Janis van Meerveld United States Magistrate Judge.

JANE TRICHE MILAZZO MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Janis van Meerveld United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is the Motion to Fix Attorney's Fees (Rec. Doc. 487) filed by Camellia Grill Holdings (“CGH”) and referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the Motion be GRANTED IN PART and that CGH be awarded $56,679.27 in attorney's fees and expenses.

Background

This dispute between the parties concerning the Camellia Grill restaurant has been playing out in litigation over more than a decade in both state and federal court. The District Court's January 27, 2021, Order and Reasons in this action provides much of the history. (Rec. Doc. 470). For purposes of the present motion, the following is relevant.

On August 11, 2006, CGH and/or its affiliates sold the immovable property at 626 Carrollton Avenue (the location of the Camellia Grill restaurant) and the “tangible property located within or upon” the Carrollton restaurant to Uptown Grill, L.L.C., and/or its affiliates. The “tangible property” included “recipes, trademarks, names, logos, and likenesses.” On August 27, 2006, CGH and The Grill Holdings, L.L.C. (an affiliate of Uptown Grill) entered into a License Agreement, pursuant to which CGH licensed the federally registered Camellia Grill trademarks to Grill Holdings. Chartres Grill L.L.C., a sublicensee of Grill Holdings, operated a Camellia Grill style restaurant on Chartres Street in the French Quarter at various times from 2010 through 2017.

Litigation in state court resulted in a final judgment that the License Agreement had terminated as of June 1, 2011. The License Agreement requires that post-termination, Grill Holdings and its affiliates must “avoid any action or the continuance of any condition which might suggest to the public that [it] has any right to the Marks, or that [it] continues to be associated with Licensor” and that Grill Holdings must “discontinue use of all Marks.” License Agreement ¶¶ 4.10, 12.1, 12.2, Rec. Doc. 11-3, at 9, 12.

During the course of this federal litigation and through multiple summary judgments and appeals, the District Court held, and the Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed, that the Bill of Sale transferred all Camellia Grill trademark rights to Uptown Grill. The Fifth Circuit observed that this conclusion meant that the License Agreement was based on a mutually mistaken assumption that CGH owned the Camellia Grill trademarks, resulting in a relatively null agreement. Uptown Grill, L.L.C. v. Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc., 920 F.3d 243, at 250 (5th Cir. 2019). But, because Uptown Grill and its affiliates had not sought to nullify the License Agreement and a court cannot declare a relative nullity on its own initiative, the License Agreement must be enforced as far as possible. Id.

Meanwhile, on February 9, 2018, the District Court partially granted a motion for summary judgment filed by CGH, holding that Grill Holdings and its affiliates had violated the License Agreement by using the Camellia Grill trademarks in operating the Chartres Grill between June 1, 2011 (the date the License Agreement was held to have been terminated), through 2017. The court held that CGH was entitled to its attorney's fees as the prevailing party under the License Agreement and referred the calculation of the amount of reasonable fees to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation.

The undersigned reviewed the invoices submitted by CGH in support of its attorney's fees incurred through May 22, 2018. Importantly, this lawsuit included many other claims that failed, such as CGH's claims that Grill Holdings and its affiliates were not authorized to operate the Carrollton Street location, that CGH is the owner of the marks everywhere except the Carrollton Street location, that CGH and its affiliates were entitled to damages for conversion, that CGH and its affiliates were entitled to damages under the Lanham Act, and that CGH and its affiliates were entitled to damages under Louisiana law. But only fees related to the breach of the post-termination provisions of the Licenses Agreement were recoverable. Thus, the court required CGH to submit a revised list of fees that included only those related to that issue.

CGH submitted a revised list that included fees incurred between 2013 and 2018. The undersigned determined that the first document in the record where one of the parties explicitly raised arguments regarding breach of the post-termination provisions of the License Agreement was in a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on September 27, 2016. The court found it appropriate to award CGH all attorney's fees and costs claimed to be related to that License Agreement dispute beginning in September 2016. But as to the attorney's fees and costs incurred before September 2016, although CGH claimed its revised list included only fees related to the breach of the post termination provisions of the License Agreement, the undersigned determined that only 50% of those fees were recoverable because that earlier work nonetheless concerned multiple purposes, not only the breach of the License Agreement. The attorney's fees both before and after September 2016 were reduced an additional 25% considering the results obtained: that is, although CGH had succeeded in preventing Uptown Grill and its affiliates from using the Camellia Grill trademarks outside of the Carrollton location, it had not actually succeeded in being able to use the marks itself and had failed to show it had suffered any damages as a result of the breach of the License Agreement. The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. (Rec. Doc. 394).

In previous rulings, the District Court had held that CGH and its affiliates could not sustain their claims that Grill Holdings and its affiliates had breached the License Agreement by using the Camellia Grill trade dress. The Court found that CGH and its affiliates did not own any trade dress rights relative to the Carrollton location and could not assert any claims beyond that location because the License Agreement did not articulate the elements constituting the putative trade dress. CGH and its affiliates began pursuing an appeal of this ruling (among others) around the same time the undersigned was considering their first motion to fix attorney's fees.

On March 29, 2019, the Fifth Circuit held that the elements of a claimed trade dress need not necessarily be articulated in a contract for a party to enforce its rights under the contract, reversing the District Court's ruling on this issue. Uptown Grill, 920 F.3d at 251.On remand, the District Court held that Grill Holdings and Chartres Grill breached the post-termination provisions of the License Agreement by using the Camellia Grill trade dress at the Chartres location after the termination of the License Agreement. The District Court enjoined Grill Holdings, Uptown Grill, and Chartres Grill from using all or most of the Camellia Grill trade dress elements (as defined by the court) at any single location. The District Court also awarded CGH its attorney's fees incurred in connection with enforcement of the License Agreement's post termination provision regarding trade dress. The Court ordered that the fee award includes all fees incurred before and after the current remand and in connection with the successful appeal but excludes fees related to the Motion to Dismiss under Rooker-Feldman, the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, and any requests under the Lanham Act.

The court must now determine the amount of the attorney's fee award. At the time of the previous fee award, CGH and its affiliates were represented by Irl Silverstein. He continued to serve as lead counsel through the February 6, 2019, oral argument on the most recent Fifth Circuit appeal. After that date, Stephen McDavid in Mississippi served as lead counsel and CGH retained Johanna McMullan and Chip Westbrook, also based in Mississippi, to serve as local counsel. CGH seeks to recover for $44,999.19 in fees incurred for Mr. Silverstein's work, $42,825 for fees incurred for Mr. McDavid's work, $22,500 for fees incurred for work by Ms. McMullan and Mr. Westbrook, $1,037 for the work of their paralegal, and $1,187.66 in expenses.

Grill Holdings does not challenge the rates charged by Mr. Silverstein, Mr. McDavid, Ms. McMullan, and Mr. Westbrook. However, it challenges the hours expended on numerous grounds. It argues that time to get new counsel up to speed on the matter should not be included, that duplication of effort and travel expenses resulting from CGH's decision to retain a Mississippi attorney as lead counsel should not be included, and that time related to issues besides trade dress should not be included. It argues that the Fifth Circuit appeal and the proceedings on remand concerned numerous issues besides trade dress and insists that the attorney's fee award must be limited to work that is directly related to the trade dress issue.

Law and Analysis

1. Award of Attorney's Fees

Louisiana law on the calculation of attorney's fees applies to this diversity jurisdiction case concerning a contract governed by Louisiana law. “The Louisiana Supreme Court [and the Rules of Professional Conduct] . . . have placed an obligation on courts to inquire into the reasonableness of attorney fees stipulated in contractual agreements.” Cashman Equip. Corp. v. Smith Marine Towing Corp., No. CV 12-945, 2013 WL 12229038, at *4 (E.D. La. June 27, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 12-945, 2013 WL 12228976 (E.D. La. July 12, 2013) (quoting Teche Bank & Tr. Co. v. Willis, 631 So.2d 644, 646 (La. Ct. App. 1994)). Thus, Louisiana courts consider the following factors in making an award of attorney's fees:

ultimate result obtained; responsibility incurred; importance of the litigation; amount involved; extent and character of labor performed; legal knowledge; attainment and skill of the attorney; number of appearances made; intricacies of facts and law involved; diligence and skill of counsel; court's own knowledge; and ability of party liable to pay.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that factors used by Louisiana courts are “very similar to those used in the federal ‘lodestar'” method. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Aker Mar. Inc., 689 F.3d 497, 505 (5th Cir. 2012). In Chevron, the Fifth Circuit found that the District Court did not err in applying the lodestar method to determine attorney's fees where Louisiana law applied. Id. Relying on Chevron, the court in Cashman also used the two-step lodestar approach where there was an arguable possibility that Louisiana law applied. 2013 WL 12229038, at *4.

Under the lodestar method, the Court first computes the lodestar “by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work.” Matter of Fender, 12 F.3d 480, 487 (5th Cir. 1994). The party requesting fees bears the burden of proving that the rates charged and hours expended are reasonable. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984); Walker v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995).

“The court then adjusts the lodestar upward or downward depending upon the respective weights of the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974).” Fender, 12 F.3d at 487. The Johnson factors are:

1) time and labor required, (2) novelty and difficulty of the issues, (3) skill required to perform the legal services properly, (4) preclusion of other employment, (5) customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by client or circumstances, (8) amount involved and results obtained, (9) experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys, (10) undesirability of the case, (11) nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) award in similar cases.

2. Hourly Rate

CGH seeks an hourly rate of $200 for its former counsel Irl Silverstein, a rate of $250 per hour for Stephen McDavid's time, a rate of $225 for Johanna McMullan's time, and a rate of $85 for paralegal time. CGH also seeks to recover for time spent by William Westbrook, but has not explicitly stated Mr. Westbrook's hourly rate. However, it appears his hourly rate is also $225. Grill Holdings does not challenge these rates, and the court finds these rates to be reasonable. See, e.g., Adams v. City of New Orleans, No. CIV.A. 13-6779, 2015 WL 4606223, at *3 (E.D. La. July 30, 2015) (collecting cases).

3. Hours Expended

a. Mr. Silverstein

CGH seeks to recover for the time spent by Mr. Silverstein working on the appeal from May 2018 through February 6, 2019. He has submitted his fee invoice for that time period and has excluded about $7,000 worth of time because it was not related to the appeal. He submits that at least 50% of his time spent on the appeal should be allocated to the enforcement of the License Agreement in regard to trade dress. He says that 33% of the original brief concerned trade dress issues. In support, he lists four trade dress related argument subparts from the brief: whether the court erred in finding that the trade dress does not exist or that CGH has no protectable interest in the use of the trade dress; whether the trade dress was sufficiently described in the License Agreement to place the parties on notice; whether the trade dress was inherently distinctive or acquired a secondary meaning; and whether a possibility of confusion existed as to trade dress so as to provide a remedy under the Lanham Act. Silverstein says that about 70% of the opposition brief addressed trade dress arguments and that 57% of the reply brief concerned trade dress arguments.

In opposition, Grill Holdings submits that only nine pages of the 63-page CGH appeal brief concerned violation of the license agreement by the use of the alleged trade dress. It argues that only one of the eight subparts in the assignments of error section of the brief concerned violation of the License Agreement by use of the alleged trade dress (that is, the first of the four subparts listed by Mr. Silverstein). Grill Holdings adds that even this argument focused in part on an alleged breach of the License Agreement by use of the trade dress at the Carrollton Location, an argument the Fifth Circuit rejected.

The parties' summaries of the briefing show that multiple issues were addressed in the appeal. CGH seems to take the position that 50-70% of the appeal concerned the trade dress/License Agreement issue. But CGH seems to have improperly included trade dress issues related to the Lanham Act in its calculations. Grill Holdings' calculations assign about 12-15% of the appeal to the trade dress/License Agreement. The court does not have the briefing before it, but has reviewed the Fifth Circuit's opinion resolving the appeal. The “Discussion” in the opinion is broken into two sections, “The Bill of Sale” and “The License Agreement.” The Bill of Sale section is divided into three subsections, none of which concern a breach of the License Agreement. The License Agreement section is divided into two subsections: “Trade Dress” and “Damages based on use of trademarks.” About half of a page of the Fifth Circuit's four-page Discussion concerned whether the License Agreement afforded CGH any enforceable rights concerning the trade dress. This indicates that the Fifth Circuit devoted about 13% of its efforts to the issue. Considering the various calculations, the court finds that about 20% of the appeal is related to the trade dress/License Agreement issue upon which CGH was successful. Accordingly, the court finds it appropriate to reduce Mr. Silverstein's appeal related work by 80%. His fees of $11,044.37 are reduced to $2,208.87.

CGH also seeks to recover for the time spent by Mr. Silverstein between April 4, 2014, and April 5, 2018. Mr. Silverstein previously submitted these same fee bills to the undersigned for consideration when fees were awarded in 2018. About 395 hours of time entries for a total of $78,954 in fees are listed. As discussed above, when considering the first request for fees, the court required CGH to submit a supplemental memorandum explaining which of those time entries were attributable to its claim that Grill Holdings and its affiliates had breached the post-termination provisions of the License Agreement. The revised list included 162.85 hours for a total of $42,570 in fees and is a subset of the fees claimed on the original list. Mr. Silverstein attested that he was familiar with the activities related to the enforcement of the License Agreement and that the list reflected time spent on that matter. Of the fees claimed on the revised list, the court awarded all fees claimed between September 2016 and May 2018 (subject to a reduction based on the Johnson factors). The court awarded fees for 50% of the time claimed before September 2016 (subject to the same Johnson factors reduction).

In submitting the same original list for fees incurred for 2014-2018, CGH now requests 50% of those fees, reasoning that the other 50% were already part of the previous fee award.However, CGH is not entitled to all of its fees incurred that were not previously awarded. It is now entitled to fees related to its efforts to enforce the post termination provisions of the License Agreement as to the trade dress. It is not possible that 50% of the original bills are both related to this issue and not included in the previous fee award. This litigation has included several other claims for which CGH is not entitled to its attorney's fees, such as claims concerning the Bill of Sale, Lanham Act claims, and state law damages claims. This court previously found that the first document to explicitly raise breach of the post-termination provisions of the license agreement was a motion for partial summary judgment filed on September 27, 2016. That motion raised both the use of the trademarks and the trade dress as violations of the License Agreement. Although CGH had not been successful on the trade dress issue at that time, the court did not reduce the fees in September 2016 on this basis. Indeed, it seems that when CGH previously segregated time related to enforcing the License Agreement from other time, both trade dress and trademark related breaches may have been included. Considering that CGH has made no effort to explain which of the fees listed on the original list are both related to the trade dress issue and are not part of the previous award, the court finds that CGH has failed to show that any of the fees on the original list must be compensated as part of the present fee award.

b. Fees of Mr. McDavid, Ms. McMullan, Mr. Westbrook, and their paralegals

CGH seeks a total of approximately $67,549.66 in fees and expenses incurred by Mr. McDavid, Ms. McMullan, Mr. Westbrook, and their paralegals. They did not begin working on this matter until after the Fifth Circuit appeal. The only issue remanded by the Fifth Circuit was the issue of whether Grill Holdings breached the License Agreement by using the alleged elements of the trade dress. And this is the issue for which attorney's fees have been awarded. Nonetheless, the District Court has explicitly excluded fees related to the Rooker-Feldman Motion, the Sanctions Motion, and any Lanham Act requests from the attorney's fee award. CGH asserts that it has excluded such time entries from its fee request.

Grill Holdings argues that CGH should not be allowed to recover for the time spent by their new counsel getting up to speed. Grill Holdings identifies approximately 27.5 hours spent by Mr. McDavid on preliminary matters like reviewing case status, meeting with the client, researching local counsel, and emailing regarding pro hac vice admission. Grill Holdings identifies approximately 13.9 hours Ms. McMullan spent on tasks such as reviewing and analyzing pleadings and motions in the state and federal litigation from as early as 2012. Grill Holdings' challenges to Mr. Westbrook's time include .4 hours spent working on a motion to enroll pro hac vice. Grill Holdings also shows that almost all of the time billed by Ms. McMullan's paralegals was spent on downloading prior filings from the court or preparing pro hac vice motions. Expenses of $126.50 were incurred for copying and downloading.

CGH argues that the Rules of Professional Conduct require reasonable preparation to provide competent representation. Further, the Local Rules require counsel to be familiar with all documents and court orders filed in the case and any consolidated cases. It insists, therefore, that it was appropriate for Mr. McDavid and Ms. McMullan to review the pleadings to understand the lengthy factual and procedural history of the matter and provide CGH with competent representation.

The court agrees with Grill Holdings that a prevailing party awarded reasonable attorney's fees is not necessarily entitled to charge its opponent for work that would not have been needed had its original counsel been retained. Indeed, courts have refused to require that the losing party pay for the attorney's fees associated with the prevailing party's change in counsel. Of course a party can choose to change its counsel or circumstances may require that it do so. But the fees awarded by contract must be reasonable. When this court reviews fee bills, it considers what a discerning client would expect. At a minimum, such a client would expect its new attorneys to get up to speed in an efficient manner and in many cases would expect its counsel to do so on their own time. Only in rare circumstances does this court find it appropriate to award the prevailing party fees incurred solely because of a change in counsel. Here, the issue on remand was limited in scope and would not require extensive review of prior rulings unrelated to the issue at hand. Under the circumstances, the court finds that the amount of time spent by Mr. McDavid, Ms. McMullan, Mr. Westbrook, and their paralegals on the preliminary matters identified by Grill Holdings was not reasonable. The court now calculates that $34,925 of Mr. McDavid's time is recoverable, $18,900 of the Ms. McMullan and Mr. Westbrook's time is recoverable, and $51 of the paralegals' time is recoverable. Similarly, the expenses spent on downloading prior filings from the court's docket cannot be recovered. The expenses claimed must be further reduced as discussed below.

Grill Holdings also argues that CGH should not be allowed to recover for expenses for Ms. McMullan's travel to and from New Orleans from Mississippi in the amount of $466.76. Grill Holdings argues that it should not bear the extra expense of CGH's choice to hire Mississippi lawyers to handle a Louisiana case in Louisiana federal court. The court agrees that under the circumstances, these travel expenses should not be borne by Grill Holdings and will reduce the award by this amount. This leaves $594.40 in fees for which CGH can recover after removing the downloading costs and unnecessary travel expenses.

To the extent Grill Holdings argues that other time should be cut because using multiple attorneys resulted in duplication of effort, it has failed to highlight any examples of such additional expense. In reviewing the invoices, the court has not identified any examples of two attorneys attending a hearing, conference, or deposition where one attorney could have done the work. No. additional cuts will be made on the basis of CGH's use of multiple attorneys alone.

Grill Holdings argues that all time spent by Mr. Westbrook should be stricken because he did not sign any of the pleadings concerning the trade dress issue for which fees are recoverable. CGH responds that Ms. McMullan's affidavit, which includes the fees expended by herself, her paralegals, and Mr. Westbrook, has already excluded any time related to the Rooker-Feldman and sanctions issues. It argues that these were the only two issues carved out of the court's award of attorney's fees. It insists that all fees claimed on the affidavit are recoverable. It adds that Mr. Westbrook's time entries reflect his familiarization with the case, his attendance at conferences, and his work on various trade dress related pleadings.

The court finds no indication that the time entries in Ms. McMullan's affidavit include time spent on Rooker-Feldman or sanctions issues. Most of the entries reference the breach of contract claims, the standing issue (one raised by Grill Holdings in an attempt to dispose of CGH's request for an injunction regarding use of the trade dress), or the preparation of an opinion letter for the client. None refer to the excluded issues. Ms. McMullan and Mr. Westbrook's time entries are detailed and the entries are not block billed. The fact that Mr. Westbrook did not sign certain motions or pleadings does not mean he was not involved in preparing them or analyzing the trade dress/License Agreement issue. The court agrees with CGH's assessment that besides the Rooker-Feldman and sanctions issues, this matter has related to the trade dress/License Agreement issue that was remanded by the Fifth Circuit. Accordingly, the court finds the time claimed on Ms. McMullan's affidavit and not related to preliminary matters is recoverable.

Similarly, the court cannot find that the time entries in Mr. McDavid's affidavit related to the excluded issues. CGH submits that Mr. McDavid worked solely on the trade dress claims and argues that all of his time is recoverable. Grill Holdings has acknowledged the relevance of the time entries that explicitly concern the trade dress issue and/or the trade dress motion, but it challenges others as unrelated. Importantly, though, the court finds that none of these refer explicitly to the Rooker-Feldman, sanctions, or Lanham Act issues. They concern a damages stipulation and plan for remand, meetings and communications with the client, work related to the scheduling order and pretrial order, and preparation of the fee award motion and affidavits. The court finds that this time falls within the scope of the fees awarded by the District Court.

Based on the court's analysis above, the lodestar calculation of reasonable fees and expenses is equal to $2,208.87 for Mr. Silverstein's time. As noted above, the reasonable fees of Mr. McDavid are equal to $34,925, the reasonable fees of Ms. McMullan and Mr. Westbrook are equal to $18,900, and the reasonable fees of the paralegals are $51. Reasonable expenses of Ms. McMullan's firm are equal to $594.40. The total lodestar award equals $56,679.27.

4. Reasonableness Factors

CGH does not seek to increase the award requested on the basis of the Johnson factors. Indeed, many of the Johnson factors are subsumed within the lodestar analysis above. Grill Holdings argues that the fee award should be further reduced under the Johnson factors. However for the reasons below, the court declines to do so.

a. Ultimate Result Obtained

With regard to results obtained, Grill Holdings challenges Mr. Silverstein's request for fees as including time spent on other issues. The court has already addressed this concern in assessing the reasonable hours expended above, which resulted in a significant reduction of Mr. Silverstein's fees. The court finds no further reason to reduce or increase the fee award because of the ultimate results obtained.

b. Responsibility Incurred

On the responsibility incurred factor, Grill Holdings directs the court to its arguments on the hours incurred. The court has already addressed these issues above and finds no further reason to reduce or increase the award on the basis of responsibility incurred.

c. Importance of the Litigation

The parties agree that the litigation was important to both sides. Grill Holdings argues that CGH's main goal was to obtain ownership of the Camellia Grill trademark, and on that matter, it failed. It argues that the breach of the license agreement was subsidiary to the infringement and ownership issues and was less important. The court has already limited fees to those incurred enforcing the License Agreement for breach of trade dress. The court finds no further basis to reduce or increase the award because of the “importance” of the litigation.

d. Amount Involved

Grill Holdings argues despite ten years of litigation, no monetary damages were awarded to CGH because it was unable to prove any compensable damages. It argues that the history of this case does not justify a fee award of over $110,000. Further, it points out that the court previously awarded $22,362.56 in attorney's fees for CGH's efforts in enforcing the License Agreement on the trademark issue. It points out that CGH now seeks far greater fees for a much shorter time frame. It adds that CGH seeks fees that were already reviewed and awarded.

CGH responds that its request for fees is not an attempt to obtain compensatory damages. It insists that it has incurred in excess of $500,000 in attorney's fees throughout the duration of this litigation. It points out that Grill Holdings' affiliates initiated this case and refused to abide by prior state court judgments and the Licenses' post-termination clause. It argues that this is the reason for the length and complexity of the litigation.

As to fees previously reviewed and awarded, the court has already addressed this issue in assessing the reasonableness of the hours expended. Although CGH did not receive a fee award, it did obtain an injunction. The matter remanded was solely trade dress/License Agreement issue. If this issue was not worth fighting over, Grill Holdings just as well as CGH could have ceased litigating. The court finds no reason to further reduce the award because of the amount in dispute.

e. Extent and Character of Labor Performed

Grill Holdings directs the court to its arguments on the hours incurred. The court has already addressed these issues above and finds no further reason to reduce or increase the award on the basis of the extent and character of labor performed.

f. Legal Knowledge, Attainment and Skill of the Attorney, and Diligence of the Attorney

Grill Holdings directs the court to its arguments on the hours incurred. It does not argue that CGH's counsel was not competent in the area of law concerning contracts. The court has already addressed counsel's knowledge, diligence, and skill in assessing the reasonableness of their fee rate and does not find that legal knowledge, diligence, or skill of the attorneys justifies an increase or decrease in the award.

g. Number of Appearances Made

Grill Holdings submits that the single issue for which CGH was awarded fees involves only the appeal and motions for summary judgment. It argues that other appearances are irrelevant and should be disregarded. CGH responds that this case has involved countless appearances by counsel at conferences, hearings, depositions, and appellate oral arguments over the span of this litigation from 2014-2021. It points out that the docket includes nearly 500 entries. The court finds that its consideration of the reasonableness of the hours spent sufficiently addresses the number of appearances made and that this factor does not justify an increase or decrease in the award.

h. Intricacies of Facts and Law Involved

Grill Holdings argues that the only claim at issue is one of contract interpretation, not a specialized area of law. It argues the issue is simple and justifies a decrease in fees. CGH responds that this is a gross over-simplification. It insists that this matter involves the application and interaction of both state contract law and federal trade dress law, including the rights and obligations of the parties to the License Agreement, the binding effect of the License Agreement on affiliates, the application of Louisiana state law to the breach of the License Agreement, and the application of the Lanham Act in the context of interpreting the trade dress found in the License Agreement. The court does not find the intricacies of the facts and law justify a reduction of the award. The record reflects that the trade dress/License Agreement issue was complicated enough to result in reversal on appeal. The court finds that its previous consideration of the reasonable hours expended sufficiently addresses this factor.

i. Court's Own Knowledge

Grill Holdings argues that the court's knowledge of this case and the previous fee award justifies a reduction in fees here. CGH argues that as this court previously found, this factor does not justify an increase or reduction of the award. The court again finds that this factor does not justify a reduction or increase of the award.

j. Ability of Party Liable to Pay

Grill Holdings submits that the Chartres Location has not operated since 2017 and that it was Chartres Grill that was deemed to have violated the License Agreement. It insists Chartres Grill has no ability to pay. It complains that any award would require another juridical person to cover the costs and fees. CGH argues that Grill Holdings and its affiliates were able to fund a brigade of attorneys to pursue this litigation since 2010. It adds that the judgment of attorney's fees is against Grill Holdings and Uptown Grill also. It points out that Grill Holdings has made no representation as to their ability to pay. CGH also notes that the court previously rejected a reduction of the award based on this factor.

The judgment for attorney's fees has been rendered against Grill Holdings and its affiliates. These affiliates have been treated as a single group throughout this litigation. There is no indication that the affiliates of Chartres Grill lack the funds to pay an attorney's fees award. The court finds that this factor does not justify a reduction in the award.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the court recommends that CGH's Motion for Fix Attorney's Fees be GRANTED and CGH be awarded $56,679.27 in attorney's fees and expenses.

Objections

A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation within fourteen (14) calendar days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

(Appendix Omitted)