MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RODNEY S. WEBB, Chief Judge United States District Court.

Before the Court is defendant's motion requesting that this Court recuse itself under 28 U.S.C. § 455 or, in the alternative, for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144 (doc. # 46). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

Counsel first seeks recusal or disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455. That statute generally requires recusal of a judge "in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," and it also lists a number of specific instances in which recusal is required. The motion, without invoking any specific subsection of the statute, asserts this Court's impartiality may be questioned "because of a personal bias or prejudice arising out of his professional and/or personal relationship and knowledge of [sic] potential knowledge against this Defendant." On its face, this allegation is clearly unfounded, as the undersigned has absolutely no knowledge of this defendant and, it goes without saying, therefore has no personal relationship, or relationship of any kind, with him. The Court is therefore tempted to reject the motion out of hand.

However, the Court suspects counsel's chief concern — in this motion and in the alternative motion — is that the Court will be biased because the case involves — in a concededly indirect manner — a family member of Judge Conmy, who is of course a professional acquaintance of this Court. In a related filing, counsel writes that "[c]learly the only two federal judge's [sic] in North Dakota have friendship amongst each other and their families." The Court will briefly address this issue.

Contrary to counsel's suggestion, there are four federal judges in North Dakota; the undersigned is the only full-time active judge, and there are three senior judges: Judges Conmy, VanSickle, and Benson. There are also one part-time and two full-time federal magistrates. The undersigned may have met, at various times, the families of each of these individuals. Thus, the Court may have met the family member at issue, as it may have met other judges' family members. However, that is the extent of the relationship, and it is unlikely the Court would even recognize the individual at issue. Thus, the relationship between the undersigned and family members of other federal judges is, contrary to counsel's assertion, not necessarily a deep or personal one, and this is certainly true in this case, suggesting recusal is not required.

The standard for § 455(a) recusal suggests that such an action is not required here. This standard is "whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned by the average person on the street who knows all the relevant facts of a case." In Re. Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, 85 F.3d 1358 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, the relevant facts are few: A family member of a fellow judge, a family member the judge at issue may or may not have met but with whom the judge clearly does not have a personal relationship, is indirectly involved in the case, perhaps as a witness, perhaps only as a part of the story that will be related at trial. This is insufficient to give the "average person on the street" reasonable questions about a judge's impartiality.

Rather, as other courts have recognized, "[A] judge's acquaintance with a party, an attorney, or a witness, without some factual allegation of bias or prejudice, is not sufficient to warrant recusal." Bailey v. Broder, No. 94 Civ. 2394 (CSH), 1997 WL 73717, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1997) (citing cases). The only "factual" allegation here is that federal judges in the same state must have close relationships with each other's families, which will inevitably prejudice one judge from hearing a case in which a family member of another judge is involved.

The Court rejects this contention and holds that it will not be biased by the presence in this case of the individual at issue. While the Court might recuse itself if the family of another North Dakota federal judge was actually a defendant, this is not the case, and indirect presence does not require recusal. Therefore, the motion for recusal under § 455 is DENIED.

The Court similarly rejects defendant's alternative motion for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144. That section requires a judge to stop handling a case "[w]henever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party. . . ." Specifically, the affidavit must contain "the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists," and must "be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith."

Counsel has filed a single document captioned "Affidavit and Certificate of Counsel." The Court notes that it is not in usual affidavit form and does not contain any assertion of good faith. Overlooking these flaws and viewing it on its merits, however, the Court finds it insufficient to require disqualification.

These statements are not enough to require disqualification. They merely state defendant's concern and justify it by reference to the "fact" that the undersigned "ha[s] friendship" amongst" his family and that of Judge Conmy. This "fact" is simply not true, as explained in detail above. Rather, the undersigned's connection to Judge Conmy's family is attenuated, at best, and in the specific case at hand goes no further than an awareness that the individual exists and, perhaps, a brief meeting.

If every judge were required to disqualify him or herself whenever a family member of a professional acquaintance was indirectly involved in a case, disqualification would be a daily event. This would be especially true in a small state and district like this one, especially since judges usually spend their careers in public life and thus come to know many members of the community, in addition to the personal and family relationships all individuals maintain. However, disqualification is not a daily event, because general familiarity with a witness alone, without more, does not require it. Therefore, the motion for disqualification under § 144 is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.