ORDER

SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.

I have reviewed the comprehensive Report of Magistrate Judge Grubin. There are no objections. I hereby adopt the Report in full.

So Ordered.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE HONORABLE SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN

GRUBIN, United States Magistrate Judge:

Pending in this action filed pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are cross-motions for summary judgment of plaintiff, at all times pertinent an inmate at the Green Haven Correctional Facility, and two of the four named defendants, Green Haven Lieutenant Daniel Connolly and the Director of the Special Housing/Inmate Disciplinary Program for the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("NYSDOCS"), Donald Selsky. The other two named defendants, a Green Haven sergeant identified only as Honsinger and the former Superintendent at Green Haven, Charles Scully, have not been served and have never appeared in this action. For the following reasons, the motions of defendants Connolly and Selsky should be granted and plaintiff's should be denied.

I.

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The moving party must initially satisfy a burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, which can be done merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party then must meet a burden of coming forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), by "a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

The court "must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party defending against the motion," Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 841 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1988); Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987), and extend extra consideration to a pro se plaintiff who is to be given "special latitude on summary judgment motions." McDonald v. Doe, 650 F. Supp. 858, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). But the court is to inquire whether "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and to grant summary judgment where the nonmovant's evidence is irrelevant or merely colorable, conclusory, speculative or not significantly probative. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511; Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d at 12, 15; Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088, 107 S.Ct. 1295, 94 L.Ed.2d 151 (1987).

II.

The following facts put forward by defendants Connolly and Selsky in support of their motions are not in dispute. An inmate misbehavior report was issued against plaintiff on December 15, 1989 charging him with six rules violations arising from allegations that he became loud, disruptive and abusive and threatened an officer during a trip to the Fishkill Correctional Facility, made sexually offensive remarks once inside Fishkill, and disobeyed orders and threw a lunch bag at a corrections officer upon his return to Green Haven. Defendants' Rule 3(g) Statement ¶¶ 1-3; Defendants' Exhibit A; Plaintiff's Rule 3(g) Statement ¶¶ 7-9. At a Tier III Superintendent's Hearing on December 28, 1989 before Lieutenant G. Schneider, who is not a party to this action, plaintiff was found guilty of four of the charges and sentenced to 45 days keeplock (effective as of December 15, 1989, when he was placed in keeplock pending the hearing) and 32 days loss of privileges. Plaintiff served those penalties and was released on January 29, 1990. Def. 3(g) Stmt. ¶¶ 4-5; Def.Ex. B; Pl. 3(g) Stmt. ¶¶ 10-11; Affidavit of Joseph Valentine, sworn to June 28, 1994, ¶¶ 5-6. While serving them, plaintiff filed an administrative appeal dated January 10, 1990 which was received by the NYSDOCS Commissioner's Office on January 17, 1990. On March 16, 1990 defendant Selsky reversed the determination for "inappropriate denial of witness who could provide information regarding seriousness from a supervisory level" and ordered a rehearing. Def. 3(g) Stmt. ¶ 6; Def.Ex. B; Pl. 3(g) Stmt. ¶ 12. On March 30-31, 1990 a rehearing was held before defendant Connolly, who found plaintiff guilty of two of the charges and imposed "time served" penalties of 45 days keeplock (for December 15, 1989 through January 29, 1990) and 32 days loss of privileges (for December 28, 1989 through January 29, 1990). Plaintiff thus suffered no additional punishment as a result of the rehearing. Def. 3(g) Stmt. ¶¶ 7-9; Def.Exs. C, D; Affidavit of Daniel Connolly, sworn to April 1, 1994, ¶¶ 1-6; Pl. 3(g) Stmt. ¶¶ 13-15; Valentine Aff. ¶ 10. Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal dated April 17, 1990, which was received by the NYSDOCS Commissioner's Office on April 23, 1990. On June 15, 1990 defendant Selsky reversed that determination for "inappropriate denial of witness," because Connolly failed to interview witnesses requested by plaintiff who had been transferred to another facility, and ordered that records of the hearing be expunged. Def. 3(g) Stmt. ¶¶ 10-11; Def.Ex. E; Pl. 3(g) Stmt. ¶¶ 16-17.

Contrary to the allegations of the complaint, there is no evidence that defendant Selsky affirmed either the December 28, 1989 hearing or the March 30-31, 1990 rehearing prior to reversing them. The record is further devoid of any evidence that plaintiff commenced an Article 78 proceeding with respect to either of these hearings or any of the events that gave rise to them. The only Article 78 proceeding to which plaintiff refers in his submissions in response to defendants' motion and in support of his own is one he claims to have commenced in the New York State Supreme Court, Dutchess County, on September 10, 1990, i.e., three months after Selsky reversed Connolly's March 31, 1990 determination. (This Article 78 proceeding is alleged by plaintiff as a basis for his retaliation claim against the other two defendants, Honsinger and Scully, who have not been served. Valentine Aff. ¶ 14.) There is, thus, no evidence in the record that defendant Selsky, either with respect to plaintiff or as a general practice, reversed hearings that he first affirmed only after punishment had been served and only after an Article 78 proceeding had been commenced.

III.

Plaintiff has wholly failed to satisfy his burden of coming forward with facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial, and defendants Connolly and Selsky are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Even if we construe the facts for plaintiff to assume arguendo that he was denied his right to call witnesses, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2979, 4 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), at the March 30-31, 1990 rehearing, there would be no claim because plaintiff suffered no deprivation of liberty as a result of Connolly's conduct because the sentence issued by Connolly on March 31, 1990 was limited to punishment plaintiff had already served. Indeed, because Selsky ordered records of the hearing expunged, there was no harm at all as a result of the March 30-31 hearing. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against Connolly and Selsky based on the March 30-31 rehearing must be dismissed. See Young v. Hoffman, 970 F.2d 1154, 1156 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 115, 126 L.Ed.2d 80 (1993) (setting aside nominal damages award of one dollar against hearing officer for failure to call witnesses at hearing as a result of which inmate suffered no penalty); Jenkins v. Semintini, No. 93 Civ. 2045 (LMM), 1994 U.S.Dist. Lexis 5024 at *6, 1994 WL 150824 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 1994) (dismissing claim against hearing officer where, "because the result of the disciplinary hearing . . . was time already served in keeplock, it is clear that Plaintiff suffered no confinement as a result of the absence of witnesses at his disciplinary hearing"); cf. Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2608, 132 L.Ed.2d 852 (1994) (administrative reversal does not bar action for due process violation at disciplinary hearing where such reversal occurs after the inmate has served a portion of punishment imposed at and as a result of such hearing).

Moreover, even if we were to stretch the complaint even further to set forth a claim based on a purported denial of plaintiff's right to call witnesses at the December 28, 1989 hearing conducted by Lt. Schneider, as the result of which plaintiff remained in keeplock until January 29, 1990, it would afford no basis for a claim against Connolly, who had nothing to do with that hearing, or Selsky, whose sole involvement with it was to reverse it on plaintiff's administrative appeal. As noted above, the record shows that any suggestions in the complaint that Selsky originally affirmed this hearing and waited until plaintiff's punishment had been served or an Article 78 proceeding had been commenced before reversing it — even if they are assumed to state a claim — are totally groundless.

CONCLUSION

Copies of this Report and Recommendation have been mailed this date to:

Mr. Joseph Valentine c/o 1995 Davidson Ave. Apt. 2A Bronx, New York 10453 August L. Fietkau, Esq. Assistant Attorney General State of New York Department of Law 120 Broadway New York, New York 10271

The parties are hereby directed that if you have any objections to this Report and Recommendation you must, within ten (10) days from today, make them in writing, file them with the Clerk of Court and send copies to the Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin, to the opposing party and to the undersigned. Failure to file objections within ten (10) days will preclude later appellate review of any order that will be entered by Judge Scheindlin. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 6(a), 6(e) and 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 825, 121 L.Ed.2d 696 (1992); Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam).