Opinion
Criminal No. 21-360 (FAB)
2022-06-29
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. José VALENTÍN [1], and Brayan Martínez [2], Defendants.
Jordan H. Martin, AUSA, United States Attorney's Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff. Jorge Luis Gerena-Mendez, Gerena Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant José Valentín. Jose L. Novas-Debien, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Brayan Martínez.
Jordan H. Martin, AUSA, United States Attorney's Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Jorge Luis Gerena-Mendez, Gerena Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant José Valentín.
Jose L. Novas-Debien, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Brayan Martínez.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Defendants José Valentín ("Valentín") and Brayan Martínez ("Martínez") (collectively, "defendants") move to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction. (Docket Nos. 37 and 38.) For the reasons set forth below, Valentín's and Martínez's motions to dismiss are DENIED .
I. Background
This action concerns an alleged attempt to import cocaine into the United States. Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Jennifer Doherty ("Doherty") prepared an affidavit in support of the criminal complaint. (Docket No. 1, Ex. 1.) The following allegations derive from this affidavit.
On September 22, 2021, a United States maritime patrol aircraft observed a 25-foot go-fast boat located 145 nautical miles south of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. Id. at p. 2. A United States Coast Guard ("USCG") boarding team (hereinafter, "USCG team") intercepted the vessel. Id. at p. 3. The go-fast boat contained two occupants and approximately 250 kilograms of cocaine. Id. Valentín identified himself as the master, "[making] a verbal claim of Dominican nationality for the vessel." Id. The Dominican Republic could neither confirm nor deny registry for the vessel. Id. Subsequently, both defendants identified themselves as the master. Id. Martínez "made a verbal claim of Colombian nationality for the vessel." Id. Colombia could not, however, confirm or deny registry for the vessel. Id. The USCG team then arrested the defendants. Id.
On September 29, 2021, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging Valentín and Martínez with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) and 70506(b) (count one), and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (count two). (Docket No. 6.) Valentín and Martínez move to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction. (Docket Nos. 37 and 38.)
II. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2), a "motion that the court lacks jurisdiction may be made at any time while the case is pending." Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). On a motion to dismiss, the allegations contained in the indictment are accepted as true. See United States v. Bohai Trading Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 577, 578 n.1 (1st Cir. 1995).
The federal judicial authority extends "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made." U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2. This Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal action when the indictment charges "that the defendant committed a crime described in Title 18 or in one of the other statutes defining federal crimes." United States v. González, 311 F.3d 440, 442 (1st Cir. 2002) ; see 18 U.S.C. § 3231 ("The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States."). Valentín and Martínez assert that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to United States v. Dávila-Reyes, 23 F.4th 153 (1st Cir. 2022). This precedent pertains to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act ("MDLEA"), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70502(c)(1) et seq.
A. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
Congress enacted the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act in 1986 to diminish the operations of international drug trafficking organizations. These evasive entities "constantly refine their methods for transporting illegal narcotics from country to country." United States v. Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d 219, 224 (D.D.C. 2013) ; see Lt. CDR Aaron J. Casavant, In Defense of the U.S. Maritime Drug Enforcement Act: A Justification for the Law's Extraterritorial Reach, 8 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 191, 199-200 (2017) (noting that Congress endeavored to "counter the traffickers’ ‘mothership’ strategy, target[ing] the larger vessels sailing just outside U.S. territorial seas that were sending smaller, faster vessels to bring contraband ashore."). Consequently, the MDLEA is an expansive statute. It provides that "an individual [on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States] may not knowingly or intentionally:"
(1) manufacture or distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance;
(2) destroy (including jettisoning ...), or attempt or conspire to destroy, property that is subject to forfeiture under section 511(a) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
48 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1)—(2). "[J]urisdictional issues arising under the [MDLEA] are preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the trial judge," and do not constitute an element of the offense. 46 U.S.C. § 70504 ; see United States v. Gil-Martínez, 980 F. Supp. 2d 165, 168 (D.P.R. 2013) (Besosa, J.).
Vessels without nationality are subject to the MDLEA. Stateless vessels include, but are not limited to:
(A) a vessel abroad which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry that is denied by the nation whose registry is claimed;
(B) a vessel abroad which the master or individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel; and
(C) a vessel abroad which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.
46 U.S.C. §§ 70502(d)(1)(A)-(C) (emphasis added). A vessel may be deemed stateless "even if [it] does not fall within one of the specifically enumerated categories." United States v. Matos-Luchi, 627 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2010) ; Dávila-Reyes, 23 F.4th at 196 ("The statute contains three nonexclusive examples of ‘vessels without nationality,’ each of which turns on the ‘registry’ of the vessel.") (Howard, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting United States v. Miranda, 780 F.3d 1185, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ). To facilitate expeditious consent and waiver, the MDLEA provides that the flag state may provide registry information "by radio, telephone, or similar oral or electronic means." 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(2).
Every vessel is required to "sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases ... shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas." Convention on the High Seas, art. 6, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U N.T.S. 82.
In Dávila-Reyes, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the phrase "vessels without nationality" is coextensive with the "international law definition of statelessness." 23 F.4th at 172. In that case, the master of a go-fast boat "claimed Costa Rican nationality for the vessel but did not provide any documentation to support that claim." Id. at 158. Costa Rica officials could neither confirm nor deny the vessel's registry. Id. at 159. Consequently, law enforcement officers determined that the vessel was "without nationality and subject to U.S. jurisdiction" pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) (" section 70502(d)(1)(C)"). Id.
On appeal, the defendants argued that "their vessel was not properly deemed stateless." Id. at 170. The Dávila-Reyes court agreed, holding that § 70502(d)(1)(C) is inconsistent with international law. Id. at 188. Pursuant to the latter, a master's verbal declaration of registry establishes a presumption of nationality. Id. at 188-89 ("Rejecting a verbal claim of nationality based on the lack of substantiating evidence [i.e. confirmation of registry from Costa Rica] negates that distinct method for claiming nationality recognized both by the MDLEA and by international law."). III. Discussion
Valentín and Martínez request dismissal of the indictment "because [ Dávila-Reyes ] declared unconstitutional the enabling jurisdictional statute, to wit, 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) of the MDLEA.") (Docket No. 37 at p. 2; see Docket No. 38 at p. 3.) Dávila-Reyes is, however, inapposite in this case. The First Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that a "verbal assertion can be undermined by contrary evidence, as in the case for any prima facie showing." Id. at 192. In fact, this decision states explicitly that:
[W]hen the master of a vessel avoids claiming a nationality or when a vessel indicates that it is attempting to claim multiple nationalities, conflicting signals of nationality create an ambiguity that properly gives rise to an inquiry and, absent confirmation, permits designation of the vessel as ‘without nationality .’
Id. at 193 (emphasis added). In dicta , the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the "government might argue in future cases ... that a vessel may be properly deemed without nationality under the MDLEA based solely on mixed signals, without the need to make any inquiry of the sort required in § 70502(d)(1)(C)." Id. at 193 n. 62.
In this criminal action, Valentín and Martínez provided the USCG team with mixed signals. Valentín claimed Dominican nationality for the vessel. (Docket No. 1, Ex. 1 at p. 3.) Martínez contradicted this assertion by claiming Colombian nationality. Id. The inconsistent declarations of nationality suggest that the vessel is stateless. See United States v. Paternina, Case No. 88-335, 1989 WL 57165, at *4, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5589, at *10 (D.P.R. Apr. 4, 1989) ("A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other state, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.") (quoting Convention on the High Seas, art. 6(2), Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U N.T.S. 82) (Pieras, J.), aff'd United States v. Passos-Paternina, 918 F.2d 979 (1st Cir. 1990) ; United States v. Tam Fuk Yuk, Case No. 08-404, 2009 WL 179633, at *1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7941, at * 4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2009) ("A vessel which claims more than one nationality is deemed stateless i.e. , a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality.") (quoting United States v. Álvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259, 1264 n.8 (5th Cir. 1985) ). Because Dávila-Reyes is inapplicable, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are DENIED .
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth below, Valentín's and Martínez's motions to dismiss are DENIED . (Docket Nos. 37 and 38.)