PETTINE, Chief District Judge.

The United States appeals the district court's dismissal of a particular count of an indictment against the defendant-appellee. The district court ruled that the indictment was untimely under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq., and dismissed the indictment with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, the decision of the district court appealed from is reversed.

Facts

On March 11, 1981, the defendant was arrested during a search of her home conducted pursuant to a search warrant. On March 12, 1981 the United States filed a two-count complaint, formally charging the defendant with possession of a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and possession of a sawed-off shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). At a probable cause hearing held on March 20, 1981, a United States magistrate found probable cause to prosecute on the sawed-off shotgun charge. However, he found no probable cause as to the stolen firearm charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and dismissed the portion of the complaint charging this offense.

On May 7, 1981, fifty-seven days after defendant's arrest, a federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment against the defendant and three other persons. Count one of the indictment did not concern the defendant. Count two charged the defendant and two others with the receipt and possession of 120 stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). The last count charged the defendant alone with possession of a sawed-off shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).

On July 1, 1981, the district court dismissed the indictment against the defendant upon defendant's motion. The court held that the indictment was untimely under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) , because the indictment was returned more than thirty days after defendant's arrest on substantially identical charges. The court then exercised its discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.

On appeal, the government argues that the Speedy Trial Act did not require dismissal of the count charging possession of stolen firearms. The United States contends that the Act's requirement that indictments be returned within thirty days of an arrest, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), is inapplicable to the stolen firearms count because no stolen firearms charges were pending against the defendant when she was indicted. The defendant contends that the government did not present this argument to the court below, and may not raise it for the first time on appeal.

Discussion

I. Raising Argument on Appeal

No transcript of the district court's hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment is available. This court thus cannot know precisely what arguments the United States presented to the trial judge. The government claims that it did argue to the court below that the count of the indictment charging possession of stolen firearms was timely under the Speedy Trial Act because the substantially identical count in the complaint had been dismissed for lack of probable cause. However, the defendant vigorously disputes this allegation, and the court below did not recall the government making this argument at the dismissal hearing. Order pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 10(c) (April 1, 1982), Appendix at 27. Thus, this Court can only assume that the government is raising its argument as to the stolen firearms charge for the first time on appeal.

The ordinary rule is that appellate courts will not consider issues not raised below. Langton v. Berman, 667 F.2d 231, 233 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Miller, 636 F.2d 850, 853 (1st Cir. 1980). The principal reason for this rule is that it "would be unfair if litigants were 'surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they ha[d] no opportunity [below] to introduce evidence.'" United States v. Miller, 636 F.2d at 853 (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556, 61 S.Ct. 719, 721, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941)). However, appellate courts do have discretion to examine issues raised for the first time on appeal, Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976), and "exceptional cases or particular circumstances" may arise where a court will review questions of law neither pressed nor decided below. United States v. Miller, 636 F.2d at 853.

The present appeal is such an "exceptional case." First, the new issue is purely legal, and the record pertinent to resolution of this issue can be developed no further. See United States v. Gabriel, 625 F.2d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113, 101 S.Ct. 925, 66 L.Ed.2d 843 (1981); United States v. Golon, 511 F.2d 298, 300-01 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1999, 44 L.Ed.2d 483 (1975) ("salient factor" in hearing issue not raised below was that the "strictly legal" issue was "presented on the face of the statute"). Cf. Dobb v. Baker, 505 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (1st Cir. 1974) (refusing to hear argument not raised below in part because additional evidence required for proper resolution). The defendant thus cannot complain that appellate resolution of this issue will deprive her of an opportunity to introduce relevant evidence. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556, 61 S.Ct. 719, 721, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941).

Second, the government's argument as to the interpretation of § 3161(b) is highly persuasive, see discussion infra at 293-295, leaving no doubt as to the proper resolution of this issue. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 121, 96 S.Ct. at 2877 (hearing argument for first time on appeal within court's discretion where proper resolution beyond doubt). Accord United States v. Parrilla Bonilla, 648 F.2d 1373, 1386 (1st Cir. 1981) (refusing to hear argument for first time on appeal where correct resolution unclear); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, 100 S.Ct. 710, 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980) (same); Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1979) (same). Given the compelling nature of the government's argument, preliminary examination of this legal issue by the trial court would not benefit either the court or the parties appreciably.

Third, the issue of whether an indictment must be returned within thirty days after an arrest where the underlying charge has been dismissed prior to indictment is almost certain to arise in other cases. Thus, declining to reach this straight-forward legal issue will neither promote judicial economy, nor aid the administration of the criminal justice system. See United States v. Golon, 511 F.2d at 301 (reviewing purely legal issue where "almost certain to be presented in identical terms in other cases").

Finally, and most important, declining to reach the government's § 3161(b) argument would result in a miscarriage of justice. Both the government and the public have a legitimate and significant interest in prosecuting suspected criminals. Where, as here, the Speedy Trial Act clearly does not bar the government from prosecuting a defendant on a particular count in an indictment, justice requires that this court correct the lower court's error even though the government failed to apprise the court below of its error. See Langton v. Berman, 667 F.2d at 233 (issue cannot be raised for first time on appeal unless gross miscarriage of justice would result); Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d at 894 (same).

II. Timeliness of Indictment As To Stolen Firearms Charge

18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) provides that "[a]ny . . . indictment charging an individual with . . . an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges." Read in isolation, § 3161(b) requires dismissal of the entire indictment in this case because it was filed over thirty days after defendant Krynicki's arrest. The government, however, contends that this time limitation is inapplicable to the filing of an indictment when the charge upon which the defendant was arrested is no longer pending at the time of indictment. This court agrees, finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1) squarely governs this case.

Section 3161(d)(1) provides:

If any indictment . . . is dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or any charge . . . in a complaint is dismissed . . ., and thereafter a complaint is filed against such defendant charging him with the same offense or an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or an . . . indictment is filed charging such defendant with the same offense or an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the provisions of [ § 3161(b), (c)] . . . shall [apply to] such subsequent complaint, [or] indictment. . . .

Section 3161(c), to which § 3161(d)(1) refers, provides time periods within which a defendant must be brought to trial after the filing of an indictment and after other critical dates.

At first glance, § 3161(d)(1) does not appear to assist the government. This section can be read to provide that, when a defendant is arrested, and subsequently indicted, "the provisions of [ § 3161(b)] . . . shall [apply to] such subsequent . . . indictment," id. § 3161(d)(1), thus rendering the indictment untimely unless filed within thirty days of the original arrest.

Such a literal construction of the statute, however, would be patently absurd. First, if the true function of § 3161(d)(1) were to require that indictments filed after dismissal of initial charges must be returned within thirty days of the original arrest, § 3161(d)(1) would become mere surplusage. Read in isolation, § 3161(b) already performs this function because its language applies to any indictment, regardless of whether or not initial charges have been dismissed. Second, such a construction of these sections would squarely conflict with the clear legislative intent underlying the Speedy Trial Act.

Given the purpose behind the Act, this court holds that § 3161(b) applies only where, at the time of indictment, the charge upon which a defendant was arrested and upon which a complaint was issued is still pending. See United States v. Jones, 676 F.2d 327, 329-32 (8th Cir. 1982) ( § 3161(b) applies only where arrestee later charged with offense). Where the complaint has been dismissed, and no charge is pending at the time of indictment, § 3161(d)(1) only directs the government to commence trial of the defendant after the filing of the indictment within the time period set out in § 3161(c). Thus, this court agrees with the district court in United States v. Belleville, 505 F. Supp. 1083 (E.D.Mich. 1981), that "the events which transpir[e] prior to dismissal of the complaint are simply irrelevant in computing the time limits within which the defendant can be indicted or tried." Id. at 1084. Accord Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667, 696 (1976). See United States v. Hillegas, 578 F.2d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Congress' purpose [in Speedy Trial Act] was to disregard the period after [an arrest and voluntary] dismissal of a complaint and prior to the filing of an indictment for the same offense.").

The legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act compels this reading of §§ 3161(b) and (d)(1). As the court noted in United States v. Mulherin, 521 F. Supp. 824, 826 (S.D.Ga. 1981), "[t]he legislative intent underpinning section 3161(d) is made clear from the . . . Senate Report" on the Act. The Senate Report describes § 3161(d) as giving "latitude to the prosecutor to re-institute prosecution of a . . . defendant whose case has . . . been dismissed on non-speedy trial grounds without having to comply with the time limits imposed by the filing of the earlier complaint." S.Rep. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 33 (1974). Congress recognized that it would be an "insurmountable burden" to "require a prosecutor to conform to indictment and trial time limits . . . set by the filing of the original complaint in order to reopen a case on the basis of new evidence." Id. Thus, "when subsequent complaints are brought, the time limits will begin to run from the date of the filing of the subsequent complaint." Id. The result should logically be no different where a dismissed complaint is followed by an indictment, rather than by a new complaint. United States v. Belleville, 505 F. Supp. at 1085. Cf. United States v. Hillegas, 578 F.2d at 459-60 ("It would indeed be anomalous to provide [in § 3161(h)(6) ] that a post-dismissal period could be disregarded when a person is reindicted but not when proceedings are reinstituted [after the voluntary dismissal of a complaint] by the filing of an original indictment. . . ." (Emphasis added.)).

In addition, the purpose of the Speedy Trial Act requires that this Court interpret §§ 3161(b) and (d)(1) to allow the government to prosecute a defendant on an indictment returned more than thirty days after an arrest where the underlying charge in a complaint has been dismissed. Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act because of "a number of factors which work against an individual who is forced to await trial for long periods of time." See H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. Ad. News 7401, 7408. These "factors" include disruption of family life, loss of employment, anxiety, suspicion, and public obloquy. Id. However, such "evils do not . . . [significantly] accompany the status of an individual against whom . . . charges have been dropped." United States v. Belleville, 505 F. Supp. at 1084. As the Supreme Court recently noted in United States v. MacDonald, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982), "[f]ollowing dismissal of charges, any restraint on liberty, disruption of employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public obloquy, stress and anxiety is no greater than it is upon anyone openly subject to a criminal investigation." Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 102 S.Ct. at 1502, at 704 (holding that Speedy Trial guarantee of Sixth Amendment is inapplicable to period between dismissal of military charges and indictment on civilian criminal charges). Thus, this Court finds that the "policy and purpose of the Act . . ., [which] have been to expedite the processing of pending criminal proceedings," United States v. Hillegas, 578 F.2d at 456, support the government's reading of §§ 3161(b) and (d)(1). The Act's purpose would not be served by requiring dismissal of the stolen firearms count of the indictment in this case because the corresponding charge in the complaint was no longer pending at the time of indictment.

The judgment of the district court dismissing the count in the indictment charging defendant with possession of stolen firearms is hereby reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.