Opinion
Civil Action 22-444
08-22-2022
RALPH O. WILLIAMS Plaintiff, v. ATTORNEY WENDY WILLIAMS; ATTORNEY RALPH KARSH; OFFICER JUSTIN P. KNIGHT; CORRIE WOODS; COURT OF COMMON PLEAS; RICHARD JOHN LORENZ; DETECTIVE JAMIE CATERINO; IAN HENDERSON; and JUDGE SUSAN F. EVASHAVIK DILUCENTE, Defendants.
Hon. William S. Stickman United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Re: ECF No. 14
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 14, filed by Plaintiff Ralph O. Williams (“Plaintiff”) be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as frivolous, malicious, and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. All federal claims should be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that, to the extent that he attempts to raise them, any state law claims should be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court, if appropriate.
II. REPORT
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee currently held at the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”) in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff raises various constitutional claims against multiple Defendants. ECF No. 14 at 1. Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on May 24, 2022. ECF No. 6.
On June 7, 2022, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the initial Complaint, ECF No. 7, be dismissed, with limited leave to amend. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff submitted objections, ECF No. 11, which were timely-filed pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule. See, e.g., White v. Pennsylvania State Police, 408 Fed.Appx. 521, 522 (3d Cir. 2010).
On July 7, 2022, District Judge William Stickman adopted the Report and Recommendation over Plaintiff's objections. ECF No. 13. Petitioner was granted leave to amend only with respect his claim that Defendant Knight allegedly withheld evidence, and his Fourteenth Amendment medical claim. Id. at 2. All other federal claims were dismissed with prejudice. Id.
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on August 1, 2022. ECF No. 14. In that document, the only allegation that Plaintiff makes against Defendant Knight is that he “request[ed] a Facebook preservation of Williams facebook[.]” Id. at 6. Plaintiff did not make any allegations of fact with respect to his medical claim.
Instead, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff made additional allegations against his attorneys and a prosecutor with respect to claims that were previously dismissed with prejudice by the Judge Stickman on July 7, 2022. ECF No. 14 at 1. Plaintiff further appears to attack his pending criminal cases and pretrial detention based on the length of their pendency, id. at 2, and on an allegedly false identification of Plaintiff and his vehicle in court by new Defendants Caterino and Henderson. Id. at 5. Plaintiff claims that new Defendant Judge DiLucente made him postpone trial, and denied a discovery motion in his criminal cases. Id. at 5 and 7-8.
B. Legal Standard
As Plaintiff is well aware, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 establishes the criteria for allowing an action to proceed IFP. Section 1915(e) requires the federal courts to review complaints filed by persons that are proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss, at any time, any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, a court must dismiss, sua sponte, a complaint that lacks arguable merit in fact or law. Stackhouse v. Crocker, 266 Fed.Appx. 189, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
The standard for reviewing a complaint under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) is the same as that for determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Banks v. Mozingo, No. 08-004, 2009 WL 497572, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2009). Under that Rule, dismissal is appropriate if, reading the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepting all factual allegations as true, no relief could be granted under any “reasonable reading of the complaint” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).
A complaint must be dismissed even if the claim to relief is “conceivable,” because a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, when determining whether to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court should apply a two-part test in order to determine whether a pleading's recitation of facts is sufficient. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). “First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.'” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
A court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In a Section 1983 action, a court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings and “‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.'” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). “‘Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.'” Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688 (quoting Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)).
That said, it is not proper for a court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Assoc.'d Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). A court further need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004).
Finally, the Third Circuit has held that, in civil rights cases, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint - regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so - when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
C. Legal Analysis
In order for a claim to be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold requirements. First, the alleged misconduct giving rise to the cause of action must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law; and second, the defendants' conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 - 331 (1986).
1. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any defendant from the initial Complaint.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to rehash claims against his attorneys and a prosecutor that were dismissed with prejudice by Judge Stickman on July 7, 2022. ECF No. 13. For the reasons stated in the initial Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 10, these claims remain deficient.
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to make allegations of fact to support his putative Fourteenth Amendment medical claim. His sole allegation of fact with respect to Defendant Knight is that he “request[ed] a Facebook preservation of Williams facebook[.]” ECF No. 14 at 6. This allegation is not sufficient to state a claim. Therefore, for the reasons stated herein and in the initial Report and Recommendation, these claims should be dismissed. ECF No. 10 at 9-11. As leave to amend would be inequitable or futile, dismissal should be with prejudice. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 482 F.3d at 251.
2. Plaintiff's new claims against Defendants Caterino and Henderson should be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff was not granted leave to raise any new claims. However, to the extent that this Court might be willing to entertain Plaintiff's new claims against these new Defendants Caterino and Henderson for allegedly providing false testimony at pretrial proceedings, see ECF No. 14 at 5, these claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
Simply put, Plaintiff cannot premise his Section 1983 claim on his alleged act of providing false testimony at the pretrial hearing. It is well established that a witness is absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983 based on his or her testimony in court. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 140-43 (3d. Cir. 1988) (extending the immunity discussed in Briscoe to pretrial proceedings); DeForte v. Blocker, No. 16-113, 2017 WL 1102655, *7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2017) (the plaintiff “cannot premise his § 1983 claim on [state trooper's] alleged act of providing false testimony at the preliminary hearing.”); Wilson v. DeMarchis, No. 20-CV-620, 2021 WL 3375421, at *9 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3370787 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2021).
As leave to amend would be inequitable or futile, dismissal should be with prejudice. Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 482 F.3d at 251.
3. Defendant Judge DiLucente is immune from suit for judicial acts.
The doctrine of judicial immunity applies to judicial officers in the performance of their official duties and relieves them from liability for judicial acts. Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)). “Ajudge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'” Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 303 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)) (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, allegations of conspiracy will not defeat immunity for judicial acts if “the very acts animating the conspiracy are normally performed by a judge”. Johnson v. Allegheny Cnty., No. 14-cv-857, 2014 WL 5513769, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2014).
Plaintiff's allegations with respect to Defendant Judge DiLucente relate to actions taken by a judge pursuant to her judicial authority. ECF No. 14 at 5 and 7-8. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that would lead to the conclusion that Defendant Judge DiLucente acted in a manner that was clearly outside of her jurisdiction.
To the extent that he raises one, any request for injunctive relief against Defendant Judge DiLucente under Section 1983 also is barred. In pertinent part, Section 1983 states that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 303-04. See also Bukovinsky v. Pennsylvania, 455 Fed.Appx. 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has failed to allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Judge DiLucente should be dismissed. As amendment would be inequitable or futile, dismissal should be with prejudice. Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 482 F.3d at 251.
4. Plaintiff cannot attack his pretrial detention under Section 1983.
While it is not entirely clear, it is possible that Plaintiff attempts to attack his pretrial detention in his Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 14 at 4. To the extent that he does so, the same should be dismissed.
The United States Supreme Court has held that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. ” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (emphasis added); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (state prisoners may “use only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement -either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.”). Any such claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
5. This Court should decline to extend supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.
As discussed in the initial Report and Recommendation, a district court may decline to extend supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Whether supplemental jurisdiction will be extended under these circumstances is discretionary. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir.2009).
Ordinarily, when “all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendant jurisdiction doctrine - judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity - will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7, (1988). If a district court decides not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, it should dismiss the state law claims without prejudice. Kach, 589 F.3d at 650.
The interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity will not be served by extending supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. This Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and dismiss Plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court, if appropriate.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 14, be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as frivolous, malicious, and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. All federal claims should be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that, to the extent that he attempts to raise them, any state law claims should be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court, if appropriate.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).