Opinion
1:17-cv-251
03-07-2022
MARK-ALONZO WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. MICHAEL D. OVERMYER, et al, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATED DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT SUTHERLAND'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 343, 362, 364]
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Mark Sutherland [ECF No. 343] be granted and the cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Mark-Alonzo Williams [ECF Nos. 362, 364] be denied.
II. Report
A. Procedural Background
Although this case has an extensive procedural history, it need not be recounted here.Williams, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), filed his Second Amended Complaint - his operative pleading - on March 27, 2018. ECF No. 61. That pleading asserts a host of claims against numerous prison officials at his previous place of confinement, SCI-Forest, including a claim that moving Defendant Sutherland, a Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner, displayed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 237-247. Williams seeks compensatory and punitive pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 285-289.
A comprehensive procedural history of this case is available in this Court's prior Report and Recommendation at ECF No. 184, pp. 2-4.
Presently pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. Sutherland's motion [ECF No. 343], filed first, was accompanied by a supporting brief [ECF Nos. 345], a Concise Statement of Material Facts [ECF No. 344], and an Appendix of Exhibits [ECF Nos. 343-2 through 343-5]. Williams responded by filing a Brief in Opposition [ECF No. 361] and a Responsive Concise Statement of Material Facts [ECF No. 366]. Sutherland filed a reply [ECF No. 368] and Williams filed a sur-reply [ECF No. 371].
In addition to responding to Sutherland's motion, Williams filed two motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 362 and 364]. In support of his motions, Williams incorporates his Brief in Response to Sutherland's motion [ECF No. 361] and Responsive Concise Statement [ECF No. 366]. Sutherland responded to Williams' motions [ECF No. 369], and Williams filed a reply [ECF No. 371]. Both motions are ripe for disposition.
The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
B. Factual Background
The following factual recitation is derived primarily from Williams' medical records, see ECF No. 343-2, and, to the extent they are supported by the record, the parties' Concise Statements of Material Fact. See ECF Nos. 344 and 366. According to Williams, he suffered a stroke on March 19, 2017, while in solitary confinement at SCI-Forest. ECF No. 366 ¶ 1. Williams asserts that he awoke in his cell "with a broken pinky finger (left hand), petechial hemorrhaging in his eyes, massive migraine, one side of his body near-paralyzed and tingling, shortness of breath, facial droop and spasms, blurred vision, and slowed movement." ECF No. 361 at 13.
Following a referral to medical, Sutherland examined Williams on March 21, 2017. ECF No. 343-2 at 2, 13. Williams complained of right facial droop, numbness in his left leg to the foot, and indicated his belief that he had suffered a stroke. Id. at 13. Sutherland performed a cranial nerve exam and a Romberg test, concluding that Williams' facial function was symmetric and that he was able to heal toe walk successfully. Id. His reflexes were normal, his heart had a regular rate and rhythm without murmur, and his extremities displayed no redness or swelling. Id. Williams' blood pressure was recorded as 160/110 and he indicated pain and decreased mobility upon palpitation of his spine. Id. Sutherland diagnosed Williams with lumbar radiculopathy, right facial tick, and elevated blood pressure. Id. He prescribed Prednisone 40 mg for five days, placed an order for Williams' blood pressure to be checked daily, and planned to review his symptoms again in one week. Id. Sutherland observed no clinical evidence that Williams had suffered a stroke. Id.
Over the next several days, the nursing staff took Williams' blood pressure daily, recording values of 122/90, 112/90, 108/88, and 112/88. Id. at 31, 153. On March 28, 2017, Williams wrote the following in a communication directed at Sutherland:
So this is what I've gathered by your non-response to my request last week. Despite the several injuries I've told you of: stroke to kidney injury . . . you ceremoniously ran BP tests at a bare minimum, sham of health care, because your bosses (who I told you would interfere because this is bigger than you) ordered you to stop providing healthcare, correct?
ECF No. 343-4. From that point forward, Williams' medical records indicate that he began to regularly refuse to have his blood pressure taken by the nursing staff and declined a scheduled follow-up visit. ECF No. 343-2 at 12, 31, 32, 138, 150, 153.
On March 29, 2017, Williams filed grievance number 670941 in which he claimed that he had been "exploitated (sic) and maltreated" by Sutherland and the medical staff. He also accused medical personnel of falsifying his medical records and intentionally misrepresenting his blood pressure readings to deny him care. ECF No. 343-3 at 5. Williams did not request monetary compensation or any other relief in that grievance. Id. See also ECF No. 361 at 7.
Sutherland examined Williams again on April 19, 2017. ECF No. 343-2 at 12. Williams stated at that visit that his medical record was being fabricated and insisted that he had suffered a stroke. Id. Sutherland noted that Williams' blood pressure was within normal limits and planned to recheck as needed. Id.
Williams maintains that most of the medical history recounted above has been fabricated. According to Williams, Sutherland "went rogue" and faked most of the medical records discussed above to "produc[e] medical fraud vis-a-vis downgrading injuries to suit a predetermined custom of providing inadequate medical treatment for inmates in solitary confinement." ECF No. 361 at 12-13. He also maintains that Sutherland tampered with his medical records, instructed the nursing staff to conduct "scam" blood pressure monitoring to make it appear that he wasn't in danger, failed to perform an angiogram to check for stroke, and "crushed" up Prednisone pills and mixed them with Williams' other medications to trick him into taking them. Id. at 15. In addition to violating the Eighth Amendment, he accuses Sutherland of violating prison health care policy 13.2.1, a 1995 class action settlement agreement between the DOC and state prisoners "contesting the practices and conditions of confinement in State Correctional Institutions," and a 2015 settlement agreement between the DOC and the Disabilities Rights Network of Pennsylvania concerning the constitutional rights of inmates with serious mental illness. Id. at 5, 19-20.
C. Standards of Re view
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under this standard "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 2425 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, Ml U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851(3d Cir. 1992).
D. Analysis
1. Exhaustion
In broad brush, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (the "PLRA"), requires a prisoner to exhaust any available administrative remedies before he may bring an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the conditions of his confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Further, the statute requires "proper exhaustion," meaning that a prisoner's completion of the administrative review process must also satisfy the applicable procedural rules of the prison's grievance system. Fennell v. Cambria County Prison, 607 Fed.Appx. 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2015). A procedurally defective administrative grievance, even if pursued to final review, precludes action in federal court. Id. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proven by defendants. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).
The grievance system utilized in Pennsylvania's prison system requires inmates to satisfy a three-step grievance and appeals process. See Grievance System Policy DC ADM-804; Smith v. Sec. of Pa. Dept. of Corrections, 2018 WL 279363, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2018). First, the inmate must "legibly set forth all facts and identify all persons relevant to his claim in a grievance which will then be subject to 'initial review.'" Smith, 2018 WL 279363, at *2 (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 233 (3d Cir. 2004)). Second, the initial review must be appealed to the Facility Administrator for a second level of review. Id. Finally, "the inmate is required to file an appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals ("the Secretary's Office")." Id. Once these three steps have been satisfied, a grievance has ordinarily been administratively exhausted for purposes of the PLRA.
Critically, however, DC-ADM 804 contains an additional requirement: that an inmate who "desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court" must "request the relief with specificity in his/her initial grievance." See Wright v. Sauers, 2017 WL 3731957 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2017); Spruill, 372 F.3d 218. Courts characterize the satisfaction of this requirement as "proper exhaustion." Smith, 2018 WL 279363, at *3 (noting that a grievance must be fully exhausted to final review and "properly exhausted" with respect to remedy).Pursuant to this requirement, an inmate is precluded from seeking legal relief in a lawsuit, including monetary damages, if the inmate did not request that same relief in his grievances (even if he appealed those grievances to the Secretary's Office for final review). See, e.g., Wright, 2017 WL 3731957, at *7 (finding lack of proper exhaustion where plaintiff failed to set forth desired monetary relief on his initial grievance form as required by DC-ADM 804); Camacho v. Beers, 2018 WL 6618410, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2018) (holding that, because "Plaintiff failed to request the specific relief of monetary compensation in the grievances he filed as to the subjects of this lawsuit... he did not exhaust all administrative remedies with regard to such claims .. . [and] may not pursue an action in federal court based on the claims raised in his procedurally defective grievances."); Sanders v. Beard, 2013 WL 1703582, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. Apr 19, 2013) (dismissing claims for monetary damages brought by plaintiffs who did not request monetary damages in their initial grievances as required by DC-ADM 804).
Conversely, courts in this district have occasionally characterized an inmate's failure to properly exhaust as a form of procedural default. See, e.g., Wright, 3731957, at *6 (characterizing a failure to specifically request monetary damages in an otherwise fully-exhausted grievance as "giv[ing] rise to procedural default").
Here, the record is undisputed: Williams failed to request any sort of monetary damages in grievance number 670941 (or any other grievance pertaining to Sutherland's treatment on or around March 21, 2017). Williams concedes as much in his response brief. See ECF No. 361 at 7 ("To be clear: Plaintiffs medical-related grievances do not mention monetary damages from defendant Sutherland"). Since he did not request monetary relief in his grievance, see ECF No. 61, no relief is available to him in the instant suit. Summary judgment for lack of proper exhaustion is appropriate.
2. Deliberate indifference
Even if Williams had properly exhausted his Eighth Amendment claim, he has failed to adduce evidence to support it. There is no question that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies to allegations of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (stating that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment") (internal quotation omitted). To establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that demonstrate: (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Such indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O 'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or "persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury." White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
Williams' claim in the instant action is based on Sutherland's alleged failure to provide proper diagnostic testing and treatment for Williams' perceived stroke. In broad brush, Williams maintains that Sutherland performed a perfunctory examination, misdiagnosed his stroke as sciatica, refused to order an angiogram that Williams felt was necessary, and falsified his medical records. While Williams does not appear to dispute that he was provided with routine access to medical staff at SCI-Forest, he accuses Sutherland of intentionally downplaying his symptoms to avoid providing treatment.
Allegations of deliberate indifference must satisfy "a high threshold." Anderson v. Bickell, 2018 WL 5778241, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 2018). It is well-settled that "an inmate's dissatisfaction with a course of medical treatment, standing alone, does not give rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim." Tillery v. Noel, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2018) (collecting cases). Such complaints fail as constitutional claims because "the exercise by a doctor of his professional judgment is never deliberate indifference." Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F.Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.")). "Therefore, where a dispute in essence entails nothing more than a disagreement between an inmate and doctors over alternate treatment plans, the inmate's complaint will fail as a constitutional claim under § 1983." Tillery, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (citing Gause v. Diguglielmo, 339 Fed.Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2009) (characterizing a dispute over medication as the type of "disagreement over the exact contours of [plaintiffs] medical treatment" that does not violate the constitution)).
By the same token, "the mere misdiagnosis of a condition or medical need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice standing alone is not a constitutional violation." Tillery, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). "Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners." Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (citations omitted). Thus, "courts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received some level of medical care." Hensley v. Collins, 2018 WL 4233021, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (quoting Clarkv. Doe, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2000)). See also Wisniewski v. Frommer, __ Fed. Appx. __, 2018 WL 4776165, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2018) (noting that "there is a critical distinction 'between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those alleging inadequate medical treatment.'") (quoting Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017)).
In the instant case, there is no question that Williams received "some level of medical care" from Sutherland. Hensley, 2018 WL 4233021, at *3. Williams' medical records confirm that he received initial and follow-up examinations and health checks from Sutherland and the nursing staff for the symptoms that Sutherland observed on March 21, 2017. "Where the plaintiff has received some care, inadequacy or impropriety of the care that was given will not support an Eighth Amendment claim." Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1186 (3d Cir. 1978). Such is clearly the case here.
To the extent that Williams disagrees with his diagnosis and complains that he should have received an angiogram, it is well-settled that an inmate's objection to the type of medications and procedures ordered by prison physicians is precisely the type of "disagreement between an inmate and doctors over alternate treatment plans" that falls well short of a constitutional violation. Tillery, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5. Indeed, these types of claims frequently arise - and are routinely rejected - in the prison setting. See, e.g., Foye v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 675 Fed.Appx. 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2017) (medical defendants were not deliberately indifferent for failing to order an MRI consult at the inmate's request); Rhines v. Bledsoe, 388 Fed.Appx. 225, at 227 (3d Cir. 2010) (decision not to order diagnostic MRI was not deliberate indifference).
Nor is there any merit to Williams' argument that the Court should not defer to Sutherland's medical judgment because he is a CRNP rather than a doctor. To the contrary, courts in this district have consistently recognized that a CRNP or physician's assistant is a qualified medical professional who is entitled to deference for the exercise of medical judgment. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Hammer, 751 Fed.Appx. 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2018) (rejecting deliberate indifference claim against physician's assistant because the defendant exercised his professional medical judgment); Bryant v. Kaskie, 744 Fed.Appx. 39, 42 (3d Cir. 2018) (applying deliberate indifference analysis to nurse practitioner). See also Simonds v. Delaware County, 2015 WL 289974, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2015) (noting that, in Spruill, "the Court of Appeals expressly considered a physician's assistant to be a medical expert for the purposes of deliberate indifference liability under § 1983) (citing Spruill, 372 F.3d at 237).
Finally, Williams argues that Sutherland's conduct violated prison policy 13.2.1 and two settlement agreements that the DOC reached with inmates and advocacy groups in 1995 and 2015. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Sutherland was a signatory to either of the referenced settlement agreements, and it is well-settled that failure to adhere to an internal prison policy "does not alone amount to a constitutional violation." Watley v. Pike County, 2018 WL 6018903 at *11 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2018) (collecting cases). See also Tennile v. Quintana, 443 Fed.Appx. 670, 672 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) ("a violation of prison regulations in itself is not a constitutional violation"); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[U]nder section 1983 the issue is whether the government official violated the Constitution or federal law, not whether he violated the policies of a state agency.").
Additionally, each of those settlements appears to be directed at the mental health care needs of inmates, an issue not presented here.
In short, the undisputed evidence of record plainly belies the viability of Williams' Eighth Amendment claim. His insistence that he suffered a stroke, despite clinical evidence to the contrary, and his unadorned averment that his medical records have been fabricated are each insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact as to the adequacy of his medical care. Id. at *5 ("[A]n inmate's dissatisfaction with a course of medical treatment, standing alone, does not give rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim.") (collecting cases); Gause v. Diguglielmo, 339 Fed.Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2009) (characterizing a dispute over treatment options as the type of "disagreement over the exact contours of [plaintiffs] medical treatment" that does not violate the constitution)). Summary judgment is warranted.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted and Williams' cross-motions for summary judgment be denied. Judgment should be entered in favor of Defendant Mark Sutherland as to all claims.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.2007).