ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEES

DAVID F. HAMILTON, United States District Judge.

Defendants Charles R. Sheeks and two law firms with which he has been associated have moved for an award of attorney fees and costs in this action brought under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Sheeks and the two law firms prevailed in this case, though plaintiff Gary Veach has appealed the judgment in favor of Sheeks on certain claims. Defendants contend that plaintiff and his attorney brought frivolous claims and pursued the case in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. For the following reasons, defendants' motions are denied.

First, at the most basic level, defendants have not presented any actual evidence of the amount of fees they actually incurred. They have submitted only unsworn assertions in their memoranda of law. To the extent that the law firm defendants contend their right to a fee award is different from Sheeks' right, the law firm defendants have not offered any indication, let alone any evidence, about the amount of any separate fees they incurred.

Second, plaintiff Veach proved, at least in the court's view of the law and the jury's view of the evidence, that Sheeks violated the venue provision in 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(2). (The jury also found, however, that Sheeks was entitled to a good faith defense under § 1692k(c).) In light of the jury's finding of a violation, even if the court thought that some award might be justified, the court could not possibly award all of the fees and costs incurred by defendants. Instead, some basis for sorting out the fees incurred on different claims and theories would be needed. See, e.g., Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of Indiana, Inc., 103 F.3d 576, 583-84 (7th Cir. 1996). Defendants have made no effort to supply such a basis.

Third, although the court has found that plaintiff's other claims against defendant Sheeks were without merit, application of the FDCPA is fraught with uncertainties. In particular, applying the FDCPA to activities of attorneys in state court collection litigation poses difficult problems, as discussed in this court's previous entry, Veach v. Sheeks, 2002 WL 243658 (S.D.Ind. Jan. 4, 2002), discussing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), and Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000), among other cases. At this stage of development of FDCPA law as applied to litigation activities, lawyers can make colorable arguments for a variety of different positions. Given the uncertainties involved in FDCPA cases, the court cannot conclude that the claims that Veach actually pursued at trial against Sheeks were outside the bounds of colorable argument. Defendants' motions for attorney fees and costs are therefore denied.

So ordered.