ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

BERNARD ZIMMERMAN, Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Patricia White ("Plaintiff") has filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. This matter is currently set for hearing on November 2, 2011. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the court finds Plaintiff's motion appropriate for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the hearing. Having considered the papers submitted, and for good cause shown, the court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs.

The background facts of this case are set forth in the court's June 24, 2011 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Docket No. 85.) There, I found that Plaintiff is disabled as to "any occupation" under the terms of an ERISA welfare benefit plan sponsored by Coblentz, Patch, Duffy Bass LLP and insured by Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Defendant"), and I awarded back benefits in the amount of $139,276.63. Plaintiff now seeks attorneys' fees and costs as the "prevailing party."

"[A]s a general rule, the prevailing party on an ERISA claim is entitled to attorney's fees, `unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'" United Steelworkers of Am. v. Ret. Income Plan for Hourly-Rated Employees of Asarco, Inc., 512 F.3d 555, 564 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983)). For purposes of attorneys' fees under ERISA, a "prevailing party" is one who achieves a judicially-sanctioned, material change in the legal relationship of the parties. Buckhannon Bd. Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604-05 (2001).

Here, it is not in dispute that Plaintiff is the "prevailing party" for the purposes of attorneys' fees under ERISA. Instead, Defendant contends that the court should invoke its discretion and decline to grant attorneys' fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) ("In any action under this subchapter . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party.").

The Ninth Circuit has established a five-part equitable test for assessing whether attorneys' fees should be awarded to a prevailing ERISA plaintiff. The court must consider (1) the degree of the opposing party's culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing party to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the opposing party would deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the party requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions. Hummell v. S. E. Rykoff Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). "No one of the Hummell factors . . . is necessarily decisive, and some may not be pertinent in a given case." Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984). When applying the Hummell factors, the court "must keep at the forefront ERISA's remedial purposes that should be liberally construed in favor of protecting participants in employee benefit plans." McElwaine v. U.S. West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

I find that the Hummell factors weigh in Plaintiff's favor. With respect to the issue of bad faith/culpability, the scales tip in Plaintiff's favor given that Defendant forced Plaintiff to participate in two lawsuits, the second of which relied on strategies that had already once been rejected by Judge Jenkins in the first round of litigation (see Docket No. 85 at p. 9), and on evidence that did little to support Defendant's arguments or rebut the evidence submitted by Plaintiff (id. at pp. 10-11). Although Defendant had the right under its policy to have Plaintiff medically examined, it chose instead to ignore Plaintiff's complaints and her doctor's observations, and rely on reports of doctors who conducted cursory file reviews and did not address the concerns of Plaintiff's doctors.

With respect to the second Hummell factor, Defendant admits its ability to satisfy an award of fees (see Def.'s Opp Br. 8:11-12), and this factor therefore also weighs in Plaintiff's favor. The third Hummell factor concerns the deterrence value of the fee award. Defendant asserts that because it is "not culpable and did not act in bad faith" there is no deterrent value gained by awarding fees. (Id. at 8:22-23.) However, because Defendant's litigation strategy was unnecessarily duplicative, I find that this factor and the factor addressing the relative merits of the parties' positions weighs in Plaintiff's favor. Finally, with respect to the last factor, although Plaintiff did not seek benefits on behalf of other plan participants or for the plan as a whole, Plaintiff's persistence in pursuing her ultimately meritorious claims — especially in light of the redundant strategies utilized by Defendant to oppose Plaintiff's claims — may confer "some benefit on other plan participants, who might be more willing to seek judicial review of denials of meritorious claims as a result of plaintiff's experience." Langston v. N. Am. Asset Dev. Corp. Group Disability Plan ("Langston I"), Case No. 08-2560, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12507, 2010 WL 330085 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2010) (citing Mardirossian v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 457 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2006)); see also Chilling v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Case No. 07-3019, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20723, 2010 WL 583970, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2010). At the very least, this factor is neutral. Accordingly, because each of the Hummell factors weigh in Plaintiff's favor, I conclude that an award of attorneys' fees in this case is appropriate.

In ERISA cases, reasonable attorneys' fees are calculated using a "hybrid lodestar/multiplier approach." McElwaine v. US West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999). The lodestar figure is determined by multiplying "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The party seeking an award must submit evidence supporting the hours worked and the rates requested, and in determining the number of hours reasonably expended, the court should exclude hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Id. at 434.

Here, Plaintiff seeks a total of $204,253.50 in attorneys' fees. The bulk of this award is for 281.4 hours of work performed by attorney Laurence Padway at a rate of $600 per hour. The remainder is for 47.8 hours performed by attorney Karen Wind at a rate of $450 per hour, and 71.3 hours performed by paralegal Felicia Phillips at $195 per hour.

Defendant argues that the $600 hourly rate charged by Mr. Padway is excessive. In light of Mr. Padway's thirty-one years of civil litigation experience in California, however, I find that Mr. Padway's hourly rate is in line with the hourly rates of similarly skilled litigators in this city, and consistent with previous fee awards issued by this court for work performed by Mr. Padway. See, e.g., Langston v. N. Am. Asset Dev. Corp. Group Disability Plan ("Langston II"), Case No. 08-2560, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35594 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010) (awarding $550 per hour rate); Kroll v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Etc., Case No. 09-1404, Docket Nos. 129, 134 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 25, 2011) (awarding $600 per hour rate); see also, Oster v. Std. Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (awarding $600 an hour to attorney Terrence J. Coleman in an ERISA matter). Mr. Padway's hourly rate is reasonable, and will not be reduced.

I also find that the $450 hourly rate sought for Karen Wind, who passed the California State Bar in 1986 and has over fourteen years of experience working both full and part-time in employee benefits law, is reasonable and consistent with the hourly rates of similarly skilled litigators in San Francisco. See Oster, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (awarding two associates with approximately 10-years of ERISA litigation experience $400 hourly rate). Many litigators with far fewer years of experience are billed at rates equal to, and often greater than, the $450 hourly rate sought here. See Langston I, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12507 at *24 (awarding $300 hourly rate for associate with 3-4 years of experience); see also Caplan v. CNA Financial Corp., 573 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1249 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (approving hourly rate of $350 for a sixth-year associate, $330 for a fourth-year associate). Thus, I am satisfied that the hourly rates charged by Plaintiff's attorneys are reasonable and commensurate with their level of experience.

With respect to the $195 hourly rate sought for Ms. Phillips for paralegal services, I find that an hourly rate of $150 is more consistent with the market rate, and therefore reduce Ms. Phillips' rate to $150 per hour, consistent with other fee awards for paralegal work in this district. See, e.g., Langston I, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12507, at *24-25; Faigman v. AT T Mobility LLC, Case No. 06-4622, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15825, 2011 WL 672648 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (awarding $150 for paralegal services); Muniz v. UPS, Case No. 09-1987, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94364, 2011 WL 3740808 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (awarding $130 per hour for certified paralegal); Kroll, Case No. 09-1404, Docket No. 129 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 25, 2011).

Finally, after reviewing the lodged billing records, I find that Defendants' objections are, for the most part, refutable and that the billable hours submitted are generally reasonable, subject to the modifications detailed below.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff should not be entitled to recover fees where the records are vague and uninformative. Defendant provides three examples of "incomprehensible" billing records on the part of Mr. Padway, and also generally claims that many of the records fail to explain why a certain task was performed or what the basis is for the task taking as long as it did. (Def.'s Opp. Brief at 12:11-20.) In response, Plaintiff argues that to the extent the record deals with communications between her and her counsel, additional information cannot be provided without jeopardizing the attorney-client privilege, and that Defendant failed to list the specific entries that they object to, making it impossible to respond. While Mr. Padway's billing records could certainly be more detailed, the burden is on Defendant to identify the specific time entries to which it objects, and Defendant identifies and challenges only one entry from April 4, 2011, where Mr. Padway bills 1.2 hours for "rev filing." (Def.'s Opp. Brief p. 12.) Defendant's objection to this time entry is not well taken. While the entry is minimal, in the context of the billing records, it is clear that Mr. Padway was revising the reply brief to the motion for summary judgment.

Defendant next contends that there is no evidence that Plaintiff's counsel (specifically Ms. Wind) kept contemporaneous records, which Defendant claims calls into question the general accuracy of the records. Both Mr. Padway and Ms. Wind have submitted declarations attesting under penalty of perjury that they keep contemporaneous time records through a program called Timeslips. The one example identified by Defendant as a potentially inaccurate time record is explained by Ms. Wind in her Supplemental Declaration, in which she states that when she works from home she logs her time manually, and those records are then later added to Timeslips by either her or an office clerk. The one error identified by Defendant is therefore likely a clerical error, and in any event, the error pertains to the date of the time record rather than to its substance, and I therefore find no need to reduce the hours sought on these grounds.

Defendant also identifies several allegedly "duplicative and excessive" time entries it argues should be excluded from Plaintiff's fee request. Specifically, Defendant objects to the time spent by both Mr. Padway and Ms. Wind for preparing the complaint, attending the case management conference, and attending the summary judgment hearing. (Def.'s Opp. Brief at 13:14-18.) I disagree with Defendant's suggestion that it is unreasonable for two attorneys to attend a case management conference and a hearing on a motion for summary judgment in a heavily-contested ERISA action and will not subtract any of this time. See Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed, 388 F.3d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 2004) (participation of more than one attorney is not a per se unnecessary duplication of effort). With respect to the preparation of the complaint, Mr. Padway has withdrawn his time entry, and this time (0.5 hours on 12/30/09) will therefore be subtracted.

Defendant next challenges eight time entries by Mr. Padway as "non-legal" work for which his fees are not recoverable. These records involve Mr. Padway's attendance at various medical appointments with Plaintiff and meetings with her doctors. (Def.'s Opp. Brief at 13:19-23.) In his Supplemental Declaration, Mr. Padway explains why he attended these meetings, what he did at these meetings, and the importance of these meetings from the perspective of his client and for his overall strategy in prosecuting this action. I am satisfied with Mr. Padway's explanations and find it reasonable for Mr. Padway to have participated in these various appointments and therefore decline to subtract any of Mr. Padway's time on these grounds.

Defendant also claims that the 28.5 hours of Mr. Padway's time for work on the instant motion is excessive and should be reduced. Defendant argues that Mr. Padway has extensive experience in the ERISA litigation field, and that it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Padway has prepared a motion for fees on numerous accessions from which he could borrow language. (Def.'s Opp. Brief at 14:14-16.) In response, Mr. Padway argues that Defendant failed to meet and confer on narrowing the issues presented in the instant motion, and that this failure forced Mr. Padway to spend more time on this motion than he otherwise would have if Defendant had agreed to confer. In light of this explanation, I decline to reduce the hours Mr. Padway spent on the preparation of the fee motion.

Finally, Defendant challenges time billed by Ms. Phillips at an attorney or paralegal rate for work it argues was secretarial or clerical in nature. (Def.'s Opp. Brief at 16:24-28.) This includes time spent by Ms. Phillips on printing documents, scheduling and confirming appointments, calendaring deadlines, e-filing documents, researching travel information, updating client information, and arranging for service of process. I agree that this time should not have been billed at an attorney or paralegal rate. Trustees of Constr. Indus. Laborers' Health Welfare Trust v. Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (clerical work should be "subsumed in firm overhead rather than billed at paralegal rates."). The majority of Ms. Phillips' time entries appears to be clerical work. The entries that appear to be non-clerical in nature include the following tasks: 2.30 hours on 4/9/09; 0.25 hours on 1/19/10; 0.20 hours on 4/29/10; 0.45 hours on 5/6/10; 4.3 hours on 9/13/10; 0.20 hours on 11/12/10; 0.35 hours on 11/22/10; 0.70 hours on 11/29/10; 1.35 hours on 11/30/10; 3.20 hours on 1/14/11; 5.25 hours on 2/22/11; 6.3 hours on 2/23/11; 5.15 hours on 2/24/11; 1.8 hours on 3/29/11; and 3.25 hours on 3/30/33. This equals 35.05 hours. Subtracting 35.05 from the requested 71.20 hours would leave 36.15 hours of clerical time.

Multiplying the approved rates by the approved number of hours, the court awards Plaintiff attorneys' fees in the total amount of $196,753.50 ($600.00 for Mr. Padway's services (280.9 hours × $600 per hour), $450.00 for Ms. Wind's services (47.8 hours × $450 per hour), $150.00 for Ms. Phillips' services (35.05 hours × $150 per hour), and $40.00 in secretarial work (36.15 hours × $40 per hour)).

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees is GRANTED (Docket No. 112). Plaintiff is awarded $196,753.50 in fees.