Brian Hoyle, Justice

Kyle Lawrence, for Appellant.

M. Keith Dollahite, for Appellee.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

OPINION

Brian Hoyle, Justice

UPS Ground Freight, Inc. and Phillip Villarreal filed a motion for rehearing of our November 27, 2019 opinion in this cause. We overrule the motion for rehearing and withdraw our opinion issued November 27, 2019. The following is now the opinion of this court.

In this interlocutory appeal, UPS Ground Freight, Inc. and Phillip Villarreal complain of the trial court's denial of their motion to transfer venue of claims brought against them by Sean Trotter and Micah Trotter. In their sole issue, Appellants contend Appellees failed to comply with the applicable venue statutes. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a multiple-car accident that occurred in Collin County, Texas. Stephanie Riddle, who was injured in the accident, was the first to file suit, which she filed in Rusk County. She named as defendants UPS Ground Freight, Inc., its employee, Phillip Villarreal, and Jacintha Nicole McElduff as independent administrator of the Estate of Nathan Dean Clark, who was killed in the accident. Appellants moved to transfer venue to Collin County. Julian Clark, the decedent's father, intervened in the suit, naming Appellants as defendants. McElduff, independently and as independent administrator of the Estate of Nathan Dean Clark, filed cross claims against Appellants. The trial court denied Appellants' motion to transfer venue regarding Riddle's claims. Appellants then filed a motion to transfer venue as to Clark's and McElduff's claims. The trial court also denied this motion. Micah Trotter, who was involved in the accident, and her husband, Sean Trotter, intervened, naming as defendants Appellants and McElduff, independent administrator of the Estate of Nathan Dean Clark. Appellants moved to transfer the Trotters' claims in intervention to Collin County. Cameronn Morrison, who was also involved in the accident, filed suit against Appellants in Collin County and filed his plea in intervention in Rusk County naming as defendants Appellants and McElduff, independent administrator of the Estate of Nathan Dean Clark.

The trial court denied Appellants' motion to transfer venue of the Trotters' claims. Appellants filed a notice of accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to civil practice and remedies code Section 15.003(b) appealing only the order denying their motion to transfer venue of the claims of intervenors Micah and Sean Trotter, Appellees.

TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 87

Initially, we must address Appellees' assertion that " Rule 87 prohibits an interlocutory redetermination or review of the trial court's prior venue rulings and thereby precludes this appeal." They argue that the venue issues decided by the trial court's rulings on Appellants' motions to transfer venue as to claims asserted by Riddle, McElduff, and Clark form the basis for its ruling as to claims asserted by Appellees. Further, they contend that, under Rule 87(5), neither the trial court nor this court can redetermine the first and second rulings. Appellees argue that, although Section 15.003 allows interlocutory appeals, Rule 87(5) remains intact and prohibits this court from reviewing the trial court's determination that Appellees can bring suit in Rusk County. We disagree with Appellees' interpretation of the interaction between Rule 87 and Chapter 15 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Statutory Construction

When construing rules of procedure, we apply the same rules of construction that govern the interpretation of statutes. In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg , 222 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). When a rule of procedure is clear and unambiguous, we construe the rule's language according to its plain or literal meaning. Id . We presume that the legislature acted with knowledge of the background law and existing statutes. Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n , 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990) ; Allen Sales & Servicenter, Inc. v. Ryan , 525 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1975). A statute will be construed with reference to the entire body of law existing at the time of its enactment if necessary to ascertain legislative intent. See In re Estates of Carrigan , 517 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1974, no writ).

When a conflict arises between a statute and a rule of procedure, we must harmonize the statute and the rule if possible. See In re CompleteRx, Ltd. , 366 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2012, orig. proceeding). Ultimately, the statute prevails unless the rule has been adopted subsequent to the statute and repeals the statute as provided by Texas Government Code Section 22.004. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(c) (West Supp. 2018); Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings , 351 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Tex. 2011). Moreover, Section 15.066 provides that, subject to government code Section 22.004, to the extent that Chapter 15 conflicts with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapter 15 controls. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.066.

In the context of a motion to transfer venue, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 86, 87, and 88 lay out the procedural requirements by which a defendant can transfer venue. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 86 - 88. Rule 87 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:

5. Motion for Rehearing. If venue has been sustained as against a motion to transfer, or if an action has been transferred to a proper county in response to a motion to transfer, then no further motions to transfer shall be considered regardless of whether the movant was a party to the prior proceedings or was added as a party subsequent to the venue proceedings, unless the motion to transfer is based on the grounds that an impartial trial cannot be had under Rules 257-259 or on the ground of mandatory venue, provided that such claim was not available to the other movant or movants.

Parties who are added subsequently to an action and are precluded by this rule from having a motion to transfer considered may raise the propriety of venue on appeal, provided that the party has timely filed a motion to transfer.

6. There shall be no interlocutory appeals from such determination.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(5), (6).

The civil practice and remedies code provides that, in suits involving multiple plaintiffs, "each plaintiff must, independently of every other plaintiff, establish proper venue." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a). Alternatively, when a plaintiff is unable to meet that requirement, the statute provides:

[T]hat plaintiff's part of the suit, including all of that plaintiff's claims and causes of action, must be transferred to a county of proper venue or dismissed, as is appropriate, unless that plaintiff, independently of every other plaintiff, establishes that:

(1) joinder of that plaintiff or intervention in the suit by that plaintiff is proper under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure;

(2) maintaining venue as to that plaintiff in the county of suit does not unfairly prejudice another party to the suit;

(3) there is an essential need to have that plaintiff's claim tried in the county in which the suit is pending; and

(4) the county in which the suit is pending is a fair and convenient venue for that plaintiff and all persons against whom the suit is brought.

Id . The statute further provides that an interlocutory appeal may be taken of a trial court's determination that a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue or did or did not establish the items prescribed by Subsections (a)(1)-(4). Id . § 15.003(b).

Interlocutory Appeal

While Appellees do not appear to be relying on Rule 87(6), which explicitly bars interlocutory appeals from venue determinations, we believe it should be part of the discussion. In 1983, the legislature revised the venue statutes and eliminated all interlocutory appeals in venue issues. See Act of May 28, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2124 (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064 ). Section 15.064 provides that, in venue hearings, the trial court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits, and it prohibits interlocutory appeals from the court's venue determination. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064. Rule 87 was completely rewritten in 1983 to conform with the predecessor to Section 15.064, which was part of the 1983 overhaul of the venue statutes. The Texas Supreme Court included the bar to interlocutory appeals in Rule 87(6). This was an attempt to shorten the venue review process as part of tort reform revisions. See House Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 32, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995).

Thus, the general rule, provided in both Rule 87(6) and Section 15.064, bars interlocutory appeals from venue decisions. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a) ; TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(6). The Texas Supreme Court has construed Section 15.064 and Rule 87 together, holding that once a venue determination has been made that determination is conclusive as to those parties and claims. In re Team Rocket, L.P. , 256 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

However, Section 15.003(b) provides for an exception to the general rule, allowing interlocutory appeals for venue determinations in cases involving multiple plaintiffs. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(b) ; Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P'ship v. Porter, Rogers, Dahlman & Gordon, P.C. , 406 S.W.3d 186, 195 n.7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.). As to the availability of an interlocutory appeal in this case, because there are multiple plaintiffs, Section 15.003(b) controls, not Rule 87(6). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.066. Therefore, Rule 87(6) cannot preclude our review of the trial court's ruling on Appellants' motion to transfer Appellees' claims.

Motion for Rehearing

Next, considering the impact of Section 15.003, we must determine whether Rule 87(5)'s bar on motions for rehearing precludes consideration of Appellants' motion to transfer Appellees' claims to Collin County in light of the trial court's prior orders denying a transfer of the claims brought by other plaintiffs. The bar on motions for rehearing was included in the 1983 rewrite. Indisputably, Rule 87(5) prohibits a second motion to transfer venue in one case unless the specified exceptions apply. In re Lowe's Home Ctrs., L.L.C. , 531 S.W.3d 861, 870 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, orig. proceeding). Nothing in Chapter 15 or its predecessors directly addresses whether a party may submit a motion for rehearing of the venue question.

As is often the case with legislation, Section 15.003 arose after application of the law created an undesirable situation. Prior to August 28, 1995, part of the statutory venue scheme provided that when two or more parties are joined as defendants in the same action, or two or more claims or causes of action are properly joined in one action, and the court has venue of an action or claim against any one defendant, the court also has venue of all claims or actions against all defendants unless certain specified exceptions applied. Act of May 28, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2123-2124 (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.061, repealed by Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 10, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 978, 981). Application of this statute led to unintended consequences as explained by the Texas Supreme Court in Polaris Investment Management Corporation v. Abascal , 892 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding). There, the court determined that the statute in effect at the time, Section 15.061, allowed intervention of more than 2000 plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors in one suit although only one plaintiff and none of the defendants resided in the county of suit. Id . at 862. Abascal was issued on February 16, 1995.

In response, the legislature repealed Section 15.061 and added Section 15.005, providing that, in a suit in which the plaintiff has established proper venue against a defendant, the court also has venue of all the defendants in all claims or causes of action arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.005. Significantly, at the same time, twelve years after Rule 87 was rewritten to bar motions for rehearing, the legislature enacted Section 15.003. The entirely new section is applicable in suits involving multiple plaintiffs, whether they are included by joinder, by intervention, because the suit was begun by more than one plaintiff, or otherwise, and requires each plaintiff, independently of every other plaintiff, to establish proper venue. Id . § 15.003. The new statutes became effective August 28, 1995.

Rule 87(5)'s bar on motions for rehearing furthers the legislature's intent, in the 1983 overhaul, to shorten the venue review process. In contrast, the legislature's goal in enacting Section 15.003 was to correct an unwanted application of the venue statutes in cases involving multiple plaintiffs.

Rule 87(5) specifies that the rule against motions for rehearing applies even if the movant was a party to the prior venue proceedings or was added after those proceedings. TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(5). It goes on to say that parties added subsequently to a venue determination may, if the issue is preserved, raise the propriety of venue on appeal. Id . Application of the rule's bar on motions for rehearing is at odds with Section 15.003's insistence that all plaintiffs prove venue is appropriate as to them even though they entered the suit at different times. Section 15.003 necessarily contemplates the potential for multiple venue hearings in light of the fact it requires plaintiffs named in the original petition, as well as plaintiffs who entered the lawsuit at a later time, to independently establish proper venue. Further, the rule's reference to complaining about a venue determination on appeal corresponds with the rule's bar on interlocutory appeals, which is in direct contravention to Section 15.003(b)'s permission for interlocutory appeals in multiple plaintiff cases. Section 15.003 prevails over the earlier-enacted Rule 87. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(c). Further, Section 15.003 controls over conflicts with the rules of civil procedure. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.066.

Before the 1995 revisions, if there were multiple plaintiffs, they were not required to establish "independently of every other plaintiff" that venue was proper for them in the county where venue was initially established. And the venue determination could be revisited only through the regular appeals process after a final judgment was rendered in the case. For Section 15.003 to be applied, Rule 87(5)'s ban on motions for rehearing must yield. We presume that the legislature was aware of the interaction between the two provisions when it passed Section 15.003. See Acker , 790 S.W.2d at 301. We conclude that Rule 87(5) does not preclude consideration of Appellants' motion to transfer Appellees' claims to Collin County.

VENUE

In their sole issue, Appellants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to transfer venue because Appellees failed to comply with Section 15.003(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. They argue that Appellees were required to, but did not, establish, independently of every other plaintiff, that proper venue is in Rusk County or establish the four statutory requirements in subsections (a)(1)-(4) of Section 15.003.

Standard of Review

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to transfer venue, an appellate court must conduct an independent review of the entire record to determine whether venue was proper in the original county of suit. Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc. , 868 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. 1993) (op. on reh'g). The appellate court cannot review the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the plaintiff's venue choice. Id . If the record contains any probative evidence supporting venue in the county of suit, a transfer is improper even if the preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary. Id .

Applicable Law

A plaintiff chooses venue by deciding where to file a lawsuit. In re Team Rocket, L.P. , 256 S.W.3d at 259. Once the plaintiff's choice of venue is challenged, the plaintiff has the burden to present prima facie proof that venue is maintainable in the county of suit. TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(2), (3)(a). The court must decide based on the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties. Id . 87(3)(a). If the plaintiff proves venue facts that support venue, the trial court must maintain the lawsuit in the county where it was filed unless the motion to transfer is based on "grounds that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the action is pending as provided in Rules 257-259 or on an established ground of mandatory venue." Id . 87(3)(c).

Where a suit involves multiple plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs, each plaintiff, independently of every other plaintiff, must establish proper venue. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a). Except as provided elsewhere in the venue statutes, all lawsuits shall be brought in one of four venues listed in the general venue statute. Id . § 15.002(a). Texas's venue scheme provides for certain exceptions to the general venue statute. Pertinent to this case is the exception regarding estate administrators. If a suit is against an executor, administrator, or guardian, as such, to establish a money demand against the estate which she represents, the suit may be brought in the county in which the estate is administered or if the suit is against an executor, administrator, or guardian growing out of a negligent act or omission of the person whose estate the executor, administrator, or guardian represents, the suit may be brought in the county in which the negligent act or omission of the person whose estate the executor, administrator, or guardian represents occurred. Id . § 15.031.

Analysis

One of the named defendants in Appellees' suit is Jacintha Nicole McElduff, as independent administrator of the Estate of Nathan Dean Clark. Appellees alleged that venue is proper in Rusk County pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.031 because the estate is being administered in that county. Appellants argue that Section 15.031 does not apply here because Appellees' suit is not one against the Administrator "as such, to establish a money demand" against the Clark estate. They contend that the statute limits its applicability to suits involving a claim for a fixed, liquidated sum, and the Appellees seek an undetermined amount of personal injury damages.

The term "money demand," which has been included in the text of the statute since 1879, is not defined by the statute. See Gambill v. Mathes , 490 S.W.2d 863, 865-66 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1973, writ dism'd). A few cases have held certain claims to constitute a money demand. See id. at 865 (claim for widow's allowance of $5,000 per month); Vela v. Shacklett , 1 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1927, no writ) (suit to recover on a promissory note); Nunn v. Titche-Goettinger, Co. , 196 S.W. 890, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1917), aff'd 245 S.W. 421 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922) (a debt or obligation of the testator incurred in his lifetime or some enforceable debt or obligation of his representative incurred subsequent to testator's death); Dickson v. Scharff , 142 S.W. 980, 981 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1912, no writ) (suit for open account for medical services); McKie v. Echols , 1 White & W. 743, 744, 1882 WL 9138 (Tex. Com. App. 1882) (contract to rent land). While these cases provide examples of "money demands," they do not shed light on the question of whether this suit, which at its heart requests payment for injuries allegedly caused by the decedent, is the type contemplated by the first portion of Section 15.031. For that answer, rather than attempting to define the term "money demand," we focus on what Section 15.031 means by the phrase "a suit ... to establish a money demand."

Venue statutes dictating permissible counties in which to sue an administrator of an estate must be read in conjunction with Texas Estates Code provisions regarding procedures for pursuing claims against an estate. The Texas Estates Code defines "claims" as liabilities of a decedent that survive the decedent's death, regardless of whether the liabilities arise in contract or tort or otherwise. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 22.005(1) (West 2014). The estates code provides a comprehensive system for the presentment of claims against an estate. See id . §§ 355.001-.203, 403.055-.056 (West 2014 & Supp. 2019). We recognize that not all of these procedures apply to an independent administration. See id . § 403.058. However, for purposes of defining "suit to establish a money demand," the process applicable to presentment of claims in dependent administrations is instructive.

Although not addressed in the estates code, different procedures govern liquidated and unliquidated claims against an estate. Cross v. Old Republic Sur. Co. , 983 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). For purposes of estates code procedures, a claim is liquidated if liability is settled, rather than contingent, and damages are certain, definite, and verifiable rather than indeterminate. Id . at 775. To establish a liquidated claim for money in a dependent administration, a claimant must first present his claim to the estate's administrator, who may either allow or reject the claim. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 355.001 ; 355.051; Walton v. First Nat'l Bank of Trenton , 956 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, pet. denied) ; Connelly v. Paul , 731 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ; see also TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 403.056 (notice to independent administrator for unsecured claim for money). If rejected, the claimant must establish his claim by filing suit against the dependent administrator. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 355.064 ; Jordan v. Massey , 134 S.W. 804, 805 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1911, no writ) ("Where the claim for money has been rejected by the administrator, and the claimant forced to sue for its establishment, he may secure in the district court judgment not only for the debt, but for the establishment of his lien").

Unliquidated claims are those that are contingent, indeterminate, not certain, and require fact findings to ascertain their amount. See Connelly , 731 S.W.2d at 659 ; Wilder v. Mossler , 583 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ). If a claim cannot be verified with a reasonable degree of certainty, it need not be presented to the estate administrator before suit. Connelly , 731 S.W.2d at 659. When a party sues the estate's representative for unliquidated damages the judgment reduces the unliquidated demand to a liquidated amount. Naumovich v. Reese , 247 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1952, no writ) (on reh'g). In a dependent administration, once a claim is established by suit and judgment, it is handled as if originally allowed and approved by the administrator. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 355.066, 355.101 ; Cross , 983 S.W.2d at 775. Similarly, any person having a debt or claim against the estate may enforce the payment of the same by suit against the independent executor; and when judgment is recovered against the independent executor, the execution shall run against the estate of the decedent in the possession of the independent executor that is subject to the debt. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 403.059.

In light of this framework, we look to the civil practice and remedies code to determine the proper county in which Appellees may file suit against the estate administrator for their alleged personal injury damages. Pursuant to Section 15.031, a suit against an estate administrator, in her capacity as administrator, to establish a money demand against the estate which she represents, may be brought in the county in which the estate is being administered. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.031. A suit for personal injury damages caused by the alleged negligence of the decedent is a suit for unliquidated damages. See Wilder , 583 S.W.2d at 667. A suit for personal injury damages against the estate administrator is a "suit to establish a money demand" because the result is that the unliquidated demand is reduced by judgment to a liquidated amount. See Naumovich , 247 S.W.2d at 420 ; see also Adams v. McHam , 289 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1956, no writ) (In case where certain venue facts then required by the statute were not proven, the court transferred the suit to county where executors resided and were administering the estates; court also noted that no money demand currently existed but must be established by suit). Therefore, Appellees were entitled to file their personal injury lawsuit against McElduff, as estate administrator, in Rusk County, where Clark's estate is being administered to establish a money demand. This is in keeping with longstanding Texas policy of giving the estate the right of being sued at its locality due to concern for expense to the estate and oversight of the administrator. Richardson v. Wells , 3 Tex. 223, 233-34 (1848) ; Neill v. Owen , 3 Tex. 145, 147 (1848).

Venue may be proper in more than one county under the general, mandatory, and permissive venue rules. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.002, 15.003, 15.031 ; Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Yarto Int'l Group, L.P. , 398 S.W.3d 272, 288 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2012, pet. denied). As between permissive provisions the plaintiff's initial choice of proper venue controls. See Nat'l Family Care Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher , 57 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, pet. denied). Because the statute is permissive, Appellees also had the option, under the second portion of Section 15.031, of filing their suit in Collin County where the accident occurred. See Olson v. Tromba , 615 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd) (held that plaintiffs could maintain venue in Gray County, the county where the accident occurred, subject to the requirement that proof of negligence be established, in Potter County, upon a showing that the estate was pending in that county, or in Harris County, the county of the temporary administrator's residence).

Further, Appellants did not base their motion to transfer on grounds that an impartial trial could not be had in Rusk County or on an established ground of mandatory venue. TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(c). Venue of Appellees' suit against McElduff as independent administrator of Clark's estate is proper in Rusk County. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.003(a), 15.031. Because Appellees' claims against the administrator and Appellants arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, venue in Rusk County is also established as to Appellants. See id . § 15.005. Having concluded that Appellees' choice of venue was correct pursuant to Section 15.031, we need not address Appellants' assertion that Appellees did not meet their burden under Section 15.003(a)(1)-(4). The trial court did not err in denying Appellants' motion to transfer venue of Appellees' claims. We overrule Appellants' sole issue.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellants' sole issue, we affirm the trial court's order denying Appellants' motion to transfer.