Opinion
Civil Action 20 Civ. 5954 (VSB) (SLC)
02-11-2022
PAMELA C. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, [1] Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SARAH L. CAVE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
TO THE HONORABLE VERNON S. BRODERICK, United States District Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Pamela C. Williams (“Ms. Williams”) commenced this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Ms. Williams seeks review of the decision by the Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), dismissing her request for a hearing concerning her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Act. Ms. Williams contends that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) dated July 29, 2019 dismissing her request for a hearing after she and her appointed representative failed to appear at a hearing scheduled for July 19, 2019 (the “Hearing”) without showing good cause (the “Dismissal Order”) was erroneous because the ALJ did not issue a request to show cause for her failure to appear. (ECF No. 26 at 5). Ms. Williams asks that the matter be remanded to “for a hearing at least on the issue of whether Ms. Williams had good cause for missing the [] [H]earing.” (Id.)
The parties have cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). On August 16, 2021, the Commissioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 20 (the “Commissioner's Motion”)), and on November 16, 2021, Ms. Williams cross-moved (ECF No. 25 (“Ms. Williams' Motion”)). For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that the Commissioner's Motion be GRANTED and Ms. Williams' Motion be DENIED.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Administrative Proceedings
On February 22, 2018, Ms. Williams, through Andrew Youngman, a non-attorney, filed the DIB application, alleging disability since November 20, 2016. (R. 67, 95-96). On June 1, 2018, the SSA denied Ms. Williams' DIB application, finding that she was “not disabled.” (R. 83-88).
On June 8, 2018, Ms. Williams submitted a request for hearing by an ALJ (the “Request for Hearing”). (R. 66-67). On June 18, 2018, the SSA acknowledged receipt of the Request for Hearing. (R. 68-70). In a letter to Youngman dated December 19, 2018, the SSA Office of Hearings Operations (the “Hearing Office”) acknowledged that Ms. Williams' Request for Hearing had been transferred to the National Hearing Center and invited Ms. Williams to submit additional evidence in support of her DIB application. (R. 59).
On March 25, 2019, the Hearing Office sent Ms. Williams, with a copy to Youngman, a Notice of Hearing (the “Notice”), indicating the date, time, location, and room number of the Hearing. (R. 32-38). The Notice stated:
It Is Important That You Attend Your Hearing
I have set aside this time for you to tell me about your case. If you do not attend the hearing and I do not find that you have a good reason, I may dismiss your request for hearing. I may do so without giving you further notice.
You may ask us if you want to appear by telephone. I will grant your request if I find that extraordinary circumstances prevent you from appearing in person or by video teleconferencing.(R. 32). Attached to the Notice was an acknowledgment form, which Ms. William was asked to return in the envelope provided. (R. 33, 49). There is no indication in the Record that Ms. Williams or Youngman returned the acknowledgment form. (See R. 7).
On June 6, 2019, Ms. Williams, through Youngman, submitted a request for a favorable decision on the record (“OTR”), which was denied. (R. 21-23).
The letter from the Hearing Office denying Ms. Williams' OTR request is dated January 4, 2012, but because Ms. Williams' request was dated June 6, 2019, the Court infers that the date is a typographical error, albeit an immaterial one.
On July 5, 2019, the Hearing Office sent to Ms. Williams and Youngman a “Notice of Hearing - Important Reminder.” (R. 15 (the “Reminder”)). The Reminder stated that the Hearing Office had sent the Notice of Hearing with an enclosed acknowledgment form, and asked that, if Ms. Williams had not yet returned the form, she “call the number listed above” to indicate whether she planned to attend the Hearing or why she could not attend the Hearing. (R. 15). The Reminder included the date, time, address, and room number for the Hearing. (R. 15). The Reminder cautioned that if Ms. Williams did “not appear at this hearing, and [did] not provide a good reason why [she] did not appear, ” the ALJ would “dismiss [her] request for hearing without further notice, ” and the denial of benefits would “become the final decision of the Commissioner on [her] application.” (R. 15).
On the scheduled date of the Hearing, July 19, 2019, neither Ms. Williams nor Youngman appeared. (R. 7-8; 102). An “associate” of Youngman's “was present at the hearing venue” and informed the ALJ that Ms. Williams would be “a half hour late” for the Hearing. (R. 8, 102). The associate, however, “did not have a signed Appointment of Representative” for Ms. Williams and was thus “required to wait in the reception area until [Ms. Williams] arrived.” (R. 8). Ms. Williams did not arrive within the half hour, and the ALJ called her case at 10:50 a.m., 35 minutes after the scheduled start time of the Hearing. (R. 8). It was later disclosed that Ms. Williams fainted on her way to the Hearing, and a friend took her home, where Ms. Williams “took medication.” (R. 102).
On July 29, 2019, the ALJ issued the Dismissal Order. (R. 4, 7-8). In the Dismissal Order, the ALJ first set forth the standard for dismissal of a request for a hearing for failure to appear. (R. 7 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(b))). The ALJ then reviewed the procedural history, noting that: on March 21, 2019, the Notice was mailed to Ms. Williams and to her representative; neither she nor Youngman returned the acknowledgment form; the SSA attempted to contact her and Youngman; on July 5, 2019, the Hearing Office mailed the Reminder; neither Ms. Williams nor Youngman responded to the Reminder; and neither Ms. Williams nor Youngman appeared at the Hearing. (R. 7-8). The ALJ also noted that the individual who told the ALJ that Ms. Williams would be late “did not have a signed Appointment of Representative” for Ms. Williams. (R. 8). The ALJ noted that when Ms. Williams had not appeared by 10:50 a.m., he called her case. (R. 8).
After considering the factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(b)(2), the ALJ found “that there is no good cause for [Ms. Williams'] failure to appear at the time and place of hearing[, ]” dismissed her Request for Hearing, and upheld the denial of her application for DIB benefits. (R. 8).
On August 28, 2019, Ms. Williams, through Youngman, filed a request for Appeals Council review of the Dismissal Order, stating that the reason for her appeal was that she “fainted during [her] trip to [the] hearing and was taken home by a friend.” (R. 11). In an accompanying letter to the Appeals Council, Youngman admitted that Ms. Williams “failed to appear” at the Hearing, but stated that Ms. Williams “suffered a fainting episode” while traveling with a friend to the Hearing, and returned “home where she took medication.” (R. 102). Youngman argued that “Ms. Williams' circumstance constitutes an unforeseeable event that is good cause for her failure to attend the [H]earing.” (R. 102). Youngman also argued that the Hearing Office did not send Ms. Williams SSA Form HA-L90 (“Request to Show Cause For Failure To Appear”). (R. 102 (citing HALLEX I-24-25(c)(2)). Because “good cause is present, ” Youngman argued that dismissal of the Request for Hearing was “not appropriate.” (R. 102). On June 15, 2020, the Appeals Council denied review. (R. 1-2).
The Record also includes additional evidence of contacts between the SSA and Ms. Williams and her representative. After a letter to Ms. Williams dated February 23, 2018 was returned as undeliverable, (R. 122), the SSA spoke to her by telephone, confirmed her address as the one in the SSA's records, and updated her telephone number. (R. 121). Ms. Williams also provided the name of another person to whom her mail could be addressed as “c/o, ” and acknowledged that she had received correspondence from the SSA dated March 6, 2018. (R. 121). The SSA contacted Ms. Williams, as well as her representative, on May 9, 18, and 30, 2018 seeking information about her work history, leaving voice messages each time. (R. 118-20). On May 16, 2019, the SSA left a voicemail for Youngman, asking him to provide an updated address for Ms. Williams “due to receiving returned mail.” (R. 109). During a call with the Hearing Office on June 20, 2019, Ms. Williams stated that she planned to attend the Hearing, and would “try to get a ride” because it was “being held excessively far from her home.” (R. 108).
B. Federal Court Proceedings
On July 29, 2020, Ms. Williams, then pro se, filed the Complaint seeking review of the Dismissal Order. (ECF No. 1). After several extensions, on August 16, 2021, the Commissioner filed her Motion. (ECF No. 20). On August 19, 2021, Charles E. Binder, Esq., filed a notice of appearance on Ms. Williams' behalf (ECF No. 22), and on November 16, 2021, filed Ms. Williams' Motion. (R. 25).
The Commissioner argues that the Dismissal Order should be affirmed because “substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that [Ms. Williams] had failed to demonstrate good cause for her failure to appear at her hearing.” (ECF No. 21 at 5). The Commissioner notes that although Ms. Williams “subsequently claimed in correspondence to the Appeals Council that she suffered a fainting episode while on the way to the hearing and returned home to take medication, ” Ms. Williams did not notify the ALJ or the SSA “of this reason on the day of her hearing and did not provide any evidence to support this claim.” (Id. at 13). Ms. Williams having failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating good cause, the Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports her factual determinations and “her overall conclusion was not an abuse of discretion, ” warranting affirmance of the Dismissal Order. (Id. at 14).
Ms. Williams frames the issue as “whether the ALJ erred in dismissing [her] request for review when an associate of her appointed representative appeared without issuing a Request to Show Cause to determine if something beyond [Ms. Williams'] control prevented her from appearing at the scheduled hearing.” (ECF No. 26 at 5). Ms. Williams argues that the ALJ's failure to issue the Request to Show Cause “is contrary to the spirit of these proceedings and instead more consistent with formal court proceedings[, ]” such that “remand is required to hold a hearing on the merits or at least permit [Ms. Williams] to submit evidence to make a determination if there was good cause for her failure to appear at the scheduled hearing.” (Id. at 6).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
1. Rule 12(c)
Under Rule 12(c), a party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings if she establishes that no material facts are in dispute and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1999); Morcelo v. Barnhart, No. 01 Civ. 743 (RCC) (FM), 2003 WL 470541, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003).
2. The SSA's Four-Step Administrative Appeals Process
“Under the SSA regulations, a claimant must complete a four-step administrative review process to obtain a judicially reviewable final decision.” Hayward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 18 Civ. 10402 (SN), 2021 WL 982296, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2021); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (setting forth administrative review process for DIB claimants). The four-step process involves: (1) the agency's determination of the claimant's eligibility; (2) the claimant may request reconsideration of the initial eligibility determination; (3) the claimant may request a hearing before an ALJ; and (4) the claimant may request Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(1)-(4).
If the claimant (or her designated representative) fails to appear at her hearing at step three, and the ALJ finds that good cause does not exist to excuse the absence, the ALJ may dismiss the request for a hearing. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(b)(1)(i). In determining whether good cause exists to excuse the absence, the ALJ may consider “any physical, mental, educational, or linguistic limitations” the claimant may have. Id. § 404.957(b)(2). Following a failure to appear, the ALJ is not, however, required to develop the record if the claimant did not return the hearing acknowledgment form. See Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual (“HALLEX”), §§ I-2-4-5(A) (“Dismissing a Request for Hearing”), I-2-4-25(C)(3)(b) (“Dismissal Due to Claimant's Failure to Appear[, ]” setting forth “When Developing Good Cause Is Not Necessary”). See Hayward, 2021 WL 982296, at *4.
HALLEX, S.S.A., available at https://www.ssa.gov/OP Home/hallex/. HALLEX is “a set of internal guidelines for the SSA, not regulations promulgated by the Commissioner, ” and a “failure to follow procedures outlined in HALLEX, therefore, does not constitute legal error.” Harper v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 08 Civ. 3803 (NGG), 2010 WL 5477758, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010).
HALLEX I-2-4-5(A) provides that one of the proper grounds for an ALJ's dismissal of a request for hearing is when “[n]either the claimant nor the appointed representative appears at the time and place set for the hearing, and the claimant was notified before the time set for the hearing that the [request for hearing] might be dismissed without further notice if he or she did not appear at the time and place of the hearing, and good cause was not found by the ALJ for the failure to appear.”
HALLEX § I-2-4-25(C)(3)(b) provides: “It is unnecessary to develop good cause when: the claimant did not return the acknowledgment form sent with the Notice of Hearing, the agency followed the contact procedures required by 20 CFR [§§] 404.938 and 416.1438 (as described in HALLEX I-2-3-20), and there is no indication in the record of good cause for failure to appear.”
Once the claimant has completed steps one through four, the Commissioner's decision is deemed a “final decision, ” and if it is unfavorable, the claimant may seek review in federal court by filing an action within 60 days of receiving notice of the Appeals Council's action. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(a)(5), 404.981.
3. Standard for Reviewing the Commissioner's Procedural Dismissal
In Smith v. Berryhill, the Supreme Court explained that 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), pertaining to judicial review of agency decisions, contains two elements: “first, a ‘jurisdictional' requirement that claims be presented to the agency, and second, a ‘waivable . . . requirement that administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted.'” 139 S.Ct. 1765, 1773 (2019) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976)). Presented with a case involving the second, non-jurisdictional requirement, the Court then held that an Appeals Council dismissal on timeliness grounds after a hearing before an ALJ was “a final decision . . . made after a hearing” for purposes of allowing judicial review. Id. at 1774, 1780. The Court also noted that a “different question would be presented by a claimant who assertedly faltered at an earlier step . . . [and] would not have received a ‘hearing' at all, ” such as a claimant “whose request for an ALJ hearing was dismissed as untimely and who then appealed that determination to the Appeals Council before seeking judicial review.” Id. at 1777 n.17. The Court thus did not address whether there would be a “final decision” for purposes of judicial review where no ALJ hearing occurred. Id. at 1774, 1777 n.17.
The Court also explained that “in an ordinary case” in which the Commissioner dismisses a benefits application on procedural grounds, “a court should restrict its review to the procedural ground that was the basis for the Appeals Council dismissal and (if necessary) allow the agency to address any residual substantive questions in the first instance.” Smith, 139 S.Ct. at 1780. Federal courts review a procedural decision for “abuse of discretion as to the overall conclusion, and ‘substantial evidence' as to any fact.'” Id. at 1779 n.19 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 483 (1986)). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Hayward, 2021 WL 982296, at *3 (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted)). “[I]f substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination” to dismiss a request for a hearing, the “court will review the agency's ‘good cause' determination for abuse of discretion.” Id.
B. Application
In the first instance, the Court finds, and substantial evidence in the Record reflects, that the Commissioner complied with her obligations to transmit to Ms. Williams at her last known address the Notice containing the time, date, and procedures for the Hearing, as well as for rescheduling or requesting a telephonic conference if were unable to attend in person. (R. 32). The Commissioner also provided Ms. Williams with the Reminder, which warned her that failure to appear could result in dismissal, and confirmed by telephone that Ms. Williams planned to attend the Hearing. (R. 15, 108). The Dismissal Order also contains the Commissioner's well-supported rationale for dismissing the Request for Hearing. (R. 7-8). Finally, the Record reflects that the SSA sent copies of all correspondence to Ms. Williams to her representative as well. (R. 2, 6, 16, 21, 37, 59, 61, 70, 79, 89). On this Record, then, “the limited question before the Court is whether the Commissioner abused [her] discretion in finding that [Ms. Williams] did not show good cause for missing [her] hearing in [her] letter to the Appeals Council, ” which asserted, without evidentiary support, that she fainted on the way to the Hearing and returned home to take medication. Hayward, 2021 WL 982296, at *4.
Here, the ALJ applied the standard in 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(b)(1)(i), which provides for dismissal for failure to appear absent good cause. (R. 7). The Record reflects that although Ms. Williams-and Youngman-received the Notice, neither appeared for the scheduled hearing, and the ALJ, after considering the factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(b)(2), found that “there [was] no good cause for [Ms. Williams'] failure to appear at the time and place of hearing.” (R. 7-8). The Court therefore finds that substantial evidence supports the Dismissal Order. See Louisiana S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-CV-130 (BKS/CFH), 2021 WL 911691, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2021) (holding that substantial evidence supported hearing dismissal order); see also Coe v. Saul, No. 19 Civ. 10993 (PED), 2020 WL 6729169, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2020) (explaining that “[t]he regulations are clear that a request for an ALJ hearing can be dismissed for failure to appear absent a showing of good cause”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(b)).
To the extent Ms. Williams argues that the ALJ should have sent her a post-Hearing notice or held a good cause hearing (ECF No. 26 at 5-6), the SSA regulation-20 C.F.R. § 404.957(b)(1)- “did not require” the ALJ to do either. Louisiana S., 2021 WL 911691, at *4 (citing Kiiker v. Astrue, 364 Fed.Appx. 408, 410-11 n.2, 3 (10th Cir. 2010) and noting that “a post-hearing notice is only required under subsection (ii)” of 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(b)(1), not “subsection (i), ” and that “the regulation did not require the ALJ to provide a good cause hearing”). Further, because Ms. Williams did not return the acknowledgment form in response to either the Notice or the Reminder, and she and Youngman then failed to appear, the ALJ was not required to develop good cause before issuing the Dismissal Order. HALLEX § I-2-4-25(C)(3); see Hayward, 2021 WL 982296, at *4 (discussing HALLEX §§ I-2-4-5 and I-2-4-25); Louisiana S., 2021 WL 911691, at *5 (“HALLEX, however, provides that developing good cause is not necessary when the claimant received the notice of hearing.”).
Even if the SSA regulation or HALLEX § I-2-4-25 were controlling, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that good cause did not exist for Ms. Williams' failure to appear. Ms. Williams offered no evidence that she was unable to understand the Notice, Reminder, or any other correspondence, and the evidence in the Record of her conversations with the Hearing Office shows that she, in fact, understood the Notice, knew when the Hearing was scheduled, and communicated her intent to appear. (R. 108, 121). In addition, the ALJ complied with the applicable regulations when he stated that he had “considered the factors set forth in 20 CFR [§] 404.957(b)(2) and [found] that there [was] no good cause for [her] failure to appear at the time and place of hearing.” (R. 8). See Louisiana S., 2021 WL 911691, at *6 (finding that ALJ complied with 20 C.F.R. § 404.975(b)(2) when she “considered” possible limitations).
Ms. Williams' only attempt to show good cause was her representation to the Appeals Council that she fainted on her way to the Hearing and returned home to take medication. (R. 11, 102). She provided no evidentiary support, such as a description of the condition that caused her to faint, the medication she took, or a statement from the friend who allegedly accompanied her. Other courts in this District have found that similarly “bare assertion[s]” by claimants do not provide good cause for failure to appear at scheduled hearings. Hayward, 2021 WL 982296, at *4. In Hayward, the plaintiff argued that he did not receive notice of his hearing due to “ongoing problems with [his] mail, ” but failed to present any evidence supporting that assertion to the Appeals Council, to whom he had advanced a different argument for his failure to appear. 2021 WL 982296, at *5. Accordingly, the court found that “the Commissioner's factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence, and the conclusion that Hayward failed to show good cause for his absence at his hearing was not an abuse of discretion.” Id. In Guerra v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court held that the plaintiff's unsupported assertion that she did not receive notice of the hearing, which was contradicted by evidence that the SSA sent the notice and reminder to the correct address, did not establish good cause for her failure to appear at the hearing. No. 12 Civ. 6750 (CS) (PED), 2013 WL 3481284, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013); see also Guinyard v. Apfel, No. 99 Civ. 4242 (MBM), 2000 WL 297165, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2000) (dismissing pro se action as untimely where plaintiff did not support her “bare assertion” that she received the Appeals Council's notice two months late in a ripped and taped envelope); Marte v. Apfel, No. 96 Civ. 9024 (LAP), 1998 WL 292358, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1998) (explaining that plaintiff must supply “affirmative evidence” to support claim of lack of notice). Accordingly, considering Ms. Williams' submission to the Appeals Council, in conjunction with the applicable regulations, “the Court finds the Appeals Council's decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Louisiana S., 2021 WL 911691, at *7.
The cases on which Ms. Williams relies are also distinguishable. (ECF No. 26 at 5-6). In Timmons v. Commissioner of Social Security, the pro se plaintiff requested before the scheduled hearing an adjournment due to a relapse of his disability condition, but the ALJ failed to consider and rule on that request before dismissing his request for hearing. 719 Fed.Appx. 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2017). The court construed this as a “colorable constitutional claim over which the District Court had jurisdiction, ” id., but did not address the regulation applicable to Ms. Williams, 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(b)(1). The plaintiff in Daneka M. v. Saul made multiple pre-hearing requests for an adjournment based on “specific and unusual circumstances preventing her ability to attend, including a court hearing for a restraining order scheduled for the same day, ” and also complied with the notice of hearing by calling to inform the Hearing Office that she was unable to attend the hearing. No. C19-1560-MAT, 2020 WL 2199493, at *3-5 (W.D. Wa. May 6, 2020). The court therefore found that the plaintiff presented a “colorable constitutional claim” based on the ALJ's failure to consider these pre-hearing adjournment requests or provide an explanation for rejecting them. Id. at 5. In Lee v. Colvin, the plaintiff did not appear at the hearing, but his representative did appear and presented evidence of the plaintiff's mental health issues, which satisfied his burden to establish good cause for his failure to appear and warranted remand. No. CV-12-5008-CW, 2013 WL 6017436, at *3-5 (C.D. Ca. Nov. 13, 2013). Finally, in Granberg v. Bowen, “the ALJ's dismissal [was] based largely on the fact that no one appeared for the hearing because of plaintiff's counsel's negligence” in failing to request an adjournment of the hearing despite telling the plaintiff he would do so. 716 F.Supp. 874, 875, 878 (W.D. Pa. 1989). Ms. Williams does not allege such negligence, nor has she offered, at the agency level or during this action, any explanation for Youngman's non-appearance at the Hearing.
Finally, the Court disagrees with Ms. Williams' contention that the appearance of an unnamed representative, who “did not have a signed Appointment of Representative, ” (R. 8), was sufficient to avoid dismissal of her Request for Hearing. (ECF No. 26 at 5). Youngman is not an attorney (R. 67), and the unnamed individual offered no evidence of her status as an attorney or that she was Ms. Williams' “appointed representative.” HALLEX I-2-4-25(A)(1). In addition, the ALJ permitted the unnamed individual to “wait in the reception area” until Ms. Williams arrived to complete the appointment paperwork (R. 8), consistent with the cases on which Ms. Williams relies. (ECF No. 26 at 5). Ultimately, the representation that the unnamed individual made to the ALJ-that Ms. Williams would be “a half hour late”-was untrue, which Ms. Williams cannot dispute given her admission that she did not appear at the Hearing and returned home. (R. 102). In view of the incorrect information provided by the unnamed individual who did not have proof of authority to represent Ms. Williams, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that the individual was not, in fact, Ms. Williams' appointed representative and the conclusion that neither Youngman nor Ms. Williams appeared at the Hearing.
The Court also finds that Ms. Williams had adequate notice of the Hearing, both through the Notice and the Reminder, each of which informed her of how to request an adjournment, instructed her to return the acknowledgment, and warned her that her failure to appear at the Hearing would result in dismissal of her Request for Hearing. (R. 15, 32). Ms. Williams does not contend that she timely requested an adjournment, or returned the acknowledgment form. She in fact admits that neither she nor Youngman-nor any other properly-appointed representative-appeared at the Hearing. (R. 102). Ms. Williams offers as good cause for her failure to appear only her assertion, unsupported by any evidence, that she fainted on her way to the Hearing and returned home to take medication. (R. 102). Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the Commissioner's factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence, and the conclusion that Ms. Williams failed to show good cause for her absence at the Hearing was not an abuse of discretion. See Hayward, 2021 WL 982296, at *5; Louisiana S., 2021 911691, at *7.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that the Commissioner's Motion be GRANTED and Ms. Williams' Motion be DENIED.
NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Broderick.
FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).