TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:

In this civil forfeiture case, the district court granted summary judgment to claimant Donald K. Daniel. A divided panel of this court affirmed. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property in Greene Tuscaloosa Counties, 893 F.2d 1245 (11th Cir. 1990). We voted to rehear the case en banc and vacated the panel's decision. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property in Greene Tuscaloosa Counties, 902 F.2d 24 (11th Cir. 1990). On rehearing, we hold that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. Accordingly, we vacate the summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

The civil forfeiture provision at issue here, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988), provides that property acquired with the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction is forfeit to the United States. On April 4, 1988, the Government filed a verified complaint describing several properties it claimed were subject to civil forfeiture under section 881(a)(6), including the International Hough Model TD12 Dozer at issue in this appeal. The complaint alleged that, in August 1983, J.C. Pate, Jr., an active drug importer, had purchased the dozer, plus equipment and attachments for it, with $65,000 in cash and an unspecified "trade in." In May 1984, according to the complaint, Pate purchased another attachment for the dozer, an International Hough Ripper Model 12RS, for $12,025.70 in cash. Both transactions, "were carried out in the name of Bobby Daniels [sic]," the claimant's brother. The complaint also alleged that Pate's tax return would not support the amount of cash he spent for all the property described in the complaint, including the dozer. In its complaint and in a separate motion filed on the same day, the Government asked for a warrant for the arrest of the property.

In support of its motion for a warrant, the Government filed the declaration of Ronald R. Brunson, a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service who had verified the complaint. Brunson, who had been investigating Pate's involvement with importing illegal drugs for two years, described the extent of Pate's drug importing operation — Pate had engaged in at least fifty drug transactions during the three-year period from August 1981 to October 1984, or an average of one every three weeks. Brunson also stated that Pate had no visible means of earning large sums of cash, and that Pate's pattern of using grocery bags full of cash to buy property and placing it in others' names was typical of a large-scale narcotics conspiracy. Brunson described Pate's purchase of the dozer in terms similar to those of the complaint.

On April 5, 1988, the district court, finding that "probable cause exist[ed] to believe" that the property described in the complaint, including the dozer, was subject to forfeiture under section 881(a)(6), issued a warrant for its arrest and directed the United States Marshal to take custody of it. Daniel filed a verified claim to the dozer and an answer to the complaint. In his answer, Daniel asserted that he owned the dozer and its equipment and attachments, and denied that the dozer "was purchased by or for" Pate or that Pate had any interest in the dozer.

Daniel then moved for judgment on the pleadings, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), asserting that the Government's complaint was insufficient because it did not specifically allege that the dozer was the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction and thus forfeit under section 881(a)(6) or that the dozer was forfeit under any other provision of section 881(a). The district court elected to treat this motion as a summary judgment motion, and so notified the Government and Daniel.

In support of his motion for summary judgment, Daniel filed two affidavits, his own and that of his sister-in-law and bookkeeper, Dorothy Daniel. Daniel's position is that although Pate, a convicted drug dealer, purchased the dozer with cash, he did so as Daniel's agent, with money earned by Daniel's legitimate logging business. In his own affidavit, Daniel stated that he had been in the logging business for over ten years. In mid-1983, Daniel asserted, he bought a used dozer from Pate for $16,000 cash in order to clear tracks for his logging trucks. Pate operated this dozer for Daniel without pay. When it broke, Pate hauled it to Tuscaloosa for repair. When it became apparent that the cost of repair would be greater than the value of the dozer, Daniel told Pate to negotiate a trade-in for a new dozer. After Pate informed Daniel that a new dozer would cost $65,000 in excess of the value of the tradein, Daniel left this sum, in cash, with Dorothy Daniel. Pate picked up the cash and bought the dozer. By mistake, the bill of sale for the dozer was placed in the name of Bobby Daniel, Daniel's brother. When Dorothy Daniel received this bill of sale, she called the mistake to Daniel's attention and prepared a paper correcting the error for Bobby Daniel to sign.

Dorothy Daniel's affidavit corroborated Daniel's account of the transaction. Dorothy stated that, as bookkeeper of Daniel's logging business, she maintained the records and received all the proceeds. According to Dorothy, most of the transactions of the business, including purchases of heavy equipment, were handled in cash. On August 9, 1983, Daniel gave her $65,000 in cash and told her to give it to Pate. Although Daniel did not tell her the purpose of the cash, she assumed that it was to be used to purchase equipment. On August 18, a bill of sale arrived for a new dozer, listing Bobby Daniel — Dorothy's husband — as owner. After Daniel told her that the dozer was his, purchased for him by Pate, she corrected the error by having Bobby Daniel sign a statement that he had no claim to the dozer and replaced his name on the bill of sale with Daniel's. She added that Daniel's business had taken deductions for depreciation of the dozer on its federal and state income tax forms.

In response to Daniel's affidavits, the Government filed the affidavit of Donald W. McArthur, an agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Government's position, as stated in its verified complaint, Brunson's declaration, and McArthur's affidavit, is that Pate, a convicted drug dealer with no visible means of earning large sums of cash, bought the dozer with cash earned through drug dealing, placed it in Bobby Daniel's name to conceal his ownership interest, and, after purchase, used it for his own purposes. In his affidavit, McArthur stated that he had investigated Pate for illegal drug trafficking, and that Pate had entered a guilty plea to a charge of managing a continuing criminal enterprise from 1981 to 1985. McArthur asserted that during this investigation, he discovered that Pate, like many drug traffickers, often concealed his assets by using cash to buy valuables (including several tractors and loaders besides the dozer at issue here) and putting them in others' names. McArthur, moreover, had seen photographs showing Pate riding the dozer at Pate's farm and photographs of the dozer parked at Pate's residence. McArthur also had interviewed Michael Lancaster, whom he described as a long-time associate of Pate's. Lancaster, according to McArthur, stated that Pate had used the dozer on Lancaster's property in exchange for repair work Lancaster did on Pate's truck, that Lancaster had helped Pate buy a trailer on which he transported the dozer, and that Lancaster understood that the dozer belonged to Pate. The dozer was seized at Lancaster's place of business.

McArthur also recounted interviews with (1) Pate, who admitted storing the dozer at his brother's residence, but stated that it belonged to Bobby Daniel; (2) Bobby Daniel, who stated that the rightful owner of the dozer was Donald Daniel and that Bobby had signed a disclaimer indicating that he did not own the dozer; and (3) Dorothy Daniel, who claimed that Daniel gave her a "sack of money" to give to Pate to purchase the dozer; she also asserted that Bobby had disclaimed ownership. Finally, McArthur stated that Pate was a life-long friend of both Donald and Bobby Daniel, and had on numerous occasions used property belonging to the Daniels' as an airstrip to import drugs.

Daniel countered the Government's version of the transaction with a second affidavit. In this affidavit, Daniel stated that because Pate operated the dozer in Daniel's logging business without compensation, transported the dozer to work sites, and was responsible for its operation, Daniel allowed Pate to use the dozer for his own purposes. It was, therefore, "quite possible" that there were photographs of the dozer at Pate's residence and being ridden by Pate, and that Pate had used the dozer at Lancaster's residence in exchange for repair work done by Lancaster.

The district court granted summary judgment to Daniel. It held, first, that the factual and legal allegations of the government's complaint were inadequate to justify forfeiture. The court did not, however, as might be expected, dismiss the Government's complaint with leave to amend. See United States v. $38,000.00 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Pole No. 3172, Hopkinton, 852 F.2d 636, 638 (1st Cir. 1988). Instead, it granted summary judgment to Daniel. First, it appears to have treated its holding that the Government's complaint was inadequate as a determination that the Government had not shown probable cause for forfeiture of the dozer, as required by section 881(a)(6). Although it could have granted summary judgment to Daniel on this basis alone, see infra p. 1439, it then proceeded to determine that there was no genuine issue of material fact — i.e., that Daniel had shown, and that the Government provided "no substantial evidence" to rebut, that the dozer was not acquired with the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction.

The court, accordingly, ordered the United States Marshal to release the dozer to Daniel. The Government, fearing that this release would deprive the court of jurisdiction over the dozer, twice moved the court to stay the release of the dozer pending consideration of the Government's motion for reconsideration. In response, Daniel filed an affidavit promising that he would keep the dozer within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court so long as any proceedings in the case were pending. The district court denied both motions to stay release, and the Marshal released the dozer from the custody of the court.

II.

The Government appeals. There are two issues on appeal: (1) whether we have in rem jurisdiction over the dozer, and (2) whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Daniel.

A.

First, we determine whether we have in rem jurisdiction. A civil forfeiture action is not an action in personam against the claimant of the property; rather, it is an action in rem against the property itself. $38,000, 816 F.2d at 1543-54 n. 12; cf. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property on Lake Forrest Circle, 870 F.2d 586, 589 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1989). In rem jurisdiction derives entirely from the court's control over the defendant res. Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 272, 37 S.Ct. 282, 283, 61 L.Ed. 713 (1917); United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204, 108 S.Ct. 2844, 101 L.Ed.2d 881 (1988). The court loses control over the res, and in rem jurisdiction ceases, when — because the losing party has failed to file a stay of judgment or a supersedeas bond — the prevailing party properly removes the res from the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Id. at 1573 (when district court released res, an airplane, to government, which transferred res to warehouse in Missouri, appellate court had no in rem jurisdiction over claimant's appeal); see also United States v. One (1) 1983 Homemade Vessel Named "Barracuda," 858 F.2d 643, 647 (11th Cir. 1988); L.B. Harvey Marine, Inc. v. M/V "River Arc," 712 F.2d 458, 459 (11th Cir. 1983).

Daniel argues, however, that when the district court released the dozer from custody, we lost in rem jurisdiction over the Government's appeal even though the dozer, pursuant to Daniel's promise, remains within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. A panel of this circuit and a panel of our predecessor circuit have reached different results on whether the release of the res from custody deprives us of in rem jurisdiction over an appeal concerning the res when the res remains within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Our circuit, in "Barracuda," 858 F.2d at 647, held that the release of the res from the custody of the district court, and the virtual destruction of the res, does not destroy our in rem jurisdiction, so long as the res remains within the district court's and, thus, our, territorial jurisdiction. In "Barracuda," the district court ruled that the res, a homemade fishing boat, was forfeit to the Government. The claimant appealed but did not file a supersedeas bond to obtain a stay of release of the boat pending appeal. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(d). The district court, accordingly, released the boat to the government, which filled the vessel with concrete and sank it in a bay within the district court's territorial jurisdiction. On appeal, the government argued that because the claimant, if successful, would be unable to salvage anything from the sunken boat, the boat effectively had been removed from the court's territorial jurisdiction. We stated, to the contrary, that "[a] court's power to exercise its in rem jurisdiction . . . ceases, and in rem jurisdiction fails, when the res leaves the court's territorial jurisdiction"; jurisdiction "is not defeated solely because a physical change occurs in the res." "Barracuda," 858 F.2d at 647 (citations omitted).

Our predecessor circuit, in contrast, held, in The Manuel Arnus, 141 F.2d 585 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 728, 65 S.Ct. 63, 89 L.Ed. 584 (1944), that when the claimant to the res fails to seek a stay or file a supersedeas bond and the court releases the res from custody, but the res remains within the court's territorial jurisdiction, the court nonetheless loses in rem jurisdiction. The court stated: "[I]t is quite clear that libellant allowed custody and, therefore, jurisdiction of the res to be surrendered and that it may not claim that the in rem jurisdiction persisted after such surrender." Id. at 586 (emphasis added); See also, e.g., United States v. $79,000 in United States Currency, 801 F.2d 738, 739 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Where no supersedeas is filed or steps taken to supersede judgment and the Marshal surrenders custody, neither the district court nor the appellate court retains in rem jurisdiction." (emphasis added.))

We do not resolve the conflict between "Barracuda" and Manuel Arnus, because this case is distinguishable from those holdings. In both "Barracuda" and Manuel Arnus, the district court released the res from custody into the hands of a party who was free, if that party so desired, to remove the res from the district, to destroy it, or, as it happened, to keep it within the court's territorial jurisdiction; the res remained within the territorial jurisdiction of the court purely by chance. In this case, however, the res did not remain in the territorial jurisdiction of the court by happenstance. Instead, the court released the dozer on the condition that Daniel — pursuant to his affidavit, see supra pp. 1434-35 note 14 — would keep the dozer within the district and, therefore, available for seizure should the Government prevail on appeal. Before releasing the dozer, therefore, the court protected its in rem jurisdiction by making Daniel its bailee for the dozer; in effect, it retained custody of the res. We hold that when a party to an in rem action induces the district court to release the res into the custody of that party pending appeal by a promise to keep the property within the territorial jurisdiction of the court — and therefore available for seizure should the losing party prevail on appeal — we have in rem jurisdiction of that appeal. Accordingly, we have in rem jurisdiction in this case.

B. 1.

Next, we determine whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Daniel. Our resolution of this issue turns on the relationship of the burden of proof for summary judgment and the burdens of proof for civil forfeiture under section 881. Accordingly, we first outline the proper analysis for a district court to use in considering a motion for summary judgment in a section 881 forfeiture action.

Our review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.2d 989, 996 (11th Cir. 1990). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a district court should award summary judgment to the moving party "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The substantive law applicable to the case identifies which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 2511-12.

In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the district court must remember that "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. Accordingly, on summary judgment, "the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. The district court should "resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant," Browning v. Peyton, 918 F.2d 1516, 1520 (11th Cir. 1990), and draw "all justifiable inferences . . . in his favor," Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987). "If more than one inference could be construed from the facts by a reasonable fact finder, and that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact," summary judgment is not justified. Bannum, 901 F.2d at 996.

The moving party bears "the initial responsibility of informing the . . . court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to "support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, in order to discharge this "initial responsibility." Instead, the moving party simply may "`show' — that is, point out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. Alternatively, the moving party may support its motion for summary judgment with affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. Id. at 331, 106 S.Ct. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting). If the moving party shows the absence of a triable issue of fact by either method, the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party, who must show that a genuine issue remains for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear, Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir. 1991). If the nonmoving party fails to "make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.

When the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it "must support its motion with credible evidence . . . that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial." Id. at 331, 106 S.Ct. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Chanel, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1477. In other words, the moving party must show that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. See id. at 1477. If the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, it is entitled to summary judgment unless the nonmoving party, in response, "come[s] forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact." Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331, 106 S.Ct. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

An understanding of the burdens of proof for civil forfeiture under section 881 is essential to the proper application of the summary judgment standard in this case. For property to be forfeit under section 881, the government first must show probable cause to forfeit the property. When the government has established probable cause, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant, who must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is not forfeit — for instance, that, despite the government's showing of probable cause, the property was not acquired with the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction. See 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988); see also United States v. Single Family Residence Real Property Located at 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 629 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 904 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056, 106 S.Ct. 795, 88 L.Ed.2d 772 (1986) [hereinafter $4,255,000]. If the claimant fails to meet this burden, the property is forfeit to the United States.

Accordingly, when the government moves for summary judgment in a section 881 civil forfeiture action, the court first must determine whether, as a matter of law, the government has shown probable cause for forfeiture. If not, summary judgment for the government is improper. See United States v. Twenty (20) Cashier's Checks, Having the Aggregate Value of Two Hundred Thousand ($200,000) Dollars in U.S. Currency, 897 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (exhibit). If so, the court then determines whether the claimant can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the property is forfeit. The court, in deciding this issue on summary judgment, first must determine whether the government has met its "initial responsibility" of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact — that is, taking all the evidence in the light most favorable to the claimant, has the government shown that no reasonable jury could award the property to the claimant? The government, because it does not bear the burden of proof on this issue, may meet this burden by either pointing out to the court specific portions of the record that it believes demonstrate that the claimant cannot show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the property, see supra note 19, or by introducing affirmative evidence negating the claimant's case. If it meets this burden, and the claimant, in response, fails to introduce significant, credible evidence sufficient to show that a reasonable jury could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant is entitled to the property, the government is entitled to summary judgment; the nonmoving party has failed to "make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

When, as here, the claimant moves for summary judgment, the court's initial inquiry is similar: the court must determine whether, as a matter of law, the government has shown probable cause. If it has not, the court should grant summary judgment to the claimant. If the government has shown probable cause, the claimant still may be entitled to summary judgment, if he affirmatively shows the absence of a triable issue of fact on the issue on which he has the burden of proof — that is, taking all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, no reasonable jury could award the property to the government. If the claimant fails to make such an affirmative showing, the court should deny the claimant's motion. If the claimant does show, however, that no reasonable jury could find that the property was forfeit, the government, to defeat the claimant's motion, must respond with evidence showing that a factual issue exists as to whether the property is forfeit.

2.

In this case, the claimant, Daniel, moved for summary judgment. Our initial inquiry, then, is whether, as a matter of law, the Government demonstrated probable cause. This court has interpreted section 881(a)(6)'s probable cause requirement as "probable cause to believe that a substantial connection exists between the property to be forfeited and an illegal exchange of a controlled substance." Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 628. As this court has emphasized, the government need not "actually prove by a preponderance of evidence a substantial connection to drug dealing." United States v. $41,305.00 in Currency Traveler's Checks, 802 F.2d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. $364,960.00 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) (evidence of probable cause "need not provide conclusive proof"). Instead, the government need only show "probable cause for belief" that such a connection exists. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 903 (quoting $364,960, 661 F.2d at 323). This court, moreover, has defined probable cause as a "`reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion' — the same standard used to determine the legality of arrests, searches, and seizures in criminal law." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property on Lake Forrest Circle, 870 F.2d 586, 590 n. 10 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting $364,960, 661 F.2d at 323); see also Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 628. Furthermore, as the court reiterated in Single Family Residence, "[t]he existence of probable cause is judged `not with clinical detachment, but with a common sense view to the realities of normal life.'" 803 F.2d at 628 (quoting $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 904).

The government may use both circumstantial evidence, $41,305, 802 F.2d at 1343; $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 904, and hearsay, Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 629 n. 2, to establish probable cause. Moreover, the government need not show a relationship between the property and a particular drug transaction, $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 904. Finally, "[t]hat the evidence presented would support an alternative hypothesis does not prevent it being probative on the issue of probable cause." $364,960, 661 F.2d at 324.

Applying this standard, we hold that based on all the evidence in the record, the Government has demonstrated, as a matter of law, that it had probable cause to believe that the dozer had a substantial connection to illegal drug transactions. The Government showed that (1) Pate was a convicted drug dealer who had engaged in extensive narcotics operations; (2) Pate had no visible legal means of earning large sums of cash; (3) Pate, as is common among those who earn money by selling illegal drugs, had a pattern of purchasing valuable objects, like tractors and dozers, with cash and placing them in others' names; (4) Pate was a life-long friend and associate of the claimant; (5) Pate bought the dozer at issue with cash and placed it in the name of a nominee, Bobby Daniel, the claimant's brother; and (6) Pate used the dozer for his own purposes, kept it on his property, and led others to believe that it was his. See United States v. 228 Acres of Land and Dwelling Located on Whites Hill Road, 916 F.2d 808, 812-14 (2d Cir. 1990) (government showed probable cause for forfeiture of property in part because "[t]he district court could reasonably infer that it was unusual to pay for expensive property such as . . . heavy construction equipment with cash"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 972, 112 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1991); cf. Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 630 ("people engaged in illegal activities often attempt to disguise their interests in property by placing title in someone else's name" (quoting United States v. One 1977 36 Foot Cigarette Ocean Racer, 624 F. Supp. 290, 294-95 (S.D.Fla. 1985)).

That we have relied on certain types of evidence — such as admissions to co-conspirators, see Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 629, or the presence of a very large amount of cash, see $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 903-04 — to find probable cause in other cases does not mean that the lack of such evidence in this case is fatal to a probable cause determination. We judge probable cause with common sense and an awareness of the many methods drug dealers use to conceal their assets; in this case, where the Government demonstrated that a convicted drug dealer purchased a valuable piece of equipment with $65,000 cash, placed it in the name of a nominee, and used it for his own purposes, we conclude that the Government has shown probable cause.

3.

Even though the Government has shown probable cause, we may affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Daniel if, taking all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the Government, no reasonable jury could find that the dozer was purchased with the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction. A claimant under section 881(a)(6) may satisfy his burden of proof in two ways, either by rebutting the government's evidence that the property was the proceeds of illegal drug activity or by showing that he was an innocent owner who was unaware of the property's connection with drug sales. Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 629; $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 906. Daniel has chosen the former method, attempting to show that the funds used to purchase the dozer were not the proceeds of illegal drug transactions, but were earned by his logging business.

Our initial inquiry is whether Daniel, as the moving party and the party with the burden of proof on this issue, has introduced credible evidence showing that no reasonable jury could fail to find that Pate bought the dozer with Daniel's money. To meet this initial responsibility on summary judgment, Daniel introduced his first affidavit and his sister-in-law's affidavit, in which both he and Dorothy swear to his version of the transaction. These affidavits, however, contain contradictions and omissions that cast doubt on their credibility; a reasonable jury certainly could choose to disbelieve Daniel's story. For instance, in Daniel's answer to the Government's complaint, he specifically denied that the dozer was purchased "by or for" Pate (emphasis added). A reasonable inference from this statement is that Pate had nothing to do with the purchase of the dozer. In his first affidavit, however, Daniel admits that Pate did buy the dozer after all, but as Daniel's agent. This affidavit flatly contradicts Daniel's answer, and casts serious doubt on his credibility. At the least, the inconsistency between Daniel's answer and his affidavit demonstrates the possibility that Daniel was initially reluctant to provide details about his relationship with Pate. A reasonable jury could infer that this reluctance implied a desire to hide something.

Daniel's first affidavit, moreover, contains an internal inconsistency that casts doubt on his credibility. Consider this: Pate worked closely with Donald Daniel, buying, operating, maintaining, and trading-in Daniel's dozers; Donald Daniel gave Pate a large sum of money in cash for the purchase of a new dozer; Pate went out and purchased the dozer for Donald Daniel but put the bill of sale in Bobby Daniel's name. A reasonable jury certainly might find it difficult to believe that Pate could have worked so closely with Donald Daniel, taken $65,000 in cash from Donald Daniel expressly for the purpose of buying a new dozer, and then mistakenly put the bill of sale in someone else's name.

Dorothy Daniel's affidavit also presents credibility questions. For instance, she indicates that she attempted to keep careful business records. She meticulously corrected the bill of sale problem, having Bobby sign a statement, carefully erasing his name, and retyping Donald's. In addition, she indicated that the dozer was depreciated in the business' books. Her story of meticulous record keeping, however, is inconsistent with a casual transfer of $65,000 in cash to Pate without any information about the transaction's purpose, let alone any record of it until the mistaken bill of sale arrived by mail. Moreover, if Dorothy truly kept careful books, then her records would have included information about the previous dozer purchased by Pate for Daniel, which they traded in for the new dozer, as Daniel describes in his affidavit. Dorothy, however, makes no mention of the history behind the dozer transaction. Moreover, Dorothy provided no copies of tax returns or other documentary evidence to support her claim that Daniel's business depreciated the dozer.

At most, the evidence Daniel submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment demonstrated a possibility that the dozer was purchased with his money. Daniel's suggestion of such a possibility — with evidence that the jury reasonably may choose to disbelieve — is insufficient to meet the claimant's strong burden as the party moving for summary judgment and the party with the burden of proof at trial. Cf. $41,305, 802 F.2d at 1345 (the "possibility of an innocent source" for currency found in house of a drug dealer "does not constitute a preponderance of evidence defeating forfeiture").

If we assume for the sake of argument, however, that Daniel has shown the absence of a triable issue of fact, the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party, the government, to demonstrate that such an issue exists. To meet its burden, the Government placed before the court its verified complaint, Brunson's declaration, and McArthur's affidavit. Daniel contends that we may not consider much of the Government's evidence on summary judgment, as it is inadmissible opinion and hearsay. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (affidavits submitted in connection with motion for summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge [and] shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence"). The nonmoving party, however, need not "produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial . . . to avoid summary judgment," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; instead, its evidence must be "reduc[ible] to admissible evidence," id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555.

We do not decide whether we may consider much of the Government's evidence under this standard. We hold that the following evidence submitted by the Government, which is probably reducible to admissible evidence — and which, moreover, is admitted by the claimant — is sufficient to show a triable issue of fact. First, McArthur's affidavit stated that Pate pled guilty to managing a continuing criminal enterprise involving drugs. Second, Brunson stated, presumably from personal knowledge gained through investigation, that Pate purchased the dozer with cash. Third, Brunson stated that Pate had no visible means of legally earning large sums of cash. Fourth, McArthur swore that he personally had seen photographs of Pate driving the dozer and of the dozer parked on Pate's property; a reasonable inference from McArthur's statement is that Pate exercised control over the dozer.

Daniel never contested that Pate was a convicted drug dealer with no visible means of legally earning large sums of cash. Moreover, he admitted, in his affidavit, that Pate purchased the dozer with cash. Finally, he admitted, in his second affidavit submitted in response to McArthur's affidavit, see supra p. 1444, that Pate exercised control over the dozer: Daniel explained that, because Pate operated the dozer in Daniel's logging business without pay and was responsible for transporting it to jobs, Daniel allowed him to use it for his own purposes and store it on his property.

These uncontested facts — that a convicted drug dealer with no visible means of legally earning large amounts of cash bought the dozer with cash and, after purchase, exercised control over it — reasonably suggest that Pate bought the dozer with the proceeds of drug transactions and that Pate owned the dozer. Of course, Daniel provides an explanation of these facts under which the dozer would not be forfeit; the jury certainly may choose to believe Daniel's story. Whether to infer from the Government's evidence that the dozer is Pate's or to believe Daniel's version of the transaction is, however, a matter for the jury, not for the district court on summary judgment.

III.

We hold that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Daniel. The Government has shown probable cause for forfeiture, and there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the dozer was acquired with the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction. Accordingly, we VACATE the summary judgment and REMAND the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

VACATED and REMANDED.