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applying Heck without specifically addressing the relevance of the nolo contendere plea
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Civ. NO 99-537 SECTION "A"
April 6, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the defendant, NOPD Officer Emelda Garrett's FRCP Rule 50(b)(1)(C) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law dismissing of the plaintiff's excessive force claim pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994) and setting aside the punitive damage verdict inasmuch as the jury found "$0" compensatory damages proximately caused by the defendant. The plaintiff filed formal opposition, to which the defendant Officer Emelda Garrett replied. The matter is deemed submitted for decision there, being no necessity of an oral hearing. For the reasons stated herein below defendant's motion is GRANTED.
FRCP Rule 50(b)(C) pertaining to renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law provides:
If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all of the evidence, the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. The movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment — and may alternatively request a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on a renewed motion, the court may:
(1) if a verdict was returned:
(A) allow the judgment to stand,
(B) order a new trial, or
(C) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law;. . . .
At the close of plaintiff's case, the Court granted defense counsel's motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the defendants, the City of New Orleans, the New Orleans Police Department and Police Officer Richard Pennington. (Rec.Doc. No. 28 attached]. During the trial, the Court also dismissed plaintiff's claims as to NOPD Officers, Elizabeth Coste and Louis Richardson. According to the plaintiff's own version of the incident which occurred at the time her arrest on the parade route, neither Officer Coste nor Officer Richardson were guilty of any offensive conduct aimed at the plaintiff.
The entire thrust of the plaintiff's opposition is that: (1) the trial record clearly supports the jury's verdict since no evidence of Watson's convictions were presented in evidence or proffered in the case; (2) the jury found that plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the defendant's intentional conduct; and, and in any event; and, in any event, (3) the jury heard the callous indifference in the defendant's voice and such arrogance standing alone is sufficient to warrant imposition of an award of punitive damages.
The Heck problem is plainly a question of law and the Watson's convictions were undisputed. Prior to trial, the Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the false arrest claim on the basis of Heck and the Watson's state-court convictions. [Rec.Doc. No. 22 attached]. It was uncontested in the pre-trial order that the plaintiff pled nolo contendere (i.e., no contest) and was convicted in municipal court on three counts-battery on a police officer, resisting arrest and public intoxication. Plaintiff was fined $1,500.00 and ordered to pay $350.00 in restitution to Officer Emelda Garrett. Watson paid Officer Garrett full restitution in the amount of $350.00.
See, Pre-Trial Order Listing Statements of Uncontested Material Facts and Stipulations at para. 7B. [Rec.Doc. No. 15 attached]. It states:
"1. Plaintiff was arrested for resisting arrest and battery on a police officer to which she plead no contest in Municipal Court. She was fined $1,500.00 and ordered to pay an additional $350.00 in restitution.
2. Plaintiff was drinking on the day in question.
3. Plaintiff used racial slurs during the incident.
4. Plaintiff refused medical treatment at Charity Hospital.
5. Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with Sheriff's deputies who attempted to book her." Id.
In summary, pursuant to the defendants' motion just prior to trial in the captioned proceeding this Court granted judgment as a matter of law dismissing the plaintiff's false arrest claim on the basis of Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2372 (1994). This Court previously held that because the plaintiff, Dolva Watson ("Watson"), pled no contest and was convicted of the charges surrounding the subject arrest and prosecution, plaintiff was barred from bringing her false arrest claim which is related to her conviction unless she could prove "that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994) To date, the plaintiff has not challenged the finality of the aforesaid convictions. In the pre-trial order, the fact of and the validity of plaintiff's related convictions were uncontested and the subject of stipulation. Also as required by the FRCP Rule 50, at the close of defendant's case, counsel for Officer Emelda Garrett reurged her motion for judgment as a matter of law dismissing plaintiff's claims.
See, Smooth Minutes [Rec.Doc. No. 26 attached].
In Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Louisiana arrestee's state court conviction for assault on a police officer barred his excessive force claim against that officer. The Hudson court explained that Heck precludes Hudson's section 1983 claim based on excessive force during an arrest, as follows:
Hudson was arrested and convicted of battery of an officer. In Louisiana, self-defense is a justification defense the crime of battery of an officer. See, LSA-R.S . 14:19; Louisiana v. Blancaneaux, 535 So.2d 1341 (La.App. 1988) (discussing justification defense to battery of officer conviction). To make out a justification defense, the criminal defendant charged with battery of an officer must show that his use of force against an officer was both reasonable and necessary to prevent a forcible offense against himself. Blancaneaux, 535 So.2d 1342. Because self-defense is a justification defense to the crime of battery of an officer, Hudson's claim that Officers Defillo, Hingle and Lanasa used excessive force while apprehending him, if proved, necessarily would imply the invalidity of his arrest and conviction for battery of an officer. This is true because the question whether the police applied reasonable force in arresting him depends in part on the degree of his resistance, which in turn will place in issue whether his resistance (the basis of his conviction for assaulting a police officer) was justified, which, if it were, necessarily undermines that conviction. We conclude therefore that to the extent that Hudson seeks to recover . . . for the alleged use of excessive force during an arrest, his section 1983 action may not proceed.Id., at 873.
LSA-R.S. 14:19 provides:
The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable, when committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense or trespass against property in a person's lawful possession; provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense, and that this article shall not apply where the force or violence results in homicide.
See also, Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding similarly that the arrestee's state-court conviction for aggravated assault on a police officer barred his Section 1983 excessive force claim against the officer, inasmuch as such claim was necessarily inconsistent with his conviction for aggravated assault of a police officer.). The Sappington court held, as a matter of law that the force Sappington claimed was used could not, under Heck, be deemed excessive. Id., at 236.
Counsel for plaintiff argues that the Hudson case is inapposite because the excessive force of which the plaintiff complained occurred after Watson was detained and not in the process of her arrest along the Orpheus parade. The Court finds this argument without merit. The Court heard the evidence adduced at trial and the only battery allegedly committed by any officer after the plaintiff was carted off from the Orpheus parade site at the intersection of Loyola Avenue and Canal Street, occurred while plaintiff was in custody of Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff when one of the Sheriff's deputies at the time of her booking at Orleans Parish Prison battered the plaintiff in the head. Plaintiff testified at trial that she did not sue the Sheriff's deputy because she believed her injuries were caused by Officer Garrett. Plaintiff testified that the Sheriff's deputy who battered her in the face or head merely caused her prior head injury to reopen and bleed. In summary, the alleged excessive force involving Officer Garrett, according to plaintiff's own testimony, occurred during the NOPD officers' attempts to cuff, subdue, and keep the plaintiff under arrest until the van picked up detainees at the parade site and hauled the plaintiff off to Charity Hospital.
Although the Court need not address the alternative issue of the jury verdict of $250 in punitive damages which clashes with the zero dollar verdicts for compensatory damages, the Court feels compelled to note its considered opinion that such verdict was the result of impermissible jury compromise. There were explicit instruction counseling against a punitive award where there was a complete failure of proof as to any element.
More to the point, the Court instructed the jury at several intervals as set forth below, and the Court is convinced in light of the lack of evidence as to causation of damages and the "$0" verdicts as to both categories of compensatory damages, that these instructions were not ignored:
But fault is only one of three elements of the plaintiff's Louisiana law claims. As I have previously told you, in order to be successful, a plaintiff must establish all the essential elements of a claim. The other elements are:
(1) That any damages the plaintiff suffered were, in fact, caused by the wrongful conduct of the defendant; and
(2) That there was actual damage to the person of the plaintiff.
See, Jury Instructions, at p. 13 (emphasis added). [Rec.Doc. No. 27].
This Court's instructions to the jury further explained "[w]ith regard to the requirement that the plaintiff sustained what are referred to actual damages . . . that actual damages may include physical injury, pain, suffering, and mental anguish, humiliation or embarrassment."
Id., at p. 14.
The Court further cautioned jurors, as follows:
You are not to award damages for any injury or condition from which the plaintiff may have suffered, or may now be suffering, unless it has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence in the case that such injury or condition was proximately or directly caused by the incident in question.
In proving damages, a plaintiff has the burden of proving through medical testimony that it was more probable than not that subsequent injuries were caused by trauma suffered in the incident in question.
Id., at p. 20.
These repetitious instructions are significant in light of the jury's response to Special Interrogatory No. 7, which asked:
"What amount of money, if any, do you find will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff Dolva Watson for any injury she sustained?
Physical injury, pain suffering, mental anguish, emotional distress, etc. $ _________ Past medical expenses $ _________"
See, Verdict Form, at Interrogatory No. 7, a copy of which is attached hereto [Rec.Doc. No. 26].
To Jury Interrogatory No. 7, the jury filled in "$0" as to physical injury, pain, suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress, and also, "$0" as to any past medical expenses. The Court notes that the plaintiff did not call any of her treating physicians to testify as to any injuries she allegedly sustained. Plaintiff did submit medical reports, none of which related plaintiff's injuries more probably than not to the incident which allegedly occurred at the parade site. Also, it was stipulated and the plaintiff herself testified regarding an altercation she had soon after her arrest, and this second altercation involved a Sheriff's deputy at Orleans Parish Prison at the time of Watson's booking on the charges of resisting arrest and battery. During that second altercation not involving the defendant NOPD Officer Garrett, plaintiff testified that while waiting to be booked at Orleans Parish Prison ("OPP"), she was battered about the head by a Sheriff's deputy and that battery caused her to bleed.
There was more than a fair amount of evidence to the effect that at the time of the incident complained of the plaintiff was "feeling no pain." The action of the plaintiff which admittedly precipitated her arrest was her insistence on repeatedly crossing the police barricade during the parade in complete disregard of Officer Garrett's repeated instructions not to do so. It was not disputed that Officer Garrett with the help of other officers on the scene did not attempt to arrest Watson until after she repeatedly disobeyed and recklessly ignored the police officer's instructions and continued to cross the police barricade despite the officer's repeated admonitions not to do so.
The Court finds the two zero ($0) dollar compensatory damage verdicts significant in light of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9 which is the Jules Stein Eye Institute's bill in the amount of $375.00. That is sufficient to prove only the cost medical damages in the sum certain of $375.00. Such evidence fails to address the issue of causation, an issue upon which plaintiff bears the burden of proof. There was an utter absence of medical testimony/evidence to the effect that more probably than not the conduct of the defendant officer as opposed to the later conduct of sheriff's deputies at OPP caused the plaintiff's alleged compensable damages.
Watson's evidence of damages consisted solely of her own testimony linking her injuries to the actions of Officer Garrett. Watson submitted no medical testimony or evidence other than her own testimony to establish more probably than not her head injuries were caused by Officer Garrett and not the blow from the Sheriff's deputy at the time of her booking. She submitted no medical evidence relating any mental suffering and humiliation she allegedly experienced at the hands of Officer Garrett. Moreover, their was ample evidence that at the time of the incident in question, the plaintiff had far more than her fair share of inebriating Mardi Gras spirits, was not in control of her own utterances or actions, and was not capable of feeling any embarrassment or humiliation in connection with her own utterances and actions, much less those of Officer Garrett at the time in question.
Counsel for plaintiff suggests that the jury discerned more than a fair amount of arrogance on the part of Officer Garrett, and that such arrogance standing alone is enough to fuel and sustain an award for punitive damages. The Court disagrees. Having heard the evidence and viewed the demeanor of both the plaintiff Dolva Watson and the defendant Officer Emelda Garrett, the Court is convinced that the inconsistency in the verdict finding liability on the constitutional claim, not one but two "$0" verdicts in the compensatory damage category and the paltry sum of $250 as a punitive damage award was the result of impermissible compromise. Had this Court not found in favor of the defendant on the basis of Heck, in the face of the jury's impermissible compromise resulting in the inconsistent verdicts, this Court would order an entirely new trial and would not simply accept one verdict and dismiss the other.
The two compensatory damage categories detailed on the verdict form were "past medical expenses" and "pain, suffering, mental anguish . . ." [Rec.Doc. No. 26].
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, notwithstanding the jury's verdict, and directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, Officer Emelda Garrett, and against the plaintiff, Dolva Watson, dismissing the plaintiff's remaining claims [i.e., excessive force/battery] with prejudice on the basis of Heck, each party to bear their own costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th day of April, 2000.