Opinion
2:20-cv-03550-JD-MGB
02-02-2021
Christopher Young, Petitioner, v. Director of the Florence County Detention Center,[1] Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARRY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Christopher Young (“Petitioner”), a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge has reviewed the petition and submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed, without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a pretrial detainee currently housed at the Florence County Detention Center with several criminal charges pending before the Florence County Magistrate and General Sessions Courts. Records from Florence County indicate that Petitioner was arrested on March 15, 2019, for assault and battery of the third degree (Case No. 20193690020917), and again on March 17, 2019, for assault and battery of the second degree (Case No. 2019A2110200171). On June 21, 2019, Petitioner was arrested on charges of common law robbery (Case No. 2019A2110400011); kidnapping (Case No. 2019A2110400012); malicious injury to animals and other personal property with an injury value of more than $2,000 but less than $10,000 (Case No. 2019A2110400013); and assault and battery of the first degree (Case No. 2019A2110400014).Petitioner's bond was consistently denied in Case Nos. 2019A2110400011, -12, -13, and -14 on October 17, 2019, May 5, 2020, and, most recently, December 10, 2020. Petitioner is currently represented by Assistant Public Defender Tamara Greer.
See Florence County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Florence/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search for name “Christopher Young”) (last visited February 1, 2021). A federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts. Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of other courts' records and proceedings). The court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009). information located in postings on government web sites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009).
Pending in Magistrate Court.
Pending in General Sessions Court.
Pending in General Sessions Court.
At this time, Petitioner's pending criminal matters have yet to be scheduled for trial. Ms. Greer wrote Petitioner a letter on April 14, 2020, explaining that,
due to the current COVID-19 pandemic the South Carolina Supreme Court originally issued an order number 2020-03-18-02 cancelling all terms of court until May 1, 2020. As the situation progressed, the Supreme Court of South Carolina issued another order number 2020-04-03-01 (which revokes earlier orders) and is titled “Operation of the Trial Courts During the Coronavirus Emergency.” This order states that “all jury selections and jury trials in all criminal and civil cases are continued until further notice.”(Dkt. No. 1-2 at 17.) She further explained that while the 12th Circuit Solicitor's Office assured her that Petitioner would be “on the next docket for jury trial, at this time we do not know when that will be. And we cannot schedule a jury term without the permission of the South Carolina Supreme Court.” (Id. at 17-18.) Ms. Greer then followed-up with a letter dated May 29, 2020, informing Petitioner that the term of court scheduled in Florence County General Sessions for June 2020 had been cancelled. She stated, “[u]ntil we receive further guidance from the Supreme Court of South Carolina, we are not sure when the next term of court will be held nor when criminal jury trials will resume.” (Id. at 25.)
It is against this procedural background that Petitioner now brings the instant § 2241 petition in the District of South Carolina alleging the violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. More specifically, Petitioner claims that he requested a jury trial as early as May 9, 2019, in Case Nos. 20193690020917 and 2019A2110200171, and as early as July 2019 in Case Nos. 2019A2110400011, -12, -13, and -14, to no avail. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 4.) Petitioner apparently wrote a number of letters to various judicial officials complaining about the delay in scheduling his criminal trials, but claims that the state court “failed to acknowledge” his letters, requests, and grievances. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1, 5 for letters to the South Carolina Bar; at 3, 16, and 26 for letters to the Florence County Clerk of Court; at 13 for letter to Florence County Judge Thomas A. Russo; and at 13 for letter to 12th Circuit Assistant Solicitor David Richardson.) Petitioner seeks the dismissal of his pending charges or, presumably, an immediate trial date in his pending criminal matters. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3; Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3-4, 12.)
The undersigned notes that Petitioner's letters do reference other various complaints of judicial “misconduct” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2), albeit disjointedly; for example, he challenges his public defender's case strategy and contests the underlying facts of his charges. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1-1; Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1, 8-10, 13, 15.) However, the focus of Petitioner's § 2241 petition here seems to be the alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. Moreover, any purported misconduct by the public defender, solicitor, investigators, or judges involved in Petitioner's pending state actions is subject to summary dismissal for the same reasons discussed below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Petitioner's pro se petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply any or all of these rules to § 2241 petitions).
The narrow question before the Court is whether it “plainly appears” that Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, his petition must be dismissed; if not, the warden must respond. Id. Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his petition is accorded liberal construction. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Petitioner seeks the dismissal of his pending state charges or, in the alternative, an immediate trial date, claiming that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. Nevertheless, this action should be dismissed because Petitioner's claims are not properly before this Court under the Younger abstention doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. At 43-44. From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Petitioner is plainly involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-02981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012) (noting the first prong of the abstention test is satisfied where the petitioner “is currently awaiting trial in an ongoing state criminal proceeding”). The second criterion is also met, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). And finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Petitioner can address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (referencing Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)) (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”). Because Petitioner's case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, federal habeas relief is available under § 2241 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224-26 (5th Cir. 1987).
Petitioner has not shown the type of extreme misconduct or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant federal interference in a pending state criminal case. While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention; thus, where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. See Askins v. Dir. of Florence Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:20-cv-02846-DCC-MHC, 2020 WL 7001015, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 6110960 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020) (referencing Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975)). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Id. Accordingly, a federal court should generally abstain from considering a speedy trial claim at the pretrial stage because such concerns can be raised at trial and on direct appeal. Id. Petitioner's claim is no different here; because he can pursue his claims in state court both during and after trial, he fails to demonstrate any “special circumstances” or irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. See, e.g., id. at *2-3; Richardson v. Thompson, No. 4:15-cv-02638-RBH-TER, 2015 WL 7422709, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 7428567 (D.S.C. Nov. 20, 2015), aff'd, 635 Fed.Appx. 94 (4th Cir. 2016).
Moreover, even if there were extraordinary circumstances, speedy trial claims are reviewable in a pretrial federal habeas proceeding only after the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 228 (finding that speedy trial issue could be reviewed in federal court before trial, “provided that the state courts have had an opportunity to rule on the issue”); Moore, 515 F.2d at 445-46 (explaining that “the cases in which the speedy trial claim has been raised in a pre-trial habeas context have granted the writ only after exhaustion on the merits in the state courts”). Thus, notwithstanding the Younger doctrine, it is readily apparent that Petitioner is not eligible for federal habeas corpus relief at this time because he has not yet given the state courts an adequate opportunity to consider the constitutional claims that he is attempting to raise on the merits here.
CONCLUSION
The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS the petition for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to the Important Notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).