McMahon, J.

DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFEND ANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT :

Plaintiff Robert Williams ("Plaintiff" or "Williams") commenced this action pro se on May 19, 2011, by filing both a complaint and an amended complaint (the "Amended Complaint"). Williams alleges that each of the listed defendants in this action (the "Defendants") discriminated against him on the basis of his race and in the context of housing accommodations, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 3604, respectively. He also alleges racial and housing discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law §§ 290 et. seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, New York City Administrative Code §§ 8-101 et. seq., as well as general contract claims. (Amended Complaint, Affirmation of David P. Stich dated August 11, 2011 ("Stitch Aff.") Ex. A ¶¶ 1, 106-112, 113-116, 117-120, 121-124, 125-126, and 127-128.) Williams seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as both compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 18-19.)

Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and/or failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED under Rule 12(b)(6).

I. Background

a. Materials the Court May Consider

"In determining whether the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action, a district court must look to the way the complaint is drawn to see if it claims a right to recover under the laws of the United States." Goldman v. Gallant Securities, Inc., 878 F.2d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 1989). A court deciding such a motion must view factual allegations in the complaint as true, but "In resolving the question of jurisdiction, the district court can refer to evidence outside the pleadings and the plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists." Luckett v. Bure, 290 F.3d 493, 496-97 (2d Cir. 2002).

"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint." Rogers v. Blacksmith Brands, Inc., 2011 WL 6293764, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2011) (quoting DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)). A district court may also consider a document that is not incorporated by reference, where the complaint "'relies heavily upon its terms and effect,' thereby rendering the document 'integral' to the complaint." Rogers, 2011 WL 6293764, at *4 (quoting Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also ATSI Communications. Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000)). "However, 'even if a document is "integral" to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document.'" DiFolco, 622 F.3d at 111 (quoting Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2006)). "It must also be clear that there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document." Id.

Applying these principles, the Court relies on Williams' pleadings, as well as a Housing Court Decision which, as discussed below, is "integral" to the Amended Complaint because it forms the basis of Williams' federal claims. The parties do not dispute the authenticity, accuracy, or relevance of the housing court decision.

b. Factual and Procedural History

The basic facts underlying this controversy are not in dispute. The following summary is drawn from Williams' pleadings, as well as the Decision/Order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, County of Bronx, Housing Part S, rendered by Hon. Paul L. Alpert, dated March 24, 2011 (the "Housing Court Decision"). (Affidavit of Allison Heilbraun dated August 9, 2011 ("Heilbraun Aff.") Ex. H.)

Williams signed a one-year lease beginning on August 1, 2008 (the "Original Lease") for apartment 6A (the "Apartment") at 624 East 222^nd Street, Bronx, NY (the "Building"). The legal registered rent in the Original Lease was $1,331.06 per month, but it included a preferential rent rider permitting Williams to pay a rent-stabilized $900 per month for the lease term.

In July 2009, the then-management company of the Building sent Williams a renewal lease which terminated the preferential rent and sought additional security in an unspecified amount. Williams objected to this renewal lease, and none was ever signed. Williams remained in the Apartment. He paid rent of $900 per month through November, 2009, and none thereafter.

In early 2010, the Building was placed into receivership, and Defendant Calderoni was appointed receiver per an order by Justice Stinson of the Bronx County Supreme Court. Commencing shortly thereafter, the receiver, through managing agents and attorneys, who together comprise the rest of the Defendants, brought multiple non-payment actions against Williams. Each was dismissed, as the Housing Court Decision found, on a "technicality."

After resolving the various logistical issues which had stalled the prior proceedings, the receiver brought another non-payment action against Williams. It appears the Defendants were unaware that Williams had been paying preferential rent, due to difficulties obtaining documentation from the prior owners, and so they sought $1,331.06 per month, retroactively.

The Housing Court found that the Defendants acted in good faith in commencing the proceedings against Williams, including seeking $1,331.06 per month. However, the court also held that Williams had never been offered a proper renewal lease or agreed to pay that full amount. Because Williams had remained in the apartment, the court found, he was obligated to pay some rent: "Notwithstanding the fact that he failed to sign the renewal or that the landlord offered an invalid lease, [Williams] still had an obligation to pay rent." (Heilbraun Aff. Ex. H at 6.) However, the court found, absent a proper renewal agreement that included a rent increase, the amount of rent Williams should have been paying was only $900 per month, not $1,331.06. The Housing Court therefore found Williams liable for a total of $10,800, representing rent for the period from when the Defendants came into receivership through the month before the decision. The Housing Court Decision also awarded a possessory judgment, enabling the Defendants to evict Williams from the Apartment if he did not pay the amount owed.

Williams has initiated an appeal of the Housing Court Decision in state court. As far as this Court is aware, that appeal is still pending.

Meanwhile, Williams has brought this action in federal court, alleging violations of federal, state, and local civil rights laws and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. I denied Williams' motion for a preliminary injunction on June 23, 2011, finding him unlikely to succeed on the merits.

The Defendants now move to dismiss the action in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).

II. Discussion

a. Legal Standard

i. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal district courts such as this Court are "courts of limited jurisdiction." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (internal quotations omitted). Without either a constitutional or statutory basis for jurisdiction, a federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and may not preside over a case. Id.; Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2009) "Subject-matter jurisdiction . . . can never be forfeited or waived." Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 584, 596 (2009).

Under the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over actions that are, in substance, simply appeals from state court judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars challenges in federal court to the substance of state-court decisions which are more properly raised on appeal, even where such challenges appear to raise questions of federal law on their face." Allen v. Mattingly, 2011 WL 1261103, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011) (citing Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005)). In other words, where the doctrine applies, the federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and may not hear the case.

Recently, however, the Supreme Court has strictly "confined" the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In this Circuit, this language has consistently been interpreted to impose four conditions, each of which must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar the court from hearing the case:

(1) the party raising the claim must have lost in state court; (2) that party's injuries must be caused by the state court judgment; (3) that party's claims must invite the district court to review and reject the state court judgment; and (4) the state court judgment must have been rendered prior to the commencement of the federal court proceedings.

ii. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted Under Rule 12(b)(6)

In cases where subject matter jurisdiction exists, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." "To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Mabry v. Neighborhood Defender Svc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 381, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). "[A] plaintiff's obligation . . . requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint under the "two-pronged approach" suggested by the Supreme Court in Iqbal. First, "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010).

Second, "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1949. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.; see generally Rogers, 2011 WL 6293764, at *3-4.

b. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is Inappropriate in This Pro Se Case

In this case, the parties do not dispute that requirements (1), (2), and (4) of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are met, but requirement (3) is not, considering that the complaint was filed by a pro se litigant.

Regarding requirement (3), Williams argues that his federal claims do not "invite the district court to review and reject the state court judgment," but rather sound in racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and housing discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 3604. (PL's Mem. of Law in Support of PL's Opp. to Def.'s Motion to Dismiss at 8.) He notes, correctly, that I informed him, at the hearing at which I denied his request for a preliminary injunction, that racial and housing discrimination claims would not be barred by Rooker-Feldman. (Id.) I also told him, however, that such a claim would be unlikely to succeed if it were "simply a restatement of [his] argument that the civil court made a mistake, got it wrong, ruled against [him] . . . simply an attempt to end run what would otherwise be a Rooker-Feldman barred claim." (Stitch Aff. Ex. D at 7;2-4, 12; 1-2.) Such an end run cannot succeed, and does not permit a party who lost in state court to avoid Rooker-Feldman and slip into federal court. See Allen, 2011 WL 1261103, at *8 (dismissing under Rooker-Feldman constitutional claims which stemmed from plaintiff's loss in state family court); Puletti v. Patel, 2006 WL 2010809 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2006) (dismissing under Rooker-Feldman claims of constitutional violations arising in connection with state court child custody determination). As the Seventh Circuit aptly stated in a case where the plaintiff tried to bring constitutional civil rights claims after unsuccessfully challenging her eviction for non-payment of rent in state court, a plaintiff "cannot manufacture federal jurisdiction by labeling her claim a civil rights action and by seeking monetary damages." Chambers v. Habitat Co., 68 Fed. Appx. 711, 714-15 (7th Cir. 2003).

It seems most likely that Williams' claims here constitute no more than such an end-run and attempt to manufacture jurisdiction in this Court. In support of his claims, Williams points, repeatedly and exclusively, to matters addressed in the Housing Court Decision. He raises several of the same arguments that court rejected; for this Court to evaluate them would be impermissible under Rooker-Feldman. Williams also repeatedly criticizes the Housing Court Decision and accuses that it resulted from bias and was legally incorrect, claims which certainly invite review of the state court proceeding. Hence, although Williams' claims "appear to raise questions of federal law on their face," Allen, 2011 WL 1261103, at *8, they are probably in actuality "challenges in federal court to the substance of state-court decisions which are more properly raised on appeal." Id.

Nevertheless, because Williams is a pro se litigant, I do not reach this conclusion and dismiss his claims under Rooker-Feldman. "A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). A court must interpret pro se filings "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Harris v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 2011 WL 2637429, at *3 (July 6, 2011) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006)).

Applying this standard, I conclude that Williams has pleaded enough of a discrimination claim to preclude dismissal under Rooker-Feldman. The "strongest arguments that [his claims] suggest" are not that the Housing Court Decision was simply wrong, but rather than the Defendants sought and obtained the judgment of eviction out of racial animus. Williams' claims can be construed to say that, although he did not pay rent and was thus subject to eviction, the receiver would not have pursued eviction against non-paying white tenants. (Stitch Aff. Ex. A ¶ 65, 93.) Thus, Plaintiff might be arguing, he was "singled out because of his race," (id. ¶ 98), and he "was subject to racial and housing discrimination at least in part, because of discriminatory animus" (id. ¶ 99). The fact that Williams seeks damages for discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 3604, (id. at 19), tends to confirm this supposition, even if the text of the pleading seems more like an attack on the state court judgment.

For purposes of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (rather than Rule 12(b)(6)), these are distinct claims, arising under federal statutes, and do not "invite the district court to review and reject the state court judgment." Allen, 2011 WL 1261103, at *8. Accordingly, I will not dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

c. The Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim Under Which Relief Can Be Granted Under Rule 12(b)(6)

No matter how much leeway I give Plaintiff in interpreting the nature of his claims, however, I cannot read the Amended Complaint to state a claim that meets the plausibility standard set forth above under Twombly and Iqbal. Even after crafting Williams' factual allegations into his best legal theory, the Court must still scrutinize the quality of the allegations themselves. The Court's solicitousness toward pro se plaintiffs does not extend to accepting implausible allegations or legal conclusions expressed as facts. To do so would enable any pro se plaintiff effectively to bypass Twombly and Iqbal entirely simply by the expressly forbidden "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, I parse the Amended Complaint to determine whether its factual allegations raise a plausible claim. Quite simply, they do not.

Williams has alleged no facts that make any claim of racial and housing discrimination plausible. His Amended Complaint, supplemented by his affidavit in opposition to this motion, establishes - and Defendants do not dispute - the following: Williams is African-American; the individual Defendants are all Caucasian; Williams failed to pay any rent because he thought he was being overcharged; he was taken to court and Defendants won a judgment of eviction against him; and he in fact was evicted from his apartment pursuant to that judgment. From this, Williams concludes, he was a victim of racial and housing discrimination - that he was evicted because he was black.

But it is hornbook law that the mere fact that something bad happens to a member of a particular racial group does not, without more, establish that it happened because the person is a member of that racial group. See Reyes v. Erickson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing § 1981 complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) where "plaintiffs offer no specific facts suggesting that defendants' [alleged misconduct] was motivated by racial discrimination"). "The naked assertion by plaintiff that 'race was a motivating factor' without a fact-specific allegation of a causal link between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's race is too conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss." Yusuf v. Vassar College, 827 F. Supp. 952, 955-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994). Williams alleges no facts tending to show that a judgment of eviction was sought and entered against him because he is black.

Furthermore, Williams' conclusion is implausible in light of the undisputed allegation that Williams had not paid rent for more than a year when the housing court proceeding was brought against him. Indeed, "Since [Williams] had remained in possession after the expiration of his rent stabilized lease and was not paying any rent the [receiver] was well within its rights to commence a non-payment proceeding." (Housing Court Decision at 4.)

Williams does not allege any facts suggesting that he was treated differently from other tenants or tenants of other races who did not pay their rent and occupied their apartments rent-free for over a year after their leases had expired. Nor does he allege any facts that suggest any discriminatory animus on the part of any Defendant. Rather, Williams repeatedly alleges "on information and belief" that "Caucasian tenants in a Caucasian neighborhood would not be treated in this manner" (Stitch Aff. Ex. A ¶ 65), and "Caucasian tenants who have not received a lawful proper lease offer . . . would be encouraged that the Defendants would do everything in their power to resolve the inherited issues that pertained to the tenants." (Id. ¶ 93). These are not statements of fact; they are conclusory. And while a plaintiff is entitled to plead on information and belief, Williams points to no "information" that will render these statements any more than a speculative claim. The same is true of Williams' conclusory claims that he "was singled out because of his race" (id. ¶ 98), and "subject to racial and housing discrimination at least in part, because of discriminatory animus." (Id. ¶ 99). These "allegations," do no more than recite the elements of the relevant claims. Therefore, they are insufficient to state a claim under the standard set forth above from Twombly and Iqbal.

Because Williams has failed to provide factual, non-conclusory allegations rendering his discrimination claims plausible, I dismiss both federal law claims in the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Williams has already amended his complaint once. He has had multiple opportunities to allege sufficient specific facts to render his claims plausible, including in the Amended Complaint, at the preliminary injunction hearing, and in his papers opposing the instant motion, and failed to do so. I see no reason to grant him permission to amend his complaint again, and I therefore dismiss these claims with prejudice. "[L]eave to amend would be futile because plaintiff has already had two bites at the apple and they have proven fruitless." Harris, 2011 WL 2637429, at *21 (quoting Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 2005 WL 2086339, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005)).

d. Dismissal of Federal Law Claims Requires Dismissal of State Law Claims

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), I may decline to exercise jurisdiction over any non-federal claims over which this Court could have supplemental jurisdiction if the Court has "dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Having dismissed Williams' federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6), I find that it would be inappropriate to adjudicate his state and local law claims. Therefore, all non-federal claims in the Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed.

e. The Parties' Other Arguments

Because I am dismissing all claims in the Amended Complaint, some under Rule 12(b)(6) and the remainder under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), I need not, and decline to, address the parties' other arguments.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed, with prejudice.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to remove the motion at Docket No. 32 from the Court's list of outstanding motions. Dated: March 1, 2012

/s/_________

U.S.D.J. [BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL TO ALL PARTIES]