 2008) quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3.
The Third Circuit has expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases. To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, the court must follow three steps:
First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
"The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of a complaint, not to resolve disputed facts or decide the merits of the case." Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 197 F. Supp. 2d 42, 53 (D. Del. 2002) citing Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, or when the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The question is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the end. Rather, the question "is whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his or her claims." Swope v. City of Pittsburgh, 90 F. Supp. 3d 400, 405 (W.D. Pa. 2014) citing Oatway v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 325 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2003).
2. Pro se Pleadings
Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read "with measure of tolerance"). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 2001); see e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this court may consider facts and make inferences when appropriate.
C. Discussion
1. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
In the medical context, a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment occurs only when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). "In order to establish a violation of [the] constitutional right to adequate medical care, evidence must show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need." Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle, 429 U.S at 104. Such indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or "persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury" White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth County Correction Institute Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). --------
Mere misdiagnosis or negligent treatment is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. "Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners." Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (citations omitted). Any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment is disavowed by courts since such determinations remain a question of sound professional judgment. Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979), quoting Bowring v. Goodwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, deliberate indifference is generally not found when some level of medical care has been offered to the inmate. Clark v. Doe, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 13, 2000) ("courts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received some level of medical care").
a. Defendant Collins
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Collins denied him "the right to adequate medical treatment" by refusing to allow him to get his wisdom teeth pulled, which caused him to have trouble eating, and by denying him "eye care," which caused him vision problems and migraines. (ECF No. 5, Complaint, at Section IV.C). In particular, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Collins told him that "the county would not pay for [his] dental or eye work." (ECF No. 38, Plaintiff's response, at p. 1).
Defendant Collins has moved to dismiss this claim, arguing that Plaintiff is merely disagreeing with "the nature and extent of medical treatment he received" at WCP (ECF No. 25, Defendant Collins' Brief, at p. 12); however, it is apparent that Plaintiff is not simply disagreeing with the medical treatment he received, but is more concerned with Defendant Collins' alleged refusal to provide medical treatment for non-medical reasons. This is minimally sufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 68.
Alternatively, Defendant Collins argues that Plaintiff has failed to show his personal involvement in any constitutional violation; however, Plaintiff specifically identifies Defendant Collins as the official who refused to allow Plaintiff to see either a dentist or an eye doctor, as allegedly recommended by WCP's medical staff. (ECF No. 38, at p. 1). Thus, Defendant Collins' personal involvement has been sufficiently alleged and his motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim should be denied.
b. Defendant Wenzel
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wenzel "failed to comply with appointments for psychiatric treatment, which lead [sic] to [him] trying to kill [himself] thirty times." (ECF No. 5, Complaint, at Section IV.C). In particular, Plaintiff states that during his last four months at WCP, Wenzel "didn't show up" for his psychiatric treatment because she was too busy. (ECF No. 38, at p. 2). Although Defendant Wenzel argues that she is not a psychiatrist, but a Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner, Plaintiff points out that she was the one responsible for prescribing his psychiatric medication and "prescribed [him] to be seen every four to six weeks." (Id.). Plaintiff also states that the "on site doctor could not do anything about [his] psychiatric meds because they were not prescribed by him." (Id.).
Defendant Wenzel has moved to dismiss this claim because it fails to state a professional negligence claim under Pennsylvania law (ECF No. 17, Defendant Wenzel's Memorandum of Law, at p. 4); however, Plaintiff makes clear in his response that he is asserting an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim such that Defendant Wenzel's argument in her own motion misses the mark. Nonetheless, Defendant Wenzel has also joined Defendant Collins' motion to dismiss, and by so doing, she is also arguing that Plaintiff's claim be dismissed because he is merely disagreeing with the nature and extent of the treatment he received. As with Defendant Collins, however, this argument mischaracterizes Plaintiff's claim. Rather than disagreeing with treatment that he was provided, Plaintiff is alleging Defendant Wenzel's deliberate refusal to provide treatment, which states a cognizable claim. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 98. Moreover, to the extent Defendant Wenzel joins in Defendant Collins' argument that Plaintiff has failed to show her personal involvement in any constitutional violation, such argument is a nonstarter, as Defendant Wenzel's involvement is plainly implicated. Thus, Defendant Wenzel's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim should be denied at this early stage of the proceeding.
2. Motion to Strike
Both Defendants have also moved to strike Plaintiff's unliquidated damage request of $3.5 million because it fails to comply with Western District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 8, which provides,
No party shall set forth in a pleading originally filed with this Court a specific dollar amount of unliquidated damages in a pleading except as may be necessary to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the Court or to otherwise comply with any rule, statute or regulation which requires that a specific amount in controversy be pled in order to state a claim for relief or to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court.The Court agrees that such a claim for relief violates this rule and should be stricken from the complaint.
In addition, both parties have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's demand for immediate release from prison as such relief cannot be granted by either party or this Court. The Court agrees that such relief should be stricken for this reason as well.
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
In addition to Defendants' pending motions to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff has filed a one-page motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 51], without an accompanying brief or statement of facts. This motion fails to comply with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and should be dismissed accordingly. III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the motions to dismiss filed on behalf of Defendant Wenzel [ECF No. 16] and Defendant Collins [ECF No. 24] be denied; that Defendant Wenzel's motion for more definite statement be denied; and that both Defendants' motions to strike Plaintiff's request for unliquidated damages of $3.5 million and his demand for immediate release from prison be granted and that such relief be stricken. It is recommended further that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 51] be denied.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file written objections to this report and recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F. 3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: August 15, 2018 cc: The Honorable Mark R. Hornak
United States District Judge