CERCONE, President Judge:

This is an appeal from the September 15, 1978 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County which adjudged the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages caused to plaintiffs' property as a result of their negligence. The lower court found partly reparable and partly permanent injury thereby awarding damages for the cost of repairs and for the depreciation in market value, respectively. This, in conjunction with interest awarded in the form of "delay compensation," made up the total damages of which, through the invocation of his equity powers, the trial judge, acting as chancellor in equity, apportioned ninety percent against contractor-defendant, S.J. Groves Sons Company, and ten percent against landowner-defendant, Jane Williams. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and vacate and remand the remainder of the case to the lower court for the reasons set forth below.

The defendant, Groves Company, was the contractor responsible for the construction of a portion of Interstate Highway 79 near the Borough of Waynesburg, Franklin Township in Greene County. In connection with its duties under this state road construction contract, Groves Company entered into a "Waste Agreement" with Jack E. Williams and Jane Williams which provided for dumping a large quantity of dirt, rock and other material commonly known as waste or fill on the land of Mr. and Mrs. Williams. The area to be covered by the fill was a natural gully with an existing water course running through it. The contour of this watershed was shaped like a bowl which was wider at the top and narrower at the bottom. The top of the bowl is one hundred (100) feet above plaintiff Wade's property which is situated to the west of the main portion of the bowl and on its lower rim.

Pursuant to the waste agreement, Groves Company covered 206,602 square feet or 4 acres of the Williams' property with 124,000 cubic yards of fill between May 18, 1971 and February 28, 1972. The fill extended to the top rim of the bowl in the section directly east of, and above, the Wades' residence. In filling this 46 foot gully to the east of plaintiffs' property, Groves sloped his fill in such a fashion as to create a more pronounced draw toward the Wades' house. This resulted in serious water drainage problems for the Wades: when it rained, a large amount of water, mud, silt, stone and other debris washed down off of the newly filled section of the bowl and into their backyard. The Wades have installed several underground pipes and catch basins to divert the course of the water away from this property. Mr. Wade and his neighbors have done bulldozer work on the contour of the Williams' property and have continually sought to maintain adequate erosion resistant vegetation on the waste area. The repairs of both the defendant-contractor and the Wades have apparently been successful since the evidence indicates that no further property damage has occurred thereafter.

In June of 1976, the plaintiffs, Furman Wade, Jr. and Audra Wade, his wife, brought an action in equity against Groves Company and Jane Williams for the damage they negligently caused to the Wades' property. Plaintiffs sought damages for both the cost of the repairs they have made and for the permanent diminution in value of their property. In addition, plaintiffs prayed for injunctive relief seeking to require the defendants to remove or otherwise remedy the condition of the land fill so as to prevent further waste from being washed onto the plaintiffs' land.

Sitting without a jury, the trial court properly refused to grant injunctive relief since there was evidence that the condition had already been substantially remedied. The trial court, however, did find both defendants "jointly and severally" liable and awarded damages of $15,053.99, which included repair costs for the temporary injury, diminution in value for permanent loss of the value of plaintiffs' property, and "delay compensation" measured by the amount of legal interest (6%) for 7 years back to 1971. This total sum of damages was then apportioned by the trial judge ten percent against the landowner-defendant and ninety percent against the contractor-defendant. This appeal follows by defendant, Groves Company alone.

In this appeal, appellant Groves presents four issues for our review: (1) whether the court below was correct in apportioning damages between defendants who are jointly and severally liable; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing "delay compensation" measured by the legal rate of interest (6%) from the time the unliquidated tort claim arose; (3) whether the trial court correctly included as part of the damage award, a bill which was made out to the plaintiffs' neighbor who was assisting him in making repairs; and (4) whether the lower court properly allowed damages for the change in market value of plaintiffs' property in addition to damages for the cost of repairs.

I.

Appellant's first argument is that the lower court erred in apportioning damages at ten percent against defendant-appellee Williams and ninety percent against defendant-appellant Groves Company after having made a determination that such individuals were jointly and severally liable. The lower court had originally based this allocation of damages on the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Statute, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 7102, added April 28, 1978, P.L. 202 No. 53, § 10(89), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102 (Supp. 1980). However, appellant Groves filed an exception on the basis that the statute was not in effect at the time this cause of action arose and, hence, was improper authority on which to base an apportionment of damages. The trial court noted that appellant was correct in stating that the statute was inapplicable to the present case, but, nevertheless, the court let its previous apportionment stand, by invoking the discretion of a chancellor in equity:

It is true that Act had not been enacted when this case arose, as counsel for S.J. Grove correctly points out, and is not retroactive beyond its effective date, September 7, 1976. See Costa v. Lair, 241 Pa. Super. 517, 363 A.2d 1313. And even now, as we consider the problem before us in equity, recognizing that there is no possibility that, at law, the differentiation could be made, we are satisfied that it is within the sound discretion of the Court as chancellor to do so. The land owner was only a passive agent in the causal connection of the acts and the resulting damages. It was the construction company who leased the land for a modest sum and who spilled the dirt fill in huge quantities down the slope, and who set the stage for the rains, whether in usual amounts or in cloud bursts, that put a substantial amount of silt and debris on plaintiff's property who gave no lease, nor any consent, and who has a right not to have his residential property made an involuntary cachement area for the overflow of dirt from the construction of I 79.

We disagree with the trial court's conclusion.

To begin with, it is doubtful whether this case is a proper one for the invocation of equitable principles at all. Along these lines the appellant asserts that, in reality, this was a trespass action at law for damages because the trial court dismissed the prayer for equitable relief in its original decree nisi. The court dismissed the claim for an injunction on the rationale that the condition had already been repaired to the extent possible which, therefore, rendered the injunction unnecessary. It is appellant's position that when the equity claim was dismissed, the action automatically became one at law, thereby rendering equitable principles inapplicable. However, we acknowledge that once equity takes jurisdiction over a controversy, that jurisdiction continues until all issues raised in that controversy have been decided. McGovern v. Spear, 463 Pa. 269, 272-73, 344 A.2d 826, 828 (1975); Arcadia Theatre Co. v. Sablosky, 418 Pa. 34, 49, 209 A.2d 375, 382 (1964).

Nevertheless, it is surely not true that a chancellor in equity has the boundless discretion to do as he sees fit. Rather, it is well-settled that a chancellor in equity must follow clearly fixed and established principles of law. In First Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n of Lancaster v. Swift, 457 Pa. 206, 210, 321 A.2d 895, 897 (1974), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania enforced the age-old maxim that "equity follows the law":

Even recognizing that a court of equity has broad powers, `[i]t is a mistake to suppose, that a court of equity is amenable to no law, either common or statute, and assumes the rule (sic) of an arbitrary legislator in every particular case.' Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law 732 (B. Gavit ed. 1941). When the rights of a party are clearly established by defined principles of law, equity should not change or unsettle those rights. Equity follows the law. Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 14 S.Ct. 71, 37 L.Ed. 1044 (1893); Bauer v. P.A. Cutri Co., 434 Pa. 305, 253 A.2d 252 (1969); Scott v. Waynesburg Brewing Co., 256 Pa. 158, 100 A. 591 (1917); Abrahams v. Wilson, 134 Pa. Super. 297, 3 A.2d 1016 (1939); see 2 J. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 425 (5th ed. S. Symons 1941).

In the present case it is clear that the new law of comparative negligence is not dispositive because of the statute's prospective effect. Likewise, as the lower court admits in its opinion quoted above, at law there would be no possibility that the damages in this case could be apportioned as the trial court attempted to do. In this situation, then, equity must follow the law and apply the normal rule that where there is joint and several liability, each defendant is liable for the entire amount of the damages regardless of degrees of fault, Randall v. Fenton Storage Co., 121 Pa. Super. 62, 65, 182 A. 767, 768 (1936), and that apportionment derives only from the tortfeasor's statutory right to contribution under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Incollingo v. Ewing, 474 Pa. 527, 539, 379 A.2d 79, 85 (1977). See also Greco v. Buccioni Eng'r Co., 283 F. Supp. 978, 985 (W.D.Pa. 1967), aff'd 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969); Hafer v. Schauer, 429 Pa. 289, 295, 239 A.2d 785, 788 (1968).

Appellee Williams argues that the trial court's apportionment of damages followed the law as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433A which provides as follows:

Apportionment of Harm To Causes

(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where

(a) there are distinct harms, or,

(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm

(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more harms.

In the case at bar there were neither distinct harms nor a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm. The single resulting harm of silt and debris being deposited upon the Wades' land was caused jointly by appellee Williams and appellant Groves Company. The negligence of both combined to cause a single injury. No specific part nor any hypothetically separate portion of the injury was singularly caused by one or the other. In illustration 4 to Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433A, the plaintiffs' land was flooded by water coming from the land of defendants A, B C. It was shown that fifty percent of the water came from A's ditch, thirty percent from B's ditch and twenty percent from C's. This was a sufficient and reasonable basis on which to make an apportionment of damages in accordance with the enumerated percentages. Whereas the illustration points to a situation in which apportionment was proper, the present case is one in which apportionment is not. Appellee Williams did not cause ten percent nor any other reasonably identifiable percentage of the dirt or fill to be deposited on the Wades' land. There was no reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm and, therefore, the damages should not have been apportioned. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433A(2).

In Lasprogata v. Qualls, 263 Pa. Super. 174, 397 A.2d 803 (1979), this court recently addressed the issue of apportionment and distinguished it from the rights of contribution and indemnity:

The right of contribution exists only between joint tortfeasors. Contribution distributes the loss equally or each joint tortfeasor pay his or her prorata share. A right of indemnity exists when the entire loss is imposed on one person. For example, an original wrongdoer may have the right of indemnity against the treating physician if the original tortfeasor is held liable for damages resulting from both his negligence and that of the physician. However, whenever two actions are brought for the separately identifiable acts of negligence on the part of the original wrongdoer and the treating physician, the apportionment of damages between the two causes should take place as we allow in the instant case. See Annot. 8 A.L.R.3d 639, 641 (1966).

Id., 263 Pa.Super. at 178, 397 A.2d at 805 (emphasis added).

In making this distinction in Lasprogata, we used a very strict definition of the term "joint tortfeasor" and thereby made "apportionment between joint tortfeasors" an inconsistency of terms. Where acts and their results are reasonably capable of separation from other acts and results, the damages should be apportioned accordingly. Here, separation is not possible and the two actors were acting "jointly" in the strict sense of that term. See, e.g., Shaull v. A.S. Beck New York Shoe Co., 369 Pa. 112, 85 A.2d 698 (1952) (lessee, contractor and subcontractor held jointly liable where wall of a building fell in killing an employee of the subcontractor). Since equity follows the law, the trial court erred in apportioning damages between the two tortfeasors, ninety percent against appellant Groves Company and ten percent against appellee Williams. We, therefore, hold that each defendant is liable for the entire amount of the judgment with the right of contribution being the vehicle for equalization should any inequity result.

II.

Appellant's next contention is that the trial court erred in awarding interest in the form of "delay compensation." Originally the lower court simply applied "interest" to the remedial damages sustained. When appellant Groves excepted, however, on the basis that interest is not recoverable on damages in unliquidated tort claims, the lower court acknowledged its error citing School Dist. of the City of Carbondale v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 346 Pa. 491, 31 A.2d 279 (1943) for the proposition that interest runs only from the time of verdict. Nevertheless, the trial judge decided to allow his interest award to stand in the same amount while reclassifying it as "delay compensation." Appellant Groves asserts that this is error.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently broached this area of the law in Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi Bottling Co., 438 Pa. 72, 74-75, 263 A.2d 336, 337 (1970) where it stated:

Although there is language in some early cases to the contrary, City of Allegheny v. Campbell, 107 Pa. 530 (1884); Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Patterson, 73 Pa. 491, 498-9 (1873), it is now the settled law in this Commonwealth that interest, as such, is not allowed in tort actions when the damages sought to be recovered are unliquidated. Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Brink's Inc., 422 Pa. 48, 57, 220 A.2d 827 (1966); Carbondale City School District v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, 346 Pa. 491, 31 A.2d 279 (1943); Klages v. Philadelphia Reading Terminal Co., 160 Pa. 386, 28 A. 862 (1894); Act of April 6, 1859, P.L. 381, § 1, 12 Pa.C.S.A. § 781 and 1 Sm.L. 7, § 2, 12 Pa.C.S.A. § 782.

This Court, however, has developed the doctrine that: ". . . there are cases sounding in tort, and cases of unliquidated damages, where not only the principle of which the recovery is to be had is compensation, but where also the compensation can be measured by market value, or other definite standards. Such are cases of the unintentional conversion or destruction of property, etc. Into these cases the element of time may enter as an important factor, and the plaintiff will not be fully compensated unless he receive, not only the value of his property, but receive it, as nearly as may be, as of the date of his loss. Hence it is that the jury may allow additional damages, in the nature of interest, for the lapse of time. It is never interest as such, nor as a matter of right, but compensation for the delay, of which the rate of interest affords the fair legal measure." Richards v. Citizens Natural Gas Company, 130 Pa. 37, 40, 18 A. 600 (1889). Irvine v. Smith, 204 Pa. 58, 53 A. 510 (1902); Stevenson v. Ebervale Coal Company, 203 Pa. 316, 52 A. 201 (1902); Klages v. Philadelphia Reading Terminal Co., supra; Campbell v. Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company, 58 Pa. Super. 241 (1914). We have emphasized that compensation for delay in payment is not a matter of right but is an issue for the finder of fact, the resolution of which depends upon all the circumstances of the case.

The trial judge in Marrazzo, as here, did not indicate his reason for awarding interest and the Supreme Court, therefore, vacated and remanded the record for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the delay. Likewise, we remand the record to the trial court for an assessment of responsibility for the delay, as well as the basis for imposing and computing the amount of "delay compensation." "All circumstances relevant to the delay must be developed and analyzed." Marrazzo, 438 Pa. at 77, 263 A.2d at 338. The trial court should articulate what legal standard he is employing and "what circumstances he considered in arriving at his decision." Id., 438 Pa. at 76, 263 A.2d at 338.

It should further be noted that Murray Hill Estates, Inc. v. Bastin, 442 Pa. 405, 276 A.2d 542 (1971) does not change the matter. There, in an action for specific performance, the lower court's award of interest was affirmed. The Supreme Court's opinion then quoted with approval a comment from the Superior Court in McDermott v. McDermott, 130 Pa. Super. 127, 130, 196 A. 889, 890 (1938) as being appropriate in equity cases:

An examination of the cases dealing with the charge and allowance of interest will disclose many difficulties, but the decided trend of courts of law and courts of equity has been `to break away from hard and fast rules and charge and allow interest in accordance with principles of equity, in order to accomplish justice in each particular case' * * * Unless a case be found, which is a conclusive precedent, the safest and at the same time the fairest way for a court is to decide questions pertaining to interest according to a plain and simple consideration of justice and fair dealing.

However, in both Murray Hill Estates and McDermott, as well as Kelly v. Allegheny Redevelopment Authority, 411 Pa. 210, 191 A.2d 393 (1963) and Mauch v. Pittsburgh Pension Bd., 383 Pa. 448, 119 A.2d 193 (1956) which are cases specifically cited by Murray Hill Estates, 442 Pa. at 410-11, 276 A.2d at 545, there was always a finding as to the existence or absence of fault between the parties. For example, in McDermott interest was not allowed because there was "nothing to indicate that the defendant was to any degree responsible for any delay . . .," 130 Pa.Super. at 132-33, 196 A. at 891, whereas the Murray Hill Estates opinion talks of the defendants' "unjustifiable and intransigent refusal to perform according to their clear undertaking." 442 Pa. at 410, 276 A.2d at 545. Thus, fault continues to be the key concept which should be kept in mind by the trial court on remand. See English Whipple Sailyard, Ltd. v. Yawl Ardent, 459 F. Supp. 866, 879-80 (W.D.Pa. 1978); Hussey Metals Div. v. Lectromelt Furnace Div., 417 F. Supp. 964, 967 (W.D.Pa. 1976).

It should also be noted that there is now a Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure allowing for an award of damages for delay in an action seeking compensation for bodily injury, death or property damage. Pa.R.Civ.P. Rule 238. This rule was adopted November 20, 1978 and is effective 120 days after December 16, 1978, which is April 15, 1979. Since the trial court entered its final decree on April 27, 1979, this action was pending on the effective date of this rule which renders subsection (f) applicable in the present case, but for subsection (g) which states that the rule does not apply to "pending actions in which damages for delay are allowable in the absence of this rule." Pa.R.Civ.P. Rule 238(g). In this regard, the Supreme Court cites us to Marrazzo which we have discussed at length above. On remand, therefore, the trial court should not apply Rule 238(f) if it determines that damages are allowable under Marrazzo.

III.

Appellant next contends that the damage award improperly included a bill for the rental of a bulldozer which Mr. Wade and his neighbor, Harold King, Jr., used to cut a ditch diagonally across the face of the slope on the Williams' property so as to prevent more fill from washing down the hill. Harold King, Jr. owns the property between the Williams' slope and the Wade property. Through his father, Harold King, Sr., who works for Harold Dulaney Lumber Company, Harold King, Jr. secured use of a bulldozer from Dulaney's on behalf of plaintiff, Furman Wade. Together Wade and the Kings worked on the fill site to remedy the problem. A bill was made out to Harold King, Jr., for $2,460.00 for the rental of the bulldozer from Dulaney's. It was marked "Paid. H.K." Appellant, therefore, asserts that it was error for the trial court to include this bill in its award of damages to the plaintiff because the bill was incurred and allegedly paid by a third party who received a substantial benefit from the repairs.

The court below stated that the remedial steps taken by the plaintiffs "were reasonably necessary and appropriate under the circumstances and were justifiable `from an engineering standpoint.'" Appellant Groves does not dispute the fact that its negligence caused a situation in which such an expenditure was made necessary. Rather, Groves seeks to avoid payment of this concededly legitimate expense because the bill was made out to, and allegedly paid by, Harold King, Jr. instead of Furman Wade, Jr., Equity, however, regards substance over form. See e.g., Roomberg v. U.S., 40 F. Supp. 621 (E.D.Pa. 1941); In Re McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, 106 A. 189 (1919). Appellee Wade testified, and the lower court apparently believed, that he incurred the obligation to pay this bill. Regardless of whether this obligation was owed to Harold King, Jr. or Dulaney himself, the fact that it was incurred by Mr. Wade as a result of the defendants' negligence is alone sufficient to meet the Wades' burden of proof as to damages, because the finder of fact could reasonably make, as the trial court did, a legal assessment of the damages on this basis. See Gordon v. Trovato, 234 Pa. Super. 279, 338 A.2d 653 (1975). Since the trial court heard the testimony and was able to make a determination as to the credibility of the evidence indicating that this obligation was actually incurred by Mr. Wade, we will not disturb its decision absent a clear abuse of discretion which is not present here. Thus, we affirm the trial court's inclusion of the Dulaney bill as part of the damage award.

IV.

Appellant's final allegation of error is that the lower court improperly awarded damages for a reduction in the fair market value of the property in addition to damages for the cost of repairs. The lower court's rationale for doing so was that the damages were "partly reparable and partly permanent." For the remediable injuries, the court awarded a sum of $6,905.99 which represents the cost of repairs, and for the permanent injury, the court awarded $5,250.00 which represents the depreciation in the fair market value of the property from its condition prior to the damage and its condition after repairs had been made. We affirm this portion of the lower court's holding.

At trial, the Wades' real estate appraisal expert, Mr. Julian Fine, testified that the situation had been corrected "probably to a full degree." The Wades' engineering expert, Michael Sydlik, acknowledged that barring a tremendous cloudburst or failure of the existing vegetation, "most of the problem is over." Finally, appellee Furman Wade himself has indicated that nor further trouble was experienced after 1975. Nevertheless, Mr. Fine testified that a prospective buyer who was informed of the history of the property would pay less for the property than he would otherwise have been willing to pay, due to the possibility, albeit remote, of another slide and because of the necessity of regularly maintaining the drainage pipes, ditches and catch basins in repair over the years. In an attempt to calculate how much a buyer would depreciate the value of the property, Mr. Fine arrived at a ten percent depreciation factor, which indicates total depreciation in the amount of $5,250.00 when applied to property with a normal fair market value of $52,500.00. Based upon this testimony, the trial court stated as follows:

In the instant case, the early damage caused by the runoff is obviously over and is fairly well contained. However, that does not change the fact that the drainage field above plaintiffs' property is permanently changed, and must be considered as permanently resulting in a change of value, the amount of which was fixed at $5250.00 by Julian Fine, a well-recognized licensed real estate broker, which is unrebutted and we believe to be a correctly founded figure.

Appellant Groves Company contends that this is "pure speculation." It is appellant's position that the damages caused were fully reparable, and were, in fact, fully remedied; and, therefore, the cost of repairs should be the sole measure of damages. We cannot agree.

It is well-settled law in this Commonwealth that the measure of damages for injury to property is the cost of repairs where that injury is reparable; however, where the injury is characterized as permanent, the measure of damages becomes the decrease in the fair market value of the property. See Art Club of Philadelphia v. Hayman Goodman, 325 Pa. 587, 592, 190 A. 922, 924 (1937); Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co., 213 Pa. 252, 257-58, 62 A. 854, 855 (1906); Vanderslice v. City of Philadelphia, 103 Pa. 102, 109 (1883); Acker v. All States Freight, Inc., 27 Lehigh L.J. 359, 362-63 (1957). See also Foster v. Humberg, 180 Kan. 64, 68, 299 P.2d 46, 51 (1956); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 1253, 1272 (1954). These cases are also authority for the allowance of damages for the cost of repairs in addition to the reduction in the fair market value of the property where the injury to such property is partially reparable and partially permanent. Id. This is in line with the modern notion of using a "compensatory standard" as the guiding light in matters concerning damage awards. See Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971). In Incollingo the Supreme Court stated that "fixed and formulated rules relating to the appropriate measure of damages in varying circumstances are not immutable, and must give way when it is determined that they are not setting a compensatory standard." Id., 444 Pa. at 308, 282 A.2d at 229. See also Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co., 213 Pa. 252, 257-58, 62 A. 854, 855 (1906) ("`The general principle upon which compensation for injuries to real property is given, is that the plaintiff should be reimbursed to the extent of the injury to the property.'") If appellees, Mr. and Mrs. Wade, were only reimbursed to the extent of the cost of their repairs, then, if the testimony of Mr. Fine is to be believed, to a real and substantial degree they would suffer a loss of ten percent of the market value of their home without having been fairly compensated. They would not be put in the same or a substantially similar position that they were in immediately prior to the defendants' negligence. As counsel for the Wades states in his brief: "The Plaintiffs have been permanently deprived of 10% of the market value of their real estate as a direct result of the Defendant's actions."

Since Art Club and Acker involved permanent tangible injury to a building, one might argue, as appellant does, that there is only an illusory permanent injury in the present case. Since there is no physical and tangible injury to a portion of the Wade property which can be characterized as permanent, the argument follows that the measure of damages should not include the reduction in the fair market value of the property. The lower court rejected this argument in a portion of its opinion which is quoted above, by concluding that the permanent change in the drainage field above the plaintiffs' property was a sufficient basis upon which to assess damages for the diminution in market value. Although this does not point to a physical permanent injury done directly to plaintiffs' land, the above analysis is reflective of a scholarly and realistic approach proffered by a recent commentator on the law of damages. He states that "physical permanency of the injury is not the real basis for the choice between the diminution approach and the repair approach. Rather, the term `permanent injury' seems to express the conclusion that, for some reason, repair cost would be unfair or inappropriate." Dobbs, Law of Remedies 314 (1973). In this case, it has already been stated that repair costs would be inappropriate to fully compensate the appellees. This real and substantial loss to the Wades was established by the testimony of an experienced real estate appraiser whose competency to so testify was not challenged. In fact, the entire substance of this witness' expert testimony went totally unrefuted. The trial judge, acting as finder of fact, recognized the expertise of the appraiser, Mr. Fine, and found his testimony to be perfectly credible. We, therefore, find no merit to appellant's claim that the diminution of fair market value was so remote or speculative to have been the basis of a damage award. The trial court's assessment of permanent damages in the amount of $5,250.00 is affirmed.

The order of the court below is reversed with respect to issue I, affirmed with respect to issues III and IV, and vacated and remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with issue II of this opinion.

MONTGOMERY, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.