Opinion
No. 10–P–970.
2012-12-5
Daniel F. YAUCKOES & another v. Martha J. SPALDING.
By the Court (KANTROWITZ, BERRY & GRAINGER, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
On September 21, 2009, the plaintiffs, Daniel F. Yauckoes and Leslie A. Yauckoes, and the defendant, Martha J. Spalding, settled a land dispute case. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to vacate the stipulation of dismissal and proceed to trial. The defendant appeals, pro se, from the denial of that motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). We affirm.
Background. The parties own adjoining properties. The plaintiffs filed a claim to quiet title to a “sliver strip” parcel by adverse possession. The defendant counterclaimed and sought title to a parcel under her driveway by adverse possession. On the day trial was scheduled to begin, the parties, both represented by counsel, settled.
As a result, both parties received the parcels they had sought in their claims. Additionally, the plaintiffs paid the defendant $2,575 to cover the taxes, survey costs, and the registry fee to record her deed. On February 24, 2010, a hearing was held on the defendant's motion pursuant to rule 60(b), which was decided, as earlier noted, adversely to the defendant.
Discussion. A motion for relief under rule 60(b) is left to the sound discretion of the motion judge. Nortek, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 65 Mass.App.Ct. 764, 775 (2006). “Under an abuse of discretion standard, we look for decisions based on ‘whimsy, caprice, or arbitrary or idiosyncratic notions.’ Bucchiere v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 396 Mass. 639, 642 (1986). We do not disturb the judges's ruling ‘simply because [we] might have reached a different result.’ Id. at 641.” Cruz v. Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 664, 670 (2012).
The defendant's claims are somewhat difficult to understand. While we are sympathetic to her pro se status, we note that a pro se party “is held to the same standards as litigants who are represented by counsel.” Maza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 1006, 1006 (1996). See Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).
The defendant has put forth some arguments, e.g., her claims under the Massachusetts Constitution, that were not raised in the court below and, as such, are waived. See Commonwealth v. FICA, 462 Mass. 737, 745 (2012). In a similar vein, while extensive documentation was presented to us, much of it was not presented below. Other claims are not properly supported by legal authority. See Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4). See also Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 81, 85–86 (1995). We also note that the defendant cashed the check given her in the settlement, which is some indication that she endorsed the outcome of her case.
The defendant concedes in her motion to submit supplemental evidence that no evidence was submitted in the lower court aside from her memorandum and affidavit in support of the motion. Included in the supplemental evidence are additional plans, copies of deeds, police reports, assessor's records, town sewer plans, correspondence from the Chelmsford engineering department and East Chelmsford water department, correspondence with her attorney, Brian Sullivan, letters to the Registry of Deeds, prior proposed settlements, and other items.
Ultimately, much of what the defendant requests would more appropriately have been addressed in a trial court or in another forum.
Conclusion. We have reviewed the claims of the defendant and find them to be without merit. See Department of Rev. v. Ryan R., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 380, 389 (2004). The parties, both having had representation at the pertinent time, entered into an agreement which benefitted both. The judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling as he did.
For these reasons, as well as for substantially those in the plaintiffs' brief, we affirm.
Order denying motion for relief from judgment affirmed.