ENTRY ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF WITT'S REMAINING CLAIMS

DAVID F. HAMILTON, United States District Judge.

Plaintiffs Sonia L. Witt and Theothis Allison allege that defendants Westfield Acceptance Corporation and Karl T. Ryan violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and the Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code, Ind. Code § 24-4.5-1-101 et seq. The case is now before the court for resolution of the court's subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff Witt's remaining claims. As explained below, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her remaining federal and state law claims.

For purposes of deciding subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants have not raised any factual issues, so the court treats the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. See Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). According to the complaint, Witt entered into a so-called "payday loan" with a company called Advance America in November 1998. As part of the loan transaction, Witt delivered to Advance America a post-dated check for $180. Witt then failed to repay the loan according to its terms, and her check was dishonored when it was presented for payment.

Advance America assigned the debt to defendant Westfield Acceptance Corporation. In April 1999, defendant Karl Ryan filed suit on behalf of Westfield Acceptance against Witt in a state court. Westfield Acceptance obtained a default judgment for $929, which included treble damages and attorney fees. When Witt later sought to refinance her home, the judgment appeared on her credit report. She then paid Westfield Acceptance $1,028.50, which was accepted in January 2000 in satisfaction of the judgment.

Witt claims that Westfield Acceptance and Ryan violated the FDCPA first by seeking and then by collecting treble damages. Witt contends that Indiana law does not permit assignment of a creditor's statutory claim for treble damages arising from a dishonored check. See Hart Conversions, Inc. v. Pyramid Seating Co., 658 N.E.2d 129, 131 (Ind.App. 1995).

In a previous ruling issued January 30, 2001, the court found that Witt's FDCPA claim based on defendants' act of filing suit to collect treble damages was time-barred because that act occurred more than one year before Witt filed this action on June 19, 2000. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (one-year limit). The same reasoning applies to Witt's parallel claim under state law, which also has a one-year statute of limitations. See Ind. Code §§ 24-4.5-5-202 — 203(7). The court also agreed with Magistrate Judge Shields' recommendation, however, that the one-year limit did not bar Witt's claim that defendants had later violated the FDCPA by actually collecting the judgment from her, including the award of treble damages. The FDCPA prohibits in part the "collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law." 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).

By claiming that defendants violated federal law by accepting payment of a facially valid state court judgment, Witt's case presents a problem of subject matter jurisdiction that the court has raised on its own initiative. The federal Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that the lower federal courts may not exercise what amounts to appellate jurisdiction over state courts. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a person who claims that her federal rights were violated by a state court judgment must assert those rights through an appeal of the judgment in the state courts — not by an action in a federal district court — with the only potential federal court review coming from the Supreme Court of the United States. See, e.g., Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 509-10 (7th Cir. 1996); Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (7th Cir. 1996) ("the fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment").

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies not only to claims and issues that were actually raised in the state court but also to claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court determinations. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-84 n. 16 (federal claims were "inextricably intertwined" with claims presented in state judicial proceeding on plaintiff's application for state bar admission); Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). After considering the parties' briefs on the issue, the court finds that subject matter jurisdiction over Witt's FDCPA claim for collection of the state court judgment is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Witt is complaining of an injury inflicted on her by the state court judgment itself, and she could prevail on her claim only by showing that the state court judgment was erroneous.

In an attempt to avoid the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Witt argues that she "is not taking issue with the actual amount of the treble damages awarded," but with the request for or collection of any charges in excess of those provided by law. Pl. Br. at 3-4. Yet, Witt acknowledges that she would need to show "that unlawful amounts were collected." Id. at 4. She could do that only by showing that the state court erred when it entered judgment against her. For these purposes, this court sees no meaningful difference between entry of an allegedly erroneous judgment and collection of that judgment. Court judgments are not intended to be meaningless pieces of paper. A party who wins a judgment is entitled to collect upon it or to enforce compliance with it. Efforts to collect or enforce a facially valid judgment are not invitations to relitigate the merits. (Witt also has not asked the state court to set aside its default judgment, nor did she contest enforcement of the judgment, as a party who questions the issuing court's jurisdiction may do.)

Witt also relies on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999), a case that illustrates the complexity of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The plaintiff in Long alleged that her landlord and its attorneys had violated the FDCPA and deprived her of property without due process of law by obtaining a state court order evicting her from her home based on a false claim for past rent. Long also alleged that when she arrived at a state court to contest the matter, the landlord's attorney persuaded her to sign a document that Long thought was an agreement to a two-week delay to work out a settlement. The document was actually a consent to entry of judgment of eviction. After Long signed the document and left, the landlord's attorney obtained the eviction order from the state court. 182 F.3d at 552.

The principal issue on appeal was whether Long's due process challenge to her eviction (with a claim for damages based on the severe consequences of her eviction) was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Seventh Circuit explained that she could not have suffered those losses but for the state court's eviction order, and she could not prevail without showing that the eviction order was invalid. 182 F.3d at 557. These factors would have led to a finding of lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman, the court said, but for one unusual feature of state law — a feature that is not present in this case. In Long, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Illinois law would not have allowed Long to raise her claims in the state court eviction case. Illinois law would have treated her claims of due process and FDCPA violations as not germane to the action for forcible entry and detainer. Id. at 559-60. Because Long did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise her claims in the state court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar them.

Plaintiff Witt tries to extend that reasoning in Long to claims that a state court defendant might have raised but was not required to raise in the state court action. Pl. Br. at 5 (arguing that FDCPA claims are counterclaims, not defenses, and that Indiana law does not treat any counterclaims as compulsory in small claims court). That argument stretches the reasoning of Long too far, and accepting it would substantially cut back on the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Long held that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because Long would not have been allowed to raise her claims in state court, not because she was not required to raise them. See 182 F.3d at 559-60. The Long court did not suggest that this narrow exception would be expanded further. Accord, Hamid v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker, Moore Pellettieri, No. 00 C 4511, 2001 WL 1543516, at *10-11 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 30, 2001) (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred jurisdiction over FDCPA claims based on collection of state court judgments where plaintiffs failed to show they were barred from raising their contentions in state court).

Witt also relies on the portion of Long that addressed claims under the FDCPA itself. The Seventh Circuit found that the alleged FDCPA violations were independent from the state court's eviction order. The alleged violations were for a false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A), and violations of § 1692f and § 1692g. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar jurisdiction over those claims, which the Seventh Circuit described as arising from violations that were "independent of and complete prior to the entry of the eviction order." 182 F.3d at 556 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff Witt's only timely claim also does not fall within that reasoning in Long. Her remaining FDCPA claim is for allegedly unlawful collection of a debt when she paid Westfield Acceptance to satisfy the state court judgment. That alleged violation is not independent of the state court judgment, and it obviously could not have occurred until after the state court entered its judgment. In Witt's case, it was the entry of the allegedly erroneous judgment that caused her alleged injuries, and she could not prevail upon her only timely claim without showing that the state court erred. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over that claim and from deciding whether the state court judgment was correct or not. Accord, Hamid v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker, Moore Pellettieri, 2001 WL 1543516, at *11 (applying Long to hold that Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred subject matter jurisdiction over FDCPA claims based on collection of state court judgments, but not over FDCPA claims arising before entry of the state court judgments).

Plaintiff Witt's remaining FDCPA claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As a result of this ruling and the prior ruling, plaintiff Witt's claims against both Westfield Acceptance and Ryan in Count I for seeking allegedly unlawful treble damages are barred by the FDCPA's one-year statute of limitations. Her claims against both defendants in Count I for collecting allegedly unlawful treble damages are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Witt has also asserted parallel claims under the Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code, Ind. Code § 24-4.5-1-101 et seq. Her claims under state law are similarly subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See Ind. Code §§ 24-4.5-5-202 — 203(7). As a result, her state law claims arising prior to the state court's entry of judgment are barred by the statute of limitations. Her state law claims based on the collection of the state court judgment are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine just as her parallel FDCPA claims are barred.

Plaintiff Allison's claims remain pending, however, as does her motion for class certification. Defendants shall respond to Allison's motion for class certification no later than April 30, 2002. No separate judgment shall be entered at this time.

So ordered.