Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-518, Section "A" (1).
June 3, 2004
Before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 7) filed by defendant Thomas Buell and a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 8) filed by defendant Mandeville Police Department. Plaintiffs, Derrick Bramlett and Gloria Buie, oppose the Buell motion but have submitted no opposition to the motion filed by the Mandeville Police Department. The motions, set for hearing on June 2, 2004, are before the Court on the briefs without oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Thomas Buell is DENIED and the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Mandeville Police Department is GRANTED as unopposed.
Background
This factual background is based upon the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. Rec. Doc. 2.
Bramlett claims that the officers' use of deadly force was unreasonable and excessive in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He seeks damages against Wade and LeMulle in their individual capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bramlett also claims that Chief Thomas Buell ("Chief Buell") of the Mandeville Police Department is liable in his official capacity because he developed and maintained polices and customs that caused the deprivation of Bramlett's rights. Bramlett also claims that Major and Buell are liable under state tort law. Bramlett's mother, Gloria Buie, alleges that she cared for him during his extended recovery and she seeks her own damages from Wade and LeMulle under state law. Bramlett and Buie claim that Chief Buell is liable for the state law claims against Major and LeMulle under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Discussion
Motion to Dismiss by Thomas Buell
Chief Buell moves for dismissal of all federal claims brought against him in his official capacity. Chief Buell argues that Bramlett's allegations are insufficient to trigger municipal liability under § 1983. Chief Buell argues that Bramlett cannot survive dismissal by simply alleging the existence of a policy or custom that led to his injuries. Chief Buell asserts that Bramlett must allege facts sufficient to support his conclusory allegations of a policy or custom.
A lawsuit against a government official in his official capacity is the equivalent of an action against the government entity he serves, Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 541 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)).
In opposition, Bramlett points out that official capacity claims are not subject to any heightened pleading requirements. Bramlett argues that at this stage in the proceedings, he need not plead his case with any greater specificity.
In reply, Chief Buell emphasizes that Bramlett has failed to allege multiple acts by the Mandeville Police Department so as to satisfy the "numerosity" requirement necessary to demonstrate a policy or custom. Chief Buell also argues that Bramlett places far too much significance in the procedural posture of this case,i.e., the infancy of the case cannot save Bramlett from his defective allegations.
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take the factual allegations of the complaint as true. David v. Assumption Parish Police Jury, 2003 WL 57039, *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2003). "All questions of fact and any ambiguities in the current controlling substantive law must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor."Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2001). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. McKinney v. Irving Independent School District, 309 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2002). "However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." David, 2003 WL 57039 at *2. Nevertheless, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is viewed with "disfavor and is rarely granted." Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
In the landmark case of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the United States Supreme Court reversed its prior restrictive interpretation of § 1983 and held that local municipalities are "persons" subject to liability under § 1983. Imposition of section 1983 liability against a municipality is appropriate in the limited circumstance of when a constitutional deprivation is caused by the execution of a policy or custom of the municipality. Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 989 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037). An "official policy" is (1) a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the government entity or by an official to whom the entity has delegated policy-making authority, or (2) a persistent, widespread practice of officials or employees which although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents the entity's policy.Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 279 F.3d 273, 289 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Prior to Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), the law in this circuit required Monell plaintiffs to meet a "heightened" pleading standard such as the one imposed in cases against individuals entitled to immunity. See, e.g., Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992). However, in Leatherman, a unanimous Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach and held that federal courts cannot impose a pleading requirement more stringent in Monell cases than that imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). 507 U.S. at 164. Rule 8 requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).
The Court is persuaded that Bramlett's allegations meet the liberal requirements of Rule 8 which is all that is required under Leatherman. Bramlett alleges inter alia that "[i]t was the policy, custom and practice of the Mandeville Police Department to inadequately supervise or train its officers" in the handling of uncooperative suspects and in the use of deadly force. Amd. Comp. ¶ 28. He also alleges that the policies as alleged caused a violation of his federal rights. Id. ¶ 27. Bramlett's allegations are bare bones at this stage but that is to be expected given that discovery has yet to proceed. Bramlett will be required to prove the existence of a policy by offering evidence of persistent and widespread conduct so as to constitute a custom or policy attributable to the municipality. It would be wholly unreasonable to require a plaintiff at this stage of the litigation to allege with specificity all of the other acts by other officers that he will rely upon to demonstrate a policy. No plaintiff can do that before discovery. Thus, if the Court were to follow Chief Buell's approach, no plaintiff could ever survive a motion to dismiss his Monell claims.
To be sure, the post-Leatherman jurisprudence in this circuit continues to include language that allegations of a policy or custom must contain "specific facts." See, e.g., Spiller v. Texas City Police Dep't, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Fraire, 957 F.2d at 1278). However, that language is directly attributable to cases decided prior to Leatherman. See, e.g., Fraire, 957 F.2d at 1278 (citing Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985)). And Yates v. Unidentified Parties, No. 02-31224, 2003 WL 21744384 (5th Cir. 2003), upon which Chief Buell relies, was specifically designated by the Fifth Circuit as unsuitable for publication. Further, the motion to dismiss in Wild v. Foti, No. 01-1574, 2002 WL 31554003, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2002), another case cited by Chief Buell, was granted only after what the district judge characterized as "ample opportunity for discovery." The case in Wild had been pending a year and a half when the motion was granted whereas Bramlett filed his amended complaint barely three months ago.
In sum, the Court is not persuaded that Bramlett has failed to sufficiently plead his official capacity claims against Chief Buell. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss filed by Chief Buell is DENIED.
Motion to Dismiss by Mandeville Police Department
The Mandeville Police Department moves for dismissal asserting that it is not a juridical entity capable of being sued. Plaintiffs have not opposed this motion. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the Mandeville Police Department is GRANTED.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 7) filed by defendant Thomas Buell should be and is hereby DENIED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 8) filed by defendant Mandeville Police Department should be and is hereby GRANTED.