Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11154 No. 6292
02-24-2016
ROBERT G. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Michael T. Schwaiger, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Mary A. Gilson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 2NO-09-812 CR MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from the Superior Court, Second Judicial District, Nome, Ben J. Esch, Judge. Appearances: Michael T. Schwaiger, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Mary A. Gilson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Hanley, District Court Judge. Judge MANNHEIMER.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
Robert G. Williams appeals his convictions for third-degree assault, fourth-degree weapons misconduct, and resisting arrest. He contends that he was not mentally competent to stand trial, and that his convictions must therefore be set aside.
Williams argues in the alternative that, if his convictions are upheld, this Court should nevertheless strike down one of the conditions of probation imposed by the superior court: a requirement that Williams reside in a community where there is a resident probation officer.
For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that the superior court properly rejected Williams's contention that he was not competent to stand trial. We also uphold the challenged probation condition.
The testimony relating to the underlying occurrence
On the day after Christmas, 2009, Gerald Ashenfelter, a resident of White Mountain, woke up to a commotion in the arctic entry of his home. When Ashenfelter went to investigate, he found Robert Williams, a co-worker, lying in his arctic entry. Williams smelled of alcohol, and he seemed intoxicated.
While Ashenfelter was trying to coax Williams to leave, Williams told Ashenfelter that he missed his children, and that everything was "fucked up". Ashenfelter went back inside his house, and then a few minutes later he came out to see where Williams had gone. Williams was nowhere in sight, but Ashenfelter found a .22 rifle leaning up against the wall of his arctic entry.
Ashenfelter reported this incident to Village Public Safety Officer Daniel Harrelson. Officer Harrelson took possession of the .22 rifle, and then he went to look for Williams.
Around 2:00 p.m., Officer Harrelson located Williams at his mother's house. Harrelson and Williams offered different accounts of what happened next.
Officer Harrelson testified that, as he approached Williams's mother's house, he noticed that the door was ajar, and he could hear moaning coming from inside. Harrelson loudly announced his presence, and he asked Williams if he was okay. Harrelson then opened the door and looked inside. He saw that the house had been "torn apart", with household items and garbage strewn across the floor. Williams was at the back of the house, lying sideways on a bed, with his legs dangling off the edge. He was holding a 16-inch kitchen knife, and he had blood on his hands.
Harrelson advanced into the house. As he did so, he again identified himself and asked Williams if he was okay. When Harrelson was about four feet from Williams, Williams sprang up from the bed and raised the knife over his head as if to stab Officer Harrelson. Harrelson was able to knock the knife from Williams's hand and to push Williams back onto the bed.
Placing a knee on Williams's chest and stomach, Harrelson succeeded in handcuffing Williams's right hand, and he announced that Williams was under arrest. Williams responded by pulling free, getting up from the bed, and swinging at Harrelson. Harrelson was again able to push Williams back onto the bed, and he cuffed both of Williams's hands together to the front of his body.
Harrelson then took Williams outside and placed him on the back of Harrelson's snow machine, intending to transport him to the White Mountain holding cell. But before Harrelson was able to put the snow machine in motion, Williams jumped off and attempted to flee. Harrelson put Williams back on the snow machine, but Williams jumped off again.
After recapturing Williams, Harrelson told Williams that he would use pepper spray on him if he did not stay on the snow machine. Williams responded by raising his hands and telling Harrelson that he was going to "choke the shit out of [him]". Harrelson then pepper-sprayed Williams. The pepper spray subdued Williams, and Harrelson transported him to the White Mountain holding cell.
Williams took the stand at trial (apparently, against his attorney's advice) and offered a significantly different account of his interaction with Harrelson.
According to Williams, he went into the woods on Christmas Day to chop wood for his mother. For protection, he armed himself with the .22 rifle, and he brought a knife for marking trees. Later that night (and the early morning of December 26th), Williams drank half of a fifth of liquor. Having drunk all this liquor, Williams decided to go to the house of his co-worker, Ashenfelter, and leave the .22 rifle with him, because Williams did not want to have the gun while he was drunk. When he left Ashenfelter's house, Williams proceeded to his mother's house and went to sleep.
According to Williams, he was startled when Officer Harrelson entered his mother's house on the afternoon of December 26th. Williams testified that, because he was startled, he got up from the bed still clutching the knife. However, Williams denied raising the knife as if to attack Harrelson. Instead, Williams testified that he held the knife down as he got up from the bed, and that he then dropped the knife to the floor.
Although Williams conceded that Harrelson might have perceived him as a threat, he insisted that he "never threatened [Harrelson] or even said a word to him". Williams also denied struggling with Harrelson. Williams acknowledged that he became angry when Harrelson announced that he was under arrest and grabbed him, but Williams reiterated that he never touched Harrelson. Instead, according to Williams, when Officer Harrelson told him that he was under arrest, Williams replied, "Well, let's go."
But in a later segment of his testimony, Williams offered a somewhat contradictory account. Williams testified that, once he understood that Harrelson was going to arrest him, he became upset because he was going to lose a good-paying job with the Bering Strait Regional Housing Authority. When Harrelson cuffed one of his hands, Williams said, "What the fuck is this for? You're — I don't need to be arrested. I got work." Williams then pulled the handcuffs away from Officer Harrelson. However, Williams insisted that he did not swing at Harrelson, nor try to choke him.
With regard to Harrelson's testimony that Williams jumped off the snow machine twice in an effort to escape, Williams claimed that he never jumped off the snow machine; rather, he fell off the snow machine when it hit ruts in the ground on the way to the holding cell.
Williams also testified that Officer Harrelson had a motive for fabricating accusations against him and for holding him in jail: According to Williams, Harrelson was "hurting individuals with his computer", and he had raped Williams's former girlfriend and one of her daughters. Williams also testified that Harrelson threatened to shoot him "because he wanted [Williams] to keep [his] mouth shut about [these] rapes."
(The state troopers conducted an investigation into these assertions. The troopers found nothing to corroborate any of Williams's accusations against Officer Harrelson.)
Having heard this testimony, the jury found Williams guilty of two counts of third-degree assault, one count of fourth-degree weapons misconduct, and one count of resisting arrest. The jury also found the aggravating factor that Williams knowingly directed his assaults against a law enforcement officer engaged in his official duties.
The litigation concerning Williams's competency to stand trial
Before the events at issue in this case, Williams had lived for many years in White Mountain with his partner, Virginia Takak, and their two children.
In early 2009, Takak ended their relationship, and Williams moved in with his mother. Around that time, Williams's family and several other White Mountain residents grew concerned that Williams's mental health appeared to be deteriorating. They were specifically concerned that he was suffering from depression and delusional thoughts, and that he was becoming prone to violent behavior.
In the summer of 2009, Officer Harrelson persuaded Williams to seek mental health treatment in Nome. This treatment seemingly helped Williams; but by November of 2009, Williams's mental health had again deteriorated. Williams would show up at Takak's house uninvited, and he would pound on her door, shout obscenities, and refuse to leave. Williams's mother told Officer Harrelson that she was worried that Williams was going to hurt her and his family.
While Williams was awaiting trial in this case, he wrote many letters from jail in which he claimed to be telepathic, and in which he accused Harrelson of rape and of using his computer to torture Williams.
Based on this information, the superior court ordered a competency examination. Dr. Lois Michaud, a forensic psychologist, met with Williams on March 3, 2010, to evaluate whether Williams possessed the ability to consult with his attorney, and whether Williams exhibited a rational factual understanding of the legal proceedings against him.
Dr. Michaud concluded that, with the assistance of medication, Williams was able to perform basic cognitive tasks. He made good eye contact; he knew the month, day, year, and season; he knew where he was; and his language skills were intact, although he had a mild deficit in his short-term recall. Dr. Michaud also concluded that Williams was able to provide meaningful factual information about the events involved in his case — although his attitude toward these events, and toward the case, was irrational.
Dr. Michaud reported that Williams had several delusional beliefs. Williams told Dr. Michaud that he was telepathic, and that even though he was in jail he was able to speak telepathically with his family and other members of the community back in White Mountain. (Williams told Michaud that there were 32 telepathic individuals in White Mountain that he could communicate with.)
Williams was able to recall and describe the events involved in this case, but Williams also told Dr. Michaud that he was able to communicate telepathically with Officer Harrelson, and that he had purposely used his telepathic powers to draw Harrelson to him on the day of the offense because he wanted Harrelson to arrest him. Williams told Dr. Michaud that he wanted to be arrested because he believed that Officer Harrelson was a threat to his life, and that he would be safer in jail. Williams also told Michaud that Officer Harrelson had either raped or intimidated everyone in White Mountain.
Based on all of this, Dr. Michaud concluded Williams was too delusional to be able to rationally communicate with his attorney. She therefore reported that Williams was not competent to stand trial.
In mid-March, the superior court sent Williams to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute to see if his competency could be restored. Two months later, on May 27th, Dr. Michaud met with Williams again. During this second evaluation, Williams no longer spoke of communicating telepathically, nor did he accuse Officer Harrelson of rape.
Because Williams stuck to the facts of his case, and did not make delusional assertions about the case, Dr. Michaud concluded that Williams was now competent to stand trial. Michaud explained that Williams was still delusional — "it isn't that the delusions have gone away" — but Williams's delusions no longer materially affected his thinking about the case.
After Dr. Michaud found Williams to be competent, he was transferred from the Alaska Psychiatric Institute back to a facility run by the Department of Corrections — where he decompensated and became psychotic. As a result, Williams was returned to the psychiatric institute.
On October 20, 2010, Dr. Michaud evaluated Williams for a third time. At this third evaluation, Williams's delusions were again prominent: he insisted that he was telepathic, and he again accused Officer Harrelson of rape. Although Dr. Michaud found that Williams had a sufficient understanding of the legal system, and an adequate grasp of the basic facts of his case, she concluded that Williams was incapable of offering a coherent account of what he did on the day of the offense. She also concluded that Williams was unable to accurately assess his case's strengths and weaknesses, and that his delusional belief that he was telepathic was intertwined with his narrative of events.
In consequence, Dr. Michaud reported that Williams again lacked the competency to stand trial, and she further declared that she did not have any hope that he could be successfully restored.
In late February 2011, another forensic psychologist, Dr. David Sperbeck, met with Williams to perform a fourth competency evaluation. At the time of this fourth evaluation, Williams was at the Anchorage jail, and he was not receiving mental health treatment.
Dr. Sperbeck found Williams to be friendly, respectful, cooperative, alert, and talkative. Sperbeck concluded that Williams was oriented with his surroundings, and that he gave direct responses to questions. Sperbeck also found that Williams was able to talk about his behavior on the day of the offense with a great degree of detail and accuracy — even though Williams's explanations of his behavior and his motivations were nonsensical.
Dr. Sperbeck concluded that Williams's delusions did not make him incompetent to stand trial. Sperbeck testified that, in his experience, the articulated beliefs and motives of many defendants "are not necessarily realistic", or even "rational", but these defendants still have sufficient understanding to stand trial. He then explained:
There are a lot of defendants that I've evaluated over the years that believed in ... telepathy; believed that they could talk to God, and [that] God was talking to them; believed that the Devil was responsible for bad things that caused their crime; and so forth. ... It doesn't necessarily make them incompetent to stand trial. There are many people who can be irrational and psychotic and still understand the legal process within which they are functioning, and can participate.
Dr. Sperbeck concluded that Williams's belief that he was telepathic did not materially impair his ability to understand what was happening to him within the criminal justice system, nor his ability to "[work] cooperatively and rationally with his attorney." Sperbeck concluded that Williams still had the ability to recall and relate information that was important to his case — "things that would [enable his] attorney ... to mount a ... defense for him."
Based on all of this, Dr. Sperbeck reported that Williams was competent to stand trial.
When Dr. Sperbeck was asked about Dr. Michaud's conflictingassessment of Williams's competency, he responded:
I think she [was] looking at his irrational and bizarre symptoms as an impediment to his ability to work with his attorney. And I don't see that. ... I have worked with many attorneys [who] generated defenses [for] mentally ill people with bizarre explanations and irrational motives, and [who
had] diminished capacity for arriving at an intentional act. ... I see this as a [question of] culpable mental state, [while] she sees it as a competency issue. ... And it's a subjective [difference].
. . .
[T]he standard is [whether] he is able to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Which he can.
At the court hearing that was held following Dr. Sperbeck's evaluation, Williams's defense counsel conceded that Williams generally understood the nature of the proceedings against him and the roles of the court, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. But Williams's attorney argued that he was not competent to stand trial because his delusions colored his viewpoint to such an extent that he was not capable of communicating rationally with her or planning his defense. The defense attorney pointed to Williams's beliefs that he was telepathic and that Officer Harrelson had perpetrated numerous sexual assaults in White Mountain.
Williams's trial judge rejected this argument and found that Williams was competent to stand trial.
The judge noted that both Dr. Michaud and Dr. Sperbeck concluded that Williams understood the nature of the legal proceedings he was involved in, and the judge declared that their conclusions were amply supported by the record.
The judge acknowledged that the more difficult issue was whether Williams was able to meaningfully communicate with his attorney. He noted that Dr. Michaud and Dr. Sperbeck disagreed on this issue. But the judge found that, despite Williams's delusions about telepathy and Officer Harrelson's activities, Williams was able to recall and coherently relate what happened to him, and the actions that he took, during the incident in question.
The judge conceded that Williams's delusions affected his understanding of why these things had happened — and the judge also acknowledged that, if Williams took the stand at trial, Williams probably would give an account that would not support his attorney's chosen theory of defense (that Williams's actions should be attributed to his being surprised and confused when Officer Harrelson entered the house and woke him). But the judge concluded that, despite Williams's irrationality regarding these aspects of the case, he remained capable of participating in his defense.
The judge therefore ruled that Williams was competent to stand trial.
Why we uphold the superior court's ruling
Under Alaska law, a defendant is not competent to stand trial if, as a result of a mental disease or defect, the defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against them, or unable to assist in their own defense — i. e., unable to consult with their lawyer with a reasonable degree of understanding. Gamble v. State, 334 P.3d 714, 716-17 (Alaska App. 2014). This standard for determining lack of competency was formulated in judicial decisions, but it is now codified in AS 12.47.100(a).
As our supreme court has recognized, the fact that a person suffers from mental illness, even serious mental illness, does not by itself mean that the person lacks the mental competency to stand trial:
The presence of some degree of mental illness is not an invariable barrier to prosecution. There may be an impaired functioning of some aspects of the defendant's personality and yet he may still be minimally able to aid in his defense and to understand the nature of the proceedings against him. A precise formula for weighing these matters is not possible to achieve. To a large extent each case must be considered
on its particular facts, and must call for the application of judicial discretion.Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 914 (Alaska 1973) (citations omitted).
For instance, the defendant in Schade was charged with first-degree murder for killing a woman by repeatedly stabbingher. Id. at 909. Schade was evaluated by two psychiatrists, both of whom diagnosed Schade as psychotic and paranoid. Id. at 912-13. Nevertheless, both psychiatrists concluded that Schade understood the charges against him and the nature and object of the proceedings against him. Ibid.
With regard to whether Schade was able to assist in his defense, one psychiatrist concluded that Schade "[would] be able to aid his counsel on a variable basis, depending upon the idiosyncrasies of his own thinking process." Id. at 912. This first psychiatrist later added (when he testified at trial) that he thought Schade had "successfully, to himself[,] denied the events of [the homicide]." Id. at 913.
The second psychiatrist told the court:
[Schade] does have the ability to aid in his defense. Whether or not he will choose to do so is a different matter. Whether ... a person who is known to be psychotic will choose to cooperate in his defense can not be predicted with certainty. ... [T]he most that can be established is whether or not he has ability to do so. I believe that he does have that ability.Id. at 913. On this record, the supreme court upheld the superior court's finding that Schade was competent to stand trial. Id. at 914.
As the supreme court noted in Schade, this is an area of law where each case must largely be evaluated on its particular facts, and where an appellate court must extend substantial deference to the observations and findings of the trial judge. Id. at 914. What an appellate court can properly demand, however, is that trial judges take assertions of incompetency seriously, that judges conscientiously investigate this issue when there are obvious grounds to do so, and that judges put the reasons for their decision on the record (either orally or in writing) so that an appellate court can meaningfully review their ruling.
The trial judge fulfilled these obligations in Williams's case.
Here, the parties agree that the first prong of the competency test was met: Williams exhibited a rational understanding of the legal proceedings against him and the roles of the court, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. The dispute was over the second prong of the test. With regard to this second prong, Dr. Sperbeck and Dr. Michaud agreed that Williams was able to accurately recall and relate the events involved in this case — though his delusions materially affected his interpretation of those events, as well as his beliefs about why they occurred. The two doctors disagreed, however, as to whether Williams's delusions substantially deprived him of the ability to consult with his lawyer.
The trial judge carefully considered Dr. Sperbeck's and Dr. Michaud's competing evaluations of this issue, and the judge assessed these competing evaluations in light of his own perceptions of Williams. Applying the correct legal standard, the judge concluded that Williams was competent to stand trial. Given the record in this case, and given the degree of deference that we must extend to the judge's decision, we conclude that the judge did not err in concluding that Williams was competent.
The condition of Williams's probation that requires him to reside in a community that is served by a probation officer
The superior court sentenced Williams to serve a composite 5 years and 3 months in prison, and the court placed Williams on probation for 5 years following his release. One of Williams's conditions of probation requires him to "reside in a community where a probation officer is assigned" — a condition that effectively bars Williams from returning to live in the village of White Mountain (although he is apparently still allowed to visit White Mountain).
The White Mountain Tribal Council asked the superior court to impose this condition, and the court concluded that this condition was justified by Williams's criminal history. The court noted that Williams had fourteen prior convictions, seven of them for assault, and that Williams had many prior probation violations. Based on this criminal history, and on Williams's mental problems, the superior court found that Williams "need[ed] to reside in a community which has a resident probation officer".
Sentencing judges have broad authority to impose special probation conditions, but probation conditions that restrict constitutional rights — such as the right to travel and reside where one wishes — are subject to special scrutiny. Such conditions must be narrowly tailored to the facts of the case.
Thomas v. State, 710 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Alaska App. 1985).
Peratrovich v. State, 903 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Alaska App. 1995).
Dawson v. State, 894 P.2d 672, 680-81 (Alaska App. 1995); Guthrie v. State, unpublished, 1997 WL 34383 at *3 (Alaska App. 1997).
For instance, in Edison v. State, the defendant was convicted of driving a snow machine while intoxicated in the town of Marshall. The sentencing judge imposed a probation condition that prohibited Edison from entering Marshall without court permission for one year after his release from prison. On appeal, this Court struck down this condition of probation because the State failed to show any nexus between Edison's living in Marshall and his act of driving while intoxicated.
Edison v. State, 709 P.2d 510, 512 (Alaska App. 1985).
Ibid.
Ibid.
On the other hand, in Guthrie v. State, one of the defendant's conditions of probation required him to either obtain sex offender treatment or (alternatively) to reside in a community with a probation officer, so that he might be closely supervised. This Court upheld this condition of probation because the record supported the conclusion that Guthrie presented a high risk of re-offending, and thus the sentencing judge could reasonably conclude that Guthrie required either treatment or close supervision. We noted that the judge considered less restrictive alternatives before imposing this condition, and we further noted the challenged probation restriction still gave Guthrie a wide variety of places to live.
Guthrie v. State, unpublished, 1997 WL 34383 at *2 (Alaska App. 1997).
Id. at *3.
Ibid.
Again, in Madros v. State, this Court upheld a condition of probation that required Madros to reside in a town with a resident probation officer for six months of continuous sobriety before he could return to his home community of Nulato. We concluded that the sentencing judge's decision was supported by Madros's history of alcohol abuse, which showed that he was at high risk to re-offend if he was not closely supervised.
Madros v. State, unpublished, 1998 WL 351236 at *1 (Alaska App. 1998).
Id. at *4.
See also Nelson v. State, where this Court upheld a probation condition that required Nelson to live in a community with a living assistance program — a condition that prevented him from living in his hometown of Angoon.
Nelson v. State, unpublished, 2001 WL 694047 at *4 (Alaska App. 2001). --------
Given Williams's history of mental illness, substance abuse, assaultive behavior, and probation violations, the superior court could reasonably conclude that Williams should be required to reside in a community with a resident probation officer who can supervise him.
In Williams's brief to this Court, he argues that the sentencing judge's handling of this matter was procedurally deficient, in that the judge did not clearly enunciate his factual basis for imposing this condition of probation, nor did the judge expressly consider less restrictive alternatives. For this reason, Williams argues that a remand is necessary, so that the sentencing judge can reconsider this issue.
We agree that the judge's discussion of this issue was deficient — that the judge did not expressly address all of the factors that must be considered under our prior decisions. But given the record in this case, and given what the sentencing judge did say about Williams (his conduct, his criminal history, his mental illness, and his prospects for rehabilitation), the judge's rationale for imposing this condition of probation is clear, and that rationale is supported by the record.
See Neal v. State, 628 P.2d 19, 21 (Alaska 1981), and Christian v. State, 276 P.3d 479, 490 (Alaska App. 2012) — both holding that even when a sentencing judge fails to make an express finding to justify a composite sentence that exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment for the defendant's single most serious offense, an appellate court is allowed to infer the appropriate finding if the record clearly establishes the sentencing judge's reasons for imposing the sentence.
We therefore conclude that a remand is not required, and we uphold the challenged condition of probation.
Conclusion
The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.