Opinion
5:24-CV-00053-M-BM
07-23-2024
DEVONTE WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. STATE EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
BRIAN S. MEYERS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the motion by defendant State Employees Credit Union (“defendant” or in context “SECU”) to dismiss [DE-8] the complaint [DE-1] of pro se plaintiff Devonte Williams (“plaintiff”). Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [DE-8] at 1. Defendant filed a memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss. [DE-9]. Plaintiff responded in opposition [DE-12], and defendant filed a reply [DE-16]. The time for filing responsive briefs has expired and the pending motions are ripe for adjudication. The motions were referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that defendant's motion to dismiss [DE-8] be GRANTED and that plaintiff's complaint [DE-1] be DISMISSED.
In his response in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendants' motion was served insufficiently,” specifically because “[d]efendants' certificate of service states that the CM/ECF will automatically send notification to plaintiff, however plaintiff has not submitted a pro se consent and registration form to receive documents electronically.” [DE-12] at 1. In its reply to plaintiff's response in opposition, defendant contends that “[d]efendant's counsel confirmed [p]laintiff's mailing address in order to mail him copies of the Motion and Memorandum” and that “[d]efendant has filed an Affidavit of Service in support of the fact copies were mailed to the [p]laintiff via the U.S. Post Office despite the wording of the Certificate of Service on the Motion and Memorandum.” [DE-16] at 2; see also [DE-19] (Affidavit of Service that a copy of defendant's motion to dismiss was sent to plaintiff on February 19, 2024). Based on the unrefuted evidence that plaintiff was properly served with defendant's motion to dismiss, the undersigned will not consider this argument further.
I. BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS
A. Plaintiff's Factual Allegations
Plaintiff filed a complaint entitled “Bill of Complaint for Equitable Relief and Consumer Redress” [DE-1] with eight attachments thereto [DE-1-1 to 1-8]. The attachments include, among other documents, a copy of the SECU Truth in Lending Disclosure form [DE-1-1]; multiple SECU deposit slips and letters from plaintiff to SECU [DE-1-2]; a SECU “Statement of Credit Denial, Termination, or Change” dated June 17, 2023 [DE-1-4]; and plaintiff's SECU Visa credit card statements [DE-1-7]. Plaintiff's complaint is not a model of clarity, and uses obscure legal terminology. See [DE-1] at 1 (beginning his complaint “Devonte Williams, the Surety on behalf of the estate titled DEVONTE WILLIAMS and a natural living being of majority status conducting the style condition of The Principal and Beneficial Equitable Title Holder, and not an infant/minor,hereinafter ‘Complainant.'”).
Plaintiff at various points makes reference to this claim being brought “[a]ssociated with the property of a minor/infant” or on behalf of the “estate of an infant.” See, e.g., [DE-1] at 1, 4. To the extent plaintiff is attempting to bring this action on behalf of another individual, he is legally unable to do so as a non-attorney. Wojcicki v. SCANA/SCE&G, 947 F.3d 240, 245 (4th Cir. 2020) (“A nonlawyer can't handle a case on behalf of anyone except himself.” (citation omitted); see also Myers v. Louden Cty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The right to litigate for oneself, however, does not create a coordinate right to litigate for others.”) (citing Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)); Local Civil Rule 5.2(b)(2) (“Except as otherwise permitted by law, no self-represented party may appear on behalf of another self-represented party.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” (emphasis added)).
Although difficult to discern, plaintiff's claims appear to arise from defendant's denial of plaintiff's application for a personal loan in June 2023, and a related dispute regarding plaintiff's payment of his SECU credit card debt. The essence of plaintiff's complaint is that defendant “breached [its] contractual obligations for non-performance by refusing to fulfill [its] fiduciary duties and has now caused [plaintiff's] account . . . to be in default.” [DE-1] at 1. Specifically, plaintiff alleges the following details:
On June 8, 2021, plaintiff “entered a consumer credit transaction involving a credit sale for a credit card with [SECU].” [DE-1] at 1. On November 13, 2023, he “tendered a negotiable instrument to [SECU] with accord and satisfaction as a performance to the agreement/contract . . . .” Id. at 2; see [DE-1-2] at 2-3 (providing filled-out credit statements ostensibly as plaintiff's negotiable instruments). SECU then “refused to carry out their fiduciary duties as instructed and refused to carry out the accord and satisfaction performance.” [DE-1] at 2. When plaintiff's “negotiable instrument” (id.), was not accepted, plaintiff's account defaulted (id. at 1).
On June 16, 2023, “[p]laintiff submitted a consumer credit application to [SECU] for a personal loan/closed end signature loan in the amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) and was denied credit for the reasons of affordability after obtaining information from a third-party source.” Id. at 2. When plaintiff's application was denied, he demanded that defendant either approve the application or “return the application to plaintiff.” Id. Because defendant did not return plaintiff's application, plaintiff claims that defendant was required by law to “accept[] the application.” Id. By not accepting the application, defendant “breached their contractual obligations and refused to carry out their fiduciary duties . . . and has committed discrimination against the plaintiff for denying [plaintiff] the right to credit.” Id.
B. Jurisdictional Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that the court has federal question jurisdiction, citing to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (see [DE-1] at 4), and includes citation to, and discussion of, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 15 U.S.C. § 1615(a)(1), and 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f). Id. at 6 (alleging that “pursuant to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 section 16 part 2,” plaintiff is owed “the interest or equity” of the “collateral security in the amount equal to thirty thousand dollars”); id. at 6-7 (alleging that “pursuant to 15 USC 1615(a)(1),” plaintiff “demand[s] that [SECU] immediately return the funds/unearned interest that they have illegally taken”); and id. at 6 (“It is a fact that pursuant to 15 USC 1602(f) the term ‘credit' means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment”).
Plaintiff additionally cites to what appears to be language from the Constitution of the State of Texas (“Texas Constitution”) in support of his argument. See id. at 5 (“No person's . . . property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made . . . ” representing with minor non-substantive variations language directly from Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution);
C. Relief Requested
The relief sought by plaintiff is that SECU: (i) “be enjoined, in fulfilling their contractual fiduciary duties”; (ii) pay “[s]ixty thousand seven hundred seventeen dollars and 96/100 ($60,717.96) . . . for the accounts of profit and disgorgement stemming from defendant [sic] contract”; (iii) “be ordered to reverse the credit denial decision,” and (iv) “be ordered to pay the amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) in damages for causing [plaintiff's] account . . . to go in default.” Id. at 8-9.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because (1) the court lacks subject-matter over plaintiff's complaint; and (2) plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See [DE-9] at 3-10.
A. Rule 12(b)(1) - Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Rule 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of an action if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing federal jurisdiction on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); Bio-Medical Applications of N.C, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 412 F.Supp.2d 549, 551 (E.D. N.C. 2006). “The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue the court must address before considering the merits of the case.” Johnson v. North Carolina, 905 F.Supp.2d 712, 719 (W.D. N.C. 2012) (citing Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999)). The presumption is that a federal court lacks jurisdiction in a particular case unless it is demonstrated that jurisdiction exists. Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337 (1895).
The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction rests on the party invoking jurisdiction, here the plaintiff. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction . . . is on the plaintiff, the party asserting jurisdiction”). The complaint must affirmatively allege the grounds for jurisdiction. Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir. 1968). If the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
The court's standard for review of a motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) depends on the nature of the movant's challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. “A defendant can challenge subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) in one of two ways; he may either assert (1) a facial challenge that the allegations pled in the complaint are not . . . sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction; or (2) a factual challenge that the allegations establishing jurisdiction are not true.” Chong Su Yi v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 80 F.Supp.3d 666, 669 (D. Md. 2015) (citing Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)). If the argument claims that the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts conferring subject matter jurisdiction, the court must assume all facts alleged in the complaint to be true and “and the plaintiff, in effect, is afforded the same procedural protection as he would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.” Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219; see also Kimble v. Rajpal, 566 Fed.Appx. 261, 262 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that where defendant raises a “facial challenge” to the jurisdictional allegations, “the court must evaluate the complaint in the same manner utilized in assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim-that is, viewing the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true”).
The court may consider any documents attached to the complaint in its analysis. Brooks-McCollum v. Aspen Prop. Mgmt. Co., 551 Fed.Appx. 677, 679 n.* (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2014), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 948, 134 S.Ct. 2886 (2014); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c). Alternatively, if the movant contests the accuracy of plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations, the court must treat the allegations of the complaint as mere evidence and may consider matters beyond the pleadings without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768; see also Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he court may consider the evidence beyond the scope of the pleadings to resolve factual disputes concerning [subject matter] jurisdiction.”). Additionally, under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Here, defendant contends that the allegations pled in plaintiff's complaint are not sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction plaintiff. See [DE-9] at 3. Accordingly, the undersigned will afford the Rule 12(b)(1) analysis of plaintiff's complaint the same procedural protection it would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration. See Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219.
Plaintiff does not allege, nor does this court discern, that this case falls under the court's diversity jurisdiction. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (requiring diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy greater than $75,000); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978); see also [DE-1-9] Civ. Cover Sheet §§ I, II.3 (“Federal Question” box marked as basis of jurisdiction and alleging that plaintiff and defendant are both residents of North Carolina). Rather, plaintiff claims, and defendant disputes, that this court has federal question “jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 USC §[]1331.” Cf. [DE-1] at 4 (alleging federal question jurisdiction); and [DE-9] at 4 (“[T]he Complaint does not assert a cause of action arising under federal law under federal jurisdiction.”).
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal question jurisdiction [does] not exist unless a federal question appears on the face of a plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Drain, 237 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986)). “It is well established, however, that ‘[f]ederal jurisdiction may not be premised on the mere citation of federal statutes.'” Uwasomba v. Jett, 2012 WL 3113169, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2012) (citing Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Services for City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990)). Therefore, “[a] patently insubstantial complaint may be dismissed . . . for want of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n.6 (1989).
The core of plaintiff's complaint is that defendant “has breached [its] contractual obligations and refused to carry out [its] fiduciary duties . . . and has committed discrimination against the plaintiff.” [DE-1] at 2. Breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties, as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, are both state law causes of action. See id.; see also Mitchell v. GMAC, No. 2:03-CV-56-FL, 2004 WL 4961036, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 29, 2004), aff'd, 109 Fed.Appx. 578 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[P]laintiff's allegation of a ‘breach of contract' sets forth nothing more than a state law claim.”); Dunn v. Dart, No. 4:09-CV-00220-FL, 2010 WL 11619246, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 21, 2010) (noting breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty as state-law causes of action); Brown v. Phylbeck, No. 4:18-CV-202-FL, 2019 WL 2745758, at *5 (E.D. N.C. July 1, 2019) (same). This court does not have diversity jurisdiction, as discussed above. Moreover, because there are no viable federal question claims for the reason discussed below, the court cannot extend supplemental jurisdiction over any such claims. Accordingly, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's state law claims and RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's state law claims be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff also quotes language from the Texas Constitution as a basis for relief. See [DE-1] at 5 (“No person's . . . property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person, and, when taken, except for the use of the State, such compensation shall be first made, or secured by deposit of money.”); cf. Tex. Const. art. I, § 17. Plaintiff has not shown how this court would have jurisdiction to consider a case under the Texas Constitution, or otherwise under Texas state law. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's claim under the Texas Constitution be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
To the extent that plaintiff was attempting cite the takings clause of the U.S. Constitution, see U.S. CONST amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”), any such claim would equally fail because a takings clause claim cannot be brought against a private actor, such as defendant here. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Mahogany Meadows Ave. Tr., 979 F.3d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The Takings Clause governs the conduct of the government, not private actors.”) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994).
As noted above, plaintiff cites and provides conclusory arguments with respect to a variety of federal laws allegedly in support of his position, namely the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 15 U.S.C. § 1615(a)(1), and 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f). [DE-1] at 6-7. However, for the reasons discussed below, plaintiff fails to state a federal statutory or constitutional claim for relief and accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint.
B. Rule 12(b)(6) - Failure to state a claim
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of claims for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if “it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Ordinarily, the complaint need contain simply “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). However, a complaint is insufficient if it offers merely “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertion[s]” without “further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff alleges factual content “that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” and shows more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 425 (4th Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (“[I]t is not our task at the motion-to-dismiss stage to determine ‘whether a lawful alternative explanation appear[s] more likely' from the facts of the complaint.”) (quoting Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015), as amended on reh'g in part (Oct. 29, 2015)).
In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of the challenged complaint and view those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); see also Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that the court must accept as true all factual allegations of the complaint). All reasonable factual inferences from the allegations must be drawn in plaintiff's favor. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. However, bare assertions of legal conclusions or formulaic recitations of the elements of a claim are not entitled to be assumed true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 68081. Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction. Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62, 72 (4th Cir. 2016) (“We are mindful of our obligation to liberally construe a pro se complaint.”); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 724 (4th Cir. 1989) (“Pro se complaints are to be read liberally ....”).
As noted above, plaintiff's state law claims that defendant “has breached [its] contractual obligations and refused to carry out [its] fiduciary duties” ([DE-1] at 2), which the undersigned recommends dismissing for the reasons discussed above, constitute the core of plaintiff's claim. The federal statutory and constitutional provisions that plaintiff cites do not support the relief that plaintiff is seeking for the reasons discussed below.
1. Federal Reserve Act of 1913
Plaintiff alleges “that pursuant to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 section 16 part 2, [i]n no event shall such collateral security be less than the amount of Federal Reserve notes applied for, whereas defendant received a collateral security in the amount equal to thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), and the plaintiff did not receive the interest or equity owed to the principal, and was denied the right to credit.” [DE-1] at 6. However, this section of the Federal Reserve Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 412, does not “create a private cause of action arising under federal law.” Slocum v. Zen Realty, No. 5:23-CV-550-FL, 2024 WL 666329, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 16, 2024); see also e.g., Kornegay v. Cap. One, No. 1:23CV1032, 2024 WL 1463794, at *2 (M.D. N.C. Apr. 4, 2024), report and recomm. adopted, No. 1:23CV1032, 2024 WL 2382300 (M.D. N.C. May 23, 2024); Robinson v. Trumark Fin. Credit Union, No. 24-CV-1466, 2024 WL 2249868, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2024) (“Section 412 does not create a private cause of action”). Because there is no private right of action under 12 U.S.C. § 412, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's claim under such statute be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
2. Consumer Credit Protection claims
Plaintiff alleges that “pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) the term ‘credit' means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.” [DE-1] at 6. 15 U.S.C. § 1602 provides definitions for the terminology used throughout the Truth in Lending Act [“TILA”], and § 1602(f) defines the term “credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f). Plaintiff appears to cite this provision as evidence of a legal right to credit. See [DE-1-2] at 5 (“State Employees Credit Union agreements, policies, etc. does not in fact supersede . . . my inalienable rights to credit.”). However, as this court has previously stated, “[n]othing in TILA guarantees an absolute right to credit, and [p]laintiff's conclusory allegation to the contrary need not be accepted as true.” Slocum v. BMW Fin. Servs., No. 5:23-CV-629-M, 2024 WL 2334514, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 28, 2024), report and recomm. adopted, No. 5:23-CV-00629-M-RJ, 2024 WL 2328204 (E.D. N.C. May 22, 2024). Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) and the undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's claim under such statute be DISMISSED.
Further, plaintiff cites 15 U.S.C. § 1615(a)(1), which states that “[i]f a consumer prepays in full the financed amount under any consumer credit transaction, the creditor shall promptly refund any unearned portion of the interest charge to the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1615(a)(1). While plaintiff had an established line of credit with defendant, the credit statements that plaintiff provides show that he overdrafted his account. See generally [DE-1-8]. Plaintiff disputes this by attaching credit statements where the “amount enclosed” portion was filled out in pen and sent back to defendant. [DE-1-2] at 2. He claims that by filling out these “negotiable instruments” he was paying off his balance. [DE-1] at 5 (“[P]laintiff's negotiable instruments [were] tendered with accord and satisfaction as a performance to the contract/agreement.”). Similarly, in his response in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff refers to “a restricted indorsed [sic] negotiable instrument.” [DE-1] at 4. While the undersigned is unable to discern the exact nature of these “negotiable instruments,” plaintiff indicates in his response in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss that he was not paying his balance with cash, as plaintiff complains that defendant “demanded that plaintiff make ‘cash' payments in a consumer ‘credit' transaction. [DE-12] at 3. Defendant returned these “negotiable instruments” to plaintiff because defendant was “unable to accept these documents.” [DE-1-3] at 3-6. Plaintiff has not cited to any legal authority indicating that he can pay his credit card balance with a negotiable instrument of his choice. To the extent that plaintiff is arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 8, which defines an “obligation or other security of the United States” to include “all bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national bank currency, Federal Reserve notes, Federal Reserve bank notes, coupons . . . bills, checks, or drafts for money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the United States, . . . ” entitles him to pay his credit card debt with a negotiable instrument of his choice, the plain language of the statute refers to an “obligation or other security of the United States,” 18 U.S.C. § 8 (emphasis added). The language does not refer to an obligation or other security of a private citizen discharging a private debt, and therefore does not support any such interpretation. Additionally, the undersigned has been unable to find any caselaw supporting plaintiff's position. See Griffin v. First Progress, No. 623CV04454TMCKFM, 2023 WL 9953525, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2023), report and recomm. adopted, No. 6:23-CV-4454-TMC, 2024 WL 862243 (D.S.C. Feb. 29, 2024) (“[The Truth in Lending Act] requires credit terms be disclosed to a consumer; it does not that require businesses, such as the defendant, accept ‘coupon notes' instead of actual money as payment.”) (citing Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998)). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1615.
c. Discrimination under 15 U.S.C. § 1691
Plaintiff alleges that defendant “has also committed discrimination” against him by denying his “right to credit” “without lawful explanation.” [DE-1] at 6. The undersigned liberally construes plaintiff's allegations as attempting to bring a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1691, which provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-- (1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract); (2) because all or part of the applicant's income derives from any public assistance program; or (3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
Here, however, plaintiff does not allege discrimination based on his race or other protected class or his reliance upon a public assistance program. Further, as noted above, plaintiff does not have a “right to credit,” and has not alleged that he has been discriminated against because of a good faith exercise of a legitimate right provided by the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Therefore, plaintiff's conclusory allegations fail to state a claim for discrimination under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691. See Fetherson v. Blackmon, No. 0:16-3189-JFA-PJG, 2017 WL 1365114, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2017) (dismissing claims against defendant that are “conclusory and lack supporting facts”), report and recomm. adopted, No. 0:16-3189-JFA-PJG, 2017 WL 1344616 (Apr. 12, 2017).
Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's Consumer Credit Protection Act claims be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
3. Any additional claims
To the extent that plaintiff was attempting to assert any further claims in his complaint [DE-1] besides those addressed above, the court does not discern any such claims, and the deficient pleading in plaintiff's complaint subjects any such claims to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. While pro se litigants are entitled to leniency, such leniency is not without bounds. See Holder v. U.S. Marshals Office, No. 5:16-CV-00145-FL, 2016 WL 3919502, at *1 (E.D. N.C. May 17, 2016) (“[T]he principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits.”), report and recomm. adopted, 2016 WL 3920213 (July 15, 2016). The undersigned finds plaintiff's statement of any other claims to be insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and RECOMMENDS that any such claims also be DISMISSED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that defendant's motion to dismiss [DE-8] be GRANTED and that plaintiff's complaint [DE-1] be DISMISSED.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on the respective parties or, if represented, their counsel. Each party shall have until August 6, 2024 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules); Local Civ. R. 72.4(b). Any response to objections shall be filed within 14 days of the filing of the objections.
If a party does not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, the party will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, the party's failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar the party from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).