Washington v. State of Louisiana Dep't of Public Safety

Full title: JASON J. WASHINGTON, JR., ET AL v. STATE OF LOUISIANA DEP'T OF PUBLIC…

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Mar 22, 2005

Civil Action No: 04-2314, Section: "J" (1) (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2005)

Opinion

Civil Action No: 04-2314, Section: "J" (1).

March 22, 2005

CARL BARBIER, District Judge

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Defendant Richard Stalder and Conspiracy Claims, filed by defendants Richard Stalder and Joseph Spino. Rec. Doc. 15. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. The motion, set for hearing on March 2, 2005, is before the Court on briefs without oral argument. For the reasons which follow, the Court finds the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2003, Plaintiff Jason Washington was arrested in Orleans Parish for possession of marijuana. He was held in the Orleans Parish Prison ("OPP") from the date of his arrest until April 15, 2003, the date of his bench trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to 60 days in OPP with credit for time already served.

According to Plaintiff's Complaint, after the bench trial, Jason Washington's mother, Julia Washington, a co-plaintiff in this case, made several inquiries as to her son's release. Julia Washington was informed that Parole Officer Narissa Cole ("Cole") had placed a parole hold on Jason Washington's release because he was allegedly on parole at the time of his arrest in Feburary 2003. When Julia Washington asked Cole to review Jason Washington's file, Cole allegedly told her that Jason Washington could remain in jail for the rest of his life for all she cared and that he would not be released until Cole herself approved this action.

Plaintiffs also allege that Parole Superintendent Joseph Spino ("Spino") knew about Julia Washington's inquiries and Cole's responses and took no action. Following inquiries by the Washingtons' attorney, Jason Washington's parole hold was lifted. Jason Washington was subsequently released on August 19, 2003.

In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Richard Stalder, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, ("Stalder") failed to act and failed to properly train and supervise both Cole and Spino. These actions and omissions are the basis for Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims for unlawful detention and confinement, and failure to train and supervise, in addition to § 1985 conspiracy claims.

Defendant Stalder argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he was not directly involved in the alleged constitutional violations. Both Stalder and Spino contend that the claims against them should be dismissed because the Plaintiffs have not pled their case with the requisite degree of particularity.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Stalder

A. Standard of Review

Defendants acknowledge that in general, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts "must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and . . . view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5^th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986). As well, a court should not dismiss a complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to relief. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 261 (5^th Cir. 1999). However, Defendant Stalder argues herein that "when a plaintiff sues a public official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court must insist on heightened pleading by the plaintiff,"¹ invoking the Fifth Circuit's decision inSchultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5^th Cir. 1995) (en banc). In fact, this formulation oversimplifies the Schultea holding to the extent that it turns it inside out.

1 Defendants' Memo in Supp., 3.

Schultea reflects the Fifth Circuit's effort to reform its jurisprudence to comply with the Supreme Court's holding inLeatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993). Prior to Leatherman, the Fifth Circuit had insisted on heightened pleading for § 1983 suits against public officials.Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5^th Cir. 1472) (overruled). The Elliott court had stated unequivocally: "In cases against governmental officials involving the likely defense of immunity we require of trial judges that they demand that the plaintiff's complaint state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity." Id. at 1473. Later Fifth Circuit cases extended this heightened pleading rule to § 1983 complaints against municipal corporations. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167, citing Palmer v. San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514 (1987).

However, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Leatherman — contrary to the then-prevailing Elliott rule in the Fifth Circuit — that courts could not apply a heightened pleading standard for § 1983 suits against states, municipalities, and government employees sued in their official capacity. 507 U.S. at 165, 166-67.²

2 Leatherman did not address the issue of § 1983 suits against public officials sued in their individual capacities; however, that is of no moment here because in the instant case Stalder has been sued in his official capacity.

In Schultea, the Fifth Circuit proposed a scheme to reconcile the requirements of Elliott with the dictates of Leatherman, prescribing an alternate method for district courts to test § 1983 allegations: the Rule 7(a) reply.³ Schultea advances a framework in which "a plaintiff suing a public official under § 1983 file a short and plain statement of his complaint, a statement that rests on more than conclusions alone. Second, the court may, in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity." 47 F.3d at 1427.

3 Rule 7(a) provides in part that "the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer."

Thus, as the foregoing illustrates, there is simply no basis in the controlling law, including Schultea, for Stalder's wholesale contention that "when a plaintiff sues a public official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court must insist on heightened pleading by the plaintiff." To the contrary, "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)'s generic pleading requirements govern suits against municipalities and individual defendants in their official capacity." Lee v. Morial, 37 Fed. Appx. 88, 2002 WL 971591 (5^th Cir. 2002). That standard requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).

Once an answer has been filed raising the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, it is within the district court's discretion (albeit narrow) to order a reply, if deemed necessary. In the instant suit, plaintiffs have sued Stalder in his official capacity, and no answer has been filed to which a Schultea reply could be ordered. Accordingly, at this juncture, the Court analyzes the pleadings under the standard set forth in Rule 8(a).

B. § 1983 Claims Against Stalder

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for individuals who have been "deprived[ed] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States by a person or entity acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although a § 1983 claim may be brought against individuals as well as local government entities, supervisors may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of their subordinates. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5^th Cir. 1994). Rather, individual supervisors may only be liable for the actions of their subordinates when such action constitutes deliberate indifference to an alleged violation. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 453.

Defendant Stalder argues that since he was not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations, he may not be subject to individual supervisor liability under § 1983. However, liability for failure to train under § 1983 may be based either on direct action by a supervisor or by a causal connection between a supervisor's conduct and the alleged violation. See Sampson v. City of New Orleans, No. 04-1052, 2005 WL 14908, at *2 (Jan. 3, 2005); see also Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 832 (5^th Cir. 1976) (noting that individual supervisor liability "does not specifically require personal participation").

The Fifth Circuit has established a three-part test to determine whether an individual supervisor may be liable for a § 1983 for failure to train claim, where the supervisor was not directly involved. A supervisor is liable if the plaintiff can establish that:

(1) the official failed to train or supervise the officers involved;

(2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff's rights; and

(3) the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5^th Cir. 2003); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989) (requiring that the shortcoming in a city's training program be "closely related to the ultimate injury").

C. Deliberate Indifference

Accordingly, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs have made allegations that if proven, would be sufficient to show that in failing to train and supervise Cole and Spino, Stalder acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' rights.

In general, courts are reluctant to find deliberate indifference where the failure to train arises out of "a single instance of injury or an isolated case of one poorly trained employee." Dennis v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Dep't., 97-3351, 1999 WL 787642 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 1999); see also Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5^th Cir. 2001) (requiring "proof of more than a single instance of lack of training or supervision"). Indeed, a plaintiff alleging a failure to train claim must show a pattern of similar violations. As the Supreme Court explained in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), a supervisor is deliberately indifferent when the inadequate training is so obvious that a constitutional violation would almost always result. Id. at 390. When this occurs, the failure to train can be classified as a policy adopted by the defendant, which allows the plaintiff to present evidence of similar occurrences. Conner v. Travis County, 209 F.3d 794, 797 5^th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiffs allege, both in their original and amended complaint, that Stalder's failure to act constitutes a policy of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. See (Pls.' Am. Comp. ¶ 14); (Pls. Comp. ¶ 55). Plaintiffs' original complaint states that there is a policy of frequent "overstays" by detainees, in situations similar to that of Jason Washington. (Pls. Comp. ¶ 55).

C. Official Policy Allegations

In Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 279 F.3d 273 (5^th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit defined an "official policy" as:

(1) A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the government entity or by an official to whom the entity has delegated policy-making authority, or

(2) A persistent, widespread practice of officials or employees which although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents the entity's policy.

Id. at 279. The Washingtons' amended complaint alleges that in supervising and being responsible for parole holds, Stalder's actions "amounted to a policy of deliberate indifference to Jason Washington's constitutional rights." (Pls.' Am. Comp. ¶ 14). Plaintiff's original complaint states that this policy "is evidenced by the frequency of 'overstays' by detainees situated similarly to Plaintiff Jason Washington." (Pls.' Comp. ¶ 56).

While the Court recognizes the generality of these allegations, because Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiff's complaint only set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," courts recognize that at this point in litigation, general allegations are acceptable, as a plaintiff will eventually be required to provide further evidence and proof of a policy upon discovery. See, e.g., Sampson v. City of New Orleans, 04-1052, 2005 WL 14908, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2005); Bramlett v. Buell, 04-518, 2004 WL 1243684, at *3 (E.D. La. June 3, 2004). For example, in Jenkins v. Lee, 98-2367, 1999 WL 97931 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 1999), the court denied a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff's complaint merely included allegations of a "connection between [the defendant's] action and the alleged constitutional violation" and policies of inadequate supervision and training. Id. at *4.

"It would be wholly unreasonable to require a plaintiff at this stage of the litigation to allege with specificity all of the other acts by other officers that he will rely upon to demonstrate a policy." Bramlett, 2004 WL 1243684, at *4. Therefore, Plaintiffs' amended complaint herein is sufficient to satisfy the liberal requirements of Rule 8, and the Motion to Dismiss the supervisory claims against Stalder must be denied.

II. Motion to Dismiss Conspiracy Claims

A. § 1983 Conspiracy Claims

Plaintiffs have also made claims of a conspiracy under § 1983, alleging that Cole and Spino conspired to deprive Jason Washington of his civil rights by agreeing to keep him imprisoned for an indefinite period of time. "To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the existence of (1) an agreement to do an illegal act and (2) an actual constitutional deprivation." Whisenant v. City of Haltom City 106 Fed. Appx. 915, 917, 2004 WL 1778247, *1 (5^th Cir. 2004), citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5^th Cir. 1994).

As this Court stated in its December 2004 order in this case, "[p]laintiffs who assert conspiracy claims under civil rights statutes must plead the operative facts upon which their claim is based." Washington v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety Corr., 04-2314, 2004 WL 2984294, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2004) (quoting Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 (5^th Cir. 1991)). Plaintiffs, in their Amended Complaint and Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, state that both Cole and Spino acted together to keep Washington in custody beyond his release date. The Plaintiffs point to the fact that both Cole and Spino work on the same cases in the New Orleans Division Office of Probation and Parole, and specifically that both were involved in Washington's case. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Spino knew that the ongoing incarceration of Washington beyond April 2003 was improper. Thus, Plaintiffs claim, Spino acted in concert with Cole to keep Washington in custody until August 19, 2003.

As noted above, Rule 8(a)(2) requires the Plaintiffs allege "a short and plain statement" of facts in their pleadings to support their claims. Plaintiffs' complaints include these specific facts, which subject to discovery and further development of the proceedings, can be the basis for legitimate claims against defendant Spino. The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint presents more than "bald assertions of conspiracy." Therefore, defendant Spino's Motion to Dismiss with respect to the § 1983 conspiracy claims should be denied.

B. §§ 1985 and 1986 Conspiracy Claims

Section 1985 provides a cause of action for civil rights conspiracies that deprive a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). However, as the Supreme Court explained in Griffin v. Breckendrige, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), a § 1985 conspiracy claim requires class-based discrimination based on "invidiously discriminatory animus."Id. at 102 n. 10. Since the Plaintiffs do not make any claims of class-based invidious discrimination, there is no basis for a § 1985 conspiracy claim.

Last, Plaintiffs also allege a § 1986 claim for neglecting to prevent a conspiracy under § 1985. See 42 U.S.C. § 1986. However, a § 1986 claim depends upon a valid § 1985 claim. See Mississippi Women's Med. Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 795 (5^th Cir. 1989). The Plaintiffs do not plead facts sufficient to support a conspiracy claim under § 1985. Thus, they cannot allege a § 1986 violation that Spino is liable for failing to prevent the conspiracy. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 15) should be and is hereby GRANTED in part, and that Plaintiffs' claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 are hereby DISMISSED; in all other respects, the motion is DENIED.