GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:

This consolidated case involves two separate challenges, one by appellant Roland Bailey and one by appellant Candisha Robinson, to their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In relevant part, that section imposes a five-year term of imprisonment upon anyone who "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm." We have long required that in order to support a conviction under § 924(c)(1), the government must demonstrate both a "nexus . . . between a particular drug offender and the firearm," United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and that "the gun facilitate[d] the predicate offense in some way," United States v. Jefferson, 974 F.2d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In order to assess whether the government has made the required showing, we have developed an open-ended test that takes account of numerous factors arguably relevant to whether a gun was used in relation to a drug trafficking offense. See, e.g., United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 621-22 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Applying this test, divided panels of the court affirmed Bailey's conviction, see United States v. Bailey, 995 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and reversed Robinson's conviction, see United States v. Robinson, 997 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Because this complex, open-ended test has produced widely divergent results and because we believe that it intrudes the court into the province of the jury, we now replace it with a test that looks to two factors only: the proximity of the gun to the drugs involved in the underlying offense, and the accessibility of the gun to the defendant from the place where the drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds are located. Applying that test, we affirm both convictions.

I. BACKGROUND

In each of these cases, possession with the intent to distribute cocaine was the predicate drug offense in connection with which the defendant was charged with using or carrying a firearm in violation of § 924(c)(1). The facts of each case are briefly as follows.

A. United States v. Bailey

In May 1989, Roland Bailey was stopped by two Metropolitan Police officers after they noticed that the car he was driving had no front license plate and no inspection sticker. When Bailey failed to produce a driver's license, the officers ordered him out of the car. Before Bailey exited the car, the officers saw him push something between the seat and the front console. Upon searching the passenger compartment of the car they discovered one round of ammunition and 27 small plastic bags containing a total of 30 grams of cocaine. The officers then placed Bailey under arrest; the ensuing search of the trunk of his car turned up a loaded 9-mm. pistol and $3,216 in cash.

Bailey was charged with one drug offense and one other firearms offense in addition to using or carrying a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). At trial, Detective Charles DiDomenico, a narcotics expert, testified that weapons such as Bailey's are frequently carried by drug dealers "not only to protect themselves, but [also] to protect their assets, drugs and money." Bailey was convicted by the jury on all charges and was sentenced by the court to two concurrent 51-month sentences of imprisonment on the drug and weapon charges not at issue here, and to a consecutive 60-month term of imprisonment on the § 924(c)(1) conviction.

B. United States v. Robinson

In June 1991, an undercover officer of the Metropolitan Police Department approached Veloria Robinson, the sister of appellant Candisha Robinson, and told her that he wanted to buy crack cocaine. Veloria then took him to an apartment in the northeast quadrant of the city. Candisha opened the door; Veloria told her that the officer wanted something. When Candisha asked what he wanted, he replied that he wanted a "twenty." He then entered the apartment and the Robinson sisters went into the bedroom. He saw Candisha hand Veloria a rock of crack cocaine, which Veloria then sold to him. The next evening, the officer made another controlled buy at the same apartment, this time from a man who claimed that he also lived there.

Shortly after the second controlled buy, a search warrant was executed at the apartment. Inside a locked trunk in the bedroom closet the police found a .22-caliber Derringer, appellant Robinson's 1990 tax return, a letter from her employer, 10.88 grams of crack cocaine, and the marked $20 bill from the first controlled buy. They also found a quantity of plastic baggies in the bedroom.

At trial, Detective David Stroud, a narcotics expert, testified that the Derringer was a "second gun" — that is, a type of gun that a drug dealer might hide on his person for use until he could get to his "real gun." Stroud also testified that drug dealers generally use guns to protect themselves from other drug dealers, the police, and their own employees.

Robinson was convicted by a jury on five separate drug counts as well as on the § 924(c)(1) charge. Including the 60-month term of imprisonment for violating § 924(c)(1), she was sentenced to 157 months of imprisonment, four years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $300.

C. The Appeals in Bailey and Robinson

Each defendant appealed his or her § 924(c)(1) conviction on the ground that the Government had failed to adduce sufficient evidence at trial that he or she had "used" or "carried" a firearm in relation to a drug offense. Different panels affirmed Bailey's conviction and reversed Robinson's, in each case over a dissent. Bailey and the government respectively suggested rehearing in banc. In order to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in our various decisions applying § 924(c), we consolidated the two cases and reheard them in banc.

II. ANALYSIS

Section 924(c)(1) states that:

Whoever, during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment for such . . . drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years.

By requiring that the use of the firearm be "in relation to" a drug trafficking offense, the Congress made it clear that it did not intend to criminalize the mere possession of a firearm by someone who commits a drug offense. "[T]he firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence." Smith v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2058-59, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993). At the same time, it is clear that a firearm need not actually be brandished in order to be used or carried in connection with a drug trafficking offense. United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1989). As Justice (then Judge) Kennedy wrote for the Ninth Circuit in the seminal opinion on § 924(c)(1):

If the firearm is within the possession or control of a person who commits an underlying crime as defined by the statute, and the circumstances of the case show that the firearm facilitated or had a role in the crime, such as emboldening an actor who had the opportunity or ability to display or discharge the weapon to protect himself or intimidate others, whether or not such display or discharge occurred, then there is a violation of [the statute].

United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).

A. Section 924(c)(1) to Date

In an effort to distinguish between mere possession of and the use or carrying of a gun in connection with a drug trafficking crime, we held early on that more than just evidence of proximity was required to establish "that the gun supported the possession crime." United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1991). By the next year, we were able to state that "a number of factors" may be relevant in any particular case: "courts have identified and will [continue to] identify" such factors. United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Just two years later Judge Wald summarized the development of our case law this way:

[W]e have enumerated a nonexclusive set of factors to weigh in making that [distinction]. Among other things, we look to whether a gun is accessible to the defendant, whether it is located in proximity to the drugs (which may cut either way depending on the facts of a particular case), whether it is loaded, what type of weapon it is, and, finally, whether there is expert testimony to bolster the government's particular theory of "use."

Derr, 990 F.2d at 1338 (citing Morris, 977 F.2d at 621-22). Thus, in each case in which a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction under § 924(c)(1), we have weighed each bit of evidence against him in order to determine whether the defendant could be said to have used (or carried) his gun in furtherance of his drug crime.

Defendants Bailey and Robinson do not attack this open-ended (for convenience Bruce-Morris-Derr) approach in determining whether a gun was used during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Nor do they question the prior holding of this (and other) court(s) that a gun need not be brandished or displayed in order to be used or carried. Instead, each argues that if this approach were properly applied, he or she could not have been convicted based upon the evidence presented at trial. In response, the government argues that it needs to present evidence only that the defendant possessed a firearm and that the firearm in some way facilitated the drug crime; thus implicitly the Government asks us to abandon the Bruce-Morris-Derr approach in favor of a simpler test.

In form the dispute between the parties is little more than a disagreement over the evidence necessary to sustain a § 924(c)(1) conviction; neither side expressly addresses the question of how the disputed element of the crime, viz. "use," ought be defined. In substance, however, this case is about what constitutes use, as opposed to mere possession, of a firearm. Only when we have resolved that question can we determine the quantum of evidence necessary to convict and formulate an appropriate test for assessing whether the government has produced that evidence.

We granted rehearing in order to revisit these issues in the light of our experience using the Bruce-Morris-Derr approach. We do so bearing in mind that because the Bruce-Morris-Derr approach represents the established law of the circuit, a due regard for the value of stability in the law requires that we have good and sufficient reason to reject it at this late date. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1565 n. 21 (11th Cir. 1994) ( in banc) (noting that although "the implications of stare decisis are less weighty" when an in banc court reviews an issue for the first time, " stare decisis is a hallmark of our judicial system" and should still be considered by the court in banc). In particular, we reconsider our own prior construction of a statute somewhat gingerly as well because "'unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation . . . Congress remains free to alter what we have done.'" Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 975 F.2d 871, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ( in banc) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2370, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (internal citations omitted)); see also Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 1980) ( in banc) ("The doctrine of stare decisis, weighty in any context, is especially so in matters of statutory construction.").

We have nonetheless identified at least three factors that justify rejecting established precedent. First, the in banc court may properly overrule a prior panel decision if "it decides that the panel's holding on an important question of law was fundamentally flawed." Critical Mass Energy Project, 975 F.2d at 876. In this regard, we conclude below that the open-ended Bruce-Morris-Derr approach impermissibly intrudes into the province of the jury. Second, when "a precedent [is] a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law . . . because of inherent confusion created by an unworkable decision," the court is justified in overruling that precedent. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173, 109 S.Ct. at 2371. In this case, even a brief survey of our decisions demonstrates (below) that the Bruce-Morris-Derr approach has produced and will likely continue to produce inconsistent results. Finally, the in banc court may overrule a prior precedent interpreting a statute "if it finds that other circuits have persuasively argued a contrary construction." Critical Mass Energy Project, 975 F.2d at 876. Again, a survey of the other circuits (also below) demonstrates that they have uniformly adopted a standard different from ours and one that seems more conducive to consistent application.

Preliminary, therefore, we survey the problems inherent in the Bruce-Morris-Derr approach: intrusion into the province of the factfinder, seemingly inconsistent results, and a continuing conflict with the interpretation of § 924(c)(1) adopted by virtually every other circuit.

1. The Province of the Jury

It is a cardinal principle of our system of criminal law that the facts are settled by the trier of fact, be it a jury or a judge, and are not ordinarily to be redetermined by a reviewing court. On appeal from a general verdict finding a defendant guilty, the deference we owe to the trier of fact requires that we draw from the record all inferences that can justifiably be drawn in support of the conviction. Hence, in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, as an appellate court we must ask not "whether [we] believe that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether the judgment was supported by substantial evidence." Woodby v. Immigration Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 282, 87 S.Ct. 483, 486, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966). Or, as the Supreme Court said in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("A jury is entitled to draw a vast range of reasonable inferences from evidence, but may not base a verdict on mere speculation").

Whether a gun was used during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense is, at its core, a question of fact. In a case where the gun was not actually fired or brandished during the commission of the crime, it may well be an ultimate rather than a basic fact, but it is still a question of fact and not of law. Of course, an appellate court may properly determine, as a matter of law, the baseline or minimum conduct that can constitute a "use," and it must determine in each case, with appropriate deference to the jury, whether the record contains sufficient evidence of such conduct. The reviewing court does not sit, however, to make its own finding with respect to an ultimate fact. Weighing the evidence is a function assigned to the jury: "We are not a second jury weighing the evidence anew and deciding whether or not we would vote to convict the defendant." United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Yet the use of an approach that requires the court to weigh numerous factors and to determine the specific relevance of individual facts in order to assess the sufficiency of the evidence invites the court to do just that.

The Bruce-Morris-Derr approach strips from the jury its "responsibility [as] the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 307 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. For example, in United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1991), we were at considerable pains to determine whether a small gun found in the pocket of a coat along with a stash of drugs "was intended for use only at the time of distribution" or was rather "the sort of weapon a drug dealer would employ for protection against an effort to penetrate a crack house." Id. at 1055. Determining that the former was more likely true, we reversed the conviction. See id. at 1056. Similarly, in Derr and Robinson, the panel struggled to determine for itself the significance of the fact that the defendant's gun was locked respectively in a closet or trunk with a stash of drugs at the time of the defendant's arrest. See Robinson, 997 F.2d at 888; Derr, 990 F.2d at 1338. Determining the weight to be given a single piece of evidence is not ordinarily an appropriate function for an appellate court.

A due regard for the limits that the jury system necessarily places upon the scope of our review would not lead us to abdicate all our responsibility as an appellate court — for example by affirming any conviction in which a gun is found and there is some connection, no matter how speculative or remote, between the gun and the predicate drug offense. A jury may convict a defendant for any of a number of impermissible reasons, and therefore, if the defendant claims that the evidence against him is insufficient to sustain his conviction, we must as an appellate court review the record conscientiously. See United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d 845, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Nor does our recognition that the approach heretofore used in this circuit impinges upon the province of the jury by itself predetermine precisely how we ought to review a § 924(c)(1) case. It does, however, strongly suggest that we must replace the open-ended Bruce-Morris-Derr approach with a manageable standard; we must, that is, state clearly the minimum showing that the government must make in order to put to the jury the question whether a defendant has violated § 924(c)(1).

2. Inconsistent Results

The open-ended approach described in Derr has produced widely divergent and seemingly contradictory results. Panels have upheld convictions where a loaded, sawed-off shotgun was found along with crack cocaine and drug paraphernalia in a lawn clipping bag beneath the exterior stairwell of a house and additional drugs and paraphernalia were found in the defendant's bedroom, see United States v. Jefferson, 974 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1992); where loaded pistols were found underneath a sofa cushion and on a bedroom nightstand in the defendant's house, which elsewhere contained crack cocaine in ziplock bags and other drug paraphernalia, see United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992); and where a loaded 9-mm. pistol was found along with cash in the trunk of the defendant's car after bags of cocaine had been found in the front seat of the car, see United States v. Bailey, 995 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In contrast, panels have reversed convictions where a loaded 22 caliber Derringer was found, along with individual packages of cocaine and marijuana, in a pocket of the defendant's trench coat in the house in which he lived, see United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1991); where an unloaded 357 Magnum revolver was found along with the defendant's birth certificate and a locked box containing cash, crack cocaine, and drug paraphernalia in an apartment in which the defendant was staying, see United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993); and where an unloaded 22 caliber Derringer was found in a closet along with crack cocaine and drug proceeds, including marked money, see United States v. Robinson, 997 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Although each of these cases can be distinguished on the basis of one or another fact — for example, by looking to the type of gun involved or to how easily the defendant could have grabbed the gun at the time that he was arrested — such distinctions seem counter-intuitive if not arbitrary. Having reflected upon our experience, we think it apparent that the court has failed to take a consistent approach because it has not laid down a standard that yields determinate results in any but the easiest of cases.

3. Conflict with Other Circuits

No other circuit has found our open-ended approach persuasive. Our sister circuits have each adopted a definition of "use" that is considerably broader than firing, displaying, or otherwise brandishing the firearm. They focus upon whether the evidence concerning the location of the gun is sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that the gun in some way facilitated the predicate drug trafficking offense. From a functional perspective, the standards they have developed for assessing the sufficiency of the evidence are much more similar to the "proximity and accessibility" standard we adopt today than to the open-ended approach that we have used in the past.

The opinion in United States v. Molinar-Apodaca, 889 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1989) is representative. In that case, police officers executing a search warrant had found a commercial quantity of marijuana in a shed outside the defendant's house; in the house itself, they found an automatic rifle and a semi-automatic handgun. Id. at 1422. In analyzing the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of this evidence, the Fifth Circuit did not look at such details as whether the guns were loaded or whether they were the appropriate type of weapon to protect an ongoing drug operation. Rather, applying circuit law to the effect "that the government is only obliged to show that the firearm was available to provide protection to the defendant in connection with his engagement in drug trafficking," the court affirmed the conviction.

In the wake of Justice Kennedy's analysis in Stewart, the Ninth Circuit applies an equally straightforward test. That court will affirm a conviction under § 924(c)(1) "if [the firearm's] physical proximity to the defendant at any time during the commission of the crime, or during arrest, supports the inference that it emboldened him to commit the underlying offense or to resist arrest." United States v. Torres-Medina, 935 F.2d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1991).

Every other circuit similarly focuses, in essence, upon whether the firearm was accessible and proximate to the defendant during the commission of the drug offense. In numerical order by circuit, see, e.g., United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[T]he court's critical concern should . . . be whether . . . [the firearm] was 'available for use' in connection with the narcotics trade"); United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a conviction may be affirmed "where circumstances indicate that the defendant intended to use the weapon by strategically placing it so that it could be available for use during a drug transaction"); United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902, 906-07 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that where the proximity of the gun to the drugs indicated that the defendant's "access to the weapon was unimpeded by distance or other objects," the jury could conclude that the weapon "facilitated [the defendant's] possession of and intention to distribute" illegal drugs); United States v. Paz, 927 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming a conviction because, during the course of defendant's possessory offenses, "the gun was present and accessible, even though under a mattress"); United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1362 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The presence of firearms at the home of a defendant where drugs, money, and ammunition are also found . . . is sufficient to establish the 'use' of a firearm as an integral part of a drug-trafficking crime in violation of § 924(c)(1)"); United States v. Warner, 10 F.3d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming a conviction solely because the firearm was "readily accessible for drug-related protection"); United States v. Vasquez, 909 F.2d 235, 240 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a conviction under § 924(c)(1) is appropriate when guns and drugs are present in the same location, because the "trier of fact [can] reasonably conclude that the availability of firearms instills [in the defendant] a heightened sense of security [while] he posses[es] the drugs with the intent to distribute them"); United States v. Quintanilla, 25 F.3d 694, 700 (8th Cir. 1994) ("To support a conviction under section 924(c)(1), the government need only establish that a firearm was present and available for use"); United States v. Torres-Medina, 935 F.2d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We hold that a firearm may be considered available [and therefore used by a defendant] for purposes of section 924(c)(1) if its physical proximity to the defendant at any time during the commission of the crime, or during arrest, supports the inference that it emboldened him to commit the underlying offense or to resist arrest"); United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that "the uses element of section 924(c)(1) is satisfied when the defendant has ready access to the firearm and the firearm was an integral part of his criminal undertaking and its availability increased the likelihood that the criminal undertaking would succeed" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1393 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[P]ossession of a firearm constitutes use in relation to the drug trafficking offense if the possession is an integral part of, and facilitates the commission of, the drug trafficking offense"); see also Note, Smith v. United States and the Modern Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1): A Proposal to Amend the Federal Armed Offender Statute, 69 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 815, 843 nn. 187-190 (1994) (noting that "other circuits have specifically rejected many of the factors considered by the D.C. Circuit: size of the gun . . . whether the firearm was loaded, number of weapons, and evidence of past actual use"). But cf. United States v. Taylor, 18 F.3d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that the analysis of a sufficiency challenge "is clearly a very fact-intensive question [that] requir[es] a careful examination of, among other things, where the gun was located and what else was found in the apartment").

B. Section 924(c) Henceforth

As the Supreme Court has made clear, the government must make two distinct showings in order to obtain a conviction under § 924(c)(1): "that the defendant 'use[d] or carrie[d] a firearm'" and "that the use or carrying was 'during and in relation to'" a predicate offense. Smith v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993). Therefore, in determining what the proper standard should be, we must determine both what constitutes the use or carrying of a gun and in what circumstances such a use or carrying is in relation to a drug trafficking offense.

1. "Use" of a Firearm

In the context of § 924(c)(1), "use" could be defined either narrowly, so as to encompass only the paradigmatic uses of a gun, i.e., firing, brandishing, or displaying the gun during the commission of the predicate offense, or more broadly, so as to include the other ways in which a gun can be used to facilitate drug trafficking. The narrow definition has the virtue of simplicity; it is, after all, relatively easy to determine whether the defendant's firing, brandishing, or displaying a gun was related to the defendant's contemporaneous (recall the "during" requirement of § 924(c)(1)) drug trafficking offense. The narrow definition also has the vice of simplicity, however; it is too narrow to capture all of the various uses of a firearm that the Congress apparently intended to reach via § 924(c)(1).

Certainly nothing in the statute indicates that the Congress intended to exclude any use from the scope of its prohibition. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that in § 924(c)(1), the "Congress employed the term 'use' expansively." See Smith, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2058. Wherefore, it held that the statute prohibits the "use" of a firearm even as an object that can be bartered for drugs. See Smith, ___ U.S. at ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2055, 2057.

Like firing, brandishing, or displaying a gun, barter involves handling the gun. A gun can surely be used even when it is not being handled, however. For example, a gun placed in a drawer beside one's bed for fear of an intruder would, in common parlance, be a gun "used" for domestic protection.

This more inclusive understanding of "use" has long been recognized in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. In Astor v. Merritt, 111 U.S. 202, 4 S.Ct. 413, 28 L.Ed. 401 (1884), the Court was required to interpret a customs statute that exempted from duty "[w]earing apparel in actual use . . . of persons arriving in the United States." Id. at 203, 4 S.Ct. at 413. The petitioner sought an exemption for clothing that he and his family had purchased abroad, but not yet worn. The Court accepted his argument:

If a person residing in the United States should purchase wearing apparel here, in a condition ready for immediate wear without further manufacture, intended for his own use or wear, suitable for the immediately approaching season of the year, and not exceeding in quantity, quality or value the limit above mentioned, no one would hesitate to say that such wearing apparel was 'in actual use' by such person, even though some of it might not have been actually put on or applied to its proper personal use . . . . An article of wearing apparel, bought for use, and appropriated and set apart to be used, by being placed in with, and as a part of, what is called a person's wardrobe, is, in common parlance, in use, in actual use, in present use, in real use, as well before it is worn as while it is being worn or afterwards.

Id. at 213, 4 S.Ct. at 419. Likewise, in Smith, the Court noted with approval the following definition of the verb "to use": "'[t]o make use of; to convert to one's service; to avail oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a purpose or action by means of.'" Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2054 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990)).

In the context of § 924(c)(1), therefore, we hold that one uses a gun, i.e., avails oneself of a gun, and therefore violates the statute, whenever one puts or keeps the gun in a particular place from which one (or one's agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate a drug crime. In a case where the predicate offense involves the distribution of drugs, the government must show that the defendant had the gun in such a place at the time that the drugs were being distributed. In a case when the predicate offense is possession with the intent to distribute drugs, however, the government need not prove that the gun was in that place during the entire period that the defendant illegally possessed the drugs or that it was in that place at the time that the defendant was arrested. Because possession with the intent to distribute is a continuing offense — that is, an offense that extends through time — the government need only prove that the defendant put or kept the gun in that place at some point while the defendant illegally possessed the drugs.

2. "During" and "In Relation To"

Once it is determined that the defendant has used or carried a gun, the more difficult question is whether he has done so "in relation to a drug trafficking offense." As the Court noted in Smith, this requirement "at a minimum, means that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence." ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2059. For the statute to be violated, therefore, the gun "must 'facilitat[e] or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating' the drug trafficking offense." Id. (quoting Stewart, 779 F.2d at 540) (alterations in original). Using a gun to protect one's drugs, drug paraphernalia, or the proceeds of one's drug sales is therefore clearly a prohibited use of the gun. Our prior decisions under § 924(c)(1) recognize as much.

The First Circuit refers to this relationship quite generally as a "facilitative nexus." That court looks only to whether the gun was "kept [where it was] to be available for use" in an ongoing drug offense. See, e.g., United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1994). The court's rationale is readily explained: once a person acquires a firearm and puts or keeps it where it can be used more actively in his drug activity, that firearm becomes a part of the drug activity and thus is used by the defendant in relation to the drug activity. It matters little whether the use is described in terms of emboldening the defendant to commit the drug trafficking crime, see, e.g., Stewart, 779 F.2d at 540, protecting the defendant's possessory interest in his drugs, see, e.g., United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir. 1990), or otherwise; any way one puts it, the firearm is being used as part of the drug activity. Therefore, like the First Circuit, we look to whether the gun was positioned so as to be available for use during ongoing drug activity in order to determine whether the use was within the scope of § 924(c)(1).

Note that in order to relate to a drug trafficking offense, the use of the gun need not actually have furthered the offense. As the Supreme Court said in Smith, the gun need only "ha[ve] the potential of facilitating" the drug trafficking offense. Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently held that "[t]he ordinary meaning of the words ['relating to'] is a broad one — 'to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.'" Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2037, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979)); see also District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 580, 583, 121 L.Ed.2d 513 (1992) (noting that when the Congress uses the phrase "relates to," it has chosen "'deliberately expansive' language" (quoting Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987))). The Congress's use of that phrase here was clearly deliberate and an indication that it intended § 924(c)(1) to be a broad prohibition, reaching more than conduct that actively advances the underlying predicate drug offense.

The legislative history of § 924(c)(1) reveals that the Congress expressly retained the "in relation to" requirement in preference to a more restrictive "in furtherance of" requirement. One bill that passed the Senate as part of the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of the current version of § 924(c)(1) would have penalized "[w]hoever, during and in relation to any [one of a number of enumerated drug] felon[ies] . . . uses a firearm, or carries a firearm in furtherance of such crime. . . ." 131 Cong.Rec. 18,155, 18,235 (July 9, 1985) (reprinting S. 49, a predecessor bill, as passed by the Senate). The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms criticized this proposal, however. Referring to the then-current version of § 924(c)(1), it argued that because "existing law already requires that the carrying be 'in relation to' the underlying crime," the proposed bill would "weaken the existing mandatory penalty provision." 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1346 (1986). Therefore, the "in furtherance of" requirement was deleted. This suggests that the Congress carefully avoided any implication that it intended to narrow the relationship that must be shown between the gun and the predicate offense in order to support a conviction under § 924(c)(1).

In sum, it is apparent that positioning a firearm in such a way that it protects or is otherwise integrated into one's drug trafficking is not just a use of that gun, but is a use of that gun in relation to a drug trafficking offense and is therefore covered by the statute. What, then, is sufficient evidence that a gun found at the scene of a drug crime is being used in this way?

Whenever there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendant at some time during the commission of the predicate drug offense put or kept a firearm in a place where it would be proximate to and accessible from a place that is clearly connected to his drug trafficking ( e.g., a place used to store, manufacture, or distribute drugs, or to keep the proceeds of drug transactions), the jury may also infer that the gun was being used to protect the drug trafficking operation, and was therefore being used in violation of § 924(c)(1). We emphasize that the jury may draw this inference regardless whether the predicate offense is one of drug distribution or of possession with intent to distribute drugs; we reject any suggestions to the contrary in our prior opinions. Cf. Bruce, 939 F.2d at 1055 ("Since possession with intent subsequently to distribute is in a sense a passive crime, it becomes somewhat difficult analytically to determine how one goes about using a gun in relation to that crime"). As the Eighth Circuit has stated:

It has become common knowledge that drug traffickers typically keep firearms available to protect themselves and their drugs and drug money. The presence and the availability of the firearms are often crucial to the "success" of the drug enterprise. It is therefore permissible for juries to infer that firearms found among a drug trafficker's paraphernalia are used to further the drug venture and are thus used during and in relation to drug trafficking within the meaning of section 924(c)(1).

United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir. 1990).

Obviously, a defendant is free to present evidence that he possessed the gun solely for a different purpose — for example, as part of a collection of guns that just happened to be kept in a place that later became involved in drug trafficking. See, e.g., United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 229, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that defendant had argued that he was a gun collector); United States v. Morrow, 923 F.2d 427, 435 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that defendant had "strenuously argued at trial that the only purpose for the gun was to shoot snakes"). It will be the duty of the trier of fact, however, and emphatically not of this court, to weigh all such evidence and to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the weapon was being used as part of a drug trafficking operation.

This test for use is not only an accurate means of ensuring that the scope of § 924(c)(1) is as broad as the Congress intended it to be; it will also avoid the problems with the Bruce-Morris-Derr approach that we outlined above. First, as we have already noted, placing or keeping a gun in such a way that it protects a drug trafficking operation is clearly a "use" of a gun "in relation to a drug trafficking offense." In most cases, the gun's proximity to and accessibility from the actual site of the defendant's drug trafficking will be the most probative evidence that the defendant was using the firearm to protect his drug trafficking. Similarly, whether the defendant carried the gun with, or to or from the location of, the drugs will be the most probative evidence that he carried it during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Second, this test can be readily administered both by the district court, which must determine whether the Government's case may go to the jury, and by the appellate panel that must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under § 924(c)(1). As such, it will assure greater uniformity across cases while penalizing more precisely the conduct that the Congress intended to reach.

C. Application of the Standard

Applying the standard for "use" to the present cases, we hold that the Government presented sufficient evidence to convict both Bailey and Robinson. When Bailey was arrested, there were 30 grams of cocaine, more than $3,200 in cash, and a loaded 9-mm. pistol in his car. He was properly convicted of possession with the intent to distribute the cocaine. Because the gun was found in the same place as the cash (namely, the trunk) and in the same car as the drugs that formed the basis of his drug trafficking conviction, the jury was entitled to infer that the money was the proceeds of an ongoing drug operation. The requirements of proximity and accessibility were both satisfied. The gun was proximate to the drugs and was easily accessible to Bailey at any time that he was handling either the drugs or the proceeds of their sale. The jury could reasonably infer that Bailey had intentionally incorporated the gun into his drug operation, was using it as part of that operation, and was therefore using it in relation to his possession with intent to distribute the drugs. Although the record does not demonstrate that Bailey had made a specific drug sale (the amount of money he had notwithstanding), there is little reason to doubt that he was using the gun in relation to the possessory offense regardless whether the gun actually furthered the possessory offense or emboldened him to commit that offense. It is enough that the jury was entitled to conclude that Bailey had put the gun into the car not for some unrelated purpose but because he was keeping drugs there; that alone establishes that the gun was used in relation to Bailey's drug trafficking offense. We therefore affirm his conviction.

The same analysis requires that we affirm Robinson's conviction. In her case, the firearm was found in the same locked trunk as were the drugs that formed the basis of her conviction for possession with intent to distribute. Again, the requirements of proximity and accessibility are obviously satisfied: The gun was proximate to the drugs, and it was accessible to anyone, such as Robinson, who had access to the drugs. Because the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs were Robinson's — a finding not at issue here — it could also infer from these facts that Robinson placed or kept the gun in the same location as the drugs in order to protect her possession of the drugs. Hence, the jury was entitled to conclude that Robinson used the gun in relation to the drug trafficking offense.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, we reject the open-ended Bruce-Morris-Derr approach and conclude instead that in order to survive a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction under § 924(c)(1), the Government need only point to evidence that the firearm in question was in proximity to the drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds and was accessible to the defendant from the site of the drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds involved in his or her predicate drug trafficking offense. When there is evidence of proximity and accessibility, we will affirm a conviction under § 924(c)(1). Because the government presented such evidence at the trials of both Bailey and Robinson, the judgments of conviction in each case are

Affirmed.