Opinion
Criminal Action No. 3:07-CR-265-O.
January 25, 2008
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Evidence (Doc. # 17) filed December 20, 2007. Having reviewed the motion, the response of the United States of America, and the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant's motion to suppress should be denied for the reasons set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant, Corey Broadnox, was indicted on September 5, 2007, for
being a person who had been convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that is a felony, did knowingly possess, in and affecting interstate commerce, a firearm, to with: a RG Industries, Model RG 31, .38 caliber revolver, serial number 019420
In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).See Doc. No. 1, (3:07-CR-265-O) (N.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2007) ("Indictment"). Defendant moves the Court to suppress evidence that he argues was obtained pursuant to an illegal search. Specifically, Defendant asserts in his motion that "law enforcement lacked probable cause to secure an arrest and search warrant-he did not sell crack cocaine to Officer St. John, at 915 N. Jester Avenue, Dallas, Texas 75211-2589, or elsewhere." See Mot. at 2. However, Defendant has expressly withdrawn his contention that he did not sell crack cocaine to Officer St. John. See Doc. No. 28, (3:07-CR-0265-O) (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2008) ("Evidence in Support of Motion to Suppress). Defendant now relies on the argument that "915 N. Jester Avenue, Dallas, Texas 75211-2589 was not his address, thus, one of the primary basis to the search warrant was not valid." See id. Defendant has requested a hearing on his motion to suppress, thus the Court addresses this matter first.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing
In deciding whether a hearing is warranted on a motion to suppress, a district court follows the guideposts established by the United States Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). Upon defendant's request, a court should hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress when the defendant makes a preliminary showing: (1) that the allegations in the affidavit supporting the warrant are false or made with a reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) that even if the false statements are set aside, the remaining portions of the affidavit are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72. In Franks, the Supreme Court also defined the standard required to make a "preliminary showing" of falsifications in an affidavit. See id. at 171. The Court explained that defendant's allegations of falsehood must be accompanied by an offer of proof. Id. More specifically, the Court stated,
Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained.Id.
In this case, Defendant alleges that the statements in the affidavit in support of the search warrant attesting that he resided at 915 N. Jester Avenue, Dallas, Texas 75211-2589 and sold crack cocaine at that residence are false. See Mot. at 5. Defendant did not submit any evidence to prove these allegations with his motion to suppress, but did explain to the Court that he was gathering such evidence and would be submitting it to the Court separately. Id. After Defendant's motion had been pending for almost a month without any supporting evidence, the Court entered an order instructing that Defendant must submit his evidence, if any, by January 23, 2008.
In response to the Court's order, Defendant submitted a document titled, "Evidence in Support of the Motion to Suppress." See Doc. No. 28, (3:07-CR-0265-O) (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2008). In his pleading, Defendant asserts that he can prove 915 N. Jester, Dallas, Texas 75211-2589 was not his residence through the testimony of several witnesses, to wit: Pearline Broadnox (Defendant's mother), Umar Ibrahim, and unknown Officers, who attempted to get consent to enter the house on January 29, 2007. Defendant's pleading is not sworn or otherwise supported by affidavit or declaration. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Further, Defendant did not submit any affidavits or sworn statements of these witnesses. Because Defendant has failed to come forward with evidence that satisfies the preliminary showing standard, the Court finds that he is not entitled to a Franks hearing on his motion to suppress. See Williams v. Kunze, 806 F.2d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the allegations in a motion to suppress did not show an entitlement to a Franks hearing where evidence consisted solely of an affidavit with conclusory allegations). Accordingly, Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing is hereby DENIED.
B. Motion to Suppress
The Court applies a two-step test when reviewing a motion to suppress evidence that was seized pursuant to a search warrant. See United States v. Sibley, 448 F.3d 754, 757 (5th Cir. 2006). In the first step, the Court determines whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Id.; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984). "The good-faith exception provides that where probable cause for a search warrant is founded on incorrect information, but the officer's reliance upon the information's truth was objectively reasonable, the evidence obtained from the search will not be excluded." Id. (quoting United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 2002). If the Court finds that the good-faith exception applies, it can deny the motion to suppress without any further inquiry. See United States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1999). If the good-faith exception does not apply, then the Court looks to whether there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's determination that probable cause existed. Id. at 407.
Here, Defendant argues that the good-faith exception does not apply because the magistrate was misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant knew or should have known was false. See Mot. at 4. Specifically, Defendant challenges statements made in the affidavit alleging that:
On February 1, 2007 at about 3:06 p.m. . . . at 915 N. Jester Avenue, Dallas, Dallas County Texas . . . the affiant purchased 1.7 grams of crack cocaine . . . from the persons described in paragraph # 3 for $100.00 dollars in U.S. currency.
Affidavit for Search Warrant and Arrest Warrant, ¶ 5. Defendant argues the information is false because he was not at the residence on the stated date and time. The Government responds that the affidavit in support of the search warrant sworn to by Officer St. John provided sufficient factual details to support the conclusion that drugs and related evidence could be found at 915 N. Jester. See Gov't Resp. at 7. Further, the Government argues that the affidavit provided a detailed description of the person from whom Officer St. John purchased the drugs. The Government therefore contends that even if Officer St. John was mistaken about the identity of the person who sold the drugs, she was certain that she purchased crack cocaine at 915 N. Jester Avenue, Dallas, Texas on February 1, 2007. Viewing the affidavit as a whole, it is clear that it contains specific factual details regarding a person or persons selling drugs at that residence. Accordingly, the affidavit established a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought. See United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2003). Based on these connections, the Court finds that the affidavit is not lacking in indications of probable cause as to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Defendant has therefore failed to show that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply.
The Court notes that the affidavit was not attached to the warrant in the court's file. At the Court's request, the parties submitted a copy of the affidavit for its consideration in determining the motion to suppress. Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence the Court hereby takes judicial notice of the affidavit finding it is a true and correct copy and attaches it to this memorandum opinion as Exhibit A.
In sum, because the Court finds that there is no showing of a reason why the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rules does not apply, no further analysis is necessary. The Court therefore ORDERS that Defendant's motion to suppress be and is hereby DENIED.