MEMORANDUM ORDER

FISH, District Judge.

Before the court is the motion of the defendants Mary Kay, Inc. and Sharon Davis (collectively, "Mary Kay") for reconsideration of that portion of the court's memorandum order, filed on September 28, 2001 ("September 28 Order"), remanding the state law claims of the plaintiff Claudine Woolf ("Woolf") to the 191st Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas ("191st District Court of Dallas County"). For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 12, 2001, Woolf filed her first amended petition in the 191st District Court of Dallas County, in which, among various state law claims, she asserted a discrimination claim against Mary Kay under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Notice of Removal ("Notice of Removal") at 1. Mary Kay timely removed Woolf's action to this court on April 4, 2001, on the basis of federal question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). Notice of Removal at 1; Mary Kay's Motion for Reconsideration at 2 ("Defendants timely removed this lawsuit based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331."). In the Notice of Removal, Mary Kay also asserted, notwithstanding the procedural bar against diversity-based removal by an in-state defendant, that this court had original jurisdiction over the case on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Notice of Removal at 2.

On September 28, 2001, the court issued a memorandum order granting Mary Kay's motion for summary judgment on Woolf's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and remanding, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3), Woolf's remaining claims under state law to the 191st District Court of Dallas County. September 28 Order at 24. Six days later, on October 4, 2001, Mary Kay filed the instant motion requesting that the court reconsider the September 28 Order insofar as it remanded Woolf's state law claims. Mary Kay's Motion for Reconsideration at 1.

According to Mary Kay, § 1367(c)(3) does not authorize remand in this instance because the court has original jurisdiction over all of Woolf's claims on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Mary Kay's Motion for Reconsideration at 4. While Mary Kay concedes that the removal statute procedurally barred it from removing this case, it argues that this court now has original jurisdiction over Woolf's state law claims on the basis of diversity of citizenship because neither Woolf nor the court, within the thirty day period following removal prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), identified any procedural defect, such as removal by in-state defendants. Id. at 2-4. Accordingly, Mary Kay requests that the court withdraw that portion of the September 28 Order remanding Woolf s state law claims and adjudicate those claims on the basis of the court's diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 3-4.

In response, Woolf argues that Mary Kay removed this case solely on the basis of federal question subject matter jurisdiction and that Woolf did not waive any procedural defect on removal because diversity of citizenship was not a basis for removal, as it would have been improper for Mary Kay, as a Texas citizen, to remove the action on the basis of diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Reconsider Remand Order ("Woolf's Response") at 1-2. Woolf also contends that the court's remand order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) applies only to supplemental jurisdiction based on original subject matter jurisdiction, not to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Id. at 2-3.

II. ANALYSIS

For the following reasons, the court stands by its previous determination to remand all of Woolf's state law claims. First, without question, Mary Kay's notice of removal was based solely on federal question subject matter jurisdiction. Notice of Removal at 1. While Mary Kay recited in the notice that there was diversity of citizenship, it also conceded that it could not remove the case on this basis because of the procedural bar against diversity-based removal by an in-state defendant. See id. at 2. The court would not have allowed Mary Kay to remove the case on the basis of diversity of citizenship because Mary Kay is a citizen of Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); McKay v. Boyd Construction Co., Inc., 769 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Although section 1441 permits the removal of cases based on diversity jurisdiction, it does not apply to those cases where any defendant is a resident of the state in which the suit was brought."), abrogated by Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 385-86, 388, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998). Woolf is thus eminently correct that it would have been "a waste of time for Plaintiff to identify this so-called `procedural defect' which accompanied a proper removal based on federal question." Woolf's Response at 1. Moreover, the court agrees with Woolf that Mary Kay's comment regarding diversity of citizenship in the notice of removal was "merely made to bolster Defendants argument that this Court assert supplemental jurisdiction to Plaintiff's state law claims along with the removal of the federal question to United States District Court." Id. at 2.

Second, Mary Kay's reliance on In re Shell Oil Company, 932 F.2d 1518 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1049, 112 S.Ct. 914, 116 L.Ed.2d 814 (1992), does not support its claim that remand was improper. Unlike the instant case, the basis of removal in Shell Oil Company was diversity of citizenship. 932 F.2d at 1518. Over a month after removal, the plaintiffs moved to remand the case on the grounds that two of the defendants were citizens of Texas, the original forum state. Id. After concluding that it could review the district court's remand order, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs waived any nonjurisdictional grounds for remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) by not moving to remand within thirty days of the filing of the notice of removal, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Id. at 1523. Notably, in the course of its opinion, the Fifth Circuit had to decide what constitutes a "defect in removal procedure," for the purposes of § 1447(c), and it cited with approval Professor David D. Siegel's distinction between remands for "procedural defects" and remands relating to supplemental jurisdiction:

What does the language "any defect in removal procedure" mean? Professor Siegel explains that Congress sought to distinguish remands for "procedural defects" from remands that may arise after removal, particularly remands relating to the court's ancillary jurisdiction [presently supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367] . . . Siegel asserts that § 1447(c) is written in such a way that a remand may be made after the 30-day limit if something arises later that would make remand proper. Siegel, 1988 Commentary, supra, at 53-54; see also H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 ("[t]he amendment is written in terms of a defect in `removal procedure' in order to avoid any implication that remand is unavailable after disposition of all federal questions leaves only State law questions"). . . .

For example, a case with state and federal claims is properly removed to federal court. The federal claims are dismissed after 30 days. The federal court still has [supplemental] jurisdiction to hear just the state claims. However, the district court may want to remand those claims to state court. As Professor Siegel explains:

["]While the dropping out of the claim on which the other claims depended does not bring about a defect of subject matter jurisdiction — because the court has discretion to retain and try the remaining claims and a defect in subject matter jurisdiction can never allow that — neither is it to be deemed a mere defect of `procedure' that would trigger the 30-day rule.["]

While Professor Siegel's discussion did not apply to the facts in Shell Oil Company, see id. at 1522, it does fit this dispute. In this case, Woolf asserted both state and federal law claims. Notice of Removal at 1. Mary Kay timely removed the suit on the basis of federal question subject matter jurisdiction. Id. On September 28, 2001, months after Mary Kay's filing of the notice of removal, the court disposed of Woolf's only federal claim and remanded her state law claims to the state court from where they were removed. As foreshadowed by Shell Oil Company, the court's disposition of Woolf's federal law claim is not, despite Mary Kay's assertion to the contrary, a defect of procedure that triggers 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)'s thirty-day rule. Id. at 1522. Remand is therefore appropriate in this circumstance.

Third, although the Fifth Circuit has not addressed this precise issue, two federal district court have decided that this court is not compelled to exercise jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. See Trask v. Kasenetz, 818 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Maher v. Moore College of Art and Design, No. CIV. A. 98-2978, 1999 WL 88964 (E.D.Pa. Feb.19, 1999).

In Trask, the defendants removed the action to the Eastern District of New York on the ground that the plaintiff's complaint stated a federal cause of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68. 818 F. Supp. at 41, 44. The plaintiff was a citizen of Florida and the defendants were citizens of Virginia and New York. Id. at 41. After dismissing the plaintiffs RICO claim, the court remanded the plaintiffs remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c). Id. at 45. Although the defendants did not assert that the court had subject matter jurisdiction on any ground other than the existence of a federal question, the court held that, even assuming diversity of citizenship did exist, it should not be compelled to exercise jurisdiction on that basis:

But where, as may be assumed here, a Florida citizen chooses to sue a New York citizen in a New York State court, the New York defendant may not remove the case. In such an instance, the defendant has no interest recognized by a federal statute in a federal forum. No provision of the Judiciary Act compels this court to retain jurisdiction over a case removed by citizens of this state based upon a federal claim that has been dismissed, even where the parties are citizens of different states. The underlying logic of the statutory scheme suggests, to the contrary, that the court should remand the case to the New York State court in which plaintiff first chose to bring it. Moreover, that court would have greater familiarity and interest in the issues that remain insofar as they relate solely to the regulation of a New York State not-for-profit corporation.

Similarly, in Maher, the court found that diversity of citizenship did not require the court to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff's remaining pendent state law claims. 1999 WL 88964, at *4. In that case, the plaintiff, a citizen of New Jersey, asserted various state causes of action and one federal due process claim against the defendant, a non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at *1. On June 8, 1998, the defendant timely removed the entire case from a Pennsylvania state court to the federal district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on the fact that the plaintiff raised a federal question. Id. Notably, over a month later, on July 17, 1998, the plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court. Id. Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant did not assert diversity of citizenship in its removal, the court held, after dismissing the sole federal claim, that it was "not compelled to exercise jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship in this case because Moore College was sued in its home state, and thus, was unable to remove the case based on diversity jurisdiction." Id. at *4 n. 2.

Although Trask and Maher might be distinguishable on the basis that the defendants in those cases did not assert diversity of citizenship, the underlying reasoning of those decisions supports the court's decision here. See also Devore v. Transport Technology Corp., 914 F. Supp. 355, 358 (W.D.Mo. 1996) (noting that Wright, Miller, and Cooper approve of the result and reasoning of Trask and that "[t]his Court would likely follow Trask were it presented with the same facts.") (internal citation omitted). As in Trask, in the absence of any other interests, Woolf's choice of forum should be honored. See Trask, 818 F. Supp. at 44-45. Moreover, given that the defendants are citizens of Texas and that the parties' Agreement required Woolf to submit her disputes to the courts of the state of Texas, the court is hard-pressed to find any prejudice to Mary Kay in remanding Woolf's state law claims. In fact, prior to removing this action, Mary Kay consistently argued that this case must be heard in a Texas state court. See, e.g., Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Transfer at 3-5 (summarizing Mary Kay's efforts in the California and Texas state courts to enforce the forumselection clause in the parties' Agreement). Finally, because only state law claims remain, those claims should, in the interests of comity, be heard by the state district court, which has greater familiarity with the unique questions of state law currently in dispute.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons state above, Mary Kay's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.