ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT GALE NORTON

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE, United States Magriste Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") properly implemented a judgment of this Court in the prior case of Tillie Hardwick v. United States, Civil No. 79-1710 (ND. Cal.) with respect to the Mooretown Rancheria ("Tribe") located in Butte County, California. Plaintiffs are a group of descendants of persons listed on the 1915 Census Roll of the Tribe. Plaintiffs contend that the BIA's failure to properly implement the Hardwick decision resulted in their applications for membership in the Tribe being denied, or reduction of their status in the Tribe from "full member" to "adoptee." Plaintiffs further contend that the BIA violated the Administrative Procedures Act, deprived them of their 5th Amendment right of due process, and breached their obligations to Plaintiffs as beneficiaries of the Hardwick judgment. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, plus costs and fees.

Defendants are officials of the BIA, an agency of the Department of the Interior. Defendants reside for venue purposes in either Washington, D.C. or Sacramento, California (in the Eastern District). It is undisputed that the BIA has no offices in the Northern District of California.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Venue

Defendants move for dismissal or transfer of this case on the ground that venue is improper in the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs contend that venue is proper in this judicial district because of the entry of an order in this district by Judge Williams in the Hardwick case in 1983.

Special provisions govern venue in civil actions in which the United States is a defendant:

(e) A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e).

For purposes of venue, all federal defendants reside in Washington, D.C. Venue does not lie in every judicial district where a federal agency has a regional office. See Reuben H. Donnelly Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 580 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that 1962 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) did not alter the rule that the federal government resides only in the District of Columbia). Venue is proper in the District of Columbia based on Defendants' residence, as provided by section 1391(e)(1).

Venue is also proper in the Eastern District based on the provisions of section 1391(e)(2). The events and omissions giving rise to the claim are decisions made by BIA officials in Washington and Sacramento that affected would-be tribe members of the Mooretown Rancheria in Butte County, located in the Eastern District. To the extent that this action might tangentially involve property rights flowing from membership in the Mooretown Rancheria (i.e., participation in Indian gaming revenues), the res is located in the Eastern District.

Plaintiffs base their allegations that venue is proper in the Northern District on subsection 1391(e)(2), the "substantial part of the events or omissions" language. Plaintiffs' sole rationale for finding venue in the Northern District is that "this Court, Oakland Division, issued an "Order and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment' ("Judgment') on December 22, 1983 in the Hardwick case that the BIA subsequently and improperly implemented in a manner that affected defendants' [sic] right to become enrolled members of the Tribe, a federally-recognized tribal sovereign, or to maintain their full membership once they were enrolled. Further, federal defendants are subject to suit in said District." (Complaint at 5.) The "events or omissions that Plaintiffs complain of, however, are the BIA's failure to properly interpret or implement the law as expressed in Hardwick, not the Court's entry of judgment in Hardwick. Thus, the events or omissions occurred in the District of Columbia and/or the Eastern District. Plaintiffs also contend in opposition to the motion to dismiss that the BIA's participation in the original and amended Hardwick actions and letters written thereafter resulted in omissions before this Court that shaped Hardwick in a manner that deprived them of [rights]." They do not challenge the judgment in Hardwick, however, and these allegations in no way change the analysis. Venue does not lie in the Northern District on any basis.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a), if the Court finds that venue has been laid in the wrong district or division, the Court may dismiss the action or transfer it to the appropriate district in the interest of justice. Because this action could have been brought in the Eastern District, and it appears that Plaintiffs only filed in the Northern District because of an erroneous belief that the entry of judgment is a "substantial event or omission" giving rise to their claims, the interest of justice would be served by a transfer. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of venue is DENIED; Defendants' motion to transfer this action to the Eastern District of California is GRANTED. Because venue is not proper in the Northern District, the Court need not reach Defendants' alternative forum non conveniens argument under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a).

B. Dismissal of Defendant Gale Norton for Insufficiency of Process

At the initial case management conference on June 5, 2001, Plaintiffs were ordered to cure their service to the Secretary of the Interior no later than June 19, 2001. Plaintiff mailed a copy of the complaint to the Secretary on June 18, 2001, but failed to include a summons with the complaint. (Declaration of Scott Keep at ¶¶ 14-15.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c) requires the plaintiff to serve a summons together with the complaint, and service of the complaint without the summons constitutes ineffective service of process. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c); see 1 Moore's Federal Practice § 4.50[2] (2001) (citing Bolivar v. Director of the FBI, 846 F. Supp. 163, 166 (D.P.R. 1994), aff'd without published opinion, 45 F.3d 423 (1st Cir. 1995); In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 123 F.R.D. 515, 518 (E.D.Pa. 1988)).

Plaintiffs did not properly serve Defendant Norton within the time specified by the Court, and the Secretary can be dismissed on this basis alone. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not object to the dismissal of Secretary Norton and do not contend that she is an indispensable party to this action. See Notice of Non-Opposition at 1:18-19, 2:10-13.) The United States remains a defendant in this action by virtue of Plaintiffs' service of process on BIA officials James McDivitt, Ron Jaeger, and Dale Risling. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Secretary Norton for insufficiency of service of process.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Transfer for Improper Venue and GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Defendant Gale Norton (Docket No. 18). This case shall be transferred to the Eastern District of California forthwith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.