WORKMAN, Justice

Thomas P. Maroney, Esq., Maroney, Williams, Weaver, & Pancake, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner.

Charles T. Miller, Esq., Laura Young, Esq., Robert William Schulenberg, III, Esq., Office of the Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha County, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Respondent.

WORKMAN, Justice:

This is an appeal from the circuit court's August 18, 2016, order granting respondent State of West Virginia's (hereinafter “respondent”) amended petition for writ of quo warranto, disallowing petitioner Erik Patrick Wells' (hereinafter “petitioner”) candidacy for the office of Kanawha County Clerk. The circuit court found that, as a registered member of the Democratic Party, petitioner's candidacy was governed by the provisions of West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 (2015) and that petitioner had failed to comply with its requirements, disqualifying him as a candidate for the office of Kanawha County Clerk.

Based upon our review of the briefs, legal authorities, appendix record, and upon consideration of arguments of counsel, we conclude that West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 is applicable to any person who seeks to hold an office or political party position to be filled by primary or general election. Therefore, in light of petitioner's failure to comply with the requirements of West Virginia Code § 3–5–7, we affirm the circuit court's order granting the petition for writ of quo warranto.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 18, 2016, petitioner, a registered Democrat, filed a “Candidate's Certificate of Announcement for 2016 Partisan Elections” and paid the required filing fee to the Kanawha County Clerk's office. Petitioner left blank a portion of the form, which states as follows:

I am a member of and affiliated with the following political party: ____________. I am a member of and affiliated with this political party as evidenced by my current voter's registration and I have not been registered as a member of another political party within sixty days of this date. (W.Va. Code § 3–5–7(d)(6) )

Subsequently, petitioner filed a “Minor Party or Independent Candidate Nomination Petition,” seeking to become a certificate nomination candidate pursuant to West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 (2009). On this form, in the space provided for “Party,” the certificate stated: “Independent.” Petitioner submitted signatures from 1,019 individuals; the County Clerk invalidated 119 of the signatures, leaving 900 signatures as valid.

On August 10, 2016, respondent filed a petition for writ of quo warranto pursuant to West Virginia Code § 53–2–1 et seq . (1923), and the following day filed its amended petition. The circuit court conducted a hearing on this matter on August 12, 2016, during which a key issue was petitioner's failure to fully complete the certificate of announcement, having left his party affiliation blank. During the hearing, petitioner testified that he was and remained a registered Democrat and had voted on May 10, 2016, in the Democratic primary. Petitioner testified that he was running for the office of Kanawha County Clerk as an “independent,” as indicated on the “Minor Party or Independent Candidate Nomination Petition.” Petitioner further testified that he read and was aware of the requirements imposed on a candidate filing a certificate of announcement, but had not decided to run for office until after the primary election.

By order entered August 18, 2016, the circuit court granted respondent's petition for writ of quo warranto and disallowed petitioner's candidacy for the office of Kanawha County Clerk in the November 8, 2016, general election. Specifically, the circuit court found that petitioner failed to fully complete the certificate of announcement required by West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 and that regardless, as a registered Democrat, petitioner could not avail himself of the certificate nomination process under West Virginia Code § 3–5–23. As pertained to the certificate of announcement, the circuit court reasoned that

[b]y failing to include the party affiliation in the certificate of announcement, the ... [petitioner] created confusion for the voters regarding precisely who is running for office and what party and party philosophies [petitioner] is affiliated with. Further, the failure to include a party affiliation in the certificate of announcement will create an impossible situation for election officials in preparing the ballet [sic] and for voters when voting.

The circuit court stated that if petitioner's name appeared on the ballot as a Democrat, it would create the impression that he was on the ballot because he either won the primary election or had his name placed on the ballot by the Kanawha Democratic Executive Committee or its chairperson. On the other hand, if his name appeared as “independent,” it would be inaccurate because petitioner is a registered Democrat. The circuit court further found that West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 was for use by “persons who seek elective office and who are not members of an organized party having a nominating election or a nominating convention.”

The circuit court further rejected petitioner's contention that he presented a viable, constitutionally-based “ballot access” challenge because “as a registered Democrat, [petitioner] had access to the ballot” and found that petitioner could have simply followed the various requirements to run for office. Specifically, the circuit court noted that petitioner could have filed a certificate of announcement for county-wide office or pursued having the Kanawha County Democratic Executive Committee place his name on the ballot. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Petitioner's appeal raises the issues of the application and scope of West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 and West Virginia Code §§ 3–5–23 and –24. In this regard, we have held that “ ‘[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.’ Syllabus point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).” Syl. pt. 3, Alden v. Harpers Ferry Police Civil Serv. Comm'n, 209 W.Va. 83, 543 S.E.2d 364 (2001). Mindful of this applicable standard, we now consider the substantive issues raised by the parties.

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises three assignments of error. First, petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in concluding that the certificate of announcement requirements contained in West Virginia Code § 3–5–7(d)(6) are applicable to a candidate seeking nomination by certificate. Second, petitioner contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that, as a registered Democrat, he could not avail himself of the certificate nomination process outlined in West Virginia Code § 3–5–23. Finally, petitioner asserts that in denying petitioner's candidacy, the circuit court denied him ballot access, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article III, Sections 7, 16 and 17 and Article IV, Sections 1 and 4 of the West Virginia Constitution.

Before we address petitioner's arguments, we note that the West Virginia Constitution reserves to the Legislature the ability to make laws concerning public officials and the manner in which those officials assume office. In syllabus point four of Morris v. Board of Canvassers of City of Charleston , 49 W.Va. 251, 38 S.E. 500 (1901), this Court held: “The constitution, in article IV, section 11, gives wide powers to the legislature to make all reasonable regulations and restrictions as to preparation of ballots and the conduct and returns of elections.”

Article IV, section 8 provides that “[t]he Legislature, in cases not provided for in this constitution, shall prescribe, by general laws, the terms of office, powers, duties and compensation of all public officers and agents, and the manner in which they shall be elected, appointed and removed.” Additionally, Article IV, Section 11 provides that

[t]he Legislature shall prescribe the manner of conducting and making returns of elections, and of determining contested elections; and shall pass such laws as may be necessary and proper to prevent intimidation, disorder or violence at the polls, and corruption or fraud in voting, counting the vote, ascertaining or declaring the result or fraud in any manner upon the ballot.

This Court is further mindful that the Legislature “inevitably must, enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election-and campaign-related disorder.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party , 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997).

A. Applicability of West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 to certificate nomination candidates under West Virginia Code § 3–5–23

As indicated above, petitioner, a registered Democrat, seeks to be a candidate for the office of Kanawha County Clerk by utilizing the “certificate nomination” process outlined in West Virginia Code § 3–5–23. The statute provides, in pertinent part:

Groups of citizens having no party organization may nominate candidates who are not already candidates in the primary election for public office otherwise than by conventions or primary elections. In that case, the candidate or candidates, jointly or severally, shall file a nomination certificate in accordance with the provisions of this section and the provisions of section twenty-four of this article.

W. Va. Code § 3–5–23(a). The nominating certificate must state the name and residence of each of the candidates; that he or she is legally qualified to hold the office; that the subscribers are legally qualified and duly registered as voters and desire to have the candidates placed on the ballot; and “may designate, by not more than five words, a brief name of the party which the candidates represent and may adopt a device or emblem to be printed on the official ballot.” W. Va. Code § 3–5–23(d). Upon fulfillment of these criteria, the statute provides that “[a]ll candidates nominated by the signing of the certificates shall have their names placed on the official ballot as candidates, as if otherwise nominated under the provisions of this chapter.” Id.

As noted above, the circuit court found that, even assuming petitioner was a proper certificate nomination candidate, he was required to file the certificate of announcement described in West Virginia Code § 3–5–7(d) and because petitioner refused to identify his party affiliation in the certificate of announcement, the certificate was noncompliant and therefore precluded his candidacy.

West Virginia Code § 3–5–7(a) provides as follows:

Any person who is eligible and seeks to hold an office or political party position to be filled by election in any primary or general election held under the provisions of this chapter shall file a certificate of announcement declaring his or her candidacy for the nomination or election to the office.

(emphasis added). Significantly, West Virginia Code 3–5–7(c) states that such certificate of announcement must be filed no earlier than the second Monday in January and no later than the last Saturday in January; petitioner filed his certificate of nomination in July, six months after the time period prescribed in the statute. Moreover, for partisan elections such as the Kanawha County Clerk, the certificate must contain

the name of the candidate's political party and a statement that the candidate: (A) Is a member of and affiliated with that political party as evidenced by the candidate's current registration as a voter affiliated with that party; and (B) has not been registered as a voter affiliated with any other political party for a period of sixty days before the date of filing the announcement ...

W. Va. Code § 3–5–7(d). In spite of the broad, compulsory language of the statute requiring “[a]ny person” seeking office in a primary “or general election” to file a certificate of announcement of his candidacy for the “nomination or election to the office,” petitioner makes two arguments in support of its inapplicability to his certificate nomination candidacy. W. Va. Code § 3–5–7(a) (emphasis added).

First, petitioner argues that our decision in State ex rel. Browne v. Hechler , 197 W.Va. 612, 476 S.E.2d 559 (1996), is dispositive. In Browne, the Court held that the 1991 version of West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 applied only to primary elections and therefore certificate nomination candidates were “not required to file a declaration of candidacy pursuant to W. Va. Code § 3–5–7 (1991).” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Browne. Respondent correctly counters, however, that West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 has undergone a critical amendment since that time.

In Browne, the Court sought to ascertain the deadline for the filing of a nomination certificate and fee under the 1986 version of West Virginia Code § 3–5–23, which used the terms “declaration” and “certificate” in a manner creating ambiguity as to the filing deadlines. 197 W.Va. at 613–14, 476 S.E.2d at 560–61. Respondent suggested that the “declaration” referred to therein was distinguishable from the nomination certificate and actually referred to the certificate of announcement required by West Virginia Code § 3–5–7. Id . at 614, 476 S.E.2d at 561. The Browne Court quickly rejected this argument, observing that West Virginia Code § 3–5–7(f) stated that “[t]he provisions of this section shall apply to the primary election ....” and was therefore “by its own terms, inapplicable” to a certificate nomination candidate, who does not participate in the primary election. Id .

This provision of West Virginia Code § 3–5–7, as it existed at the time of Browne, seemingly confining applicability to candidates participating in a primary election survived each of the Legislature's various amendments enacted in 1998, 2005, 2007, and 2009. However, the 2015 amendments to the statute eliminated this provision in its entirety. Accordingly, there is no longer any wording contained within the language of the statute stating that its provisions apply exclusively to candidates participating in the primary election. In fact, the sole reference to its applicability is now the long-standing opening statement that the statute and its requirements are mandatory upon “[a]ny person who is eligible and seeks to hold an office or political party position to be filled by election in any primary or general election [.]” W. Va. Code § 3–5–7(a) (emphasis added).

What this Court is left with, then, is the plain language of West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 which unmistakably makes itself applicable to all candidacies, including certificate nomination candidacies, and clearly mandates that all those seeking office in a primary or general election file a statutorily-compliant certificate of announcement. Whether this was the intention of the Legislature in making the 2015 amendments to the statute is not for this Court to speculate: “Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.” Syl. Pt. 2, Crockett v. Andrews , 153 W.Va. 714, 715, 172 S.E.2d 384, 385 (1970). What is clear, however, is that the Court's decision in Browne is no longer valid as pertains to this issue in light of the 2015 amendments to West Virginia Code § 3–5–7.

Petitioner argues alternatively that West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 is inapplicable to a certificate nomination candidate because such candidacy is governed exclusively by West Virginia Code § 3–5–23, which requires no such certificate of announcement and mandates that upon filing of the certificate of nomination, a candidate “shall” be placed on the ballot. W. Va. Code § 3–5–23(d). The Court, however, cannot countenance such a myopic view of our election code. This Court has made clear that

[s]tatutes which relate to the same persons or things, or to the same class of persons or things, or statutes which have a common purpose will be regarded in pari materia to assure recognition and implementation of the legislative intent. Accordingly, a court should not limit its consideration to any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word, but rather review the act or statute in its entirety to ascertain legislative intent properly.

Syl. Pt. 5, Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving & Storage Co ., 159 W.Va. 14, 217 S.E.2d 907 (1975). Certainly our state election code presents a comprehensive “code of laws for the establishment, administration and regulation of elections and election procedures in the state of West Virginia.” W. Va. Code § 3–1–1 (1963).

Petitioner provides no support for the notion that statutes purporting to have a broad reach become completely inoperable when more specific statutes delineate additional requirements specifically applicable to certain individuals or processes. West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 contains no exclusivity language, nor is there anything inherently inconsistent with requiring a candidate to file both a certificate of announcement pursuant to West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 and a nomination certificate containing all of the required signatures and representations required by West Virginia Code § 3–5–23. As stated in Browne, the certificate of announcement serves to “ensure the orderly administration of ... elections and to provide notice to the electorate of the identity of candidates[.]” 197 W.Va. at 614, 476 S.E.2d at 561. Petitioner offers no reason why such goals should be rendered inapplicable to certificate nomination candidates.

Nonetheless, petitioner highlights a purported “conflict” in West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 and § 3–5–23 in support of his suggestion that he is not required to complete the certificate of announcement. The certificate of announcement requires a candidate to identify, among other housekeeping matters, the date of the election, the office sought, the district, the candidate's legal name, county of residence, and address. W. Va. Code § 3–5–7(d)(1) through (5). Subsection (d)(6), however, requires a candidate in a partisan election to identify his or her political party and swear, under oath, that the candidate is a member of and affiliated with that political party and has not been registered as a voter affiliated with any other party for the preceding sixty days. W. Va. Code § 3–5–7(d)(6). West Virginia Code § 3–5–23(d) provides merely, however, that the nomination certificate “may” designate a party name, device or emblem. In spite of petitioner's insistence to the contrary, we perceive no appreciable conflict in these provisions, much less one which would render the provisions of West Virginia Code § 3–5–7(d)(6) wholly inapplicable to a nomination certificate candidate.

The certificate of announcement described in West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 (and in fact the entire statute) pertains to the candidate himself. The certificate seeks information which identifies the candidate, the office for which the candidate is running, and information designed to ensure the candidate is a proper one for the office he or she seeks. The Legislature has made clear in enacting the requirements of West Virginia Code § 3–5–7(d)(6) that voters are entitled to know with which political party, if any, a candidate is affiliated and that the candidate has not been otherwise affiliated in the preceding sixty days. The substantial ends of these disclosures is clear: voters are entitled to know the party or principles for which a candidate stands, to the extent a candidate has so affiliated himself or herself, such that they can make a knowledgeable decision in casting their votes. This statute seeks to prevent candidates from engaging in chicanery regarding their political affiliations, if any, designed to inure entirely to their individual political benefit and mislead the electorate. See Lippitt v. Cipollone , 337 F.Supp. 1405, 1406 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (upholding similar requirements to preclude candidates from “altering their political party affiliations for opportunistic reasons.”).

The provisions of West Virginia Code § 3–5–23, however, are geared toward ascertaining information about the “groups of citizens” who purport to by-pass the primary election and nominate a candidate by certificate. While the certificate itself is required to be filed by the candidate, the provisions of West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 deal virtually exclusively with the qualifications of the citizens who seek to nominate the candidate and the certificate by which they seek to do so. Subsection (b) governs the credentialing required of those who solicit or canvass voter signatures on the nomination certificate. Subsection (c) details the criteria for becoming a signator of the nomination certificate and the number of such signators required. Subsections (e) and (f) outline the duties of the Secretary of State to investigate the “validity of the certificates and the signatures thereon” and any penalties for violation of the statute. Subsection (d), which petitioner suggests “conflicts” with the requirements of a candidate to aver his or her registered party affiliation provides simply that the group of citizens which seeks to nominate a candidate “may” designate a name or emblem for themselves. It does not speak to the registered party affiliation, if any, of the candidate.

Petitioner offers absolutely no argument or rationale before this Court as to why requiring the certificate of announcement delineated in West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 of certificate nomination candidates under West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 is impractical, impossible, or inequitable. Indeed he likely cannot inasmuch as, despite his insistence that he was not required to complete a certificate of announcement, it was he who took it upon himself to file one, albeit incomplete and untimely. Any inefficacies in requiring nomination certificate candidates to complete the form are not only immaterial to our application of the statute as drafted by the Legislature, but merely theoretical. In fact, we note that the certificate of announcement itself as promulgated by the Secretary of State appears to expressly contemplate execution by certificate nomination candidates who effectively by-pass the primary election. The Secretary of State's Official Form C–1 entitled “Candidate's Certificate of Announcement for 2016 Partisan Elections” requests the candidate to indicate the “Date of Election” and requests the candidate to “Check one” of the following: primary, general, or unexpired term. Should the form be applicable only to those candidates participating in the primary election, there would be no need to make an allowance for a candidate to check only “general” election, unless that candidate may by-pass the primary and run only in the general election as nomination certificate candidates do.

The critical importance of the frank disclosure of a candidate's party affiliation is well-illustrated in the case at bar. As indicated above, petitioner is a registered Democrat, yet seeks to run by nomination certificate as an “independent.” Although this term is commonly used to refer to individuals who eschew party affiliation, West Virginia does not recognize an official designation of “Independent.” Rather, those who are “unaffiliated” are registered as such. To run as unaffiliated or “independent,” petitioner may not merely declare himself “independent” or lacking in party affiliation; he must change his registration to reflect accordingly. West Virginia Code § 3–5–7(d)(6) requires that he declare his party affiliation, if any, and aver that he has not otherwise been affiliated in the 60 days preceding the filing. This Court has observed that such requirements “promote political stability, preserve party integrity ... and prevent voter confusion.” State ex rel. Billings v. City of Point Pleasant , 194 W.Va. 301, 307, 460 S.E.2d 436, 442 (1995) ; see also Bendinger v. Ogilvie , 335 F.Supp. 572, 575 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (noting that without such requirements “party swapping and changing might become so prevalent that the average political party could no longer function properly”).

However, upon filing his certificate of announcement—six months late—petitioner failed or refused to identify his political party, thereby wholly usurping the paramount purpose of the nomination certificate. On the nomination certificate and in sworn testimony, petitioner purported to identify as having no party affiliation or “independent,” all while maintaining his registered Democrat status. Simply put, petitioner is a registered Democrat and any attempt to otherwise identify himself or “disaffiliate” with the Democratic party can only be accomplished by changing his registration; to permit otherwise would perpetrate a fraud on the electorate. As we have previously stated, “the State's interests in preserving the integrity of the political process.... are put at risk by candidates who skip from one party to another just prior to an election campaign to take advantage of a political opportunity.” Billings , 194 W.Va. at 308, 460 S.E.2d at 443. If “skipping” from party to party to take advantage of a political opportunity puts the State's election interests at risk, it is fairly inarguable that allowing a candidate to masquerade as something he is not makes an utter mockery of those interests.

The statute as currently constituted, requiring all candidates to file a certificate of announcement in January, appears to reflect a Legislative intent that voters and candidates should know at the outset who is running for elected office. Certificate nomination candidates then obviously have until August 1—an additional approximate six months—to collect the signatures necessary to secure their nomination. This prevents certificate nomination candidates from first emerging near the end of the election season to the surprise of an unwitting recognized political party candidate.

We therefore hold that West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 requires any person who is eligible and seeks to hold an office or political party position to be filled by election in any primary or general election to file a certificate of announcement declaring his or her candidacy for the nomination or election to the office. Accordingly, candidates who seek to hold an office or political party position pursuant to West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 must complete a certificate of announcement in accordance with the provisions of West Virginia Code § 3–5–7. It is undisputed that petitioner filed his certificate of announcement six months late and that when he did so, his failure to state his political party made his untimely filing also incomplete. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court committed no reversible error in disallowing his candidacy.

B. Certificate Nomination Candidacies by Recognized Political Party Members

Our above holding notwithstanding, we turn now to petitioner's argument that the circuit court erred in finding that, as a registered Democrat, the certificate nomination process contained in West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 was not available to him. Although effectively unnecessary to the resolution of this matter given our above holding, the Court chooses to consider this properly raised issue given its importance. See generally Syl. Pt. 1, Israel by Israel v. West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Comm'n , 182 W.Va. 454, 388 S.E.2d 480 (1989) (permitting consideration of issues presenting “sufficient collateral consequences” resulting from failure to address “questions of great public interest”). As noted above, the circuit court found that the certificate nomination process is available only to third-party or independent candidates, rather than individuals affiliated with a recognized political party who neglect or refuse to participate in the primary process or seek nomination by the executive committee of their party or convention.

Without question, this Court has historically recognized West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 as “providing the method for ballot access for third-party and independent party candidates .” Write–In Pritt Campaign v. Hechler , 191 W.Va. 677, 681, 447 S.E.2d 612, 616 (1994) (emphasis added). Moreover, in Manchin , 165 W.Va. at 222, 270 S.E.2d at 644, this Court stated that the statute “constitute[s] a method for third-party or independent candidates to gain access to the general election ballot.... [and] that the petition process serves as the functional equivalent of a primary election.” (emphasis added). Notably, the West Virginia Secretary of State's official credentialing form and nomination petition expressly state that they are for “independent” or “minor party” candidates. There is nothing on these forms remotely suggesting this process is for use by individuals with recognized political party affiliation.

The language of West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 presents some ambiguity in that it does not expressly forbid a member of a recognized political party from becoming a certificate nomination candidate. However, the language of the statute plainly suggests that it is a mechanism by which only unaffiliated or minor party candidates may enter the election process. In fact, the statute begins with the statement that “[g]roups of citizens having no party organization may nominate candidates who are not already candidates in the primary election for public office....” The use of the phrases “no party organization” and reference to candidates “who are not already candidates in the primary election” unquestionably suggests that it is for use by candidates who do not belong to one of the recognized “political part[ies]” in West Virginia. See W. Va. Code § 3–1–8 (1965) (“Any affiliation of voters representing any principle or organization which, at the last preceding general election, polled for its candidate for Governor at least one percent of the total number of votes cast for all candidates for that office in the state, shall be a political party...”). Moreover, subsection (d) permitting the designation “by not more than five words, a brief name of the party which the candidates represent and may adopt a device or emblem to be printed on the official ballot” further suggests that the statute is designed for independent or third party candidates, recognized party candidates having no need to effectively “create” a name, emblem or device to reflect their party.

Having determined that the statute is ambiguous, we turn then to our canons of statutory construction. This Court has repeatedly held that “in the interpretation of a statute, the legislative intention is the controlling factor; and the intention of the legislature is ascertained from the provisions of the statute by the application of sound and well established canons of construction.” State v. Gen. Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars , 144 W.Va. 137, 144, 107 S.E.2d 353, 358 (1959). Critically,

[t]he only mode in which the will of the legislature is spoken is in the statute itself. In the construction of statutes, it is the legislative intent manifested in the statute

that is important and such intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute .... and the general rule is that no intent may be imputed to the legislature other than that supported by the face of the statute itself. .... A statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form in which it is enacted.

Id . at 144–45, 107 S.E.2d at 358. (emphasis added). As we previously stated herein, “statutes which have common purpose will be regarded in pari materia ... [and] a court should ... review the act or statute in its entirety to ascertain legislative intent properly.” Syl. Pt. 5, in part, Fruehauf Corp ., 159 W.Va. 14, 217 S.E.2d 907. As the Supreme Court of Massachusetts observed in reference to similar “imprecisions” in its election laws,

[t]hey simply goad us to undertake a holistic evaluation of the election law regime, and to ascertain as we must “the intent of the statute from all its parts and from the subject matter to which it relates.” DiGiacomo v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co ., 66 Mass.App.Ct. 343, 346, 847 N.E.2d 1107 (2006). See Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., supra at 839, 494 N.E.2d 1008 (courts “should not accept the literal meaning of the words of a statute without regard for that statute's purpose and history”). Thus, we turn to the statutory scheme “as a whole,” Wolfe v. Gormally, supra , mindful that “[t]he general purpose of the Legislature in enacting the statutes regulating ... elections was to make a reasonably consistent and harmonious body of law ... which should have the final result of filling the offices required by law.” Thacher v. Secretary of the Commonwealth , 250 Mass. 188, 190, 145 N.E. 256 (1924).

Libertarian Assoc. of Mass. v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth , 462 Mass. 538, 969 N.E.2d 1095, 1105–06 (2012).

In examining the election laws in pari materia , it becomes apparent that it was the Legislature's intention that West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 was for use exclusively by unaffiliated or minor party candidates. Our election code provides that “[a]t each primary election, the candidate or candidates of each political party”—which quite obviously includes the Democratic party—“shall be nominated by the voters of the different political parties ... [by a] plurality of the votes cast[.]” W. Va. Code § 3–5–4(a). Quite simply, members of recognized political parties are to be nominated by their party during the primary election. In view of the fact that the primary process is available only to candidates of “each political party,” individuals who do not belong to these parties, as defined by statute, or any minor political party ostensibly have no means of entering the election process in absence of the provisions of West Virginia Code § 3–5–23.

West Virginia Code § 3–5–23, therefore, provides for the certificate nomination process and quite understandably reads in terms of groups of citizens who “hav[e] no party organization” and candidates who “are not already candidates in the primary election.” W. Va. Code § 3–5–23(a). The absence of any provision even suggesting that the certificate nomination process is available to a recognized party candidate compels a conclusion to the contrary. As noted above, “no intent may be imputed to the legislature other than that supported by the face of the statute itself.” Gen. Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, 144 W.Va. at 145, 107 S.E.2d at 358. This Court therefore may not impute the availability of the certificate nomination process to a recognized party candidate inasmuch as the face of the statute quite simply does not support any such usage.

The evolution of the statute lends further credence to our conclusion that it was not designed for, and therefore does not permit, a member of a recognized political party to avail himself of its process. The 1916 version of the statute provided that nomination by certificate was available to “[p]olitical parties having national organization ,” but having cast less than ten percent of the total vote cast for governor at the general election. W. Va. Code § 3–5–23 (1916) (emphasis added). Clearly, this language contemplates minor party candidates. Presumably in view of the fact that the statute, as then constructed, did not appear to allow for unaffiliated candidates, the statute was amended in 1941 to make itself available to “groups of citizens having no party organization[.]” W. Va. Code § 3–4–29 (1941) (emphasis added).

Not only is this conclusion consistent with the statutory scheme and compelled by our canons of statutory construction, its equity is apparent. In light of our above conclusion that candidates must file a certificate of announcement declaring their party affiliation, to permit recognized political party candidates to then by-pass the primary and use the nomination certificate process allows him or her to then appear on the ballot ostensibly as the candidate of one of the recognized parties. To suggest that this would create voter confusion is putting it mildly. These requirements seek to avoid “political opportunism which is [ ] likely to threaten the State's interests”, Billings , 194 W.Va. at 308, 460 S.E.2d at 443, and are necessary to maintain “order, rather than chaos” in the nomination process. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). As in this case, petitioner was a registered Democrat, yet held himself out for purposes of obtaining nomination certificate signatures as “independent.” Accordingly, to allow him to appear on the ballot as “independent” or “unaffiliated” is patently false; to allow him to appear on the ballot as “Democrat” suggests that he is his party's nominee—also patently false.

These considerations inexorably lead to the conclusion that in order to “maintain[ ] the integrity of different routes to the ballot and [ ] stabiliz[e] the political system,” West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 is available only to unaffiliated or minor party candidates. Polly v. Navarro , 457 So.2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. App. 1984). Plainly, this same conclusion was reached by the State's chief elections official, as evidenced by the form promulgated by her office entitled “Minor Party or Independent Candidate Nomination Petition.” We therefore hold that a candidate who is registered and affiliated with a recognized “political party” as defined in West Virginia Code § 3–1–8 may not become a candidate for political office by virtue of the nomination certificate process outlined in West Virginia Code § 3–5–23.

C. Constitutional Issues

Petitioner asserts that he has fully complied with the substantive and procedural requirements of West Virginia Code §§ 3–5–23 and –24, and therefore has the fundamental constitutional right to ballot access through the signature petitions. Petitioner maintains that his right to become a candidate for public office is a fundamental right, see Garcelon v. Rutledge , 173 W.Va. 572, 318 S.E.2d 622 (1984), and there is nothing preventing him, a registered Democrat, from running as an unaffiliated candidate pursuant to the provisions set forth in West Virginia Code § 3–5–23. He reminds this Court that candidates' rights are necessarily tied to voters' rights. See Bullock v. Carter , 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). Petitioner states that the circuit court's decision effectively denied 900 Kanawha County voters the right to nominate and vote in the general election for a candidate of their choice.

Respondent counters that Petitioner is not being denied access to the general election ballot because of any arbitrary and capricious action by those who supervise the election process and ballot for Kanawha County elections. Rather, Respondent maintains that petitioner should not be included on the general election ballot because he chose to ignore all of the options which would have permitted him to be on the ballot as a representative of the party to which he belongs, the Democratic party. Having decided at the last minute to fling his “Democratic hat into the ring,” petitioner failed to change his registration to unaffiliated at least sixty-one days before filing his certificate of candidacy under West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 ; he compounded that problem by refusing to fully complete the Candidate's Certificate of Announcement, leaving his party affiliation blank.

In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992), the United States Supreme Court established a balancing test to evaluate challenges to state ballot access requirements:

A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). The required analysis “depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Id. For “severe” restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992) ). For “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,” the “State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.” Id. (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

Without question, “[t]he impact of candidate eligibility requirements on voters implicates basic constitutional rights.” Anderson , 460 U.S. at 786, 103 S.Ct. 1564. Nonetheless, “not all restrictions imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally-suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates.” Id . at 787, 103 S.Ct. 1564. “[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” Storer, 415 U.S. at 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274. In syllabus point four of Sowards v. County Comm'n of Lincoln Cty. , 196 W.Va. 739, 474 S.E.2d 919 (1996), we held:

The State of West Virginia through its Legislature retains the authority to prescribe reasonable rules for the conduct of elections, reasonable procedures by which candidates may qualify to run for office, and the manner in which they will be elected.

While he raised a constitutional argument as an assignment of error, petitioner does not set forth constitutional challenges to any specific provision of our State's election code. In particular, he fails to advance the argument that the January deadline set forth in West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 for the filing of a certificate of announcement creates a burden that falls unequally to a candidate seeking ballot access through West Virginia Code § 3–5–23. In the same fashion, petitioner does not assert that the substantive requirements imposed by West Virginia Code § 3–5–7 impose any particular burden on those candidates.

Instead, petitioner contends that groups of citizens under West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 are free to nominate any qualified citizen and there is no compelling state interest in requiring their candidate to file a certificate of announcement under West Virginia Code § 3–5–7. On this issue, petitioner confuses the right of citizen voters with his own and therein misapprehends the proper test for reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulations on the candidate. See Timmons , 520 U.S. at 358–59, 117 S.Ct. 1364 (noting state need not establish that ballot access restrictions are narrowly tailored and necessary to promote its interests unless restrictions severely burden rights). Ultimately, the focal point of our inquiry is whether a “reasonably diligent” candidate can be expected to satisfy the requirement. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 742, 94 S.Ct. 1274. In this regard, petitioner has failed to establish or even argue that he could not satisfy the requirements set forth in West Virginia Code § 3–5–7. He simply maintains those requirements are inapplicable to his candidacy. As discussed above, we reject that argument because it goes against the plain language of the statute.

We do not disagree with petitioner's claim that pursuant to West Virginia Code § 3–5–23, a group of citizens has the right to associate together to express their support for a candidate and select its “standard bearer.” Such a group would have similar constitutional protections as those who are members of a majority political party because the freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments includes political organizations. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) ; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). “The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.” Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57, 94 S.Ct. 303, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973). The First Amendment protects not only an individual's right to associate with the political party of his or her choice, it also protects citizens' right “to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political views.” See California Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 574, 120 S.Ct. 2402 (2000) (holding California's proposition which converted State's primary election from closed to blanket primary in which voters could vote for any candidate regardless of voter's or candidate's party affiliation violated political parties' First Amendment right of association); Clingman v. Beaver , 544 U.S. 581, 600, 125 S.Ct. 2029, 161 L.Ed.2d 920 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (“constitutional protection of associational rights is especially important in th[e] context [of primary elections] because the aggregation of votes is, in some sense, the essence of the electoral process. To have a meaningful voice in this process, the individual voter must join together with like-minded others at the polls. And the choice of who will participate in selecting a party's candidate obviously plays a critical role in determining both the party's message and its prospects of success in the electoral contest.”).

It does not follow, though, that a third party or unaffiliated group of citizens who nominates a candidate pursuant to the provisions set forth in West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 is absolutely entitled to have its nominee appear on the ballot. See Libertarian Party of New Hampshire v. Gardner , 759 F.Supp.2d 215, 225 (D.N.H. 2010), aff'd , 638 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding right to nominate candidate does not translate into right to control whose name appears on election ballot). A particular candidate might be ineligible for office, unwilling to serve, or, as here, fail to comply with the State election law. “It seems to us that limiting the choice of candidates to those who have complied with state election law requirements is the prototypical example of a regulation that, while it affects the right to vote, is eminently reasonable.” Burdick , 504 U.S. at 440 n.10, 112 S.Ct. 2059.

Accordingly, we agree with respondent that this is not a ballot access case. As discussed more fully above, petitioner, a registered Democrat, had the opportunity to seek ballot access through the provisions of West Virginia Code 3–5–7 but simply failed to do so.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we therefore affirm the circuit court's August 18, 2016, order granting respondent's amended petition for writ of quo warranto, disallowing petitioner's candidacy for the office of Kanawha County Clerk, in the November, 2016 general election.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE DAVIS dissents and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.

Davis, Justice, dissenting:

The case sub judice is not a difficult case to decide. This State's statutes, as well as this Court's prior cases interpreting those statutes, clearly address the issues raised in these proceedings and lead to the inevitable conclusion that Mr. Wells has satisfied the requirements to run as an independent candidate for the office of Clerk of Kanawha County in the November 2016 General Election. Be that as it may, my colleagues nevertheless have convoluted the issues in this case by doggedly deciding that Mr. Wells is not a proper candidate for office despite his satisfaction of all of the statutory requirements that entitle him to have his name placed on the 2016 General Election ballot. In reaching this conclusion, the majority has determined to ignore the express statutory language and our established precedent, instead inserting into these authorities invisible requirements that neither were intended nor adopted by the Legislature in promulgating this State's election laws. Because the majority's opinion is wholly unsupported by the applicable law and completely fails to follow the express statutory language governing these proceedings, I emphatically dissent.

Mr. Wells is an Independent Candidate

The crux of this case involves Mr. Wells' decision to run for office as an independent, or unaffiliated, candidate. Such nomenclature should not be confused with the Independent Party, which is a viable third party in many states. In West Virginia, however, it is not, because the Independent Party has not satisfied the statutory requirements requisite to its recognition as a “political party.” See W. Va. Code § 3–1–8 (1965) (Repl. Vol. 2013). Thus, the majority's supposition that allowing Mr. Wells, who has conceded that he is a registered member of the Democrat Party, to run as an independent would confuse the voters is unfounded and without merit. All that Mr. Wells has professed to do is to run as an independent candidate who is not affiliated with any party. He is not seeking to run as a candidate representing the Democrat Party, or any other party, under the cloak of independence. Rather, Mr. Wells seeks to run for public office as an individual, who may or may not have a party affiliation, without representing any political party as its candidate.

Unquestionably, Mr. Wells is entitled to run as an independent candidate because of his constitutional right to freedom of association. While the majority attempts to sweep this inherent freedom under the rug, simply minimizing its existence does not obviate the importance of this fundamental constitutional right. The United States Supreme Court has explained the protections afforded by the freedom of association as follows:

“It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) ; see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522–523, 80 S.Ct. 412, 416–417, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960). The freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments includes partisan political organization. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2681, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion)[.] “The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.” Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57, 94 S.Ct. 303, 307, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973).

Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut , 479 U.S. 208, 214, 107 S.Ct. 544, 548, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (additional citation omitted). Likewise, the Court has observed that

[b]arring political parties from endorsing and opposing candidates not only burdens their freedom of speech but also infringes upon their freedom of association. It is well settled that partisan political organizations enjoy freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Tashjian, supra, 479 U.S. at 214, 107 S.Ct. at 548 ; see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2681, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion). Freedom of association means not only that an individual voter has the right to associate with the political party of her choice, Tashjian, supra, 479 U.S. at 214, 107 S.Ct. at 548 (quoting Kusper [ v. Pontikes ], supra, 414 U.S. [51], at 57, 94 S.Ct. [303], at 307[, 38 L.Ed. 2d 260 (1973) ] ), but also that a political party has a right to “ ‘identify the people who constitute the association,’ ” Tashjian, supra, 479 U.S. at 214, 107 S.Ct. at 548 (quoting Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122, 101 S.Ct. 1010, 1019, 67 L.Ed.2d 82 (1981) ); cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–462, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), and to select a “standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences.” Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 384, 525 F.2d 567, 601 (1975) (Tamm, J., concurring in result), cert. denied

, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976).

Depriving a political party of the power to endorse suffocates this right.

Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm. , 489 U.S. 214, 224, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1020–21, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989).

In addressing the freedom of association, it is apparent that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to associate cuts both ways—individuals have the right to associate with political organizations of their choosing and political organizations have the right to identify candidates who best reflect their beliefs. Thus, Mr. Wells has a right to associate with the group of citizens who nominated him to run for the office of Kanawha County Clerk and the group of citizens who signed the nominating petitions endorsing his candidacy have a right to select the candidate who they want to represent them. In rendering its ruling in this case, though, the majority unabashedly has decided that a candidate for political office may associate with but one group—the political party of which he is a registered member—and that the citizens who support him as a candidate representing their ideology have no right to associate with him because he is already “spoken for.” I can find no support for such an interpretation of the constitutional right to freedom of association, and I am simply incredulous that my brethren have adopted such a myopic view.

Independent Candidates are Governed by W. Va. Code § 3–5–23

The majority perpetuates its error by failing to give credence to the statute that governs independent or unaffiliated candidates, W. Va. Code § 3–5–23 (2009) (Repl. Vol. 2013), and this Court's interpretation thereof. By dictating that a candidate who is a registered member of a recognized political party cannot run as an independent or unaffiliated candidate, the majority casts aside all of the provisions of W. Va. Code § 3–5–23 in which the Legislature has painstakingly delineated the nomination process for such candidates. In doing so, the Legislature has not imposed a requirement that the candidate not be registered as a member of another political party and, in fact, even permits voters who are registered members of a political party to sign nominating certificates: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code to the contrary, a duly registered voter may sign the certificate provided in this section and may vote for candidates of his or her choosing in the corresponding primary election .” W. Va. Code § 3–5–23(d) (emphasis added).

Moreover, this Court expressly has held that

[a]n unsuccessful candidate for a nomination in a primary election may afterwards be nominated by certificate, under the provisions of the statute above referred to, as a candidate of a political party other than that with which he declared himself, on oath, to be affiliated in the preceding primary election.

Syl. pt. 2, George v. Board of Ballot Comm'rs , 79 W.Va. 213, 90 S.E. 550 (1916). This interpretation of W. Va. Code § 3–5–23 also presupposes that a person who is a registered member of a recognized political party may run as an independent candidate given that only members of recognized political parties may participate in this State's primary elections. Although the Legislature has revised the subject statutory language to prevent unsuccessful primary election candidates from subsequently running as independent candidates, the legislative amendments have stopped short of incorporating an unaffiliated proviso into the eligibility requirements of independent candidates. Cf. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party , 520 U.S. 351, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (approving Minnesota's anti-fusion law); Storer v. Brown , 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (upholding California's one-year disaffiliation provision).

When interpreting a statute, this Court is charged with following the intent of the Legislature—not inserting or substituting our judgment for that of the legislators enacting the statutory language at issue. In this regard, this Court previously has held that “[t]he Legislature must be presumed to know the language employed in former acts, and, if in a subsequent statute on the same subject it uses different language in the same connection, the court must presume that a change in the law was intended.” Syl. pt. 2, Hall v. Baylous, 109 W.Va. 1, 153 S.E. 293 (1930). Similarly, “[i]t is not for [courts] arbitrarily to read into [a statute] that which it does not say. Just as courts are not to eliminate through judicial interpretation words that were purposely included, we are obliged not to add to statutes something the Legislature purposefully omitted. ” Banker v. Banker , 196 W.Va. 535, 546–47, 474 S.E.2d 465, 476–77 (1996) (emphasis added; citations omitted). Accord Syl. pt. 3, in part, West Virginia Health Care Cost Review Auth. v. Boone Mem'l Hosp. , 196 W.Va. 326, 472 S.E.2d 411 (1996) (“If the language of an enactment is clear and within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it, courts must read the relevant law according to its unvarnished meaning, without any judicial embroidery.”). Thus, it is apparent that the Legislature expressly intended to change the meaning of W. Va. Code § 3–5–23 to prohibit former primary candidates from running as independent candidates by employing specific wording to this effect. See Syl. pt. 2, Hall , 109 W.Va. 1, 153 S.E. 293. However, it is equally apparent that, by not incorporating a disaffiliation provision, the Legislature did not intend to permit only individuals who are not registered members of any political party from seeking office as an independent candidate. See Banker , 196 W.Va. at 546–47, 474 S.E.2d at 476–77.

Despite its express acknowledgment that W. Va. Code § 3–5–23 governs independent candidates, the majority's insertion of an additional requirement that the candidate be unaffiliated ascribes a meaning to the statute that the Legislature did not intend. Although the Legislature, in its many amendments of this section, certainly could have added an unaffiliated requirement to its terms as have other states, its failure to do so for one hundred years after this Court expressly found that a candidate who is affiliated with a major political party nevertheless can run for office as an independent candidate dictates that the Legislature never intended the restrictive interpretation the majority has ascribed to W. Va. Code § 3–5–23. As such, this Court's longstanding, century old interpretation of a candidate's eligibility to seek office as an independent candidate, as well as the Legislature's implicit approval thereof, invariably remains intact in light of the majority's failure to expressly overrule the same. The resulting discordance—between our centennial opinion in George and the majority's confounding refusal to either follow or invalidate this precedent—undoubtedly will create an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty for individuals seeking to run as independent candidates and officials charged with enforcing this State's election laws alike.

Independent Candidates are Not Required to File Certificate of Announcement

The majority further erred by requiring independent candidates, such as Mr. Wells, to comply with the certificate of announcement requirements of W. Va. Code § 3–5–7 (2015) (Supp. 2016). Such a ruling completely ignores the statutory language at issue in this case as well as this Court's prior opinion interpreting the same and is a wrong interpretation of the applicable law.

W. Va. Code § 3–5–7 begins with the requirement that

[a]ny person who is eligible and seeks to hold an office or political party position to be filled by election in any primary or general election held under the provisions of this chapter shall file a certificate of announcement declaring his or her candidacy for the nomination or election to the office.

W. Va. Code § 3–5–7(a). Interpreting the earlier version of this statute, which did not include the general election reference, this Court specifically found that candidates who were independent or representing a third party through the nominating certificate process of W. Va. Code § 3–5–23 were not required to file a certificate of announcement under W. Va. Code § 3–5–7 :

Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 3–5–23(a) (1986), the deadline for filing with the secretary of state the certificate and fee for a person seeking ballot access as a candidate for the office of president or vice-president as the nominee of a third-party otherwise qualifying for inclusion on the general election ballot by method other than primary election is the first day of August preceding the general election, and such persons are not required to file a declaration of candidacy pursuant to W. Va. Code § 3–5–7 (1991) .

Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Browne v. Hechler , 197 W.Va. 612, 476 S.E.2d 559 (1996) (emphasis added).

While the statutory language of W. Va. Code § 3–5–7 has changed slightly since this Court's decision in Browne, the overarching fairness concerns have not, nor have they been addressed by the legislative amendments to this statute. In Browne, the Court recognized that the Legislature had imposed an August 1 filing deadline for presidential and vice-presidential candidates and, because they were not selected through the primary election process, the January filing deadlines for the certificate of announcement requirement of W. Va. Code § 3–5–7, which then pertained solely to primary election candidates, could not be applied to them. Browne , 197 W.Va. at 614, 476 S.E.2d at 561. W. Va. Code § 3–5–7 now governs both primary and general election candidates, but two salient distinctions between the major political party candidates governed by W. Va. Code § 3–5–7 and the independent and third party candidates governed by W. Va. Code § 3–5–23 remain: (1) independent and third party candidates, by definition , do not participate in the primary election process and (2) W. Va. Code § 3–5–24 (2014) (Supp. 2016) imposes a separate filing deadline for independent and third party candidates which cannot be reconciled with the filing deadline imposed by W. Va. Code § 3–5–23.

In Anderson v. Celebrezze , 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (plurality opinion), the United States Supreme Court found that an Ohio statute requiring independent and third party candidates to satisfy pre-primary filing deadlines was unconstitutional because such candidates are not selected through the primary election process and the legislation failed to appreciate the associational rights of such candidates and the voters who support them. The Supreme Court explained the unconstitutional impact of such deadlines upon independent candidates, and their citizen supporters, as follows:

Not only does the challenged Ohio statute totally exclude any candidate who makes the decision to run for [office] as an independent after the March deadline. It also burdens the signature-gathering efforts of independents who decide to run in time to meet the deadline. When the primary campaigns are far in the future and the election itself is even more remote, the obstacles facing an independent candidate's organizing efforts are compounded. Volunteers are more difficult to recruit and retain, media publicity and campaign contributions are more difficult to secure, and voters are less interested in the campaign.

It is clear, then, that the March filing deadline places a particular burden on an

identifiable segment of Ohio's independent-minded voters. As our cases have held, it is especially difficult for the State to justify a restriction that limits political participation by an identifiable political group whose members share a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status. “Our ballot access cases ... focus on the degree to which the challenged restrictions operate as a mechanism to exclude certain classes of candidates from the electoral process. The inquiry is whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens ‘the availability of political opportunity.’ ” Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2844, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (plurality opinion), quoting Lubin v. Panish, supra, 415 U.S. [709], at 716, 94 S.Ct. [1315], at 1320[, 39 L.Ed. 2d 702 (1974) ].

A burden that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the First Amendment. It discriminates against those candidates and—of particular importance—against those voters whose political preferences lie outside the existing political parties. Clements v. Fashing, supra, 457 U.S. at 964, 102 S.Ct. at 2844 (plurality opinion). By limiting the opportunities of independent-minded voters to associate in the electoral arena to enhance their political effectiveness as a group, such restrictions threaten to reduce diversity and competition in the marketplace of ideas. Historically political figures outside the two major parties have been fertile sources of new ideas and new programs; many of their challenges to the status quo have in time made their way into the political mainstream. Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, supra, 440 U.S. [173], at 186, 99 S.Ct. [983], at 991 [, 59 L.Ed. 2d 230 (1979) ] ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 345 [354] U.S. 234, 250–251, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211–1212, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (opinion of Warren, C.J.). In short, the primary values protected by the First Amendment—“a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) —are served when election campaigns are not monopolized by the existing political parties.

Anderson v. Celebrezze , 460 U.S. at 792–94, 103 S.Ct. at 1572–73, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (footnotes and citation omitted). From this ruling in Anderson, then, it is apparent that the application of early filing deadlines to independent and third party candidates raises significant constitutional concerns regarding the freedom of such candidates and their supporters to associate.

Moreover, the majority's opinion effectively imposes two conflicting sets of filing deadlines upon independent candidates. By definition, an independent or third party candidate is someone who has not participated in the primary election, which criterion presupposes that the primary election must have been held before the persons eligible to run as independent or third party candidates can be determined. W. Va. Code § 3–5–23(a). W. Va. Code § 3–5–7 requires all candidates, for both the primary and general elections, to file a certificate of announcement by the end of January preceding the primary election. W. Va. Code § 3–5–7(c). If independent candidates must first wait for the primary election to run its course to determine who may run as an independent candidate, however, it is impossible for independent candidates to satisfy this temporal requirement. Moreover, W. Va. Code § 3–5–24, which pertains only to independent and third party candidates, and not to all candidates generally, imposes a completely different filing deadline. Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 3–5–24(a), independent and third party candidates are required to file their candidacy papers by August 1 before the general election. This Court has long recognized that when both a general and a specific statute apply to a given set of facts, our well-established rules of statutory construction instruct that the specific statute governs. “The rules of statutory construction require that a specific statute will control over a general statute[.]” Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. Caryl, 181 W.Va. 42, 45, 380 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1989) (citations omitted). Here, it is apparent that the specific August 1 filing deadline that applies solely to independent and third party candidates is the operative date by which Mr. Wells' candidacy papers should have been filed as opposed to the more general requirements of W. Va. Code § 3–5–7, which apply to all candidates without regard for the specific source of their candidacy.

Finally, the majority has condoned the circuit court's rejection of Mr. Wells' candidacy based solely upon his failure to complete the party affiliation portion of his certificate of announcement. While I disagree that Mr. Wells, as an independent candidate, was required to complete a certificate of announcement, I most certainly do not believe that his failure to list his party affiliation, standing alone, is sufficient to deprive him of the opportunity to run for public office. W. Va. Code § 3–5–7(d)(6) requires all candidates for partisan elections to list their party affiliation; W. Va. Code § 3–5–23(d) permits, but does not require, independent candidates to disclose their party affiliation. In the case sub judice , Mr. Wells invariably found himself in a proverbial catch–22 situation when he was required to file a certificate of announcement under W. Va. Code § 3–5–7 : he could either disclose his party affiliation as Democrat and risk being mistaken as a candidate representing that party, rather than as a candidate running independently of any particular party, or he could have listed independent as his party affiliation to signify that he is running as an independent candidate and risk prosecution for knowingly providing false information under W. Va. Code § 3–5–7(f). Rather than choosing between the lesser of these two evils, Mr. Wells simply left the party affiliation section of his certificate of announcement blank, as he was allowed to do on his independent candidacy papers, and now he must endure the wrath of that choice.

As noted previously, specific statutes are preferred over general statutes. Here, the requirement to disclose a candidate's party affiliation under W. Va. Code § 3–5–7(d)(6) simply cannot be reconciled with the discretionary disclosure language of W. Va. Code § 3–5–23(d). In such circumstances of irresolvable statutory conflict, “[t]he general rule of statutory construction requires that a specific statute be given precedence over a general statute relating to the same subject matter where the two cannot be reconciled.” Syl. pt. 1, UMWA by Trumka v. Kingdon, 174 W.Va. 330, 325 S.E.2d 120 (1984). Thus, as an independent candidate, Mr. Wells' candidacy filings were governed by those statutes that pertain specifically to independent candidates—W. Va. Code §§ 3–5–23 and 3–5–24 —and not by the provision applicable to all candidates generally.

Independent Candidate Nominated by Certificate is Entitled to Inclusion on Ballot

Lastly, I take issue with the majority's suggestion indicating that, “[i]t does not follow, though, that a third party or unaffiliated group of citizens who nominates a candidate pursuant to the provisions set forth in West Virginia Code § 3–5–23 is absolutely entitled to have its nominee appear on the ballot.” (Citation omitted). Such a misguided statement completely ignores the express statutory language governing the candidacies of independent and third party candidates.

Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 3–5–23(d), “[a]ll candidates nominated by the signing of the certificates shall have their names placed on the official ballot as candidates, as if otherwise nominated under the provisions of this chapter.” (Emphasis added). This Court previously has held that “[g]enerally the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar significance and meaning, and regard is to be had for their general and proper use.” Syl. pt. 4, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars , 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959). Moreover, “[i]t is well established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory connotation.” Syl. pt. 1, Nelson v. West Virginia Pub. Emps. Ins. Bd., 171 W.Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982). In light of these established precedents, then, it is apparent that if an independent candidate has satisfied the nominating requirements and obtained the requisite signatures, his name is required to be placed on the ballot. As such, because he satisfied the requirements to run as an independent candidate, Mr. Wells' name should be listed on the 2016 General Election ballot as a candidate for the office of Kanawha County Clerk. The majority's supposition to the contrary is simply not supported by the express statutory language.

Majority's Decision Disenfranchises Mr. Wells and His Supporters

The Legislature clearly delineates the path an independent candidate for public office must follow to have his name placed upon the general election ballot. For reasons that escape me, the majority has littered this path with procedural landmines that not only make it virtually impossible for an independent candidate to achieve ballot access but which also disenfranchise those voters who wish to associate with such candidate. The United States Supreme Court appreciated the challenges faced by unaffiliated voters and third parties, cautioning that imposing early filing deadlines upon the candidates representing these groups would have deleterious consequences—not just for these candidates and the voters they represent but for the major political parties also.

The characteristic American third party ... consists of a group of people who have tried to exert influence within one of the major parties, have failed, and later decide to work on the outside. States in which there is an early qualifying date tend to force such groups to create minor parties without first attempting to influence the course taken by a major one. For a dissident group is put to the choice of foregoing major-party primary and other prenomination activity by organizing separately early on in an election year, or losing all opportunity for action as a third party later.

The same analysis, of course, is applicable to a “dissident group” that coalesces around an independent candidate rather than attempting to form a new political party.

Anderson v. Celebrezze , 460 U.S. at 805, 103 S.Ct. at 1578–79, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

The effect of the majority's decision herein is not limited solely to the fate of Mr. Wells' candidacy for the office of Kanawha County Clerk. Rather, many more independent and third party candidates likely will be adversely impacted by these rulings in both this election cycle and in future years to come. Individuals, be they candidates for political office or voters for such candidates, are constitutionally guaranteed the right to associate with others who share their beliefs. Because the majority's decision in this case eviscerates this fundamental right, I resolutely dissent.