OPINION and ORDER

NORAH KING, Magistrate Judge

This is an action for injunctive relief in which Plaintiff seeks removal of certain structures on Defendants' real property located in Coshocton County, Ohio, which allegedly infringe on Plaintiff's flowage easement rights. With the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Doc. No. 13, and on Plaintiff's motion to strike portions of affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Doc. No. 24. .

I. Background

The United States [hereinafter "Plaintiff"] owns and operates the Mohawk Dam located in Coshocton County, Ohio, on the Walhonding River, a tributary of the Muskingum River. Complaint, at ¶ 4. In 1941, Plaintiff acquired flowage easement rights over a parcel of land in Tiverton Township, Coshocton County, Ohio, in order to allow Plaintiff to properly manage the operation of the Mohawk Dam for the purpose of controlling floods for the Muskingum River Watershed Area. Id., at ¶¶ 4, 5; Declaration of Steven B. Shideler, at ¶ 2, attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. This easement was acquired by an instrument recorded in the Deed Records of Coshocton County, Ohio, in Volume 179, Page 220. Complaint, at ¶ 5; Declaration of Steven B. Shideler, at ¶¶ 2, 3, 8; Assignment of Flowage Easement, Attachment B1, attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. This easement specifically provides:

Said easement being the right to back up water up to and over the said premises by the erection and operation of a dam, called the Mohawk Dam, as provided in the Official Plan of the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District, with a spillway of the height proposed in said Official Plan, being at an elevation of about eight hundred and ninety (890) feet above sea level, with the right fo the Grantee to require the removal of all existing buildings below an elevation of eight hundred and eighty-five (885) feet above sea level and with the agreement that no new buildings be build below an elevation of eight hundred and ninety (890) feet above sea level except by permission of the District and that all buildings built or maintained below the elevation of the spillway of the dam (eight hundred and ninety [890] feet above sea level) be built and maintained at the risk of the owner, and also, with the right of said Grantee, its officers or agents, to enter that part of the premises hereinafter described and remove or destroy drift, or to police same, and for any legal or lawful purpose authorized by the directors of said District, the Grantors hereby waiving all damages that may arise from the detention of said waters by reason of said dam. . . .

The easement over the parcel of land at issue sets the spillway elevation of Mohawk Dam at eight hundred and ninety (890) feet mean sea level [hereinafter "msl"]. Id.; Declaration of Steven B. Shideler, at ¶ 8. The easement prohibits new construction below the spillway elevation, except by permission of the Huntington District, United States Army Corps of Engineers. Assignment of Flowage Easement, Attachment B1, attached to Exhibit B to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Jack D. Newcome [hereinafter "Mr. Newcome"] and Annette S. Newcome [hereinafter "Mrs. Newcome"] [collectively hereinafter "Defendants"], by reason of a series of conveyances, are the current owners of the parcel of land subject to Plaintiff's flowage easement rights. Complaint, at ¶¶ 6, 7. Mr. Newcome acquired this property in 1997 by deed from his parents, Jack R. Newcome and Ruth M. Newcome. Declaration of Steven B. Shideler, at ¶ 5; Attachment B3, attached to Exhibit B to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Currently, a cabin, a privy and a woodshed are located within Plaintiff's flowage easement. Complaint, at ¶ 8; Declaration of R. Scott Johnson, at ¶ 5, attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; Declaration of Steven B. Shideler, at ¶¶ 7, 11. These structures were erected after the government's easement was secured. Id., at ¶ 9. Defendants concede that the encroaching structures at issue are below the 890-foot mark. Answer, at ¶ 13.

II. Standard for Summary Judgment Motion

The standard for summary judgment is well established. This standard is found in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, which provides in pertinent part:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Pursuant to Rule 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . ." In making this determination, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). However, summary judgment is appropriate if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the opposing party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

III. Analysis

A. Easements Generally

"An easement is an interest in the land of another, . . . that entitles the owner of the easement, the dominant estate, to a limited use of the land in which the interest exists, the servient estate." Crane Hollow, Inc. V. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, 138 Ohio App.3d 57, 66 (4^th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Alban v. R.K. Co., 15 Ohio St.2d 229, 231 (1969)). "When an easement is created by an express grant, the extent and limitations of the easement depend upon the language of the grant." Id. Although the owner of the servient estate may use the land for any purpose that does not interfere with the easement, the rights of the easement owner may be protected by mandatory injunction ordering the removal of a structure that encroaches on the easement. United States v. Hughes, 408 F.2d 619 (6^th Cir. 1969).

B. The Parties' Contentions

By its submission of the deed and the affidavits of surveyors and of a division chief of the United States Corps of Engineers, Plaintiff has established: (1) that the United States acquired a perpetual flowage easement over the property now owned by Defendants for the express public purpose of protecting communities downstream from the Mohawk Dam from potential flood damage; (2) that the easement grants to the United States, inter alia, the right to prohibit or restrict the placement of any structure or obstruction below the spillway elevation; (3) that the structures and obstructions on Defendants' land are below that level; (4) that the structures did not predate the easement; and (5) that Defendants had notice of the easement at the time they acquired the property. The Unites States therefore moves for summary judgment requiring removal of the infringing structures.

Defendants concede most of the United States' allegations. Specifically, Defendants admit the existence and original date of the easement, Answer, at ¶ 4, admit that the easement grants to the United States the right to prohibit the building of structures within the spillway, admit that the structures at issue do not predate the easement, and admit that the land on which the structures sit was acquired with full knowledge of the easement. Id., at ¶ 5. Moreover, Defendants do not deny that the structures at issue are situated below the spillway. Id., at ¶ 13. Instead, Defendants claim that the encroaching structures were built with the permission of the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District [hereinafter "MWCD"]. Id., at ¶¶ 6, 7, 9, 10. The original "Assignment of Flowage Easement," restricts the building of new structures below the spillway to those constructed "by permission of the District." Attachment B1, attached to Exhibit B to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The resolution of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment therefore turns on whether there is evidence that permission was granted by the MWCD to build the structures at issue.

C. Plaintiff's Evidentiary Challenge

In their memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Defendants contend that the structures at issue in this action were constructed with permission. To support this contention, Defendants initially offered the Affidavit of Jack R. Newcome, Defendant Mr. Newcome's father and a former owner of the property, which states in pertinent part:

In the spring of 1954, my father met with someone from, [sic] the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District, to the best of my knowledge, out of New Philadelphia, Ohio, and told him at what elevation to build the cabin. He set a stake in the yard above the old cabin, and told him that nothing out of wood frame could be built until we reached and [sic] elevation of eight feet above the stake. I met with Dad on site the next day, and he relayed the information to me, and showed me the stake.

Affidavit of Jack R. Newcome, at p. 2, Doc. No. 23. Plaintiff moves to strike this portion of the affidavit as inadmissible hearsay. Doc. No. 24.

Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." An affidavit that does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(e) is subject to a motion to strike. See Reddy v. Good Samaritan Hospital Health Center, 137 F. Supp.2d 948, 954 (S.D. Ohio 2000). "[S]tatements made `on information and belief' are insufficient to satisfy the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 56(e)." Id. at 956. Furthermore, "`[b]elief, no matter how sincere, is not equivalent to knowledge.'" Id.

The quoted portion of the Affidavit of Jack R. Newcome meets the definition of hearsay evidence, i.e.,"a statement, other than one made by the declarant . . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Defendants contend, in response, that this statement constitutes a present sense impression within the meaning of Fed.R.Evid. 803(1), and therefore qualifies as an exception to the rule against hearsay. Rule 803(1) defines a present sense impression as "[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." Fed.R.Evid. 803(1). "To come within this hearsay exception, a statement describing an event must be made while the declarant was perceiving the event, or immediately thereafter." Pridemore v. Legal Aid Society of Dayton, 625 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (S.D. Ohio 1985). The statement must be made "contemporaneously, or nearly so, with perception of the event." Id. The statement must be made within minutes, not days, following the event. United States v. Price, 58 Fed. Appx. 105, 107 (6^th Cir. 2003).

The challenged portion of the Affidavit of Jack R. Newcome, Doc. No. 23, does not qualify as a present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. A statement made "the next day," Doc. No. 23, can hardly be regarded as having been made "immediately after" the alleged meeting between the affiant's father and "someone," Id., from the MWCD.

In response to Plaintiff's motion to strike, Defendants offer an additional affidavit of Jack R. Newcome, in which he states, in part: "He personally knows that his father met in the spring of 1954 with someone from, [sic] the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District, to the best of my knowledge, out of Philadelphia, although he did not overhear the conversation." Third Affidavit of Jack R. Newcome, at ¶ 8, Doc. No. 26. However, even accepting this portion of the new affidavit, Defendants point to no basis for admitting into evidence a hearsay statement that an agent of the MWCD granted permission to build a structure within the easement.

The record in this action offers no admissible evidence that the MWCD granted permission to build the structures at issue in this case.

D. Interference with Easement

Defendants also contend that, in any event, the structures would have little effect on the flood control program and would, therefore, not "unreasonably interfere" with the easement's purpose. Defendants argue that, since "[w]ater flows freely on and around the structure [Structure # 465, a cabin] . . ." "there is no interference with the right to back up the water." Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, p. 6, Doc. No. 14. However, whether or not water can flow freely around the infringing structures is irrelevant. Defendants apparently concede that the structures are located within the spillway elevation; this fact alone establishes a violation of the express terms of the flowage easement which interferes with and restricts Plaintiff's rights as to its easement. "It is no excuse to say that [a] particular obstruction is minor in nature. If [the landowner] can continue to maintain [an] obstruction, there is no reason why others similarly situated cannot do likewise; the ultimate effect being a limitation on the usefulness of the easement." United States v. Hughes, 408 at 621. Structures that are located within the spillway constitute a material impairment of the Government's rights under the easement.

E. Adverse Possession

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims must fail because Plaintiff had "knowledge of and acquiesced to the elevation of the structure for a period. . . . in excess of 40 years." Answer, at ¶ 11. However, "[a]n easement acquired by the United States by deed cannot be lost by adverse possession." United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Caylor, 159 F. Supp. 410, 413 (E.D. Tenn. 1958). That the Plaintiff may have failed to enforce its rights will not be construed as an abandonment of its interest. Id.; United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Bagwell, 698 F.Supp. 135, 137 (M.D. Tennessee 1988) ["It is well-established that laches, estoppel and waiver based on inaction do not apply against the Government in situations where it is seeking to enforce its property rights."].

Defendants acquired the property at issue with notice of the flowage easement rights of the United States; they will not now be heard to complain that the United States seeks to exercise those flowage easement rights. It follows that, in the absence of evidence of permission, all structures and obstructions built after execution of the "Assignment of Easement" which are located below 890 feet msl must be removed.

WHEREUPON, Plaintiff's motion to strike portions of the Affidavit of Jack R. Newcome, Doc. No. 24, is GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Doc. No. 13, is also GRANTED. Defendants are ORDERED to remove the encroaching structures, i.e., (1) Structure # 465, a cabin; (2) Structure # 603, privy; and (3) Structure # 722, a shed, from their property within ninety (90) days of the date of this Opinion and Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.