DUHE, Circuit Judge:

McDermott, appellant/third-party plaintiff, appeals from a judgment dismissing its third-party claims for contractual indemnity against Appellees. The district court in a cogent and well reasoned opinion entered judgment against McDermott because its claims are barred by the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act. Wagner v. McDermott, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1551 (W.D.La. 1994). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

McDermott was hired to construct an offshore platform located on the outer Continental Shelf. McDermott hired Capital Welding Fabrication, Inc. (Capital) to do welding on the platform. Capital dispatched welders on loan from Landry Enterprises, Inc. (Landry) to the worksite. McDermott provided a barge on which the welders were housed and fed. Mark Wagner, one of the Capital/Landry welders, sued McDermott under the Jones Act, general maritime law and Section(s) 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) after he slipped and fell aboard the barge. The district court found that Wagner was not a seaman and Wagner settled his claims.

During the litigation with Wagner, McDermott filed third-party claims against Capital and Landry (and their insurers) seeking indemnity under their nearly identical contracts with McDermott. The district court ruled that McDermott's claims are barred by the Louisiana Act because the McDermott-Capital/Landry contract is not maritime and Section(s) 905(c) of the LHWCA does not apply to McDermott's contractual claims. The district court also found that state law applies even if Section(s) 905(c) applies because the Louisiana Act is not inconsistent with Section(s) 905(c).

DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute that if Louisiana law applies to McDermott's claims, the claims are barred under the Louisiana Act. McDermott argues that maritime law, which enforces indemnity provisions barred by the Louisiana Act, governs the dispute because its contract with Capital/Landry is a maritime contract. We adopt Judge Doherty's thorough analysis and holding that the contract is non-maritime in nature. Wagner, 899 F. Supp. at 1554-55 ("Nature of the Contract"). Since the contract is non-maritime, maritime law does not apply. Hollier v. Union Texas Petroleum Corp., 972 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1992).

McDermott contends that Section(s) 905(c) of the LHWCA governs the dispute to the exclusion of state law. Appellees, on the other hand, argue that Louisiana law applies either as the law of the adjacent state by default, or through the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. §(s) 1333 (1986), which incorporates state law as surrogate federal law if state law is not inconsistent with applicable federal law. If the OCSLA does not apply, Louisiana law governs the dispute. See Dominque v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co., 923 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1991). But as the district court points out, authority exists for both the applicability and non-applicability of the OCSLA to this dispute. Wagner, 899 F. Supp. at 1556. Like the district court, we do not decide whether the OCSLA applies. We assume without deciding that the OCSLA applies and makes the LHWCA applicable to Wagner's claim. The LHWCA is a workers' compensation scheme for certain workers engaged in maritime employment. Additionally, LHWCA coverage extends to workers engaged in the production of natural resources on the outer Continental Shelf through Section(s) 1333(b) of the OCSLA. We hold, however, that the McDermott-Capital/Landry contract is not governed by Section(s) 905(c) of the LHWCA.

The LHWCA codifies a negligence cause of action in favor of covered workers against a negligent vessel that causes injury. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1986). When a non-OCSLA worker brings an action for vessel negligence, any indemnity agreements between the worker's employer and the vessel in favor of the vessel are void. Id. If the plaintiff is an OCSLA worker, the proscription of 905(b) is removed to the extent that the indemnity provisions are reciprocal and are between the employer and a vessel. 33 U.S.C. §(s) 905(c) (1986).

Both the 905(b) proscription and 905(c) exception to the proscription apply by their very terms only to agreements between employers and vessels. The LHWCA defines "vessel" as the actual vessel and its "owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, charter[er] or bare boat charterer, master, officer, or crew member." 33 U.S.C. §(s) 902(21). Here, Wagner was injured on a vessel owned by McDermott. Therefore, McDermott argues, its contract is enforceable under Section(s) 905(c) because McDermott is a vessel as defined by the LHWCA and has a reciprocal indemnity agreement with Wagner's employer.

This Circuit has clearly stated, however, that neither 905(b) nor 905(c) proscribe non-vessel related indemnity agreements. Knapp v. Chevron USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1986); Doucet v. Gulf Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1986). In Knapp, an employee of a contractor sustained injuries when he fell from a safety net attached to an offshore platform. The employee sued the platform owner who filed a third-party claim for contractual indemnity against the contractor. The platform owner prevailed in the trial court but lost on appeal because the indemnity agreement was void under the Louisiana Act. The court explained:

Neither the 1972 amendments adding Section(s) 5(b) nor the 1984 amendments adding Section(s) 5(c) to the LHWCA proscribe non-vessel related indemnity agreements. The distinction between vessels and non-vessels is well-established. We will not impute to congressional silence a desire to apply the 1984 LHWCA amendments to non-vessels. Nor are we persuaded that these amendments preempt the field.

Knapp, 781 F.2d at 1131 (citations omitted).

Similarly in Doucet, a roustabout was injured on an offshore platform. The platform owner filed third-party claims for contractual indemnity against the roustabout's employer. The Court again found that the indemnity claim was barred by the Louisiana Act.

The Compensation Act [LHWCA] neither expressly permits nor forbids contractual indemnity agreements between non-vessels and compensation-paying employers. This silence is a gap in federal law that, according to the Shelf Lands Act, is to be "filled" by state law governing such indemnity contracts.

Doucet, 783 F.2d at 525 (citations omitted).

We recognize that neither Knapp nor Doucet involves a vessel nor a 905(b) claim as this incident does. Nevertheless, McDermott's claims are treated the same because McDermott contracted with Capital/Landry in its capacity as contractor, not as vessel owner, the same position as the relevant parties in Knapp and Doucet.

We interpret the Section(s) 905(c) requirement of an indemnity contract between "the employer . . . and the vessel . . ." to require that the contracting entity must be contracting in its capacity as the vessel, not as a party who incidentally utilizes a vessel in other operations. Here, McDermott entered into a contract for welders to work on a fixed platform it was constructing. McDermott was not acting in its capacity as vessel owner but only as a contractor who incidentally utilized a vessel to accomplish its work. The fact that McDermott happens to own the vessel does not place the contract within Section(s) 905(c). McDermott argues that because Plaintiff asserted a Section(s) 905(b) claim, Section(s) 905(c) must govern the contract dispute. While Section(s) 905(b) liability is a requisite for Section(s) 905(c) applicability, the contract must be of the type covered by Section(s) 905(c). It must be with a vessel. The McDermott-Capital/Landry contract is not.

Having held that the McDermott-Capital/Landry contract is not governed by Section(s) 905(c), we need not determine whether the Louisiana Act is inconsistent with Section(s) 905(c). The indemnity provisions of the McDermott-Capital/Landry contract are governed by state law and are barred by the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act.

AFFIRMED.