Summary
holding that plaintiff had right to enforce restrictive covenant that ran with defendant's land, although covenant did not refer to plaintiff or her predecessors in interest as intended beneficiaries
Summary of this case from Criscenzo v. Chabad-LubavitchOpinion
(SC 16199)
Argued May 25, 2000
Officially released July 4, 2000
Action to enjoin the named defendant from violating a deed restriction and to enjoin the defendant town of Greenwich from issuing a building permit to the named defendant, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the action was later withdrawn as against the defendant town of Greenwich; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court, Hickey, J., against the named defendant only; judgment for the named defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, O'Connell, C.J., and Foti and Lavery, Js., which reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, and the named defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Frederic S. Ury, with whom, on the brief, was Deborah M. Garskof, for the appellant (named defendant).
Stanley A. Twardy, Jr., with whom, on the brief, were Deborah S. Gordon and Keith P. Carroll, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
In this certified appeal, the plaintiff, Dorothy Wood, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing a judgment of the trial court. The trial court's judgment denied the plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction prohibiting the named defendant, Laila Amer, from building a home on a lot located across the street from the plaintiff's property in Greenwich. The plaintiff had sought enforcement of certain restrictions contained in the named defendant's chain of title. The trial court rendered judgment for the named defendant on the basis of the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-575a.
General Statutes § 52-575a provides: "Action to enforce recorded private restrictions or notations on maps. No action or any other type of court proceeding shall be brought to enforce a private restriction recorded in the land records of the municipality in which the property is located or a notation on a filed map pertaining to the use of privately owned land, the type of structures that may be erected thereon or the location of same unless such action or proceeding shall be commenced within three years of the time that the person seeking to enforce such restriction had actual or constructive knowledge of such violation. This section shall be deemed not to apply to any private restriction or notation pertaining to (a) any public utility easement; (b) any right-of-way; (c) any park or open space land; (d) any private driveway, roadway or street, or (e) any sewer line or water line."
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of the plaintiff's claim. Wood v. Amer, 54 Conn. App. 601, 609, 736 A.2d 162 (1999). We granted the named defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following two issues: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that: (1) the `Brush deed' contained two separate restrictive covenants, and that, therefore, the grantor intended that only one house was to be located on either lot 10 or lot 11; and (2) the statute of limitations contained in General Statutes § 52-575a had not expired with respect to the plaintiff's claim of a violation of a covenant not to build?" Wood v. Amer, 251 Conn. 908, 739 A.2d 265, [ 739 A.2d 264], (1999). This appeal followed.
Having reviewed the briefs, the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed. In its thorough and thoughtful opinion, the Appellate Court properly considered the issues on which we granted certification. See Wood v. Amer, supra, 54 Conn. App. 601.